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PEACE, POWER, AND REVOLUTION: PEACE STUDIES, MARXISM, AND THE ACADEMY

Peter Dale SCOTT*

Writers on peace and world order face something of a dilemma in their choice of audience. If one takes Marxism seriously one risks being too controversial for a U.S. academic environment. However if one does not, one has little chance of opening significant dialogue with the thinkers from other parts of the Second or Third World. These are not small matters for an academic program concerned with global integration. Considerations of audience are however tactical.

Underlying them is a more important issue of substance. Most Marxist systems of thought not only presuppose the inevitability of class conflict, they endeavor to heighten and advance an exclusionary consciousness. Whether or not the conflict they envision is violent, it seems to be incompatible with studies whose avowed goal is conflict resolution.

Hence the tendency among some peace theorists to belittle or ignore Marxism, to act, or more precisely to talk of acting, as if Marxism will simply go away. Such peace theory will be of little relevance to the world we now live in, especially when the increasing rationalization of social life has been accompanied by such backlashes of irrational violence—e.g. the Red Brigades in Italy—that old-line Marxist parties and bureaucracies are left in the role of defending public order.

Whatever the Marxist attitude towards Peace Studies, Peace Studies must take Marxism seriously. I say this as one who is not a Marxist, and who believes that Marxism has given rise to serious errors, and indeed tragic dilemmas, in matters of practice. And yet to write off the pervasiveness of

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Marxist thought as mere evidence of human folly is itself folly of an order that is both perverse and self-defeating.

Marxism has both a great strength and a great weakness. The great strength is to see that material forces underlie social systems, through dialectical interactions which, in Marx's own words, force humans to "make their own history, but . . . not . . . just as they please."¹ The great weakness of Marxism is to dehumanize its own vision, to the point where history is no longer a matter of people at all, but only of classes or economic conditions.²

At this point the great promise of liberation risks becoming, just like Christianity before it has risked becoming, a dirge of tragic necessity and empty expectation. This is a weakness not just of theory but even more of practice, as most visitors to socialist countries have seen for themselves.

Ironically many western observers (and some peace theorists) have been more concerned to criticize Marxism's strength—which is apparently threatening—than its weakness—which is apparently sometimes shared.

For peaceworkers the issue of Marxism is an especially sensitive one. Both inherently and historically the relationship of modern peace theory to Marxism is dialectical. On the one hand it too is committed wholeheartedly to a vision of qualitative social change. To quote Marx's eleventh Thesis on Feuerbach, it agrees that up to now "the philosophers have merely interpreted the world, whereas the point is to change it." On the other hand it eschews both violence and class warfare, the stock Marxist mechanisms for meaningful social change. It does so not merely from fastidiousness or optimism, which would be to lack a sense of the tragic, but on the contrary because of its tragic awareness that, as Aeschylus put it so long ago in the *Agamemnon*, "violence loves to breed violence."³ In this it follows in the tradition of Ruskin and Tolstoy, those two neglected nineteenth-century thinkers who so influenced Gandhi.

To Marxist critics of the peace movement, and even to sophisticated anarchists such as Chomsky, such a position is self-defeating if not self-contradictory. All peace theorists should be aware of their vulnerability to this kind of logical criticism. It is however the aim of this article to argue that mere logical consistency is not the best criterion for either scientific thought or, even less, social practice. On the contrary, modern quantum mechanics has revealed what the physicist Niels Bohr called the principle of complementarity, which asserts that objects of knowledge may possess complementary properties, one of which if known will exclude knowledge of the other.⁴ J. Robert Oppenheimer once pleaded for a like acceptance of tolerance for the great social antinomies

that through the ages have organized and yet disunited man's (sic) experience: the antinomy between . . . change and . . . eternity . . . between freedom and necessity; between action . . . and analysis.⁵

More recently another physicist has warned that "extending principles of science beyond their normal domain of application may lead to spurious conclusions."⁶ Yet it is our common sense, not quantum physics, which tells us a man can be acted towards as a human being even if he can be analyzed to be an exploiter. It was the desire to be scientific, in part, that led Marxists to suppress their human sympathies, just as the desire to be consistent has led some peace theorists to reject all forms of dialectical analysis as schismogenic.

I would argue that the acceptance of irreconcilable antinomies or doubleness is the necessary mark of a mature and successful system of either scientific or social thought. By addressing the critical issues raised for it by Marxism, peace theory can best articulate the inherent doubleness in its position which should continue to inspire it with both wise moderation and painful self-doubt. The human network must coexist in our consciousness with the analytical one: a coexistence which will distinguish peace theory from not only most official Marxists but many western social scientists (Hofmanns, B.F. Skinner, the sociobiologist E.O. Wilson, etc.).

To begin with, peace theory should not belittle or ignore the valid Marxist criticisms of U.S. or other great power impact on the rest of the world. This happens all too often, sometimes from simple ignorance, sometimes from the strength of anti-communist conviction, and perhaps most frequently from a desire to maintain what is considered a "credible rhetoric" and to avoid multiplying difficult issues. Inevitably the same factors can lead to the perpetuation of stereotypes about the "Communist enemy," stereotypes which contribute neither to the intellectual dignity of these authors nor, it goes without saying, to their efficacy for peace.

The peace literature of some years back was more prone to such habits, and today's reader is likely to perceive their ideological limitations. The stereotypic communists in more recent peace theory are usually sketched in a more subtle, accommodating and ironic manner, in the fashion of the "convergence" theory that was current in the brief era of so-called peaceful coexistence for wheeling and dealing among the big powers) and the even more misleadingly named "small wars"—i.e. distant wars small only on the horizon, such as Vietnam, where four times as many tons of bombs were dropped as in the whole of World War II.

According to convergence theory, communists, as they became more experienced in the exercise and responsibilities of power, would become more and more like us. In its more extreme formulation ("hard convergence theory") communist ideology would itself wither away, along with all other forms of anachronistic ideology. A "softer" convergence theory stopped short of predicting the demise of communism, and merely contemplated a world in which the so-called communist and non-communist states would become more adept in their nonviolent interactions.

The "soft" convergency model is, I believe, both a truer model and a necessary one to all who attach a high priority to the reduction of the nuclear threat. It is however naive and evasive to imagine that great-power détente can by itself become the platform for a nonviolent world order. As Richard Falk has noted, other conflicts in the world limit the potentiality of a Soviet-American "condominium," while past arms control arrangements in particular can be seen by other parties "as seeking to freeze the bipolar hegemony."⁸ Similarly many proposals for a World Peace Force to regulate disputes between minor powers fail to appreciate the suspicions with which Third World governments, let alone peoples, view such efforts to enforce the status quo.

