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9

The Global and the Local in International Communications

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Introduction

After three thousand years of explosion, by means of fragmentary and mechanical technologies, the Western world is imploding. During the mechanical ages we had extended our bodies in space. Today, after more than a century of electric technology, we have extended our central nervous system itself in a global embrace, abolishing both space and time as far as our planet is concerned . . . As electrically contracted, the globe is no more than a village.

(Marshall McLuhan, 1964, 11-12)

A Third World in every First World
 A Third World in every Third World
 And vice-versa

(Trinh Minh-ha, 1987)

Contemporary rhetoric suggests that we live in a unitary world in which space and time have collapsed and the experience of distance imploded for ever. The antagonistic blocs of East and West are giving way to international markets, moneys and media. Germany is unified. A new and expanding 'Europe' looms. The centrifugal force of 'globalization' is the catchphrase of the 1990s. Yet at the very same time, in the same but different world, the centripetal forces of old and new tribalisms and nationalisms are at work and ethnic struggles are breaking out all over. Armenians confront Azerbaijanis, Serbs fight Croats, Hutu and Tutsi kill each other; Hindu-Moslem relations in India and Black-Jewish relations in the USA are strained; Jews and Moslems, Turks and Somalis worry about racism across Europe; and Sarajevo, Grozny, Kigali become part of the international lexicon of tragedy and terror. Far from the 'loss of the subject', identity seems to lie at the heart of politics in the late twentieth century.

Giddens (1990: 64) defines globalization as 'the intensification of world-wide social relations which link distant localities in such a way that local happenings are shaped by events occurring many miles away and vice versa'. For Giddens, what he calls 'time-space distanciation' (p. 64), a theme

developed at length in Harvey (1989), helps to create 'complex relations between local involvements (circumstances of co-presence) and interaction across distance (connections of presence and absence). In this stretching process of relations, there are numerous modes of connection between different regions and contexts. Appadurai (1990) has described five such 'scapes' of interaction as the ethnoscape, the technoscape, the infoscape, the finanscape and the mediascape - which are interconnected, even overlapping.

Much theoretical debate centres on how the current situation should be conceived and labelled. Some argue that there is a discernibly 'new' kind of economic-cultural structure to be called 'post-modernity' (Harvey, 1989) while others argue that the evident changes of the last fifteen years simply reflect the supreme development and natural extension of global capitalism and prefer to call this structure 'late capitalism' (Jameson, 1990) or 'high modernity' (Giddens, 1990). What is significant throughout these debates is that the role of communication and information have been finally and generally recognized as crucial elements in the new world order. Yet the role and shape of communications in the 1990s is by no means very fixed or very clear, and neither are our theoretical models for explaining/exploring communications on an international scale. The rapidity and complexity of change in the media environment during this decade seems to require a newer set of terms and vantage points than are offered by older perspectives, which often seem frozen in a bygone era. This chapter explores the dynamic tension between the global and local levels of analysis, as suggested by Giddens, as a provocative and useful construct which can help us uncover the deeply contradictory dynamics of the current moment. In the twin yet opposing processes of globalization versus localization, media play a central role and reveal the tensions between the macro and micro levels of socio-economic structures, cultures, and development dynamics.

A Brief Reprise of Older Models in International Communication:

Since the 1960s, the field of International Communication has been dominated by three intellectual paradigms: that of 'communications and development', that of 'cultural imperialism' and currently by a revisionist 'cultural pluralism' which is still searching for a coherent theoretical shape. It will be argued here that this third construct is itself full of contradictions, and that the 'global/local' model at least has the merits of putting 'contradiction' at the core of its construct. A brief reprise of these models is useful, both as intellectual history and to understand the different theoretical bases and implications of the models for current understanding.

'Communications and Development' emerged out of developmentalist thinking in the early 1960s. After the Second World War, the emergence of independent national political systems such as India, Algeria, Ghana, out of the grip of varied European colonialisms, spawned debates among Western academics about the nature of 'development' and the obstacles within such

newly-independent nations to development. Some arguments focused on the lack of capital for investment, prompting such practical solutions as the World Bank and interest-bearing loans, under which results many developing nations are still groaning. Other arguments examined the lack of entrepreneurial vision and trained manpower, spawning education exchanges and training programs. The arguments developed by Daniel Lerner (1958) and Wilbur Schramm (1964) focused instead on the Weberian/Parsonian 'mentalities' or conjeries of attitudes that were supportive or obstructive to change. They suggested that the traditional values of the developing world were the central obstacles to political participation and economic activity, the two key elements of the development process. The 'solution' for their analysis was the promotion of the use of communications media to alter attitudes and values, embodied in 'media indicators' (minimum numbers of cinema seats, radio and television receivers, and copies of daily newspapers as a ratio of population necessary for development), which were adopted by UNESCO and widely touted in the developing world. This perspective has been roundly criticized for its ethnocentrism, its ahistoricity, its linearity, for conceiving of development in an evolutionary, endogenist fashion and for solutions which actually reinforced dependency rather than helping to overcome it.

The 'dependency' paradigm, developing initially in Latin America and building on older critiques of imperialism (Gunder-Frank, 1964) instead recognized the global structures and interrelationships conditioning the 'development' of the Third World, particularly the multiple and diverse legacies of colonialism. It was particularly critical of the post-independence economic dynamics which kept Third World states in economic hock to the ex-imperial powers, and argued that 'development' could not be mere mimicry of Western structures but had to be conceived as an autonomous, self-chosen path that built on the rich/ancient cultures of the Third World. From within this broad, critical framework, the specific model of 'cultural imperialism' argued that, far from aiding Third World nations to develop, the international flows of technology transfer and media hardware coupled with the 'software' flows of cultural products actually strengthened dependency and prevented true development. The great merit of the models of 'cultural imperialism' (Schiller, 1976; Mattelart, 1979) and 'media imperialism' (Boyd-Barrett, 1977) was their recognition of global dynamics and relationships, taking their cue from much older models of imperialism, and the suggested linkages between foreign policy interests, capitalist expansion and media infrastructures and contents. This theoretical model spawned a wide variety of empirical studies which documented the imbalanced flow of media products - from news (Galtung and Ruge, 1965) to films (Guback and Varis, 1982) to television programming (Varis, 1974/1984) - as well as the export of organizational structures (Katz and Wedell, 1977) and professional values (Golding, 1977) from the developed to the Third World. Behind its structuralist analysis and the descriptive mapping of international communications dynamics, a central assumption was that western cultural values (often conflated to 'American' values) such as consumerism and individualism, expressed implicitly in a variety of media genre as well as directly through advertising, were being exported to and decisively altering Third World cultural milieux. Fears of 'cultural homogenization' and 'cultural

synchronization' (Hamelink, 1983) were voiced, and arguments made for Third World 'cultural disassociation' along the lines of Samir Amin's 'delinking' from the global capitalist system as the only way toward autonomous development and protection of indigenous cultures. Criticism of this position have been made from quite divergent historical perspectives. One argument, looking back in time, suggests that the very term 'cultural imperialism' tends to obscure the many deep and diverse *cultural* effects of imperialism itself, including the export of religion, educational systems and values, European languages, and administrative practices, all of which have long ago and irretrievably altered the cultural milieu of the colonized (Sreberny-Mohammadi, 1996). Such an argument questions the utility of terms such as 'authenticity' and 'indigeneity' within a lengthy history of cultural contact, absorption and recreation, and suggests that a cultural debate which focuses mainly on modern media neglects other much older and deeper structures which may embody 'foreign' values but may also be the pillars of modernity.

