

## TELEVISION AS A SOCIAL ISSUE

Edited by Stuart Oskamp *Claremont Graduate School*

How are women and ethnic minorities portrayed on television? What is the effect upon viewers, particularly on children, of violence on television? Can television play a positive role in society? How should the industry be regulated?

These are just some of the controversial questions discussed by media researchers, programmers, critics and policy-makers in this important volume. The contributors also consider: how to interpret and implement television's trusteeship role; how ethnic and gender stereotyping can be avoided; whether television companies, aiming to attract large audiences, seek the lowest common denominator in their programming; and how social science research can contribute to media policy and television programming.

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## The popular press and political democracy

Colin Sparks

POLYTECHNIC OF CENTRAL LONDON

There is considerable contemporary concern in Britain about the state of the newspaper press. Although developments in this field have not been subject to the same sort of intense scrutiny that the rather more dramatic occurrences in the electronic media have attracted, there are nevertheless many voices expressing worries about what are seen as new trends. The most common charge is that a great part of the press has effectively severed its links with political life.

This is an important question, since it is the historic claim of the newspaper press to be one of the central guarantors of political democracy. The popular self-definition of the press as the 'Fourth Estate' points precisely in that direction. Both Macaulay in 1828, and Carlyle twelve years later, had political matters on their minds when they gave the term popular currency and both were certainly aware of its echoes of the most famous formulation about the Third Estate. It is worthwhile remembering that for Macaulay:

The gallery in which the reporters sit has become a fourth estate of the realm. The publication of the debates, a practice which seemed full of danger to the great safeguards of public liberty, is now regarded by many persons as a safeguard tantamount, and more than tantamount, to all the rest together. (Macaulay, 1907: 71)

Recognition of the direct link between the press, liberty and the extension of political democracy did not necessarily imply approval. Carlyle was even more vigorous: 'Printing, which come necessarily out of Writing, I say often, is equivalent to Democracy', which he

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did not regard as a very Good Thing (n.d.: 392). The plebeian proponents of press freedom were also the advocates of mass democracy, and the struggle over the 'taxes on knowledge' was for them one major part of the general struggle for the extension of the franchise. That concern continued. Forty years ago, a Royal Commission on the Press could confidently argue that: 'The Press may be judged, first, as the chief agency for instructing the public on the main issues of the day. The importance of this function needs no emphasis' (RCP, 1949: par.361, p.100) and go on to wax extremely lyrical about the 'democratic form of society' and the role of the press therein. Thirty years after that, the 1977 Royal Commission on the Press, while noting the 'entertainment' role of the press, still took the 'serious functions' as the acid test of press performance (RCP, 1977: par. 2.1, p. 8).

In much of the world the link between the press and politics remains a powerful and influential one: there are too many banned papers, jailed journalists and cowed editors for anyone to imagine that the link between at least some newspapers and political life is not a central concern to our rulers. In Britain, however, things are perceived differently. It is not so much that critics of the press are concerned with the political positions adopted by the press that interests us here: the support for one particular political party is such an obvious and pronounced aspect of the press that it hardly seems worthwhile adding to the mound of literature on that topic. Our interest is in the fact that in recent years the focus of criticism has shifted somewhat and is now concerned with the overall content of the press. This position is well summarized in the following:

The trivialisation and the lowering of standards within the press has had three major detrimental effects on our democracy. These effects go well beyond legitimate concerns about bias in politics and touch the deepest nerves of our society.

First of all, it has debased the level at which political and social debate is conducted and trivialised the most important issues of the day.

The second effect derives from the fact that the vast majority of working people depend for their reading on the tabloids. It is that the tabloids are producing a gradual disenfranchisement of ordinary people from accuracy of fact, from the stimulation of debate and from discussion on the serious aspects of major issues of the day.

The third way in which lower press standards are undermining democracy

involves a specific charge. It is that the press has effectively ceased to be the people's "watchdog" over government.

These three problems of trivialisation, disenfranchisement and reluctance to challenge the government of the day are issues which should cause serious concern to every single person who treasures our democracy. (Todd, 1987: 3-4)

Such a critique deserves taking seriously not only because it comes from the leader of what is still the largest organization of workers in Britain, and one which has been prepared to invest considerable sums of money in an ill-fated attempt, the *News on Sunday* project, to produce a popular alternative to the existing tabloid press, but also because it rightly locates the issue at the centre of political life. And although the case is here argued in terms of specificities of the British press, there are strong grounds for thinking that it may be of more general application.