An integrative peace theory must look more critically at great-power convergency. It must dare to ask whether the commonality uniting the U.S. and the Soviet Union (emphasis on "productivist" growth and large-scale development, with their consequences of bureaucratization and depersonalization) is not, as some recent Marxists and post-Marxists have charged, a source of alienation and repression, domestically as well as in the Third World.⁹ The critique of great-power "productivism" is perhaps best summed up by the claim of the Greek-French post-Marxist Cornelius Castoriadis that the growth of society towards maximized social product is accompanied by dialectical enslavement.

Such objections have gained far greater circulation with the growing awareness of social and ecological limitations to growth.¹⁰ Thus Richard Barnet questions Marx's assumption that it is man's nature to be productive, and his resulting acceptance of capitalist modes of production in which "for the first time, nature becomes purely an object for humankind." As he comments,

The contemporary apostles of abundance through mastery of nature are as likely to be found at the chamber-of-commerce as at the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist party. . . . [T]he relationship between man and man is theoretically different under capitalism and socialism, but the relationship between man and nature is essentially the same. . . . Both modern capitalism and modern socialism see expanded production as the answer to human happiness. . . . The promise of equitable sharing of future abundance is much less disturbing than the threat to redistribute existing finite resources.¹¹

This critique of Marxist productivism echoes that of Baudrillard and the Frankfurt School: Max Horkheimer complained that socialists, in making "labor into a transcendent category of human activity . . . make themselves into carriers of capitalist propaganda"; and Walter Benjamin wrote that the vulgar Marxist stress on labor

recognizes only the progress in the mastery of nature, not the retrogression of society; it already displays the technocratic features later encountered in Fascism.¹²

Barnet updates the criticism by giving it an ecological context; he suggests that the growing ideological debate over growth "may well be the issue on which a true 'convergence' . . . takes place."¹³

One of the most encouraging recent developments for peace studies has been the increase in serious normative thinking about growth and indicative planning, backed by empirical research. These have led to an emerging consensus that the problem with all present planning processes, public and private, capitalist and socialist, "is that accountability is weak".

The process of planning priorities . . . can take place only on a human scale. In his book *The Breakdown of Nations*, Leopold Kohr, anticipating E. F. Schumacher, makes an impressive historical argument that bigness leads to various forms of social breakdown. . . . The choice is more democracy or much less. The effective participation of people in making the decisions that most directly affect them is the precondition for economic, political and spiritual liberation.¹⁴

If it is the perception of shared threats that creates commonality, then the precariousness of twentieth-century living has some compensations. As anxiety about growth replaces the naive Enlightenment faith in progress, both capitalism and state socialism seem limited by the same outmoded assumptions. The emergence of such a perspective is a necessary precondition for the emergence of an integrative peace literature that is normative without being either utopian or parochial. To say this is not to renounce the search for non-competitive plenty through technology, but that such a search must become much more self-critical than hitherto.

In the recent work of authors such as Galtung, Falk, and Barnet, we have seen peace research whose critique of communist goals is credible precisely because it is a critique of our own goals as well. Just as urgently needed is a similarly serious critique of Marxist techniques of social change. The situation is less symmetrical: capitalist violence tends to result in war, Marxist violence (at least until recently) tends to produce murderous revolution. Ultimately both perspectives, though for different reasons, tend to belittle movements and organizations eschewing violence as unrealistic.

Here again, at least on the international level, theorists of world order have noted the common inability of both capitalist and communist thought to contemplate serious alternatives to the present creaky system of nation-states. In the words of Richard Falk,

Leninist conceptions of global reform also emphasize revolution on the national level, and do not discern any need for altering the state system as the principal basis of global organization.¹⁵

Until recently Marxists could believe that war would disappear with the advent of socialism, and that wars between socialist states could not occur.

The recent conflicts between Vietnam and Cambodia on the one hand, Vietnam and China on the other, have indicated how naive that belief was.

Marxist theorists, in turn, have faulted peace and world order students for being naive for the opposite reason: assuming that "some kind of centralized institutional structures on the globe" must sooner or later emerge, because this development is necessary for human survival.¹⁶ In his balanced and constructive critique in this issue, James Mittelman retorts that this "preoccupation with the nation state system has resulted in the neglect of economic phenomena," and that "under prevailing conditions [of production], global planning is not a magic solution to the ills of capitalist life."¹⁷ One can look to fruitful refinements of both points of view, the value-oriented and the analytical, as a result of this theoretical debate.

One can object to both sides, however, that theory by itself, whatever its prospects in the academy, offers little hope for dealing with the current world crisis. Mittelman's appeal that world order studies "show the class contradictions that . . . can give rise to a transition to a new order," seems to speak much more clearly to the world crisis of 1848, than that of 1984.¹⁸ If peace studies eclecticism risks failing to probe socio-economic realities, so also a Marxist emphasis on theoretical correctness can blind one to the actual movements which in the world today are doing most to further peace.

There are burgeoning peace movements in the world today. They are already powerful enough to affect NATO strategic planning, and hence to be taken seriously by the "value-free" pragmatists who plan for no other future than nuclear domination or a balance of terror. Thus they are assuredly historical, even if they fit neither the world order modelists' emphasis on global institutions, nor the Marxists' emphasis on class and the logic of competing capitalisms.

Are such movements merely responsive, or do they carry in themselves the seeds, and models, of a new, less repressive social order? It is too early to affirm this possibility, but not naive to hope for it. It is certainly no less naive than the Marxist expectation, from which recent events in China and Cambodia have disillusioned us, that a socialist revolution would bring with it an end to oppression and alienation within the state.

To say this is not to suggest, as George Orwell did in *Animal Farm*, that socialist revolutions are unproductive of significant change. Serious comparative study of capitalist and socialist social systems has been greatly retarded by the paucity of scholars prepared to concede, even as a hypothesis for serious investigation, that there are distinctive merits to both systems. In the United States this paucity is no accident, but a legacy of the Cold War, and above all of what a Senate committee called the CIA's "massive intrusion" into foundation activities, including so-called social science research. In 1963-66, more than one-third of the grants awarded by non-"Big

Three" foundations (those other than Ford, Rockefeller, and Carnegie) "in the physical, life and social sciences . . . involved CIA funds."¹⁹ A prime target for CIA attention and support was the field of Soviet, Soviet bloc, and China studies, with the result that at least some of those who came ultimately to dominate these fields were doubling as CIA consultants and policy advisers.

One does not need to impugn all the scholarship of the Cold War era to propose, in all modesty, that a new style of less biased (and by that fact alone more peace-oriented) comparative studies is needed. It is only by such disengagement from the policy-oriented research of the 1950s and 1960s that a serious, credible critique of socialist (along with capitalist) societies can be undertaken.