Another strand of critique, looking forward to the new realities of the 1990s, suggests that, like the earlier arguments for 'communications and development', the 'cultural imperialism' model was based on a situation of comparative global media scarcity, limited global media players and embryonic media systems in much of the Third World. The speed-up of history, evidenced in the rapidity of changes in many areas of social life, is especially evident in the global spread of communication and information technologies and the advent of many new and diverse media actors over the past decade or so. In the 1990s, it is clear that the international media environment is far more complex than that suggested by the 'cultural imperialism' model whose depiction of a hegemonic media piper leading the global media mice appears frozen in the realities of the 1970s, now a bygone era.

Empirically there is a more complex syncopation of voices and a more complicated media environment in which western media domination has given way to multiple actors and flows of media products. More nations of the south are producing and exporting media materials, including film from India and Egypt, television programming from Mexico and Brazil. For example, *TV Globo*, the major Brazilian network, exports telenovelas to 128 countries, including Cuba, China, the former Soviet Union, East Germany, earning export dollars for Brazil, and its productions outnumber those of any other station in the world (Tracey, 1988). Indeed the flow of televisual materials from Brazil to Portugal is one example of how contemporary cultural flows reverse the historic roles of imperialism, while Latin American telenovelas on Spanish television channels in the USA has been called 'reverse cultural imperialism' (Antola and Rogers, 1984). In another region and medium, the Indian film industry has an international reputation as the most productive - more than nine hundred films in 1985 - with an extensive export market (Dissanayake, 1988). India has also managed to keep a somewhat dualistic yet productive tension between high art film and a popular cinema, creating movies that reflect and reinforce different elements of India's rich cultural past as well as indigenizing invasive foreign elements into a distinctive Indian style (Binford, 1988). Television, too, has been successful at translating ancient Indian culture into popular contemporary

televisual fare, the Hindu epic, the Ramayana, clearing urban streets and creating a huge demand for additional episodes over the fifty originally planned (Chatterji, 1989). These Third World producers have become not only national producers but international exporters of cultural products, a process which revisionists claim has altered any one-way flow of western material and the 'hegemonic' model of cultural imperialism (McNeely and Soysal, 1989). These 'global pluralists' adopt an optimistic voice regarding the diversity of media producers and locales and the many loops of cultural flows that have merged (Tracey, 1988; Boyd, 1984). But the very rapidity of change on the international media scene makes it hard to discern long-term trends. The 'global cultural pluralists' are correct to note the coming of age of many Third World media producers and the localization of some media production. Yet at the same time even stronger tendencies toward greater globalization and conglomeratization can be discerned, which I will document shortly.

There is also a conceptual challenge to the 'cultural imperialism' model, stemming from new modes of analyzing media effects which question the 'international hypodermic needle' assumption proffered by the 'hegemonic' model. Arguments about 'the active audience' and 'polysemy' (e.g. Fiske, 1987) inserted into international communications debate suggest that diverse audiences bring their own interpretive frameworks and sets of meaning to media texts, thus resisting, reinterpreting and reinventing any foreign 'hegemonic' cultural products, the details of which we will again explore later. The 'global cultural pluralism' model seems to suggest many independent and happy producers, somewhat evacuating issues of dominance, cultural appropriation and media effects. I think we need a fourth perspective, one that essentially recognizes and does justice to the dynamic tension between the global and the local, as suggested by Giddens, and the shifting terrains that they encompass. After Trinh Minh Ha (1987), I will call this outlook 'the global in the local, the local in the global' and use the rest of the chapter to explore some of the evident contradictions and tensions between these two poles in different contexts.

We could divide globalization in the media sphere into four separable elements: the globalization of media forms, of media firms, of media flows and of media effects. I will examine them in turn.

1 Globalization of Media Forms

It is claimed that more and more of the world is wired as a global audience with access to electronic media. The 'success' of the spread of media distribution and reception systems is in evidence - by the end of the 1980s radio signals were globally available and transistors had overcome lack of infrastructure, while nationally based television services had been established in all but the smallest and poorest of African and Asian countries. Globally, the number of television receivers rose from 192 million in 1965 to 873 million in 1992. There are antennae in the Amazon jungle. China is the third largest producer of television receivers. Beyond RTV reception, video

Table 9.1 Television receivers, 1970-92.

Continents, major areas and groups of countries	Number of television receivers									
	Total (millions)					per 1000 inhabitants				
	1970	1975	1980	1985	1992	1970	1975	1980	1985	1992
World Total	298	407	558	689	873	81	100	125	142	160
Africa	1.6	2.7	8.2	15	26	4.5	6.6	17	26	38
America	108	153	202	260	302	211	273	331	392	408
Asia	41	54	98	137	235	20	23	38	48	73
Europe (including former USSR)	144	192	243	268	300	205	264	324	349	381
Oceania	3.8	5.6	6.8	8.6	10	187	264	296	348	375
Developed	273	365	478	550	616	259	331	416	463	498
Developing	25	42	80	139	257	10	14	24	38	61
Africa (excl. Arab states)	0.4	0.7	3.6	6.0	12	1.4	2.2	10	14	23
Asia (excl. Arab states)	40	52	94	130	224	19	23	37	47	72
Arab states	2.6	4.2	9.3	16	25	21	30	56	82	105
Northern America	92	130	166	204	226	405	548	661	774	800
Latin America and the Caribbean	16	23	36	56	76	57	70	99	139	166

players/recorders (vcrs) have *potential* global reach (Alvarado, 1988; see also Boyd et al., 1989). Thus, at least in terms of national involvement in electronic media production and distribution of public access to communications infrastructure, there has been significant development over the past three decades.

However, distribution is still extremely unequal. The global 'average' of 160 television receivers per 1000 population actually ranges from a high of 800 per thousand in North America to a low of 23 per thousand in the non-Arab states of Africa. The global trend is in place, yet by no means 'achieved'. Global still does not mean universal.

2 Globalization of Media Firms

Central to any discussion of globalization has been the rise of global markets and the role of transnational corporations (TNCs) in adapting to, producing for and profiting from that. The media sphere has long had its global firms, which tend to become bigger and more powerful as the century winds to an end (Bagdikian, 1990). Media moguls such as Rupert Murdoch, Silvio Berlusconi and Henry Luce with the Warner Brothers have created corporate structures that span continents, combine holdings in broadcast, print and film production and also control distribution facilities such as satellites and cable networks. As an example, the merger in March, 1989, between Henry Luce and Harry and Jack Warner made Times Warner the largest media corporation in the world. It had an assessed value of \$18 billion, a workforce approaching 340,000, a corporate base in the USA, with subsidiaries in Australia, Asia, Europe and Latin America (Time Warner Inc., 1990). Revenues were over \$10 billion during 1989 from activities in magazine and book publishing, music recording and publishing, film and video and cable television. Time Warner is thus a prime example of a growing global corporate structure which is highly vertically integrated - controlling the production process from the conception of a film idea to the building in which it will be shown, for example - and diversifying horizontally to have stakes in other related leisure and information holdings. By Time Warner's own analysis, vertical integration has numerous benefits, including 'creative synergies' and economies of scope and scale; 'optimal levels of promotion' which prevents separate companies having a "free ride" on the promotional activities of others'; enables companies to 'be responsive to the desires of consumers'; and allows companies to accept greater financial risk than firms which operate in individual industry segments, thus being able to support projects of questionable commercial value. Access to global markets essentially reinforces and multiplies the economies of scale.

