

# The Sociology of News Production Revisited

*Michael Schudson*

Social scientists who study the news speak a language that journalists mistrust and misunderstand. They speak of 'constructing the news', of 'making news', of the 'social construction of reality'. 'News is what newspapermen make it', according to one study (Gieber, 1964: 173). 'News is the result of the methods newswriters employ', according to another (Fishman, 1980: 14). News is 'manufactured by journalists' (Cohen and Young, 1973: 97) in the words of a third. Even journalists who are critical of the daily practices of their colleagues and their own organizations find this talk offensive. Such language propels journalists into a fierce defence of their work, on the familiar ground that they just report the world as they see it, the facts, facts, and nothing but the facts, and yes, there is occasional bias, sensationalism, or inaccuracy, but a responsible journalist never fakes the news.

That is not what we said, the scholars respond. We did not say journalists fake the news, we said journalists make the news:

To say that a news report is a story, no more, but no less, is not to demean news, nor to accuse it of being fictitious. Rather, it alerts us that news, like all public documents, is a constructed reality possessing its own internal validity.

(Tuchman, 1976: 97)

In the most elementary way, this is obvious. Journalists write the words that turn up in the papers or on the screen as stories. Not government officials, not cultural forces, not 'reality' magically transforming itself into alphabetic signs, but flesh-and-blood journalists literally compose the stories we call news. Journalists make the news. (Would you say, the journalist might respond, that scientists 'make' science rather than 'discover' it or report it? Yes, the conscientious scholar must answer, we would say precisely that, and sociologists of science do say precisely that.)

This is not a point of view likely to make much headway with professional journalists. 'News and news programmes could almost be called random reactions to random events', a reporter told British sociologist Graham Murdock. 'Again and again, the main reason why they turn out as they do

is accident – accident of a kind which recurs so haphazardly as to defeat statistical examination' (1982: 163). The study of the generation of news aims to find an order behind this sense of accident (and to understand as ideology journalists' failure to believe in such an order).

The sociology of the production of news goes back at least to Max Weber (1921; 1946), who wrote of the social standing of the journalist as a political person; Robert Park (1922; 1923), an ex-journalist himself, who wrote about the US immigrant press and news itself as a form of knowledge; and Helen MacGill Hughes (1940), who wrote an early study of human interest stories. But the formal study of how news organizations produce news products dates to studies in the early 1950s of 'gatekeepers'.

Social psychologist Kurt Lewin coined the term 'gatekeeper' and several social scientists (White, 1950; Gieber, 1964) applied it to journalism. David Manning White studied a middle-aged wire editor at a small mid-western newspaper. For one week, 'Mr Gates' (as White called him) made available to the researcher every piece of wire copy, both those he rejected and those he selected to print in the paper. He then wrote down a reason for rejection on every story he turned down. Some of these reasons were not very illuminating – 'not enough space'. Others were technical or professional – 'dull writing' or 'drags too much'. Still others were explicitly political – 'propaganda' or 'he's too Red'. These last greatly influenced White's interpretation of gatekeeping although political reasons for rejection accounted for just 18 out of 423 cases. Mr Gates admitted that he did not like President Harry Truman's economic policies, that he was anti-Catholic, and that these views affected his news judgement. White concludes that 'we see how highly subjective, how based on the "gatekeeper's" own set of experiences, attitudes and expectations the communication of "news" really is.'

If Mr Gates' judgements can be attributed to personal subjectivity, we should expect some variation among wire editors if a larger sample were studied. Walter Gieber found otherwise in a 1956 study of 16 wire editors in Wisconsin. All the editors selected news items in essentially the same way. They were not doing politics in selecting the news. They were doing a rote task. The typical editor was 'concerned with goals of production, bureaucratic routine and interpersonal relations within the newsroom' (1964: 175). Gieber's analysis is a refutation, not an extension, of White's.

The term 'gatekeeper' is still in use. It provides a handy metaphor for the relation of news organizations to news products; but it leaves 'information' sociologically untouched. It minimizes the complexity of newsmaking. News items are not simply selected but constructed. The gatekeeper metaphor fails to describe this. It also ignores the feedback loops in which the agencies that generate information for the press anticipate the criteria of the gatekeepers in their efforts to get through the gate, like teenagers trying to figure out how best to talk and look in order to get admitted to X-rated movies or to 'pass' as adult at establishments that serve liquor. The whole industry of public relations, which after the First World War emerged as a major intermediary between government and business on the one hand, and journalism on the other (Schudson, 1978) trades on its expertise in knowing how to construct items that 'pass'.