At the same time, one does not need to wait upon the results of such investigations to see that these socialist societies are still far from entering on that promised season in which the state shall wither away. In the words of Madhu Dandavate,

Marx, who claimed to be a 'scientific socialist' and always made a blistering attack on the pre-Marxian socialists as 'Utopians,' with no relevance to the revolutionary politics of change, was himself the author of the greatest utopia, "the withering away of [the] State."²⁰

Why have Marxist expectations here been so ironically disappointed? Most western observers have responded with something like Michels' Iron Law—that there simply is no alternative to the bureaucratic state as organized violence, and that Marx was naive to deny this. But the research of historians, or of anthropologists into contemporary small-scale societies, have reminded us that it is simply not the case that the large-scale bureaucratic state is the only viable form of social organization. Theorists preaching the Iron Law are like Eskimos asserting that the only form of housing is the igloo.²¹

Dandavate's point is quite different. Socialist states have proven to be repressive, he argues, because of Marx's failure to evolve an alternative to a repressive vehicle of change—i.e. the dictatorship of the proletariat, or "the proletariat organized as the ruling class." Although Marx and Engels saw clearly that the state was a product of society at a certain historical stage of its development, and believed in its ultimate disappearance, their methodology of change was fatally skewed. Even though they did not exclude the possibility that in certain advanced countries, "the worker may obtain his objective by peaceful means," their continuous argument—in opposition to anarchists like Bakunin—was that "the worker must one day capture political [i.e. repressive] power in order to found the new organizational labour."²²

Dandavate notes the irony that Marxism, in the name of abolishing the

library bathroom, are nonetheless condescending about the achievements of King and the civil rights movement. King's impact on U.S. history is ineluctable, not just for his victories in the areas of desegregation and voting rights (some of which would have happened sooner or later), but for his role in rousing consciousness and in delegitimizing the idea of service in imperialist military operations overseas.

In their emphasis on human, affirmative grass-roots actions, as well as in their recognition that "the personal is the political," Gandhi and King provide an intellectual perspective from which one can recognize the fatal one-sidedness of Marxist revolutionary processes. Just as Christianity before it lost its full social meaning when reduced to the antisocial truth that "the kingdom of God is within," so Marxism, despite its humanist inspiration, becomes dehumanized to the extent that it reduces revolutionary concerns to the seizure of external political power. Thus it is no accident that Marxist movements have sometimes become stultified, facing the sterile alternatives of either bureaucratic party politics, on the one hand, or strategies of terror, on the other.

It unfortunately seems possible that, as global bureaucratic and corporate rationalization proceeds, terrorist strategies may not only supplement but even displace traditional socialist ones. If we are to oppose such a development, we must understand it; and above all avoid the kind of facile blanket condemnation which fails to discriminate between circumstances.

During the Vietnam War, for example, the U.S. government made a case for its involvement out of the terrorist incidents, including assassination, for which the National Liberation Front had undeniably been responsible. But the U.S. government failed to tell its public that, prior to the N.L.F.'s renewal of hostilities, it had been targeted by the U.S.-backed Diem regime for physical extermination.²⁴

Advocates of affirmative nonviolence need not hesitate to concede that (as Hannah Arendt and others have pointed out) there are enemies against which it will result not in victory but in massacre.²⁵ However the resort to terrorism as a technique of desperate self-defense should not be equated with the advocacy of terrorism as an offensive strategy of social change. Unfortunately some American intellectual opponents of the Vietnam War, not a few of them from privileged backgrounds, failed to make this elementary distinction. Their translation of Carlos Marighella's urban guerrilla tactics into Weatherman elitism must figure among the major reasons why the once-powerful S.D.S. and anti-Vietnam War movements lapsed so swiftly into recriminatory disagreements over tactics.

In Gandhi's and King's fusion of the personal and the political, one strives to create now, in oneself and in one's movement, the processes of interaction one desires for the future. Far from being utopian, this fostering of humanity

state, in fact trains its disciples to become dictators. We might add that in various internal revolts against bureaucratized Marxist parties, such as those following Regis Debray's *Revolution in the Revolution*, this ironic self-contradiction is only intensified. But such a criticism of tactics is empty, unless one has an alternative.

The alternative put forward by Dandavate is that of Gandhian nonviolence.

The universal principle, which was at the root of Gandhi's techniques and philosophy, was expressed most ably by Rajendra Prasad through the aphorism *Yatha Pinde Taiha Brahmaude* (as the microcosm, so the macrocosm). In his method of change the process of reform in the individual did not await the final transformation in the society. Both the processes were tuned in unison. A truly liberated individual was to him the most effective instrument of social transformation. Naturally, in Gandhian technique, the forms of nonviolent mass struggle were so devised that they contributed to the enrichment of the lives of the individuals who participated in the struggles.

Both in the forms of struggle as well as in the tasks of social reconstruction Gandhi gave little importance to the State. So his methodology was not based on the capture or destruction of [the] State. He wanted the local initiative at the grass-root level to play the dominant role in struggle and reconstruction.²⁶

One can accept the importance of this critique without conceding the possibility of a "truly liberated individual" in our present oppressive world, or indeed in any foreseeable alternative to it. Similarly, one can accept the Gandhian emphasis on the primacy of process to self- and social liberation, and with it the emphasis on grass-roots activity, without becoming committed to particular Gandhian notions about either asceticism or peasant organization. What remains central is the contemporaneous interaction between individual and society in the process of becoming liberated.

Dandavate goes on to observe how Marx's western preoccupation with the state blinded him to the potential revolutionary role of the peasantry, a role since confirmed in socialist revolutions (China, Yugoslavia) as well as in Gandhi's India. Twentieth-century Marxism, responding to conditions in China and the Third World, has of course acknowledged this role. It may also be the case that the extreme social divisions in India are reflected in Gandhi's own thought. Gandhism has by no means solved the problems of India's oppressive social structure; and Gandhi's own preference for peasant cottage industry may have been too utopian an alternative to effectively modify the forces of modernization in India. I do not know enough to speak of these issues.

But Gandhi's combination of personal nonviolence and grass-roots organization has been an inspiration to more recent movements, notably that of Martin Luther King in this country. I have little patience for middle-class white intellectuals who, never having themselves liberated so much as a

has proven (in the right conditions) to be longer-lasting, and of greater relevance for positive change, than radical elitist terrorism, whose nineteenth-century Russian practitioners helped to create that nemesis of anarchism, the Soviet Revolution. Perhaps the origin of the difference is the Gandhian insistence on always recognizing one's opponent as a human being, and addressing their humanity. From this starting-point of human interaction flow many consequences for process, as feminist and peace groups are still discovering. Nonviolence is more than just an idea: it seems that one has to have actually experienced this process in order to evaluate it.