Time Warner's own materials readily describes the company as 'a vertically integrated global entity' (Time Warner, 1990: 47). Indeed, large corporations have not been slow to recognize the positive public value attached to the notion of 'globalization' as a unifying process of recognition of a common humanity, and coolly to adopt it for their own purposes. Thus, as part of its own self-marketing, on Earth Day - April 22, 1990 - a day devoted to global

awareness and ecological concern. Time Warner launched a new logo and a new motto: 'The World is Our Audience'. In similar fashion, Sony justifies its development of American-based holdings by appropriating a famous radical grassroots slogan 'Think Globally. Act Locally' for its own purposes. Thus Sony USA writes 'It is Sony's philosophy that global corporations have a responsibility to participate actively in the countries in which they operate, a philosophy of "global localization". This means thinking globally while acting locally - being sensitive to local requirements, cultures, traditions and attitudes' (Sony USA, 1990: 1). (Note that Sony employs 100,000 worldwide, enjoys an annual consolidated sales of about \$16.3 billion, and has its stock sold on exchanges in ten countries.) These global giants clearly see themselves as part of a current phenomenon and are quick to point out the increasingly international activities of competitors.

Some try to debate the extent of this process of consolidating a few vertically integrated global media giants and their power to control the creation, production and distribution of worldwide information and communication. Thus, Murdoch's News Corporation argues against the notion that the emergent pattern is of 'international media holdings by relatively few media forms', by arguing that 'multinational media companies have emerged but they are too numerous to be characterized as "few"' (NTIA, 1990: 5). But this appears nothing more than a quibble: of the thousands of corporations

Table 9.2 Selected major information and communication groupings. Total media turnover - Top 15 Corporations out of 78 listed by UNESCO, 1989.

Group	Country	Ranking-media	Media sales	Press, publishing, recording (%)	Radio, TV, motion pictures (%)	Period
Capital Cities/ABC	USA	1	4440	23	77	
Time	USA	2	4193	61	39	
Bertelsmann	Germany	3	3689	54	18	June 87
News Corp	Australia	4	3453	58	32	June 88
Warner	USA	5	3404	49	51	
Communications						
General Electric	USA	6	3165		25	
Gannett	USA	7	3079	88	12	
Times Mirror	USA	8	2994	85	11	
Gulf + Western	USA	9	2904	37	63	
Yomiuri Group	Japan	10	2848	63	23	86
CBS	USA	11	2762		100	
ARD	Germany	12	2614		100	
NHK	Japan	13	2541		100	March 88
Advance	USA	14	2397	92	8	
Publications						
MCA	USA	15	2052	8	92	

NB Of the 78 firms listed by UNESCO in the complete table not one was based in the Third World.

active in the media business worldwide, this group of global media moguls is clearly no more than a handful. While accurate and extensive comparative data is still hard to find, a UNESCO-compiled table for seventy-eight firms listed for their total 1987 media turnover (including press and publishing, television, radio and cinema) shows that only seven had turnover of more than three billion dollars, with 15 having turnover of more than 2 billion dollars (UNESCO, 1989: 104).

Of the seventy-eight firms listed in the complete table, not one was based in the Third World. Forty-eight were US or Japanese, while the rest were western European, Canadian or Australian. Already in 1988, the combined revenue of five such giants (Bertelsmann AG; News Corp; Hachette; and pre-merger Time inc. and Warner) was estimated at \$45 billion, or 18 per cent of the \$250 billion worldwide information industry (see Table 9.2).

Many of these corporations are American, and for many sectors of the American culture industries international sales are now a crucial source of income. In 1989 foreign revenues accounted for 38 per cent of total revenues for the American motion picture industry and helped to keep the value gap between imported film and film exports at \$3 billion dollars. Ted Turner's Cable News Network is received by the Kremlin and the Islamic Republic, and *Baywatch* enjoys an international audience.

Yet clearly in the 1990s not all this global expansion is conducted by American or European-based firms, the usual assumption of the 'cultural imperial' thesis. There is considerable inter-capitalist rivalry, and foreign interests have discovered both the lucrative domestic US market, still the single largest in the world, and the global resonance of American popular culture. A few recent examples would be the globalization of Hollywood, involving the purchase of Columbia Pictures and Tri-Star Pictures by Sony, the Japanese giant which had already bought Columbia Records in 1988 (the context for the Sony America slogan discussed above); the purchase of MGM/United Artists by Pathe SA, an Italian company; the purchase of 20th Century Fox by Rupert Murdoch's Australian-based News Corporation, and in November 1990, the purchase of MCA Inc, which includes Universal Studios, Universal Pictures and MCA Records by the Japanese firm Matsushita.

The dynamic of foreign firms buying US media outlets extends well beyond film-making into many other media: Murdoch's News Corporation owns newspapers in Boston and San Antonio, Harper Row books, and Triangle Publications which publishes *TV Guide*, the largest circulation magazine in the USA; International Thomson Group, based in Canada, owns 116 daily newspapers in the USA; the British based Maxwell Communications owns Macmillan Books; Bertelsmann AG, the German giant, owns RCA and Arista Records, while the Dutch firm N. V. Philips owns Polygram, Island and A&M Records.

The increasing complexity and transnationalization of global media markets were the focus of a study by the National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA), a section of the US Department of Commerce in Washington, DC. Entitled *Comprehensive Study on the Globalization of Mass Media Firms*, in February 1990 it invited input in order to 'better formulate US communications policy in a rapidly changing information environment' (NTIA, 1990). Culling through the responses, it rapidly

becomes clear that the US-based media/culture corporations are concerned essentially with two phenomena that affect their access to international media markets. The first is the newly defined and instituted European cultural policy which they interpret as a set of trade barriers to the free flow of American cultural products. The second is the problem of media piracy, significantly but not solely in the Third World. Yet it is abundantly clear that Europe is viewed as the most promising media market, with very little interest paid to or in media development in the Third World, other than chagrin at the media free ride that many Third World societies have enjoyed. Thus these frequently cited examples of media 'globalization' actually reveal its very limited coverage. These processes involve corporate actors of the north, interested in northern media products and audiences, with marginal amounts of the production or circulation occurring among the peoples of the south. It seems quite evident that the production and promotion strategies of these global media firms would do little to alleviate the global imbalance in media availability, and rather exacerbate the global imbalances between the media rich and the media poor.