If the gatekeeper model is ultimately insufficient, what approaches might

work better? Three perspectives on newsmaking are commonly employed. The first is the view of political economy that relates the outcome of the news process to the structure of the state and the economy and to the economic foundation of the news organization. This view appears in its most theoretically sophisticated and self-critical form in British media studies (Murdock, 1982).

The second approach comes primarily out of sociology, especially the study of social organization, occupations and professions, and the social construction of ideology. This perspective tries to understand how journalists' efforts on the job are constrained by organizational and occupational routines.

Third, a 'cultural' approach emphasizes the constraining force of broad cultural traditions and symbolic systems, regardless of the structure of economic organization or the character of occupational routines.

All three of these approaches have strengths and weaknesses I will discuss here. All of them, even taken together, have so far fallen short of providing adequate comparative and historical perspectives on news production.

### The Political Economy of News

News is a form of culture. It is a structured genre or set of genres of public meaning-making. This is not to suggest that it floats in some sort of symbolic ether. It is a material product and there is a political economic dimension to understanding the production, distribution, and appropriation of news (Garnham, 1990: 10).

The value of a political economy perspective varies depending on what aspect of 'news' it is that one wants to explain. Is it the conservative, system-maintaining character of news? This is more often than not the feature of news that political economy scholars focus on – but there are many other possibilities. One of them is the very opposite – the press in liberal societies has sometimes been characterized as adversarial or even nihilistic, system-attacking or system-denigrating, government-toppling or crime-promoting. In other cases, there are finer features of news that analysts want to understand. Why does news seem to focus on individuals rather than systems and structures? Why does news appear to be so heavily dependent on official sources? Or analysts may focus on features of the literary character of news – why is there a 'summary lead' rather than a chronological opening to a news story? Why has the length of a television sound bite in American network news declined over the past two decades? Why do city hall reporters summarize the highlights of official meetings rather than report the whole, often disorganized and desultory proceeding – and what consequences are there to thereby 'rationalizing' the portrait of the political process (Patetz et al., 1971)? Perhaps the most complex question of 'what to explain' concerns whether one should find distressing, and try to explain, the deviation of the media from 'fair' and 'objective' reporting or, instead should find disturbing and try to understand how it is that 'fair', 'objective' reporting presents a portrait of the world in tune with the view of dominant groups in society. Thus critics have objected to the Glasgow Media Group's studies for castigating television news bias

when the more important point may be that broadcast news programmes 'achieve their ideological effectivity *precisely through* their observation of the *statutory* requirements of balance and impartiality' (Bennett, 1982: 306).

The link between the larger political economy of society and day-to-day practices in journalism is, as Graham Murdock has observed, 'oblique' (Murdock, 1982: 158). The link between ownership of news organizations and news coverage is not easy to determine. It is hard to tie patterns of ownership to specific habits of reporting. Research on the consequences of news content of chain ownership compared to independent ownership of American newspapers has been either inconclusive or, as C. Edward Baker puts it, 'tepid, hardly motivating any strong critique of chain ownership or prompting any significant policy interventions' (Baker, 1994: 19).

Normally, news 'coincides with' and 'reinforces' the 'definition of the political situation evolved by the political elite' (Murdock, 1982: 172). This basic intuition seems incontestable but the greatest research interest lies in determining its limits. Much of the movement toward institutional or organizational-level analysis of the news emerged in the late 1960s because 'instrumental' perspectives from political economy did not seem to describe the aggressive and critical investigative reporting of the day. A view that sees large corporations and the media working hand-in-glove cannot explain why corporations in the early 1970s should have been so incensed at how the media covered politics, the environment, and business (Dreier, 1982). The behaviour of the American press in questioning the Vietnam war and in bringing down President Nixon may have emerged precisely because the political elite was divided much more profoundly than it ordinarily is. Even then, the press seems largely to have gone about its normal business of citing official leaders — just at a time when officials were at odds with one another (Hallin, 1986). The result was that the media amplified elite disagreements in unsettling and unpredictable ways.