From the experience of nonviolent demonstrations since the 1960s, one can distinguish at least five stages in the evolution towards positive or affirmative nonviolence:

- 1) Actions which are nonviolent in the negative sense, where no violent events occur and the problem of violence does not arise.
- 2) Actions which are nonviolent in spirit, so that the mood of a group is able spontaneously to contain or prevent the occasional violence of individuals, provocateurs, or police.
- 3) Actions which institutionalize this spirit, by establishing a network of monitors with armbands, authorized to act on behalf of the group as a whole.
- 4) Actions by groups trained in this spirit, where nonviolence is sanctioned by prior self-discipline.
- 5) Actions where the nonviolent discipline extends beyond conduct to attitude, so that protesters remain "respectful and friendly" even after experiencing repressive violence.

I must confess that until I had participated in the last two types of action I was deeply mistrustful of them, as being at best unrealistic if not perversely divisive. What has occurred in me, and I suspect many others, is a change of trust. As I now look back on discussions of violence and nonviolence in the 1960s, by intellectuals such as Marcuse or Arendt, what strikes me is their failure, as spectators, to distinguish the experience of affirmative nonviolence (beyond perhaps the second stage), the experience for which I know no other positive word than what Gandhi called *satyagraha* or truth-energy.

Affirmative nonviolence can be seen as the nonalienated power of the people who affirm it. Assuredly it is not the only form of people's power in the world today, and not necessarily the most representative. It may however be the form of people's power that is best adapted to flourish in the advanced capitalist states of the First World, that hegemony which has proved so resistant to other forces for social change.

Most theorists, including Marxists before E.P. Thompson, have failed to acknowledge and interpret this historic reality. Marxists and post-Marxists have made many of the criticisms to be found in the preceding pages, against not only Soviet-style regimes but Marxist theory itself. But on the historical reality and affirmative force of nonviolence (as opposed to, for example, mere "peaceful transition" from one regime to another) one does not expect widespread Marxist assent: quite the reverse.

Perhaps the best example to illustrate the difference between the two viewpoints is the work (influential on myself) of Herbert Marcuse. In his critique of productivism and the performance-principle, in his emphasis on Schillerian notions of liberation through art and play, and above all in his critique of "the relegation of real possibilities to the no-man's-land of utopia" (as "itself an essential element of the ideology of the performance principle"), Marcuse, like other members of the Frankfurt School, is close to the position I have been outlining.²⁶ But Marcuse's and the Frankfurt School's general disinterest in matters of revolutionary tactics, inherited to a large degree from Marx, is enough in itself to distance it from the nonviolent movement, which discounts theory and places considerations of process at the very forefront.²⁷

Those who have experienced the reality of nonviolence as a process of social change need not fear to concede that there is a Marxist humanism. But we must also not fear to criticize Marxist inhumanism: the reduction of humans (in practice, as opposed to analysis) to "classes" and in some cases to social enemies who need to be eliminated. Here Aeschylus is more contemporary than Marx: where we simply oppose political power with political counterpower we have not made matters better and may have made them worse. One can cite numerous post-revolutionary societies which, even if they have undeniable social and economic achievements to their credit, have in the area of the political reproduced the oppressive features of the governments they overthrew.

To make this theoretical observation is not to condemn all past and future revolutions: those which last inevitably have had more than violence to further them. There may even be, as some have anticipated, a convergence of tactics, in which revolutions discover ways of becoming more sophisticated and humane. The examples of China, Cuba, and Vietnam might seem to confirm such a possibility. The example of Cambodia should remind us that there is nothing inevitable about it.

The point to be made here is an intellectual one. Insofar as Marxists (or for that matter anarchists or terrorists) dehumanize their own politics, by ignoring their human doubleness and imitating the inhuman practices of their enemies, there is a discernible cost: any resulting new order will also threaten to reproduce the inhumanity of the old. To say this is not to discredit all

uses of violence in our present, radically defective world. It is rather to say that historical Marxism, as we have known it, has been a radically defective guide to the practice of social change, whatever its merits as a mode of social analysis. In its preoccupation with external political power, in its separatist appeal to the dictatorship of either an industrialized or a peasant proletariat, in its postponement of needed personal changes until after the revolution, it has never been able to achieve the goal of a classless society which is one of its most attractive features.

Instead our action must be our liberation from the dialectic of the past. This means doubleness: even when we are slaves and must be conscious of ourselves as slaves, we must also act as free people. This would be my own intellectual interpretation of Gandhi's *satyagraha* or truth-energy, a concept which is itself more important, and elegant, in that it is so much more simple.

To this critique the Marxist revolutionary retorts: what alternative practice is there? Gandhi may have helped expel the British, but his successor Bhavé has had little impact in his efforts to mitigate the inequities of the Indian landholding system. William Jennings Bryan, when U.S. Secretary of State, was a Tolstoyan, which helps to explain his resignation in 1915, in the face of Wilson's increasing interventionism into World War I.²⁸ But Bryan's pacifism was no more efficacious than Wilson's idealism in forestalling the folly of their Mexican adventure, the Vera Cruz mission of 1914.²⁹

The response of the modern peace-worker in turn is that nonviolence, a mode of affirmative social process and organization, must be distinguished from nineteenth-century Tolstoyan pacifism, an ethical and hence personal position.³⁰ Nonviolence, unlike pacifism, has not only inspired the organization of mass social movements, it has been particularly important to the movements of those who are the conscious victims of the organized violence of the status quo: minorities, women, and now those aware of the threat of the nuclear arms race. This should tell something to those who, from their academic armchairs, dismiss nonviolence as utopian or unhistorical.

Even so, peace-workers must be sensitive to Marxist criticisms. It is clear that one cannot convert our present political system simply by converting individuals who are currently in power; and work at the grass-roots level, as advocated by Gandhi, has hitherto been piecemeal and frustratingly slow. And yet nonviolent social movements have undeniably shown themselves to be of increasing historical significance in the last century, even though (or perhaps precisely because) these movements have not been directed towards the seizure of political power. Trade unions have revolutionized the working conditions in industrial societies; women have been granted the suffrage and some of their other rights; and in the last two or three decades public opinion has finally become a meaningful deterrent to the waging of what are perceived to be unjust wars.³¹

These limited successes are not yet substantial enough to silence Marxist critics who argue that nonviolence, as a strategy, cannot answer the needs of the world's oppressed. They are however of particular relevance to the building of what we might call a transpolitical platform, a platform for the transcendence in human relations of traditional power politics and structural violence.³²

The question of humanizing behavior, both our own and our opponents', cannot be postponed until after some apocalyptic revolution. History confirms, however problematically, that it need not be. Central to Marx's predictions for the fall of capitalism was his expectation of an increasing accumulation of misery. If that increasing misery did not occur where Marx expected it, it is at least partly because the ruling class, for whatever reason, came to deal less oppressively with its domestic workers and peasants. It is shocking today to recall that, in the midst of the Irish potato famine, while perhaps a million Irish were dying, the British government terminated its emergency relief, which violated liberal economic theory and "promised to keep the Irish on our hands."³³ We can guess that the English would not act so callously towards the Irish in the twentieth century, even if English-speaking awarenesses have not yet been sufficiently expanded to prevent the mass starvations in Bangladesh or the Sahel.