3 Global Media Flows

Globalization has often been applied to the spread of western mediated products across the globe, from which few places seem immune. There is much anecdotal evidence of the use of western cultural products, sometimes in somewhat improbable and erstwhile 'remote' places. Ouderkirk (1989) describes trekking up the highest Guatemalan mountains in search of some remote and authentic Qeche Indians and hearing some stirring music which as she approached turned out to be old Beatles tapes! Pico Iyer's (1989) travelogue talks about 'video nights in Kathmandu' and elsewhere in Asia, encountering 'Ike and Tina Turner' sandwiches in the heart of the People's Republic of China, Burmese musicians playing songs by the Doors, as well as countless Asian remakes of Rambo movies. The film *Bye Bye Brasil* amusingly reflects on the public abandonment of traditional performing arts for television as it spread into the hinterland of Brazil. Visits to the Islamic Republic of Iran revealed considerable use of American videos such as *Robocop* and *Maximum Overdrive* and audiotapes of Madonna and Michael Jackson, all brought in via the black market from Dubai (Sreberny-Mohammadi and Mohammadi, 1994).

As already mentioned, much early work supportive of the 'cultural imperialism' hypothesis provided descriptive mappings of unequal global flows, and much international debate in the 1970s-80s focused on this notion, as an indicator of global domination and threat to indigenous cultural survival. This culminated in the UNESCO Mass Media Declaration, the report of the Macbride Commission and the formulation of a tenet of the New International Information Order as moving from a merely 'free' flow to a 'free and balanced' flow of communication (although no adequate empirical measures of such balance have ever been devised).

Trade Barriers and Piracy: Local Strategies vis à vis the Global

Two different strategies have been devised to deal with the imbalanced flow: trade barriers to cultural imports and piracy. Limits on the amount of imported programming and vetting of imported materials exist in Brazil, India, Iran and elsewhere in the Third World. But it was Europe's move toward an albeit voluntary continental policy for 1992 that worried transnational corporations. Time Warner argued that it faced formidable trade barriers, 'some of which are clothed in the garb of "cultural" measures ostensibly designed to protect the cultural sovereignty and artistic heritage of the country in question'. (Time Warner, 1990: 48). The corporation proclaimed a certain sensitivity: 'Although we must be sensitive to the cultural environment and needs of every locale in which we operate, trade barriers can only be justified to the limited extent that they are truly necessary to protect indigenous cultures that would otherwise be overwhelmed by the cultural products of other countries' but in the very next paragraph the tone changed: 'The cultural issue is appearing with alarming frequency in the international marketplace, and must be roundly rejected' (Time Warner, 1990: 48). Its main concern, shared by other media multinationals, was the European initiative in the *Television without Frontiers* directive which suggested a 50 per cent quota on imported programming by October 1992 where possible (although this is non-binding) and defines a 'European' television company, one where the production and control of production is in an EU state or as a majority of the total cost of production is borne by a producer or co-producer from the EU states or those states privy to the Council of Europe convention. Thus even the possibility of transnationals developing coproductions with Europeans is limited to a minority financial and creative capacity, a trade limitation in Time Warner's eyes. There are also European Union initiatives to promote the EU audiovisual industry and cultural uniqueness of member states as well as the development and standardization of hardware such as HDTV. France's impressive ability to get film included in the remit of the GATT talks is well known; though cultural importation remains a point of controversy within the EU. While Koreans were chastized for putting live snakes in cinemas showing US-made films, and Brazil and Egypt were noted for developing policies promoting homemade cultural production, from the statements of Time Warner and other corporations it was evident that essentially they saw Europe as the problem, not the Third World. The former presented an already well-developed media market with a substantial population possessing considerable disposable income, a market to which US-based firms want ready access. Thus a closer examination of corporate 'globalization' strategies reveals highly preferred locales and areas of acute disinterest, depending on the already existing level of insertion of the populations within global capitalism.

The Third World was problematic to transnationals mainly because of its video piracy, an ingeniously literal understanding of the 'free flow' concept. It is apparent that the still limited and unregulated media markets of the Third World are not especially attractive to transnational culture brokers, which perhaps ironically gives Third World media systems a chance to produce for themselves and escape the western cultural net, a *force majeure* for delinking.

Media Localization

At the same time as these dynamics of globalization have been established, an opposing tendency is concurrently at work, as a consequence of, and often in reaction to, the former; that is the dynamic of localized production and the indigenization of cultural products already referred to above. The evidence about such trends is patchy and somewhat contradictory. Varis (1984) in his two studies of television flows in 1973 and 1984 concluded that few national systems had made major transitions to self-reliance in television programming. Yet more recent research comparing Europe with Asia by Sepstrup and Goonasekera (UNESCO, 1994) reveals some interesting trends. Of the nine countries studied, two Asian countries – India and Korea – revealed the highest amounts of domestically produced television, about 92 per cent of their respective televised programming (Sweden 81 per cent, Netherlands 78 per cent, Hungary 70 per cent, the Philippines produces 67 per cent, Bulgaria 61 per cent), while Italy (58 per cent), and Australia (46 per cent) had the lowest proportions of domestically produced programming. But Latin American researchers argue that, despite the proliferation of media, television programming has become more North American; that 99 per cent of the films shown on Brazilian television are American, and that cheap packages of old movies and TV shows are 'dumped' and thus flood the Latin American media scene (Osava, 1990). Oliveira argues that Brazilian homemade television is even more commercial than American programming with 'merchandizing' of products a central part of telenovela content, encouraging a consumerist way of life of which the USA is the most advanced example (Oliveira, 1990). The same can be said of Peruvian media. India's film industry is being severely challenged by the spread of video and video piracy, the importation of western movies and the closure of cinemas as running costs rise and audiences dwindle (Mohani, 1990). Cross-fertilization between western cinema and television – predominantly American and British – with the popular Indian cinema is creating more 'hybrid' cultural forms, like a new film genre wryly described as the 'curry eastern' (Jain, 1990).

Some evidence suggests that when a choice is available domestic production is preferred over imported. Telenovelas garner larger audiences than imported American soaps not only in Brazil but elsewhere in Latin America (Antola and Rogers, 1984). But evidence from Sepstrup and Goonasekera's research (UNESCO, 1994) shows a more complicated picture: Indian audiences are the most loyal to domestic programming (99 per cent of daily viewing) while audiences in the two eastern European countries chose the largest daily proportion of foreign programming (Hungary 47 per cent and Bulgaria 42 per cent). Presumably a mix of demographic variables such as gender, education, urban dwelling, linguistic background, coupled with different patterns of work, leisure and actual programming schedules, may all play a role in accounting for the diet of programmes viewers actually chose when offered a mixed menu of foreign and domestic materials. This makes generalizations about audience behaviour difficult, and suggests much work remains to be done regarding audience preference structures. Fears of hybridization and creolization exist, that the 'authenticity' of a culture is damaged and undermined in its contact with western culture industries and its adoption

of genres foreign to domestic cultural tradition. Some counter that the Latin telenovela is a truly indigenous and independent genre (Straubhaar, 1981), building on internal cultural forms and breaking with the mimicry of western genre. Tunstall in *The Media are American* (1977) pointed out that the importation of media systems to the Third World included not only media hardware but also western forms and genres, which he suggested would lead to precisely such 'hybrid' concoctions. But Oliveira (1990) argues that this 'indigenization' of media often seems to enhance not diversity but domination by domestic corporate concerns. But, we must ask, what is this pristine image of culture that lurks behind this argument? Human history is a history of cultural contact, influence and recombination, as is in evidence in language, music, visual arts, philosophical systems; perhaps media flows merely reinforce our mongrel statuses.