Explanations from political economy may be especially apt for understanding the broadly different stances different news organizations or types of organizations take toward audiences in the marketplace. Curran et al. (1980) ask why elite and mass-oriented newspapers provide such different fare when reader surveys find that different classes prefer to read similar materials. Their explanation centres on the value to advertisers of advertising in papers that attract a small, concentrated elite audience. The expense of having an advertisement reach an 'upscale' audience is lower if a large share of this audience can be reached through one publication — without having to pay the cost of reaching thousands of extraneous readers.

Fewer and fewer corporations control more and more of the American news media (Bagdikian, 1983). Major media conglomerates control more and more of the world's media. Where media are not controlled by corporations, they are generally voices of the state. Under these circumstances, it would be a shock to find the press a hotbed of radical thought. But, then, critical or radical thought in any society at any time is exceptional. That there could be a moment of critical upheaval in American society and in the American media in the late 1960s raises doubts about any political economic perspective that attributes power — or unity — of Orwellian proportion to the capitalist class. The 'velvet revolution' in Eastern Europe in 1989 raises related doubts about

attributions of unlimited power to the socialist state. The ability of a capitalist class to manipulate opinion and create a closed system of discourse is limited; ideology in contemporary capitalism is contested terrain. The ability of a socialist bureaucracy to create a closed system has limits, too, although its direct efforts to create one have often been stronger, have certainly been more explicitly advanced, and have faced fewer legal or political impediments.

Nevertheless, a political economy perspective has sometimes tended toward 'conspiracy theory' or simple-minded notions that a ruling directorate of the capitalist class dictates to editors and reporters what to run in their newspapers. There is no reason political economy need take this turn but it certainly has done so in the past. A kind of conspiracy model is apparent in Edward S. Herman's and Noam Chomsky's *Manufacturing Consent* (1988). This work offers a 'propaganda model' of the mass media, the view that the media 'serve to mobilize support for the special interests that dominate the state and private activity' (1988: xi). For Herman and Chomsky, news serves established power and, although they recognize some variability in the American press, they do not locate any essential difference between the role of leading news institutions in the USA and *Pravda* in the Soviet Union. For them the propagandistic character of news follows necessarily from the fact that the news is produced by a concentrated industry of several dozen profit-making corporations, an industry dependent on advertising for its profits and government officials for its sources, intimidated by right-wing pressure groups, and imbued with anti-communist ideology.

Because the political economic perspective has been adopted and developed primarily by left-wing critics and analysts of the news media, it is not surprising that it tends to paint the news media in liberal societies in the tones of news media in authoritarian regimes. If differences are noted, an equivalence is nonetheless asserted between the limits placed on news media in authoritarian societies by state control and the constraints placed on the press in liberal societies by market mechanisms. Both state and market can limit free expression but this does not make their means or motives for doing so the same. Public criticism of state policy is invariably easier in liberal societies with privately owned news outlets than in authoritarian societies with state or private ownership. In China, published criticism of the state has been tightly constrained; newspapers, it is said in China, 'swat flies but don't beat tigers' (Polumbaum 1994: 258). Reporters have some freedom to write articles critical of high officials, but they must then circulate these as internal documents not available in the public press (Grant, 1988).

The political economy perspective in Anglo-American media studies has generally been insensitive to political and legal determinants of news production; it has been far more 'economic' than 'political'. Increasingly, this is recognized as a serious deficiency. A lively discussion in western Europe now finds great virtue, not just cooptation by the state, in the institutional mechanisms and cultural traditions of public service broadcasting (Garnham, 1990: 104–14). Increasingly, there are efforts to articulate a view of 'civil society' where the media can attain a degree of autonomy from both state and market — and in this context public serving broadcasting is held up as a model (Keane, 1991).