A high priority for peace-workers is to encourage this expansion of the perimeters of human interaction. Here technology, so often inimical to communal compassion, can be an ally. Parochialism can become increasingly outmoded when we see, not just all peoples, but the globe itself, in the center of our television screen. This is another trend about which we have no reason to be complacent. The century which invented napalm and cluster bombs, to say nothing of nuclear weapons, cannot congratulate itself on having reached new heights of humanitarianism. It may be that we are seeing our bureaucratic governments become more and more barbarous even as their people become more and more civilized. And yet it is noteworthy that the same governments (such as our own) which have invented strategic bombing, napalm and c.b.u.'s for enemies abroad, have also moved towards wooden and rubber bullets at home.³⁴ The most hateful products of the new weapons technology have been reserved for enemies defined as alien, in remote areas like East Timor or Afghanistan, with whom we have not yet identified.

What is changing here is the consciousness not of governments but of peoples, as they insist, with increasing energy, on expanding into new areas, including the international arena, the humanity expected of personal relationships. This is important, not just because of their achievements, but because of the process itself as it reconstructs movements for social change. In America alone, the civil rights movement, the women's movement, and now the new peace movement have affected U.S. history, not just by win-

ning concessions, but by developing and refining in practice new strategies of organization in which both personal and political priorities condition each other.

On the other side the inhumanitarianism of twentieth-century state power makes humanitarianism, not historically irrelevant, but more urgent an issue than ever. It is this dialectic which had inspired E.P. Thompson's *Protest and Survive*. A transpolitical peace strategy can no more ignore humanitarianism as a social force than it can afford to depend on it. This is particularly true in the face of the universal nuclear threat, one whose urgency renders meaningless the distinction between interested and disinterested political behavior.³⁵

These considerations should give us the courage to stand by our difficult conclusion, reached out of Aeschylean pessimism rather than Enlightenment complacency, that the issues of peace and of significant social change (by which we mean the change which would support a world peace-system) are in the long run inseparable from the discipline of a nonviolent practice in social change. They should not lead to a new complacency. More specifically, if we reject violent procedures for change (whether Marxist, anarchist, or whatever), we should not by that token become counter-revolutionaries refusing to deal with others in different circumstances who have benefited from violence.

We must see social forces; yet we must not in our actions reduce human beings to forces. To reach this conclusion is to have arrived at a form of advocacy, one which a faculty committee at the University of California at Berkeley recently used as an official reason for refusing to authorize peace studies as an academic discipline.³⁶ This seems like the application of a double standard. No one objects to moral philosophers who argue or teach conclusions opposing murder—even, in the case of the antivivisectionist Peter Singer, the murder of animals. Apparently however one should only study mass killing, not oppose it. To argue that moral judgments hold sway in the political arena as well is viewed as an adversarial activity, one which challenges current political practice and the post-Machiavelian political science (not considered to be controversial by the university) which blandly ratifies it. As René Girard has noted, society protects itself from revelations that it is based on the use or threat of violence.³⁷

If we were to oppose mass killings from prejudice alone the charge of unacademic advocacy would be understandable. It is however the effort to argue and test such a position with available historical evidence which seems to be viewed as particularly threatening. Meanwhile my university has belatedly hired one or two Marxist scholars—as if to corroborate that the distinction between Marx and Weber is of less significance than their differences from Gandhi.

In short while Marxists reject the peace alternative as academic, a prominent university has just rejected it as being too involved in advocacy. This suggests that the peace alternative may be closer to the center of the question of social change than either of these other parties would like to admit. While we should not make too much of these differences, neither should we attempt to bury them in a futile effort to avoid controversy. For the truth known to all is that there can be no peace without significant change, change in our thinking as well as our institutional practices. In the pursuit of such change, he or she who is not controversial will also not be relevant.

Shortly after World War II, the intellectual issues of the Cold War were epitomized by the celebrated break between those two thinkers of the French Resistance, Sartre and Camus. Camus argued that Marxism had betrayed the cause of liberation by converting individual rebellion into mobilization of the abstract mass. Sartre retorted that Camus' romantic nihilism ignored the analytical realities of the Cold War between East and West: "I see only one solution for you: the Galapagos islands."³⁸ We can perhaps summarize the twofold conclusion of this essay by asserting, in the spirit of doublethink, that it is important to see the sense in which each author was partly right. At the same time, to avoid closing on a note of expansive and meaningless tolerance, we must reject the one premise which at that time these two resistance intellectuals prominently shared. This was their common assumption that the historical arena is a theater of murder, and that to change it we must (in Camus' words) "prepare ourselves to commit murder."³⁹ Once again my point is not against the actual practice of the French Resistance, but rather against the generalized rhetoric of violence which both writers derived from it.

It interests me that, at the height of the Vietnam War, the university had not the slightest difficulty with my teaching both *these* authors, who on this point were in their own way corroborating the status quo. I am also interested that, in the spirit of academic detachment which I still cultivated at that time, it never occurred to me to say that here both authors were wrong.

I suppose it took the outcome of the Vietnam and Cambodia Wars, along with half a dozen years of intermittent violence and tear gas on this campus, for me to begin to see all the participants in those tragedies, including myself, as similarly limited by the nexus of violence which we either shared or tacitly condoned. I experienced one of the more meaningful changes of my life at that time, a change which in this context I may be forgiven for calling "existential." I came to conclude that the issue of violence was precisely where we had the greatest need, and the greatest opportunity, to break out of the existing order. I am not used to concluding on such a personal note, but part of my changed belief is that it is to the personal that we must bring history back.

We shall not do so by merely withdrawing from history, as Tolstoy has been accused of doing. Nor on the other hand can we alter reality if we become "prisoners of realism," allowing the struggle for power to convert us into mirror-images of our opponents. No one can put on paper a verbal solution to this dilemma of power: even the appeal for compassionate doubt and understanding, with which I began, could easily, if converted into a social program, become an excuse for not taking sides in legitimate social struggles.

Our task, fortunately, is much simpler: not to invent a new solution to servitude and injustice, but to recognize and strengthen those constructive forces already in our midst. It is time for Marxists to recognize that non-violent movements in general, and the global peace movement in particular, are among such significant constructive forces; and that their rejection of traditional power (i.e. violence), in the name of more human values, is a key to their historical significance and possibility for change, not a detriment to them.