More to the point, evidence suggests that the 'newer' model of cultural indigenization may have been severely overstated and certainly presented in far too naive a manner. Much of this so-called indigenous production is created by large corporations, and deeply infused with consumption values, one of the basic critiques of the 'cultural imperialism' perspective. Another point of direct relevance to the 'localism' claim is that the level of this media production is at the level of the nation, either through state-supported or national corporate networks. Thus in such arguments the 'local' is really the 'national', while the truly local (subcultural, grassroots, etc) is ignored. This 'national' culture may privilege urban lifestyles over rural, may barely represent minority languages and tastes, even disallowing such diversity in the name of 'national unity'; it may produce mediated culture within a narrowly defined ideological framework that fits the politics of the regime of the day. The case of Iran suggests that tradition required defending at the moment that it was already challenged, so Islam as 'cultural identity' was constructed to oppose the Shah and the influx of foreign cultural values and products, only to be used after the revolution as an ideological weapon against all political opponents (Sreberny-Mohammadi, 1991). National agendas are not coincidental with truly 'local' agendas, and real concerns arise as to whether 'national' media cultures adequately represent ethnic, religious, political and other kinds of diversity. In international relations, the 'national' level may be local vis à vis the global level, but in domestic relations the 'national' is itself a site of struggle, with a variety of 'local' identities and voices in contention.

Cultural Products in the Global Economy

The new revisionism also seems to have exaggerated the size/amount of this 'localized' production, which is perhaps of financial significance for national economies in the Third World, but is barely yet reflected in international statistics. There are immense difficulties involved in cross-national calculations and comparisons of media, information and cultural production and flow statistics. UNESCO has made a major effort to compile international data in *World Communication Report* published in 1989. Taking this information for the moment at face value, it provides important indicators of the extent of the

changes the 'global pluralists' suggest. For example, information on 'total turnover for information and communication' for selected major information and communications groupings which includes equipment, services, and cultural products, clearly shows the continuing dominance of US and Japanese firms (see Table 9.3).

These comprise 67 per cent of the top 25 companies, 66 per cent of top 50 companies and 67 per cent of the top 100 companies; European firms, by contrast, comprise 28 per cent of top 25, and 26 per cent of the top 50 (with Canada the only other nation included), and 26 per cent of the top 100 companies. Other Commonwealth countries begin to appear in the second 50, while Korea and Brazilian companies appear at positions 83, 91 and 94. Of 304 organizations listed by UNESCO in a ranked table of major information and communication groupings, Globo placed 301. Thus the example of *Rede Globo* and Brazilian cultural production as a counter to 'cultural imperialism' as a net exporter of cultural products is cut to size. Simply summarized, corporations based in the USA, Japan and western Europe dominate.

If hardware and software areas are parcelled out, does the picture look any different? Not significantly. The table for 'total media turnover' for major information and communication groupings provides a remarkably similar picture to the above.

Half of the first 25 companies, of the first 50, and of the total of 78 companies for which statistics are presented, are US companies (see Table 9.2). No Third World media corporation penetrates this 'top 78'. Now, of course, such figures represent the total dollar value of communications output, and say nothing specific about export dollar values, but they do dampen the optimistic hailing of major Third World cultural producers. While the map of global cultural flows is more complex in the 1990s, it is not as yet fundamentally realigned. But what about the question of 'effects'?

4 Global Media Effects?

Media effects is one of the most disputed areas of domestic media research so there is no reason to expect any greater unanimity about effects at the international level. The 'cultural imperialism' thesis did tend to suggest a 'hypodermic needle' model of international effects, 'American' values being injected into Third World hearts and minds. Recent work, building on reception theory and models of the active audience, is giving a more nuanced view of international effects as mediated by pre-existing cultural frameworks and interpretative schema. Thus, despite their book's title (*The Export of Meaning*), Leibes and Katz (1990) argue that meaning is not exported in western television programming but created by different cultural sectors of the audience in relation to their already formed cultural attitudes and political perceptions. Others (Beltran, Oliveira) argue that it is not so much national American values that are exported but rather more generalized capitalist consumption values (which, of course, America best epitomizes) reinforced by advertising and prevailing development orientations.

Table 9.3 Selected major information and communication groupings. Total turnover for information and communication.

Group	Country	Ranking-information and communication	Information and communication sales	Total sales	Information and communications (%)	Period
IBM	USA	1	54 217	54 217	100	March 88
NTT	Japan	2	40 926	40 926	100	March 88
ATT	USA	3	37 458	33 598	111	March 88
Matsushita	Japan	4	24 883	34 832	71	March 88
Deutsche Bundespost	Germany	5	20 185	28 960	70	March 88
NEC	Japan	6	19 822	19 822	100	March 88
Philips	Netherlands	7	19 253	26 023	74	March 88
British Telecom	UK	8	17 344	17 344	100	March 88
France Telecom	France	9	16 650	16 650	100	March 88
Toshiba	Japan	10	16 106	17 824	90	March 88
Lucky Gold Star	Korea, Rep. of	83	2 791	11 474	24	March 88
CBS	USA	84	2 762	2 762	100	86
TRW	USA	85	2 721	6 821	40	September 87
Apple	USA	86	2 661	2 661	100	November 87
ARD	Germany	87	2 614	2 614	100	May 87
US Sprint	USA	88	2 592	2 592	100	85
TDK	Japan	89	2 586	2 586	100	March 88
Toppa Printing	Japan	90	2 584	3 800	68	86
Samsung	Korea, Rep. of	91	2 581	14 193	18	86
NHK	Japan	92	2 541	2 541	100	86
Ford Motor	USA	93	2 500	71 643	3	March 87
IBL	UK	300	501	501	100	86
Globo	Brazil	301	500	500	100	86
Nippon	Japan	302	500	500	100	March 87
Telecommunication Construction						
Tait	USA	303	500	500	100	
JTAS (Jydskø Telefon)	Denmark	304	500	500	100	

Groups 11-82 and 94-299 have not been included in this table.

cc
1989

human factor
the fall

For them, globalization portends homogenization which, while useful for milk, produces a culture that tastes bland and is not even good for you!

What is often omitted from discussions on effects, are the deeper shifts in cultural orientations and patterns of sociability, in modes of perception and information-processing, that the advent of media create everywhere, albeit in different forms relative to the pre-existing local culture: that is to say it is the very 'fact of television', as Cavell (1982) calls it, in our social lives, not so much its content, that is most often overlooked.