This suggests that, within market societies, there are various institutional

forms and constitutional regimes for the press. Rosario de Mateo's (1989) sketch of the newspaper industry in Spain during the Franco regime, the transition to democracy, and the full restoration of democracy makes it clear that private, profit-making newspapers put ideological purity as their first priority under Franco. After Franco, however, the same private, profit-making press has emphasized profits first while providing more opportunity for freedom of expression. Where state-operated media in authoritarian political systems serve directly as agents of state social control, both public and privately owned media in liberal societies carry out a wider variety of roles, cheerleading the established order, alarming the citizenry about flaws in that order, providing a civic forum for political debate, acting as a battleground among contesting elites. Phina Lahav and her colleagues have usefully surveyed press law in seven democratic societies. Lahav concludes that in countries like Sweden and the USA free expression is better protected than in countries like the United Kingdom, France, and the Federal Republic of Germany with 'a more elitist attitude toward the press' (Lahav, 1985: 4).

While there is serious ideological contestation in liberal democracies, how does it take place? What institutional mechanisms or cultural traditions or contradictions of power provide room for debate and revision? Daniel Hallin, borrowing from the work of Jürgen Habermas, has argued that the opportunity for the media to offer dissenting views and to publicize scandalous news arises in part because they must attend as much to their own legitimacy as to furthering the legitimization of the capitalist system as a whole (Hallin, 1985). If they fail to attend to their own integrity and their own credibility with audiences, they may in fact 'simply become ineffective ideological institutions'. This, it appears, is exactly what happened to official media in eastern Europe; readers there were famous for recognizing that the only reading worth doing is reading 'between the lines'.

The relation of news organizations to new information technologies is a feature of political economy that has occasioned more discussion in the news business than research among scholars. The production process of news has been transformed, both in print and broadcast; indeed, as newspapers embrace both computer and telecommunications capabilities, the gap between broadcast and print newsrooms narrows. Where broadcasting always relied on print media for information and ideas, increasingly print relies on broadcast as well, and CNN is part of the taken-for-granted background noise in American newsrooms.

Beginning in the 1970s, newspapers have seen the introduction of VDTs, pagination (the electronic assembly of pages), on-line and database research, remote transmission and delivery, digital photo transmission and storage. The technologies are generally introduced to lower labour costs and to provide the technical capability to make the newspaper more 'user-friendly', with more interesting and attractive page design. The question for the sociology of news is what influence, overall, any of this has on the news product. Anthony Smith (1980) was probably the first to draw comprehensive attention to the issue but his work has not been followed up with the same analytic skill. We know that the new technology has moved elements of newspaper production from the 'backshop' to the newsroom, has increased the amount of time editors spend on page make-up, and has improved spelling. But has it changed the news

product in any more fundamental ways? Some observers suggest that the ability of foreign correspondents to send copy home by satellite has led to more and shorter stories on timely events rather than fewer, longer, more analytic, and less time-bound work. This may decrease the quality of news (Weaver and Wilhoit, 1991: 158-59) - but hard evidence on how new technology affects the news, or even hypotheses about it, are limited.

### The Social Organization of Newswork

In an influential essay, Harvey Molotch and Marilyn Lester (1974) created a typology of news stories according to whether the news 'occurrence' is planned or unplanned and whether the planners of the occurrence are or are not also the promoters of it as news. If an event is planned and then promoted as news by its planners, this is a 'routine' news item. If the event is planned but promoted by someone different from the agent of the occurrence, it is a 'scandal'. If the event is unplanned and then promoted as news by someone other than its hapless instigator, it is an 'accident'.

This typology defines news by the way it comes to the awareness of a news organization. In none of the three news types is the occurrence a spontaneous event in the world that the news media discover on their own by surveying the world scene. For Molotch and Lester, it is a mistake to try to compare news accounts to 'reality' in the way journalism critics ordinarily do, labeling the discrepancy 'bias'. Instead, they seek out the purposes that create one reality instead of another. The news provides a 'reality' that is 'the political work by which events are constituted by those who happen to currently hold power' (1974: 11). Molotch and Lester reject what they call the 'objectivity assumption' in journalism - not that the media are objective but that there is a real world to be objective about. For Molotch and Lester, newspapers reflect not a world 'out there' but 'the practices of those who have the power to determine the experience of others' (1974: 54).

In what might these practices consist?