Admittedly such movements have just entered on the difficult challenge of confronting the contemporary "realities," or nightmares, of militarized national security states and nuclear weapons. But, although they have much to learn, theirs seem the only hopeful track for containing the structural violence of the current state system. History suggests that the key to subduing the state is not through simply seizing the state apparatus (as did Lenin), nor by simply smashing it (as proposed by anarchists), nor by simply ignoring it (as in Gandhi's hopes for cottage industries).

The key (a very old one) lies first in developing countering institutions, and then struggling to ensure that these will not (like churches and trade unions before them) be simply co-opted. For this emphasis must be on fostering and protecting the kind of "new consciousness," or "beginner's mind," which in my view the peace movements now possess and most traditional Marxists conspicuously lack.

But, in their current condition, neither peace movements nor peace studies should ignore the achievements of Marxism. Here I agree with Mittelman's critique of world order studies: that "what is wanting is rigorous inquiry into the determinants" of today's social ills.⁴⁰ We need to sharpen our understanding of the socio-economic forces which now prevail, not just at the moment when they lead nations into wars (though even here we need far greater insight), but wherever they can be shown to obstruct an evolution towards a more peaceful and stable order:

In this area Marxist analysis can contribute to peace studies, along with analyses from other starting-points, such as ecology or social psychology, which Marx ignored. Indeed we may take this area of analysis as perhaps the most urgent task of peace studies, but not the only one. The other, I

believe, is to consider and evaluate modes of practice in which the search for self- and for communal improvement are not (as in the later Marx) separated.

The rapidly-evolving processes of the various nonviolent movements deserve special study, particularly in their increasing efforts to organize for survival on an international basis. The adaptation of grass-roots processes to global problems is a major challenge, one barely begun. Here academic peace students can properly be not just observers but participants. As one possibility their studies might go beyond existing and alternative world-order models to actual exchanges with like-minded individuals from other parts of the world. But on another level their experience might include participation, if only as observers, in nonviolent social process, a participation for which no form of book-knowledge or sophisticated analysis can serve as substitute. Their task would be not only to learn but to evaluate; for non-violent process is assuredly not fixed and infallible. On the contrary it is still rapidly evolving and open to amendment.

An academic program of peace studies will have to establish criteria for the reconciliation of such participatory field work with the legitimate requirements of academic objectivity. Just as the anthropologist living among cannibals must ultimately choose between the study and the practice of cannibalism, so the student of nonviolent process must retain a certain discriminatory detachment as long as he or she continues to be a student. Nor should a peace studies program reflect an uncritical bias in favor of nonviolent process, or any other approach to peace. If placements with peace studies conflict resolution groups are to be one important option for peace studies programs, so should placements of interns in the State Department, congressional offices, or political lobbying groups. The stress in this article on the first option should not inhibit any differently-minded student from pursuing their own preference.

This emphasis on critical objectivity is not a reluctant concession, the price for coexistence in a liberal academic institution. A critical spirit and tolerance of diversity are both central (if fallible) ingredients of a meaningful, self-improving process of peace study.

While acknowledging the need for peace studies to be as objective as possible, we should not succumb to the current academic prejudice of total detachment from what is studied (a prejudice without deep roots in the history of the university), any more than to the activist prejudice in favor of total commitment. The academic praise of total detachment seems to generate particular hostility towards peace studies: while scholars can easily contemplate fieldwork among cannibals or criminals (where there is small risk of conversion to the studied lifestyle), there is much more apprehension about peacework among peace activists, insofar as the risks of conversion,

or at least of altered lifestyle, are greater. The academic goal should not however be total detachment, but a large and open mind.

As it is, some academics and some radicals are hostile to the proposition that we should strive to confirm in ourselves and our activity as much as we can of that order which we strive also to confirm in the world. Precisely because this old-fashioned proposition is so controversial, I should like to conclude by reaffirming it boldly. *Yatha Pinda Tatha Brahmaṇde*: the personal is the political. Or, more literally, "as the fragment, so the cosmic egg."

Notes

1. Karl Marx, *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Napoleon*, in L.S. Feuer (ed.), *The Basic Writings of Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels* (New York: Doubleday, 1959), p. 320.
2. Jurgen Habermas has noted the "peculiar disproportion" between Marx's dialectical practice of inquiry, and the reductionism and scientism of his theoretical self-understanding: Jurgen Habermas, *Knowledge and Human Interests*, tr. Jeremy J. Shapiro (Boston: Beacon, 1971), p. 42, cf. pp. 56-58; Thomas McCarthy, *The Critical Theory of Jurgen Habermas* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1978), p. 18. I agree with Christine Sylvester on the importance of Habermas' communication and socialization theory (especially his "reconstruction of historical materialism" by reconciling Marx with Piaget) to integrative peace studies, and above all on his project of combining "empirical-analytic concern with ethical praxis," this issue, *Alternatives*, p. 386. As will become clear in this essay, I locate the key to this combination not in "theory-building" but in a balance between theoretical study and actual experience of non-violent process in social movements.
3. Aeschylus, *Agamemnon* (ed. Fraenkel), 764-66. The Greek *hubris*, which Fagles translates here as "violence," is more traditionally translated in ethical rather than political terms, such as "pride" (Thomson), "impiety" (Morstead), "insolence" (Fraenkel), or "crime" (Lattimore). But the relevance of the passage, and of the *Oresteia* myth it illustrates, is unmistakable. Cf. Aeschylus, *The Suppliant Maidens* (tr. Lattimore), 101-10.
4. Heinz R. Pagels, *The Cosmic Code: Quantum Physics as the Language of Nature* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1982), p. 94.
5. J. Robert Oppenheimer, *Science and the Common Understanding* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1954), pp. 87-88; discussed in Norman Rabkin, *Shakespeare and the Common Understanding* (New York: Free Press, 1967), pp. 19-28.
6. Pagels, op. cit., p. 94.
7. An extreme example is Amital Etzioni's claim that the United States was "countering Communism" in Guatemala in "1956" (i.e. 1954), and Lebanon in 1958: *Hard Way to Peace* (New York: Crowell-Collier, 1962), p. 137, cf. p. 16. Elsewhere Kenneth Boulding belittles communist ideology as "strongly enemy-centered; almost everything is conceived of in terms of a struggle, against external enemies, against internal enemies, or against nature. . . . The reasons for this may be found partly in the character of the prophet of the ideology and partly in the necessity for any ideology to differentiate itself in its early stages from a hostile environment. Karl Marx was a man of deep inner hostilities who spent much of his life in bitter polemics. . . . The Communist of capitalist countries seem very frequently to be of this personality type; communism is for them an ideology that legitimizes their inner conflicts and enables them to project on the society around them the hatreds that arise from the frustration of their avoidance patterns"; Kenneth E. Boulding, *Conflict and Defense: A General Theory*