Britain is a stable bourgeois democracy. It has been one in substance since 1929, and in final form since 1950, and therefore the adult lives of the vast majority of its citizens have been passed in such a political order. The population has an enormous experience of life in such a system and very few have any direct knowledge of any alternative, better or worse. There has been a fairly regular alternation of the political complexion of governments and there has not, as yet, been any serious threat to, or interruption of, that process. In that sense Britain is an example of a 'mature' bourgeois democracy in a way which it shares only with the USA among the major capitalist countries. In Europe, only Sweden has similar historical experiences. It therefore does not seem unreasonable to assume that the nature and functioning of the press in Britain illustrates the 'normal' functioning of the press in a society with this sort of social and political structure. One would, of course, expect differences arising from peculiar local traditions, circumstances and so forth, but in general the model prevailing here can be thought of as representative.

If the claim by Ron Todd is true, then it would seem to follow that the normal state of affairs in a bourgeois democracy is that the vast majority of the citizens are denied information which they need to function as political citizens and therefore, obviously, the claims of this form of political life to represent the 'will of the people' are clearly false. Put in more formal language, it is a condition of the existence of a 'public sphere' that 'access is guaranteed to all citizens' (Habermas, 1979: 198).

It is therefore a matter of some importance to ask whether the claim is in fact true.

Todd is not alone in his perception and, like others, he focuses on the polarization of the press into 'quality' and 'tabloid' components. Baistow is even more definite about the limits of the latter, writing that 'the drift towards the gutter and the subordination of news content to sensation, scandal, jazzy packaging and million-pound bingo in the scramble for sales have provided the most dramatic evidence of the tabloid revolutions' radical impact upon popular journalism' (Baistow, 1985: 57). The five 'quality' papers do indeed provide extensive information about the social, economic and political world, and it is undoubtedly the case that their readership is both very small in number, even taken together, and, relatively socially privileged. The majority of newspaper readers have to make do with the tabloid press, whose attention to political and economic life is both intermittent and abbreviated. On the face of it, then, Todd and his co-thinkers have a point.

There are, however, a number of objections which are worth considering. In the first place, it might be claimed that this is not a new development. In fact, Habermas, in the article quoted earlier, cited the press of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries as the true organs of the 'public sphere' and argued that the commercialization of the press since around 1830 had been part of the 'refeudalization' of the public sphere, in which political life was increasingly conducted as a private matter between the state and powerful corporate actors. This is overstating the case to some extent since there seems to be no necessary reason why the motives of an owner should lead to exactly the type of press we have today: after all, if knowledge and free debate were the royal road to maximum profits then it would be a very foolish capitalist who filled a paper with anything else. More substantially, there is a long history of complaints that the press is becoming trivialized. Some of the early examples of content analysis were addressed to this question, recording a shift towards the 'trivial' in the US press of the 1890s (Krippendorff, 1980: 14). Closer to home, the journalist Jane Soames, writing of the British press in the mid-1930s, lamented that 'there is nothing to replace the lively uncensored comment upon public affairs which our great-grandfathers assumed to be essential to the formation of public opinion' (Soames, 1938: 108). Nearly thirty years later Raymond Williams, after a content analysis of the British press, wrote: 'the formulas seem to be

hardening: "the masses" — crime, sex, sport, personalities, entertainment, pictures; "the minority" — traditional politics, traditional arts, briefings on popular trends' (Williams, 1968: 89–90).

It does seem likely that the processes which are the subject of contemporary criticism have been going on for rather longer than is often thought. One stage in the transformation of the press from an organ of political enlightenment into a compendium of interesting items was the emergence of the 'new journalism' of the 1880s (Lee, 1976: 117–30) and it took a major step forward with the drive towards mass circulation papers in the inter-war years (Curran and Seaton, 1981: 123:31). This has important consequences, in that it broadens the debate from outrage at a particular title or proprietor, but it does not really alter the main charge. It is useful to be reminded that the sort of apocalyptic denunciations directed at Rupert Murdoch by Peter Kelner (1987: 250–51) and *The Sun* by John Pilger (1987), in the name of some supposed recent golden age which he and his methods destroyed, are part of a much longer tendency. Indeed, it strengthens our concern with the 'normality' of the development since we would appear to be considering not a recent and therefore possibly temporary aberration but a long-term trend. We are not in a position to say that things are getting worse more quickly now than in the past, but we might note that Professor McQuail's attempt at a tripartite division of the press into 'quality', 'middle' and 'popular' does not seem to recommend itself to current critics (McQuail, 1977: 31). The evidence of opinion and research appears to be that the mass circulation press in a bourgeois democracy has only partially fulfilled the proclaimed aims of the press as an element of political life.