The arrival of media in Third World settings is finally being examined by anthropologists (although there is never an index listing for 'media' or 'television' in a cultural anthropology textbook, despite the fact that most Third World societies are now mediated in some way) and communications researchers. Ethnographic studies are beginning to show the rich play between the pre-existing culture and the new quasi-international culture and the shifts in social relations that the latter may foster. In an ethnographic study conducted in various sites across Brazil, Kottak (1990) explored how television alters patterns of sociability, usage of time, creates conflicts within the family and alters the gender balance, themes also explored in the comparative work on family use of television compiled by Lull (1988). Kottak suggests the need to investigate media impact over time, finding in Brazil an early mesmerization with the television set with a later development of selectivity and critical distance, negative attitudes toward television increasing with higher income and years of exposure. Political context and dramatic events also impinge on media usage: global news viewing was high during the Gulf War, while domestic attention to international channels grew during the Iranian revolution (Sreberny-Mohammadi and Mohammadi, 1994) and in China under martial law (Lull, 1991). News carried by international media channels can open up the range of information and interpretation available to audiences, be a major irritant to governments, challenge state censorship and perhaps help democratic movements.

Other ethnographic work suggests the slippery boundaries of the 'global' and 'local'. Abu-Lughod (1989) has studied the impact of what she calls 'technologies of public culture' on the Awlad 'Ali, the Western Desert Bedouin in Egypt. Although these Bedouin have been quite marginal to mainstream Egyptian culture, they were by no means culturally or politically untouched before these technologies arrived; indeed, they often made their money from selling post war scrap metal and from smuggling goods between pre-Qaddafi Libya and Egypt. Abu-Lughod examines the impact of tape-players, radios and television on Awlad 'Ali life, saying that their use does not eliminate sociability but in fact brings people together for long periods of time. Such use does realign social relationships, mixing the sexes and tempering age differences at home, while video shows in local cafes kept young men away from the home and gave them greater exposure to media. In line with reception theory, she argues too that these technologies do not destroy distinctive cultures because 'it is not just that people themselves seem to embrace the technologies and actively use them for their own purposes, but that they select, incorporate and redeploy what comes their way' (p. 8) although she notes that so far at least the amount of truly foreign programming available is extremely limited. If anything, new technologies

such as cassettes have helped to revitalize Bedouin identity as distinct from Egyptian culture through recordings of poetry and song. The urban middle-class Egyptian lifestyles revealed on soap operas present a different set of options to Bedouin women, especially the possibility of marrying for love and living independently of the extended family, so that the dominant Egyptian mediated culture is used as a language of resistance against the authority of tribal elders. Also embedded in such programming are consumer values, for electronic durables as well as products for a newly sexualized femininity, drawing the Bedouin further into the Egyptian political economy. Yet at the same time, in a contradictory manner, Egyptian radio and television carries more transnational messages about Islam, which is gaining in popularity, and which provides an antidote both to capitalist urban Egyptian values as well as the local Bedouin identity (Abu-Lughod 1989: 11; 1993).

Hannah Davis (1989) describes life in a small Moroccan agricultural town of 50,000 people and notes how 'symbols from different worlds overlap: a picture of the king of Morocco hangs next to a poster of the Beatles. The sounds of a religious festival outside . . . mingle with the televised cheering of soccer fans . . . in the morning we watch a holy man curing a boy, then stop off at the fair where we see a woman doing motorcycle stunts; in the evening we watch an Indian fairy tale or a Brazilian soap opera or an Egyptian romance' (p. 13). She remarks 'it is not the contrast between the elements that is striking; it is the lack of contrast, the clever and taken-for-granted integration' (p. 12). As in much of the Middle East, public space is male space, and thus it is the women who gather round the television and ver at night, watching Egyptian, Indian and 'French' - here the generic term used for western - films. Egyptian films were romances that reduced the women to tears, while the western films elicited 'gasps of surprise, horrified hiding of the eyes, fascination or prurience', with American sexual shamelessness being both admired and feared, imitated and denigrated. The transcultural mix of symbols is apparent when one young girl organizes a traditional religious feast yet defiantly appears wearing a denim skirt and earrings; thus, such symbols may be used in personal struggles to 'define, test or transform the boundaries' of local lives (p. 17).

Such examples reveal the complex (re)negotiation of identity(ies) vis à vis the 'dominant' and the 'foreign' cultures, both of which shift in focus depending on the specific locale of the actor. The above examples pose a number of different pairs of relations in which the site of the 'local' and the image of the 'global' are differently defined: rural/urban; Bedouin/Egyptian; Moroccan/Egyptian; Bedouin/French; Moroccan/American and so forth. This work reveals again the post-modern 'bricolage' of assorted cultural icons from different locations and time periods which circulate inside the non-industrialized world, yet invites no simple reading of the effects of these encounters. Iran is again a useful example of the way in which cultural icons can become deeply invested with one set of ideological connotations in one moment of political struggle, and invested with completely the opposite connotations at a subsequent but differently defined political moment. Thus religious language, traditional symbolism and mythology were popularly (re-)adopted as part of the revolutionary struggle against the Shah, but with the new repression of the Islamic Republic a popular cultural underground began

and
democracy
transformation

David

to produce hard liquor and circulate western videos as part of a new resistance (Sreberny-Mohammadi and Mohammadi, 1994). Thus a 'sign' of resistance – the veil, for example – at one point in time can become a 'sign' of oppression at another. The details of such anthropological/ethnographic work extend the 'localist' focus, and show the complexity and range of reactions to and uses of contemporary global cultural encounters. They warn us against generalized assumptions about media/cultural effects, that the 'foreign' may emanate from the urban capital, a western country other than the USA and perhaps even from a Third World media producer of very different cultural background but whose depictions of social life in the process of development can reverberate across the south.

One other basic shift that the global flow of mediated products and the establishment of culture industries in the Third World creates is that documented by Horkheimer and Adorno toward consumption of mass-produced culture. That is culture, from being local lived experience, becomes media product, with the implicit danger that what is not reflected on television no longer has cultural worth. One last neglected 'effect' is important to consider. It has been argued that media development in the west has moved through a set of 'stages' during which one form of communication and its preferred modality of discourse has been dominant. These have been described by Ong (1982) as orality, chirography/typography and the period of the dominance of electronic media which he labels 'secondary orality'. Yet in the Third World there is evidence that the middle stage, at least as measured by mass literacy and circulation of printed materials, may be 'jumped', with societies moving directly from a predominantly oral culture directly into the 'secondary orality' of electronic media. We have paid little attention to this new and different kind of cultural formation. The 'communications and development' model tended to collapse history, suggesting the development of newspapers, cinemas, radio and television all at once, while the 'cultural imperialism' model has given most attention to electronic media. Yet if print is connected to the development of rational logical thinking (Ong), to the development of modern ideologies not linked to church or aristocracy (Gouldner), and the growth of a public sphere, open debate and active citizenry (Habermas), then the limited if non-existent development of this mode of communication in developing countries has profound political and social consequences which have barely been acknowledged.

Change in the 1990s

Over the past few years, new tendencies have developed and older ones have become exaggerated.

Greater but not Equal Access

The greatest changes in the media environment have occurred in Asia, as a result of both national (Freedom Forum, 1993) and transnational activities (Chan, 1994a). Recent figures (*Screen Digest*, April 1994) suggest that nine

Asian countries from Pakistan to China have between them 62 terrestrial television channels, 18 of which were launched since 1990. In Hong Kong, Malaysia, Singapore and Taiwan over 90 per cent of homes have television; China and the Philippines have over 50 per cent penetration, although India and Pakistan still have only around 20 per cent of homes with television.