Mark Fishman conducted a participant-observation study of newspaper work in a California newspaper with a daily circulation of 45,000 and a full-time editorial staff of thirty-seven (Fishman, 1980). He finds that journalists are highly attuned to bureaucratic organizations of government and that 'the world is *bureaucratically organized for journalists*' (1980: 51). That is, the organization of 'beats' is such that reporters get the largest share of their news from official government agencies. 'The journalist's view of the society as bureaucratically structured is the very basis upon which the journalist is able to detect events' (1980: 51). One of the great advantages of dealing with bureaucracies for the journalist is that the bureaucracies 'provide for the continuous detection of events' (1980: 52). The bureaucrat provides a reliable and steady source of news.

One study after another comes up with essentially the same observation, and it matters not whether the study is at the national or local level - the story of journalism, on a day-to-day basis, is the story of the interaction of reporters and bureaucrats. Some claim officials have the upper hand (Gans, 1979: 116;

Cohen, 1963: 267). Some media critics, including many government officials, say reporters do (Hess, 1984: 109). There is little doubt, however, that the centre of news generation is the link between reporter and official, the interaction of the representatives of the news bureaucracies and the government bureaucracies. This is apparent in the actual daily practices of journalists. 'The only important tool of the reporter is his news sources and how he uses them', a reporter covering state government in the USA told Delmer Dunne (1969: 41). Stephen Hess confirms this in his study of Washington correspondents. He found reporters 'use no documents in the preparation of nearly three-quarters of their stories' (Hess, 1981: 17-18). Hess does not count press-releases as documents - these are, of course, another means of communication directly from official to reporter. It is clear that the reporter-official connection makes news an important tool of government and other established authorities. Some recent work, accordingly, examines news production from the viewpoint of the news source rather than the news organization (Cook, 1989). The corollary of the power of the government source or other well-legitimated sources is that 'resource-poor organizations' have great difficulty in getting news coverage (Goldenberg, 1975). If they are to be covered, as Todd Gitlin's study of SDS indicated, they must adjust to modes of organizational interaction more like those of established organizations (Gitlin, 1980).

There has been much more attention to reporter-official relations than to reporter-editor relations, a second critical aspect of the social organization of newswork. Despite some suggestive early work on the ways in which reporters engage in self-censorship when they have an eye fixed on pleasing an editor (Breed, 1955: 80), systematic sociological research has not been especially successful in this domain. Certainly case studies of newswork regularly note the effects - usually baleful - of editorial intervention (Crouse, 1973: 186; Gitlin, 1980: 64-65; Hallin, 1986: 22). Frands Mortensen and Erik Svendsen (1980) pay explicit attention to various forms of self-censorship in Danish newspapers. Generally, however, studies do not look at the social relations of newswork from an editor's view. This may have something to do with rhetorical forms of understanding the news process that social scientists have unconsciously borrowed from film and fiction portrayals of journalism or it may have to do with the greater glamour of and greater access of reporters compared to editors. In any event, most research has focused on the gathering of news rather than on its writing, rewriting, and 'play' in the press. There has been little work, for instance, on the production of headlines, although informal observation suggests that headlines often misrepresent stories in the direction of conventional thinking or toward the editorial preferences of the newspaper.

This is particularly unfortunate when research suggests that it is in the *play* of a story that real influence comes. Hallin (1986), Herman and Chomsky (1988) and Lipstadt (1986) all argue that in the press of a liberal society like the USA lots of news, including dissenting or adversarial information and opinion, gets into the newspaper. The question is *where* that information appears and how it is inflected. Hallin interestingly suggests there was a 'reverse inverted pyramid' of news in much reporting of the Vietnam war.

The nearer the information was to the truth, the farther down in the story it appeared (Hallin, 1986: 78).

If one theoretical source for the sociology of news has been symbolic interactionism or social constructionist views of society (as in the work of Molotch and Lester, Tuchman and others), a complementary source has been organizational or bureaucratic theory. If, on the one hand, the creation of news is seen as the social production of 'reality', on the other hand it is taken to be the social manufacture of an organizational product, one that can be studied like other manufactured goods. This latter point of view is evident, for instance, in Edward Jay Epstein's early study (1973) that grew out of a political science seminar at Harvard on organizational theory. That seminar took its working assumption to be that members of organization 'modified their own personal values in accordance with the requisites of the organization' (1973: xiv). One should therefore study organizations, not individuals, to analyze the 'output' they produced - in this case, news. Epstein's study, based on fieldwork at national network news programmes in 1968 and 1969, emphasized organizational, economic, and technical requirements of television news production in explaining the news product. Epstein's study, like many others, finds the technical constraints of television news particularly notable. These, of course, have changed radically and rapidly in the past two decades - a serious historical account of this technological revolution remains to be written. A broadly comparative sociology of news would observe how the absence of some technical and logistical features of news production taken for granted in advanced economies limits news coverage in developing nations. In Ghana, for instance, poor communication between cities and rural areas, including the frequent breakdown of lorries carrying newspapers to the countryside, has helped confine reporting to urban areas and issues (Twumasi, 1985).