The second major objection is that, while it is true that the mass circulation press devotes relatively little attention to political life, the primary functions of constituting the 'public sphere' are now played by broadcasting, and in particular by television. This is one of the most powerful arguments mounted to defend the existence of publicly regulated broadcasting, since it is argued that these systems have a universal reach and that any fragmentation of these institutions and their audiences would result in the collapse of one of the few guarantors of the wide dissemination of political information, ideas and debate.

The first thing to say about this is that, in the form given above,

it accepts the substance of the charge that the newspaper press is not an adequate mechanism for informing the citizen since, if it was, broadcasting would not have this vital role. The second point is that any truth that it may have looks like vanishing rather rapidly as the international restructuring of broadcasting continues. The third point is that even though television, and radio, do provide political and economic information at a time at which they are available to mass audiences, and although the priorities of reporting, the 'news-values', of TV news approximate rather more closely to the norms of the 'quality' rather than the 'popular' press, the amount of information they provide is extremely limited compared with that of the quality press. Consequently, anyone relying solely on the television news for political and economic information will be less equipped than a person reading the quality press, and will indeed have only a very limited account of the world. Finally, the evidence of recent research seems to suggest that the claim of TV news as the 'main source' is in fact untrue. Robinson and Levy:

... described the barriers television faces in effectively transmitting news stories: too little airtime to tell most stories in sufficient depth; an easily distracted, often inattentive audience; the lack of viewer control over the pace of story presentation; the absence of clear separation between stories or story elements; inadequate historical perspectives or causal explanations to make the story meaningful; frequent inconsistencies between words and pictures; and the lack of redundancy to give more than one perspective. (Robinson and Levy, 1986: 232)

We do not need to share their belief that there either is or should be a 'meaning' to TV news which the audience fail to understand, or that there is some fixed quantity of 'information' which they should 'gain', in order to agree with their analysis of the problems associated with relying on TV news. The objection based on the replacement of the newspaper by broadcasting as a mechanism for enabling the citizen thus seems to be untenable.

The third major objection to this position is that the lack of political information in the popular press is an artefact of a particular and restricted definition of politics. On this account, if one broadens one's notion of politics from the traditional concern with the state and its works to include a much wider range of life experiences, then one would find that the popular press is indeed stuffed with politics. Thus Seaton and Pimlott locate the 'political'

element of the media very widely and suggest that: 'It might be argued that non-political media coverage is politically more important in the long run than overtly political material because of the role of the media in establishing or modifying acceptable values' (Seaton and Pimlott, 1987: x). This is a persuasive argument, since it is impossible to deny that, for example, sports reporting is saturated with politics and does indeed loom very large in much of the popular press. We can, however, see the obvious difficulty with this position if we recast it in more formal terms. The argument is that the development of 'late capitalism' has indeed led to the atrophy of the classical public sphere, but that this has been replaced by a politicization of other areas of what was previously 'civil society', with the consequence that there has been the development of a number of different public spheres concerned with particular areas (Keane, 1984: 29). However correct it might be to argue that sport is deeply penetrated by chauvinism of various kinds, and however worthy it might be to attempt to constitute a public sphere in which this can be subjected to a rational critique, it is shockingly naive to imagine that such an activity is a substitute for, or even comparable with, the classical questions of state politics, for example war. Politics may be much more than struggle over the direction of the state, although in modern capitalism that is in itself a great deal, but it is also irreducibly centred upon that struggle. Any theory, then, which celebrates the politicization of the apolitical at the expense of the depoliticization of the political thus restricts itself to the horizons set for it by the existing order.