Asia has become part of the 'global village'. Since most economic forecasts anticipate a massive growth in the Asian middle class, an estimated 250 million people in India alone (*Guardian*, March 25, 1995), the further media penetration of households, increased satellite programming and increased advertising seem likely. In 1994–95 there were over 15 international conferences held in Asia about various aspects of broadcasting and telecommunications in the continent, just one indication of the increasing importance of the continent for these industries.

But the media impact is unequal. There are huge disparities between countries, and there are equally great disparities between rural and urban communities within countries. For example, in Indonesia, the fifth most populous country in the world, urban dwellers are 30 per cent of population but own 65 per cent of the televisions; only 23 per cent of rural areas have TV, and the bulk of those are black and white sets. Yet the calculations are that the middle class is 3 per cent of population, which still gives advertisers over 5 million people to target (*Multichannel News International*, March 1995), so a fifth commercial TV channel began in January 1995 with Soeharto family members playing a key role in the commercial media game.

There remains significant global inequality of access to print, to radio and to television – though these are no longer simply regional disparities. Table 9.4 shows the global inequalities in numbers of newspapers, books and amount of newsprint consumed. Illiteracy is increasingly recognized as the biggest barrier to development, with a strongly skewed gender pattern (Sreberny-Mohammadi, 1994). Research on the relationship (if any) between access to electronic media and patterns of literacy is needed; perhaps instead of arguing against television we should concentrate more on the value of literacy. The inequality in access to telephony is shocking, while provision of such services are of far more direct social utility than developments in broadcasting. Nor does the presence of television imply the availability of other indicators of development; for example, it is estimated that over 50 per cent of households in China have television, while only 1 per cent has running hot water.

The other geographic area where there has been a dramatic change in the media environment is the Middle East. The Gulf War brought 24-hour American news coverage to the region, found eager audiences and created pressure for change in the regional media industries. This, coupled with a postwar economic boom, has fostered a more open media environment (Warwick, 1995). 1994 saw the launch of no less than 20 satellite-delivered television channels in the region (*Media International*, 1995) including Egyptian Satellite Channel (ETC), ORBIT, MBC, and five channels of ART from Saudi Arabia. Video penetration is also estimated at over 90 per cent in many countries.

down
 need for new
 figures

Table 9.4 Selected global media consumption, 1987-92.

	Radios (per 100 people)		Televisions (per 100 people)		Annual cinema attendances (per person)		Annual museum attendances (per person)		Registered library users (%)		Daily news-papers (copies per 100 people)		Book titles published (per 100,000 people)		Printing and writing paper consumed (metric tons per 1000 people)		Letters posted (per capita)		Telephones (per 100 people)		Inter-national telephone calls (minutes per capita)		Motor vehicles (per 100 people)	
	1990	1990	1988-91	1987-91	1987-91	1987-91	1987-91	1987-91	1987-91	1990	1988-91	1990	1988-91	1990	1991	1990-92	1990-92	1990-92	1990-92	1990-92	1990-92	1989-90	1989-90	
Aggregates	113	54	2.3	0.8	-	30	74	95	401	48	31	50												
Industrial	18	6	3.0	-	-	4	5	4	13	3	-	3												
Developing	35	15	2.8	-	-	9	15	20	105	13	-	15												
World	126	60	2.4	0.9	-	31	94	108	406	84	36	54												
OECD	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	15	-	-												
Eastern Europe and former Soviet Union	41	29	1.5	0.6	22.0	25	34	10	-	18	6	19												
Eastern Europe only	81	44	1.7	0.8	18.2	25	92	82	249	54	39	42												
European Community	92	48	1.8	1.5	-	51	161	128	-	74	73	45												
Nordic	55	37	1.6	0.1	11.8	10	66	45	116	48	21	43												
Southern Europe	164	72	3.0	1.1	-	35	-	122	486	71	27	63												
Non-Europe	201	80	3.8	1.4	-	25	-	135	648	79	34	73												
North America	18	5.5	3.0	-	-	4.4	5.2	4.0	13.4	3.1	-	3.1												
All developing countries	10	0.9	-	-	-	0.6	1.8	0.3	3.2	0.3	-	0.2												
Least developed countries	15	2.5	-	-	-	1.2	2.7	1.5	3.3	1.5	-	2.6												
Sub-Saharan Africa	113	54.4	2.3	0.8	-	30.3	74.4	95.2	401.0	47.8	-	50.1												
Industrial countries	35	14.7	2.8	-	-	9.2	15.1	20.3	104.9	13.0	-	15.4												
World																								

Compiled from Human Development Report 1994, pp. 160, 161, 193.

Continued Growth of Media Conglomerates: the Conquest of Heaven

A renewed frenzy of US-centered media mergers was seen in 1995. For a while in August, the Walt Disney take-over of Capital Cities/ABC gave that conglomerate the status of the world's largest media entertainment corporation. But that was rapidly eclipsed in the autumn when Time-Warner regained its position as the world's giant by merging with Turner Broadcasting, the owners of CNN. Other mergers and joint ventures include: Microsoft with NBC; Westinghouse with CBS; Seagram with MCA. The search for 'synergy' is creating ever fewer giant media corporations, the new mega-moguls or multicoloured behemoths.

God's biggest current problem is not being in geostationary orbit. The celestial spheres have been purchased and occupied by satellites, the technological form that has done most to revolutionize global broadcasting and telecommunications and create a borderless world, at least for images and information if not for the movement of peoples. STAR beams over Asia; ORBIT over the Middle East; SKY and ASTRA over Europe. The transnational media moguls have shifted from ignoring the south to recognition of the potential spending power of Third World middle classes, hence the expansion of satellite provision, fast-changing takeovers and buyouts of media companies, and the testing of new formats (*Index on Censorship*, 1994; Rusbridger, 1994; Shawcross, 1995). STAR TV (launched by Hutchison Whampoa but purchased by Murdoch in 1992) had already by 1995 reached 54 million homes with a footprint that stretches from Israel and the UAE to China, Hong Kong and Korea. CNN, BBC WORLD, and MTV have all found satellite distributors and southern audiences.

However the new mogul invaders are beginning to be met with more resistance than their old eponymous counterparts.

'Domesticating' Output

As has already been mentioned, local or regional programming is often far more popular than western programming. ZEE TV, developed by the Indian trading group Essel and broadcasting in Hindi, rapidly became more popular than Murdoch's STAR and the state-sponsored and dull Doodashan. In 1993 Murdoch bought a 49 per cent share in the company, MTV left, and acknowledging the need to 'indigenize' programming, STAR has developed a Hindi music channel, Channel V.

Thus even the major media players have come to realize the need for 'cultural sensitivity' and to recognize the different taste cultures within regions. So far this often tends toward a 'Cinema Paradiso' approach to programme content, cutting out the anticipated 'naughty bits' while conveniently forgetting that entire programmes are deeply imbued with non-local values and attitudes regarding family life, relations across the generations, gender roles, lifestyle, even political participation.