- (New York: Harper, 1962), pp. 285-86. One can unfortunately give many such examples of transmitted falsehoods and *ad hominem* arguments.
8. Richard A. Falk, *A Study of Future Worlds* (New York: Free Press, 1975), p. 82.
9. Among the names which come to mind are those of Jean-Paul Sartre and the existentialist Marxists, including Henri Lefebvre and Lucien Goldmann, and Herbert Marcuse and the Frankfurt School. In this country an important influence has been the St. Louis journal *Telos*, which has translated the works of writers such as Jean Baudrillard (*The Mirror of Production*) and Cornelius Castoriadis. Cf. Mark Poster, *Existential Marxism in Postwar France* (Princeton: Princeton U.P., 1977); Martin Jay, *The Dialectical Imagination: A History of the Frankfurt School and the Institute of Social Research 1923-1950* (Boston: Little Brown, 1973).
10. Cf. Robert Heilbroner, *An Inquiry into the Human Prospect* (New York: Norton, 1974); Fred Hirsch, *Social Limits to Growth* (New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1976).
11. Karl Marx, *Grundrisse*, cited in Richard Barnet, *The Lean Years: Politics in the Age of Scarcity* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1980), p. 298, pp. 299-301.
12. "Heinrich Regius" [Max Horkheimer], *Dämmerung* (Zurich, 1934), p. 181; Walter Benjamin, *Illuminations* (New York, 1968), p. 261; both quoted in Jay, op. cit., p. 57. Jay notes elsewhere that what Horkheimer "disliked in Marx's view of nature, [the early] Marcuse himself expressed. . . : 'All "nature" (in the widest sense of extrahuman being) is the medium of human life, the life-means [*Lebensmittel*], which also means food) of men. . . . Man cannot simply be subservient to or come to terms with the objective world, he must appropriate it, to make it his own.' Clearly implied here was the domination of nature rather than reconciliation with it" (Jay, p. 75). But cf. fn. 25 below.
13. Barnet, op. cit., pp. 299-301.
14. *Ibid.*, pp. 312-14.
15. Falk, op. cit., p. 167.
16. Saul Mendlovitz, ed., *On the Creation of a Just World Order: Preferred Worlds for the 1990s* (New York: Free Press, 1975), p. 359; quoted in James Mittelman, "World Order Studies and International Political Economy," this issue, *Alternatives*, p. 338.
17. Mittelman, op. cit., pp. 340, 342.
18. *Ibid.*, p. 339.
19. U.S. Cong., Senate, Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, *Final Report*, 94th Cong., 2nd Sess., Senate Report No. 94-755, book I, *Foreign and Military Intelligence* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1976), p. 182.
20. Madhu Dandavate, *Marx and Gandhi* (Bombay: Popular Prakashan, 1977), p. 47.
21. A reader has asked "what alternatives" I can envision to the large-scale bureaucratic state. Living as we do on the nuclear brink, I find the question astonishing. One can imagine a Roman citizen of the second century A.D. asking such a question; and our answer to him would be those forms of social organization which did in fact supplant the Roman Empire in Western Europe: the urban church, the rural villa, the monastery. Cf. Peter Brown, *The World of Late Antiquity: AD 150-750* (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, c1971), or Perry Anderson, *Passages from Antiquity to Feudalism* (London: New Left Books, 1974). I cannot predict what might succeed to the state as we know it; but I suspect that our failure to envisage peaceful transitions may only result in drastic ones.
22. Both quotes from Marx's address to the International Workingmen's Convention at the Hague, 1872; cited in Karl Kautsky, *The Dictatorship of the Proletariat* (Greenwood, CT: Greenwood Press, 1981) pp. 8-9; Dandavate, p. 48. Among later Marxists it is Gramsci who (as Mittelman notes, op. cit., pp. 332-333) most clearly sees the need to achieve hegemonic change, not through the state, but by developing alternative institutions such as workers' councils.

- 23. Dandavate, op. cit., p. 49.
- 24. The best discussion is by Noam Chomsky, based on documentation in the Pentagon Papers: Noam Chomsky, "The Pentagon Papers as Propaganda and as History," *The Pentagon Papers: Critical Essays Edited by Noam Chomsky and Howard Zinn, in The Pentagon Papers (The Senator Gravel Edition)* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1972), V, 182-87.
- 25. Hannah Arendt, *On Violence* (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1970), p. 53.
- 26. Herbert Marcuse, *Eros and Civilization* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1955), p. 150. I disagree with Christine Sylvester's (and Thomas McCarthy's) claim that, according to Habermas, "the early Frankfurt School's *Kulturkritik* verged on rejecting science and technology altogether" (op. cit., p. 387). In fact Habermas, accurately summarizing Marcuse, wrote that for the latter "social emancipation could not be conceived without a complementary revolutionary *transformation* of science and technology themselves." (Jurgen Habermas, "Technology and Science as 'Ideology,'" in *Toward a Rational Society*, tr. Jeremy J. Shapiro, (Boston: Beacon Press, 1971), p. 85; reprinted in Thomas McCarthy, *The Critical Theory of Jurgen Habermas*, op. cit., pp. 21-22; emphasis added). Marcuse was counting on a transformed industrial technology to liberate humanity from an economics of scarcity, so much so that (as already noted at footnote 12), he could be criticized. Cf. *Eros and Civilization*, p. 152.
- 27. In the late 1960s, after having approvingly observed nonaggressive demonstrations against the Vietnam War, Marcuse elevated nonaggressiveness (as opposed to the structured non-violence of which I have been speaking) to the level of a tactical requirement:

Our goals, our values, our own and new morality, our OWN morality, must be visible already in our actions. The new human beings who we want to help to create—we must already strive to be these human beings right here and now. ["On the New Left," in Massimo Teodori, ed., *The New Left: A Documentary History* (New York: Bobbs Merrill, 1969), p. 469.]

But given Marcuse's dialectics of catastrophic contradictions, it was virtually impossible for him to adhere to this principle with any consistency. As Morton Schoolman points out,

Marcuse's final position on violence is ambivalent. While his strategic analysis viewed violence as a necessary evil, violence clearly left the opposition paralyzed. Inadvertently or deliberately, it is difficult to say, Marcuse proved violence to be an inappropriate means of achieving revolutionary aims. New strategies must be sought. [Morton Schoolman, *The Imaginary Witness: The Critical Theory of Herbert Marcuse* (New York: Free Press, 1980), p. 309.]