The final objection we must consider is very similar. In its journalistic form it expresses itself as 'giving the readers what they want'. In its more sophisticated form, this position argues that the common elements which constitute the mass taste have a positive value. The populist position argues that the readers are not passive dupes: they have the opportunity to purchase quality titles but make an active choice to buy the popular press. They do not passively consume the material they have chosen but discriminate within it and find in even the most unpromising material elements which speak to their concerns and experience (Holland, 1983).

We have no quarrel with this position in so far as it seeks to explain human behaviour. We wish only to point out that it is hardly an objection to the position on the nature of the popular press that we have outlined above. On the contrary, it provides an

extremely forceful account of why that press is the way it is, and provides the starting point for a fuller analysis.

There is a well-developed account of the development of the British press, most clearly articulated by James Curran, which argues that in a society of commodity production with very sharp income stratification and relatively unrestricted advertising, there will be a tendency for the press to evolve into two forms. One will seek to reach a relatively small number of rich readers in order to maximize the specialized advertising revenue which forms a very large part of its total income. The other section of the press will seek to reach a very large audience and will depend more on cover price than general advertising for its income. We find this most persuasive and do not wish to challenge the overall analysis. However, it does not explain why the minority press should be relatively rich in political and economic material while the mass press should be relatively rich in scandals and so forth, particularly since Curran himself has shown in some detail that the reading tastes of the audience of the quality press are in many respects strikingly similar to those of the mass audience (Curran et al., 1980: 303-5). After all, there is no obvious and compelling reason of press economics as to why it should not be the other way around. The content of the popular press can only be explained by the dual action of the economics of the market and the nature of mass taste.

Clearly, there are objective limitations on mass consumption of the quality press. It is relatively expensive, sometimes hard to obtain and it demands quite a high level of cultural competence in order to consume it. However, these are secondary factors: despite low incomes and poor education a proportion of manual workers, for example, do read even the *Financial Times*. The vast majority do not because they do not choose to.

The implications of this analysis are very important, although they may discomfort some of its supporters. In an advanced and stable bourgeois democracy, the vast majority of citizens voluntarily choose not to be as well informed as possible about the political and economic life of the society that they allegedly control. Indeed, they choose a press which systematically prioritizes other matters over and above political life.

There are three possible responses to this fact. The first is to blame the producers — proprietors, editors, journalists or whoever. This is the response chosen by Todd. It seems to us

wrong since it mistakes the moral irresponsibility of the agent for the underlying cause. The second is to blame the consumers. This is again an error since it assumes that there is some perfect standard, usually the preference of the writer, against which purchasers may be judged. The third is to accept the reality for what it is and enquire into its consequences.

If we take seriously the implications of the fact that the consumers choose this sort of newspaper because it speaks to them about things which matter to them then we are speaking more about social and political life in a stable bourgeois democracy than about the nature of the press. Whatever people might say to pollsters or politicians, their day-to-day practice demonstrates that they are much more interested in sport and entertainment and sexual scandal than in knowing about the world of politics. Since this practical judgement is based on a lifetime of experience it might be open to us to deplore it but we can hardly claim that it is based on ignorance. A much more satisfactory explanation for this state of affairs is that political and economic power in a stable bourgeois democracy is so far removed from the real lives of the mass of the population that they have no interest, in either sense, in monitoring its disposal. The infrequent rituals of elections apart, there exist few if any channels whereby any opinion that anyone might hold can be implemented or even heard. Football matches take place every week in winter and anyone who cares to pay for a ticket can go along and cheer. Consequently it should not come as a surprise to find that political life is most fully covered in just those periods when people get a say, however limited, in political life, whereas football matches get reported in detail with great regularity. If it is indeed the case that the amount of political and economic information available is decreasing in the mass press, then this would tend to confirm the hypothesis that as people have more and more experience of their place in the bourgeois democracy they display less and less interest in it. The reverse would also tend to hold good: those populations emerging from more repressive societies — fascist or Stalinist for example — would be expected to have a much greater degree of interest in the possibilities of political life since they have not yet learnt the tight limits of such activities. We might advance the proposition that the more stable and established a bourgeois democracy is the less interest the mass of the population will have in its workings and the more apolitical and 'trivial' the popular press will become.