Who are the journalists in news organizations who cover beats, interview sources, rewrite press-releases from government bureaus, and occasionally take the initiative in ferretting out hidden or complex stories? If the organizational theorists are generally correct, it does not matter who they are or where they come from since they will be socialized quickly into the values and routines of daily journalism. Initial evidence from a cross-national survey by Colin Sparks and Slavko Splichal (1989) apparently supports this view: despite different national cultures, despite different patterns of professional education, and despite different labour patterns of journalists (some in strong professional associations or unions, some not), the stated professional values of the journalists surveyed do not differ greatly. The structural sources of these professional values, however, may. In communist Poland, journalists were strongly attached to professionalism, not out of occupational autonomy but as a refuge from 'the unpleasant push and pull of political forces' (Curry, 1990: 207). Professionalism was a set of values and practices that protected the Polish journalist from manipulation by the Communist Party, government bureaucrats, and the sponsoring organization of each newspaper or journal.

Journalists at mainstream publications everywhere accommodate to the political culture of the regime in which they operate. Still, ideals of journalistic professionalism may incline journalists toward acting to support freedom of expression. In China, some journalists have developed a professional

devotion to freedom of expression and have been a pressure group for the liberalization of press laws (Polunbaum, 1993). In Brazil under military rule in the 1960s and 1970s, reporters grew adept at sabotaging the government's efforts at censorship (Dassin, 1982: 173-76).

Professional values notwithstanding, some American scholars have sought to ascertain the social backgrounds of media personnel as clues to the kind of bias they will bring to their work. Studies by S. Robert Lichter, Stanley Rothman and Linda S. Lichter (1986) made the case that news in the USA has a liberal 'bias' because journalists at elite news organizations are themselves liberal. Their survey of these journalists finds that many describe themselves as liberals and tend to vote Democratic. This is a moderate liberalism, at best: the group is more socially liberal (53 per cent say adultery is not wrong) than economically liberal (only 13 per cent think government should own big corporations). American elite journalists fully accept the framework of capitalism although they wish for it a human face.

The Lichter, Rothman and Lichter approach offers no convincing evidence that the news product reflects the personal views of journalists rather than the views of the officials whose positions they are reporting (Gans, 1985). American journalists in leading news institutions are generally very committed to their ideology of dispassion, their sense of professionalism, their allegiance to fairness or objectivity as it has been professionally defined. They have a professional commitment to shielding their work from their personal political leanings. Moreover, their political leanings may be weak. Several close observers find leading American journalists not so much liberal or conservative as apolitical (Gans, 1979: 184; Hess, 1981: 115).

Critics and activists who advocate the hiring of more women and minorities in the newsroom share the emphasis in Lichter, Rothman and Lichter on the personal values journalists bring to their jobs from their social backgrounds. They hope to see new hiring practices transform the nature of the news product itself to be more oriented to groups often subordinated or victimized in society. Some anecdotal evidence (Mills, 1988) suggests that a changing gender composition of the newsroom does influence news content, but other reports suggest that definitions of news have not dramatically changed (Beasley 1993: 129-30). In the USA there has probably been more concern that the growing affluence of national journalists who report by fax and phone and access databases from their computers will separate journalists from direct contact with the poor or others who live in places unpleasant to visit than there has been hope that a modest increase in the representation of minorities and women in the newsroom will increase the connection of the press to a broader constituency.