Reverse Flows

In early 1995 ZEE TV took over the satellite television company TV Asia in the UK for an estimated £10m, giving it access to the approximately 2 million Asians in the UK, and 8 million in Europe. ORBIT, out of Rome, and MEBC,

ec

ec:
from citizens to consumers

out of London, broadcast not only to the Middle East, but also to Arab speakers across Europe and North America. Emirates Dubai TV (EDTV) in the UAE has been broadcasting to the estimated 8 million Arabs in Europe and the 8 million in the US since December 1993, offering a 24-hour channel of news and entertainment including children's programming and sport that is 70 per cent in Arabic, sourced from the Arab world and supported by two Dubai-based production houses. Slowly the south is broadcasting to the north.

Going Global

Other southern channels are also going global: India's Doordashan will lease capacity on PanAmSat PAS 4 over the Middle East and Europe; China Central Television (CCTV) is set to launch the world's first 24-hour Chinese television service and Chinese News and Entertainment (CNE) already serves an estimated one-million-strong Chinese community in Europe. WETV also aims to globally distribute programmes from the south, by women, by non-commercial groupings with a dedicated satellite, Mondiale, in the planning stage (Fountain, 1995).

Such developments mean that global flows do not only flow out from the West, but increasingly flow in. The issues of international communication described here are not just concerns of the south but increasingly of the north as well, and connect to debates about multiculturalism and diversity in North American and European contexts. Indeed, it is ironic to note how Third World concerns about cultural identity, so scorned by western countries in the 1970s, are now articulated by those very countries in the 1990s.

Forms of Resistance

Governments have reacted to the heavenly invasions in different ways. None have tested the 'prior consent' principle accepted by WARC to limit the incursions of satellite signals (Chan, 1994b). Some have banned satellite dishes (Singapore, Malaysia, Saudi Arabia, Iran); dishes are produced by People's Liberation Army in China while technically banned, the ban being ignored in rural China. The encryption of signals limits access; ORBIT, broadcasting from Rome to the Middle East, uses an encrypted signal which requires a decoder. Other controls on distribution have also been devised; for example, Bahrain utilizes an MMDS delivery system, taking in outside satellite channels but feeding them to the domestic population via cable, allowing for a governmental point of control over what is distributed. The satellite distributor may also clash with the programme maker: STAR bumped BBC World from its China footprint when the Chinese authorities objected to BBC coverage of human rights issues but Murdoch wanted to maintain his positive relationship with the Chinese authorities. Despite curbs and regulations in many states, economic, political and cultural resistance are variously expressed through piracy, illegal dishes, illegal cable, etc.

Conclusion: Global, Regional, National, Local

If nothing else, the chapter has shown the complexity of the global contemporary media/culture spectrum at the start of the twenty-first century, and the

range of theoretical constructs that have been used to explain, and base policy on the international role of media, particularly in the 'Third World'. The 'mood' of contemporary analysis can be quite varied. One position is that of the happy postmodernist who sees that many kinds of cultural texts circulate internationally and that people adopt them playfully and readily integrate them in creative ways into their own lives, and that cultural bricolage is the prevailing experience as we enter the twenty-first century. Another is the melancholy political economist who sees the all-pervasive reach of the multinationals and wonders how long distinctive cultures can outlast the onslaught of the western culture industries. Somewhere in between lies the cautiously optimistic fourth-worlder who sees in the spread of media the possibilities for revitalization of local identities (ethnic, religious, class, etc) and their use as tools of political mobilization vis à vis both national and global forces. But we have also seen the slippery nature of the linguistic terms used in international communications analysis: that 'global' rarely means 'universal' and often implies only the actors of the north; that 'local' is often really 'national' which can be oppressive of the 'local'; that 'indigenous' culture is often already 'contaminated' through older cultural contacts and exists as a political claim rather than a clean analytic construct. The bi-polar model suggests either imbalance/domination, the political-economy perspective, or balance, the 'global pluralist' perspective, whereas the real world reveals far greater complexity.

Cultural boundaries are not etched in stone but have slippery divisions dependent on the self-adopted labels of groups. What seems clear is that, far from an end to history, or the loss of the subject, identity politics and cultural preservation are going to be amongst the hottest issues of the next century that will be fought out internationally and intra-nationally, with profound political and economic consequences. The apparent triumph of late capitalism in 1989-90 and the demise of the so-called second world of state socialism suggest that ideological politics in the classic sense is going to be less important than the revival of identity politics in the future. Yet at the same time as the demise of a single master narrative of global progress is trumpeted in some quarters, in others the old indicators of a single path to 'development' are still utilized, and even adopted with greater eagerness by Third World societies yearning for 'progress'. It is likely that in the next decade we shall see a revival of intense debate about development, and the unresolved role of culture within that process, neo-Lernerian arguments for the positive role of media systems as part of national development encountering arguments for more thoroughgoing Third World economic disassociation and delinking from the global capitalist economy (Amin, 1990), as well as fourth world/indigenist culture arguments for the maintenance of local identities (Verhelst, 1990). These levels may themselves be in conflict, for a strong 'national' position taken in relation to international economic and cultural forces may lead to repression of 'local' forces and voices in relation to that 'national' level. Interstate relations are not coterminous with intercultural relations, and the political and conceptual agenda of the twenty-first century is going to be how to cope with these various levels of actors and processes. It is here that conceptual leakage in the global/local framework of analysis is most evident, highlighted by the particularly complex set of issues raised by mediated cultural flows which poignantly reveal in their electronic

presence the absence or porousness of boundaries. In the bipolar model it is the 'national' level of analysis that becomes invisible. Yet it is national policy-making that helps define a cultural identity, provides the regulatory framework for media organizations - the state providing direct funding and control in many Third World nations - and cultural trade policy, as well as defining the domestic public sphere and the extent to which diverse voices will or will not be heard. As Giddens himself underscores in much of his work, nation-states are the key political systems of the modern world, controlling the structures - legal, administrative, financial, military, surveillance, and informational - in which we all live and which are now involved in transnational dynamics - a capitalist world economy, the world military order, systems of inter-governmental organizations, transnational political movements, etc - which both press in on and explode the meaning of national boundaries (Giddens, 1985). Indeed, as Giddens argues, the worldwide system of nation states exists in constant tension with the global capitalist economy.

In the mid-1990s the global media picture is more complex than ever. Transnational media co-exist with domestic, and compete for audiences; domestic production can become even more commercial, garish and explicit than the western 'originals'; but perhaps new programming formats, indigenized media products, alternative news frames, might also develop. Pressures for democratization, variety, entertainment, are strong, and it seems a form of Eurocentric hubris to deny others what we enjoy in the name of some questionable 'high culture' purity. It is an exciting time in media development, when the paternalistic preoccupation of the past twenty years might give way to a realization that the creativity, energy and indeed entrepreneurship of the south is at least equal to that of the north. Southern media environments need to be taken as seriously as northern sites, and studied with as varied and contextualized approaches, and that must now include flows and actors on many levels: the global, the regional, the national, and the local, since all of these might constitute the loci of the 'imagined communities' (Anderson, 1983) of the future.

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