In this perspective the anomaly to be explained is why quite large numbers of people still continue to choose newspapers which do provide substantial amounts of political and economic material. What is it that persuades a minority of people in Britain that it is more important to them to know about the US presidential contenders than about the sex life of pop stars? (Often, of course, there is some overlap . . .) In some cases this is undoubtedly because they wield substantial amounts of social, economic and political power and they need information on which to base their decisions. This group is a small number of people, as is the number of those who read these papers because they look forward to the day when bourgeois democracy is no longer a stable system. Others read these sorts of papers because they provide specialized information which is important to their working lives. But surely only a small proportion of the six and a half million people who read the quality press in Britain in 1985 were the ruling class, or revolutionary socialists, or wanting to change their white-collar jobs? The bulk of the daily readership of the quality press must consist of people who read papers of this kind because they believe it is important to them to know about the world. They believe this despite the experiences which have led the vast majority of their fellow citizens to reject such a belief and despite the fact that it is very difficult to see the concrete utility of any of this information. We might conclude that these people are very well educated but very credulous.

The fact that the market conditions and political realities of bourgeois democracy increasingly tend to persuade people to opt out of effective participation in the public sphere is further illuminated by the internationalization of the press. There is a well-known tendency towards the international ownership of the press and there are more recent tendencies, particularly in magazine publishing, towards the internationalization of operations. Both of these are important developments for study even if their impact is often grossly overestimated: the idea that the nationality of a press baron, and still more the nationality of the baron's holding company, might be of importance seems to us one of the sillier ideas about the press ever espoused. Our concern here is with the recent emergence of an 'international' press. By this we primarily mean those papers which now produce international editions. There is a fairly long tradition of this in magazine publishing, with the major US news magazines having long had an

international scope, and the British based *Economist* has now joined them. There is also a long tradition of the 'expatriate' newspaper: the *International Herald Tribune* was 100 years old in 1987. There has, however, been a recent increase in the number of newspapers operating internationally, and arguably a change in their character. In the case of the *International Herald Tribune*, it is argued that the change began after the end of the Second World War with the dominance of the US in the life of 'the West' and a consequent increase in interest on the part of the world elite in the political and economic life of the USA (Vinocur, 1987).

The other two most obviously 'international' newspapers are the overseas editions of *The Wall Street Journal*, published in Europe and Asia, and the *Financial Times*, published in Europe and the USA. Both of these newspapers are the recent products of long-distance transmission and remote printing, as are the two Japanese-language and one Arabic newspapers which are published in Europe. In October 1987, the Maxwell Communications Corporation announced plans for a European newspaper. It is clear that, however problematic they may be at present, and however small their readership, these types of papers represent an important new development.

To consider only the English-language papers, we would distinguish them as examples of a different kind of newspaper because although they retain a considerable amount of material generated by their home papers, and significant elements of editorial control continue to reside in the home paper, the tendency in each of them is towards a more global sense of news. Although all the papers remain very dependent on the resources of their home news organizations, their editors expressed considerable concern with grappling with the unfamiliar problems of producing a newspaper whose readership was not constricted by the political and economic life of a national state (Cass, 1987; Keaty, 1987). The strategy of the papers is clear both objectively and subjectively: as the world financial market has become internationalized, with major interconnected centres in Tokyo, London and New York, so there has been a growth of the need for the international production of a newspaper aimed at serving that international market.

The readership of these newspapers is an international one: only about 10 percent of the readership of the European edition of the *Financial Times* are British expatriates, for example, and this

proportion falls as the circulation rises. The readership of all three papers is also a very rich and powerful group. In the case of *The Wall Street Journal Europe*, taking the figures for 1985, 71.6 percent of subscribers were described as 'top management', and 52.9 percent worked for companies employing 1000 or more people. More than 90 percent were college educated. Their median employment income was \$61,500. More than 20 percent earned more than \$100,000 (*The Wall Street Journal*, 1985: 65-9). Of the European readership of the international edition of the *Financial Times*, in 1987, 71.4 percent of readers were board members and 80 percent earned more than £20,000 (approximately \$32,000) per annum (FT, 1987). One in ten of the readers of the *International Herald Tribune* is a dollar millionaire. These people are well described by Nigel Harris:

The elders of the world's tribes reveal the unification of the social system in the astonishing uniformity of their consumption patterns; or rather in the acceptance by all the world's rulers of the cultural style of the dominant section. Once the suit was the mark of Europe's tribes. But now even the Saudis increasingly don them abroad; they have long driven the same cars . . . At work the world of power is the same, the same desk in the same air-conditioned office, the same telephone to bark command, the same gadgets, the same potted plant and discreet secretary. At leisure, they bask on the same beaches, golf on the same links, and hob-nob in the same air-corridors . . . (Harris, 1983: 18)

We might add: and they read the same newspapers. The significance of this latter fact is obscured for those of us who speak a quaint, or perhaps cute, local dialect of the current dominant world language. It is revealed much more sharply and negatively if we consider the two Japanese international papers: these are perforce largely emigre papers due to the current low level of international diffusion of Japanese. The emerging world newspapers are in English, which is not the mother tongue of the majority of their readers.

Natural language has always been one of the key points of conflict in cultural and political nation-building. One of the claims to legitimacy of the existing press systems is that they are in principle available to all citizens since they are produced in the language of those citizens. This claim has always masked a certain hypocrisy and the marginalization of alternative tongues, but its acceptance at least in large part is obviously a condition for the press playing a role in the construction of a public sphere. Unless

the information about political and economic life is in a language that the citizens can understand then it can hardly be public. The *Financial Times* is in principle available to the building labourer in Birmingham in a way that it is not to one in Kyoto, Dusseldorf or Madrid.

The emergence of an international press is a symptom that the national state is no longer the decisive arena of political life and a pointer to the emergence of an embryonic international public sphere. The class of people who inhabit that sphere not only wish to read the densest of available newspapers but are prepared to make the effort to do so in a language not their own. They do this because they need to run their daily lives. Those who, for whatever reason, have not mastered this symbolic system are excluded from that public sphere. Indeed, we can conceive of the theoretical possibility that advertisers might, in a particular national instance, find that they could reach their target audience of the rich and powerful more efficiently through the international press than the local quality papers, which would thus be without their economic grounding and would, left to the market, die. All that would then be left to the mass of the population would be a press effectively devoid of political and economic information and, if the international press happened to be in a language they had not mastered, they would be completely denied such information. The capitalist market would have destroyed the link between the capitalist press and capitalist democracy.

The provision of an international system of press-based information and opinion is thus dependent on an audience's desire for such material and corresponds to the development of real political and economic power which transcends the boundaries of the national state. Those who run the world economy have the information they need. Those who run the national economies and political systems have the information they need. Those who are forced to run by these interlocking systems have the private world as an attractive escape.

Two things follow from this. The first is purely conceptual. It is surely time to re-emphasize James Curran's point that we must stop thinking and writing about some unified category of the 'news paper' (Curran et al., 1980: 305). Whatever they may have in common in their production, the two ends of the press spectrum are clearly different sorts of cultural commodities serving different sorts of markets and providing different sorts of satisfactions. We

are unlikely to understand their social functions if we continue to use a blanket category designed for a quite different situation.

The second is more to do with politics. We have here argued that the nature of the modern popular 'press' is derived from structural features of capitalist democracy. It follows that all the legislative tinkering and noble alternative dreaming is doomed to failure so long as these social and political conditions persist. Subsidies could, no doubt, support a highly informative popular press, but it is most unlikely that they would persuade more people to be more interested in a political world with which they have no permanent link other than as subjects. The same structural realities, rather than the accidents of personality, are at the root of the failure of attempts to short-circuit the press system by borrowing its forms and to pursue worthy ends through: 'Responsible human interest stories (which) have integrity and can avoid the tabloids' tacky sentimentality . . . (and) can also provide sound information and background woven into the narrative' (NoS, n.d.: 10).

It does not follow from this that the outlook is one of Orwellian gloom. We have argued that the modern press is the product of the conditions of life in a stable capitalist democracy. The infrequent and ritualized political participation of such an order does not exhaust the possibilities for popular political life. Certainly, a ballot every few years is not the simple and unchanging definition of 'democracy': it would certainly be as unrecognizable as such to the men who gave us the term as their attitude to women, slaves and non-citizens would be unacceptable to us. It might also strike the honest observer that 'banana monarchy' is a likelier description of the future of Britain than 'stable capitalist democracy'. If the modern press in Britain is the genuine product of the social and economic realities of the society, and of the working class's perception of its place within that society, then a change in those social and economic realities can lead both to a changed perception of the nature and scope of political life and to an irresistible demand for a different, more political, press.

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