What is fundamental in organizational approaches, as opposed to the social recruitment/personal values approach of Lichter, Rothman and Lichter, is the emphasis on a) constraints imposed by organizations despite the private intentions of the individual actors, and b) the inevitability of social construction of reality in any social system. Both points are crucial. As for the first, it should be noted that constraints come not only from the news organizations reporters work for directly but from patterns of newsgathering that bring reporters from different publications under the influence of one another. In the USA, there is criticism of 'pack journalism', where reporters covering the

same beat or same story tend to emphasize the same angle and to adopt the same view-point. In Japan, 'reporters' clubs' are organizations of reporters assigned to a particular ministry, and most basic news comes from reporters in these clubs. Since most clubs are connected to government agencies, news takes on an official cast. The daily association of reporters at the clubs contributes to a uniformity in the news pages; reporters are driven by what is described as a 'phobia' about not writing what all the other reporters write (Feldman, 1993: 98, 120-23; Lee, 1985; Thayer, 1975).

As for the second point, many (though not all) analysts from a social organizational perspective abandon any strong claim that there is a 'reality' out there that journalists or journalistic organizations distort. News is not a report on a factual world; news is 'a delectable consumer product that must be made fresh daily' (Tuchman, 1978: 179). It is not a gathering of facts that already exist; indeed, as Tuchman has argued, facts are defined organizationally - facts are 'pertinent information gathered by professionally validated methods specifying the relationship between what is known and how it is known. . . . In news, verification of facts is both a political and a professional accomplishment (1978: 82-83).

### Cultural Approaches

In social organizational approaches, the fact that news is 'constructed' suggests that it is *socially* constructed, elaborated in the interaction of the newsmaking players with one another. But the emphasis on the human construction of news can be taken in another direction. Anthropologist Marshall Sahlins has written in a different context that 'an event is not just a happening in the world; it is a *relation* between a certain happening and a given symbolic system' (1985: 153). Molotch and Lester, Tuchman, and others who emphasize the 'production of culture' do not focus on the cultural givens within which everyday interaction happens in the first place. These cultural givens, while they may be uncovered by detailed historical analysis, cannot be extrapolated from features of social organization at the moment of study. They are a part of culture - a given symbolic system, within which and in relation to which reporters and officials go about their duties.

Most understandings of the generation of news merge a 'cultural' view with the social organizational view. It is, however, analytically distinct. Where the organizational view finds interactional determinants of news in the relations between people, the cultural view finds symbolic determinants of news in the relations between 'facts' and symbols. A cultural account of news helps explain generalized images and stereotypes in the news media - of predatory stockbrokers just as much as hard-drinking factory workers - that transcend structures of ownership or patterns of work relations. In Paul Hartmann's and Charles Husband's analysis of British mass media coverage of racial conflict, for instance, they note that 'The British cultural tradition contains elements derogatory to foreigners, particularly blacks. The media operate within the culture and are obliged to use cultural symbols' (1973: 274). Frank Pearce, in examining media coverage of homosexuals in Britain (1973), takes as a

theoretical starting point anthropologist Mary Douglas's view that all societies like to keep their cultural concepts clean and neat and are troubled by 'anomalies' that do not fit the preconceived categories of the culture. Homosexuality is an anomaly in societies that take as fundamental the opposition and relationship of male and female; thus homosexuals provide a culturally charged topic for story-telling that seeks to preserve or reinforce the conventional moral order of society – and its conceptual or symbolic foundation. News stories about homosexuals, Pearce says, may be moral tales, 'a negative reference point . . . an occasion to reinforce conventional moral values by telling a moral tale. Through these means tensions in the social system can be dealt with and "conventionalized"'. (1973: 293).

If Mary Douglas is one theoretical reference point for Pearce, Sigmund Freud is another (though unstated). Pearce cites R. D. Laing's observation that people enjoy reading the kind of material to be found in the sensational press because it enables them vicariously to experience pleasurable feelings they are otherwise forbidden to discuss or imagine. 'These pleasurable sensations that we have denied but not annihilated', Pearce writes, 'may be lived through again by means of the sensational newspaper' (1973: 291).