- 28. Peter Brock, *Pacifism in the United States: From the Colonial Era to the First World War* (Princeton: Princeton U.P., 1968), pp. 934-36; quoting Merle Curti, *Bryan and World Peace* (Northampton, Mass., 1931), pp. 175, 183.
- 29. Jean-Baptiste Duroselle, *From Wilson to Roosevelt: Foreign Policy of the United States, 1913-1945* (New York: Harper and Row, 1968), pp. 61-62.
- 30. George Lakey, "Strategy for a Living Revolution," in *World Order Book* (New York: Institute for World Order, 1973), p. 57:

Bourgeois pacifism is clearly an inadequate ideology for a revolutionary program. But nonviolent struggle as a strategic commitment is something else again. (One can see the difference when one realizes that most pacifists do not practice nonviolent resistance, and most people who practice nonviolent resistance are not pacifists.)

For an extended study of nonviolent politics, cf. Gene Sharp, *Exploring Nonviolent Alter-*

natives (Boston: Sargent, 1971), and *The Politics of Nonviolent Action* (Boston: Sargent, 1974); also the articles by Alvin Gouldner in *Telos*, 1975-78.

31. Daniel Ellsberg has documented the role of the anti-war movement in preventing both the Johnson and Nixon administrations from escalating the Vietnam War, particularly by the use of tactical nuclear weapons.

32. Cf. Raghavan Iyer, *Parapolitics: Toward the City of Man* (New York: Oxford U.P., 1979). However Iyer's use of the word "parapolitical," where I have suggested "transpolitical," is at odds with the usage of at least two important newsletters for covert violence and repression studies: *P/P: Parapolitics/Parapolitique* (Paris), and *Parapolitics* (Washington). The former is published by the Association pour le Droit & l'Information (46, rue de Valenciennes, 75006 Paris), an affiliated member of the International Peace Research Association (IPRA) and of the International Confederation for Disarmament and Peace (ICDP).

Cf. Peter Dale Scott, *The War Conspiracy: The Secret Road to the Second Indochina War* (New York: Bobbs Merrill, 1972), p. 171, where parapolitics is defined as

1. a system or practice of politics in which accountability is consciously diminished. 2. generally, covert politics, the conduct of public affairs not by rational debate and responsible decision-making but by indirection, collusion, and deceit.

Iyer's goal, for which I have suggested the term "transpolitics," is in exactly the opposite direction: towards the subordination of delegated political powers to processes emphasizing grass-roots participation and personal interaction. Though some reviewers found Iyer's book utopian and theoretical, it proposes a model for evolution close to that of Barnett and other authors cited in this essay. In my view peace studies need both the analytical dimension of parapolitics, political economy, etc., and the normative dimension of transpolitics.

33. Words attributed to Sir Charles Trevelyan. Lord John Russell, the Prime Minister at the time, wrote to the Duke of Leinster on October 17, 1846 that "any attempt to feed one class of the United Kingdom would, if successful, starve another part": John Prest, *Lord John Russell* (London: Macmillan, 1972), p. 245.

34. Those who would disagree by citing the present conduct of troops in Northern Ireland should compare the British repression of the 1798 uprising, in which barely-armed peasants were summarily massacred, and the British commander, Lord Cornwallis, wrote of his subordinates that "nothing but blood will satisfy them." Cf. Michael de L. Landon, *Erin and Britannia: The Historical Background of a Modern Tragedy* (Chicago: Nelson Hall, 1981), p. 223; Thomas Flanagan, *The Year of the French: A Novel* (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, c.1979). The hard-heartedness of the current Reagan administration towards the large numbers of people it has helped to render homeless and destitute might seem to be a stronger argument against the proposition that governmental behavior has been improved in this area: we must wait for future elections to see whether the Reagan policies will be sanctioned by the American people.

35. Thus a prominent Marxist historian, E.P. Thompson, has called for an international protest movement "at every level of society" to bring its influence to bear on the rulers of national states on both sides of the Iron Curtain: E.P. Thompson and Dan Smith (eds.), *Protest and Survive* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1981), p. 47. For his description of a new and transcendent priority, "the politics of human survival," Thompson has not surprisingly been criticized by other, more traditional Marxists.

36. Since the writing of this article, another faculty committee of the University of California at Berkeley has authorized Peace and Conflict Studies as an experimental special program, for an initial period of two years.

37. René Girard, *Des Choses cachées depuis la fondation du monde* (Paris: Grasset, 1978).

38. Jean-Paul Sartre, "Réponse à Albert Camus," *Les Temps Modernes* 82 (August 1952), p. 313; general discussion in Germaine Bree, *Camus and Sartre: Crisis and Commitment* (New York: Delacorte Press, 1972).
39. Albert Camus, *The Rebel: An Essay on Man in Revolt* (New York: Vintage, 1956), p. 5. In his later "Reflections on the Guillotine," Camus moved towards what Philip Thody has called a "politics of compassion," arguing that "we can never be justified in performing actions as irretrievable and absolute as taking a man's life away from him"; Philip Thody, *Albert Camus, 1913-1960* (New York: Macmillan, n.d.), p. 208; Albert Camus, *Essais*, ed. R. Quilliot (Paris: Pléiade, 1965), 1021-64, esp. p. 1051.
40. Mittelman, *op. cit.*, p. 335. Christine Sylvester makes a similar point when she faults world order studies for "downplaying aspects of control embodied in economic structures," *op. cit.*, p. 389.

WORLD ORDER AND INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY: ISSUES OF WORLD SYSTEM CHANGE

Christine SYLVESTER*

The field of international relations is not simply headed for a new round of epistemological controversy as some contend.¹ It is already there. Traditionalists, ever ready to defend a state-centric, security-oriented world² are challenged by students of international political economy (IPE). The latter are themselves engaged in controversy over the nature of the system: mainstream analysts of IPE picture the world in terms of profound interdependencies requiring management;³ analysts in the more radical world system tradition picture the world as a political and economic entity that operates according to long-standing principles of production and exchange.⁴ Somewhere between the two centers of debate stands the normative tradition of inquiry associated with the World Order Models Project (WOMP).⁵ WOMPers seek to encourage humanistic transformation of the system and therefore are chided by traditionalists and mainstream IPE analysts as idealistic, while their belief in the efficacy of political action renders them invisible to analysts in the more structure-oriented school of world system inquiry. In the generally cacophonous melee, there is one final set of actors—the bridge-builders who roam the arena calling alternately for heightened controversy and for synthesis.⁶

This paper is concerned with the quality of the debate in the field and with the possibility that bridges might be built between two traditions which do not normally address each other's concerns. Our focus of attention is the world system and world order traditions which we find intriguing for several reasons. First, each purports to replace mainstream interpretations of system structure, process, and development with a new tradition that is more attuned to visible and hidden elements of the system and to the continuities and discontinuities that give rise to change. Second, each is seemingly blind to issues raised by the other. World system scholars focus on structural ele-

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