Incidentally, this sort of observation brings into the analysis the news institutions' sense of their audience, something relatively rare in the sociology of news. Of course, there is a large literature in communication studies on the 'uses and gratifications' audiences get from the mass media. But these studies are rarely invoked by analysts to explain why we get the sort of news we do. Is this an important omission? Perhaps not. Journalists typically know very little about their audience. American journalists underestimate the size of their working-class audience (Gans, 1979: 238–39). Soviet journalists overestimate the education level of their readers and underestimate the proportion of women in their audience (Remington, 1988: 167). Herbert Gans found that the reporters and editors he studied at news weeklies and network television programmes 'had little knowledge about the actual audience and rejected feedback from it'. They typically assumed that 'what interested them would interest the audience' (1979: 236). Neither American nor Soviet journalists show much interest in learning more about their audiences. But journalists, like other writers, address an 'implied audience' and it would be instructive to know more about how this image of the reader is constructed in the journalists' minds.

A cultural account of news is also relevant to understanding journalists' vague renderings of how they know 'news' when they see it. The central categories of newswriters themselves are 'cultural' more than structural. Stuart Hall has tried to define the indefinable 'news values' or 'news sense' that journalists regularly talk about. He writes:

'News values' are one of the most opaque structures of meaning in modern society. All 'true journalists' are supposed to possess it: few can or are willing to identify and define it. Journalists speak of 'the news' as if events select themselves. Further, they speak as if which is the 'most significant' news story, and which 'news angles' are most salient are divinely inspired. Yet of the millions of events which occur every day in the world, only a tiny proportion ever become visible as 'potential news stories'; and of this proportion, only a small fraction are actually produced as the day's news in the news media. We

appear to be dealing, then, with a 'deep structure' whose function as a selective device is un-transparent even to those who professionally most know how to operate it.

(1973: 181)

This seems to me exactly right, at least for western journalism. In the Soviet Union, at least in the first instance, the matter was much simpler – 'the party's conception of newsworthiness becomes the journalists' (Remington, 1988: 169), although there is evidence even in pre-Gorbachev days that Soviet journalists held professional values distinct from party directives (Mills, 1981). Gaye Tuchman's observation on American journalists parallels Hall's on the British when she writes that 'news judgement is the sacred knowledge, the secret ability of the newsmen which differentiates him from other people' (1972: 672).

The cultural knowledge that constitutes 'news judgement' is too complex and too implicit to label simply 'ideology' or the 'common sense' of a hegemonic system. News judgement is not so unified, intentional and functional a system as these terms suggest. Its presuppositions are in some respects rooted much more deeply in human consciousness and can be found much more widely distributed in human societies than capitalism or socialism or industrialism or any other particular system of social organization and domination can comprehend. Patriarchal and sexist outlooks, for instance, may well be turned to the service of capitalism, but this does not make them capitalist in origin nor does it mean that they fit capitalist structures especially well.

A specific example may illustrate the many dimensions of this problem. Why, Johan Galtung and Mari Ruge (1970) ask, are news stories so often 'personified'? Why do reporters write of persons and not structures, of individuals and not social forces? They cite a number of possible explanations, some of which are 'cultural'. There is cultural idealism – the western view that individuals are masters of their own destiny responsible for their acts through the free will they exercise. There is the nature of story-telling itself, with the need in narrative to establish 'identification'. There is also what they call the 'frequency-factor' – that people act during a time-span that fits the frequency of the news media (daily) better than do the actions of 'structures' that are much harder to connect with specific events in a 24-hour cycle.

This last point is particularly interesting. Is it a 'social structural' or a 'cultural' phenomenon? In some respect, it is structural – if the media operated monthly or annually rather than daily, perhaps they would speak more often of social forces than of individuals. Indeed, examining journalism's 'year-end reviews' would very likely turn up more attention to social trends and structural changes than can be found in the daily news. But, then, is the fact that the press normally operates on a daily basis structural or cultural? Is there some basic primacy to the daily cycle of the press, of business, of government, of sleeping and waking, that makes the institutions of journalism inescapably human and person-centred in scale?

Or might there be some more or less universal processes of human perception that lead to an emphasis on the individual? Does this have less

to do with something peculiarly American or western or capitalistic than it does with what psychologists refer to as the 'fundamental attribution error' in human causal thinking - attributing to individuals in the foreground responsibility for causation that might be better attributed to background situations or large-scale trends or structures? That news definitions and news values differ across cultures can be demonstrated by comparative research. For instance, the Soviet media, like western media, operated on a daily cycle, but very little of the news concerned happenings in the prior twenty-four hours (Mickiewicz, 1989: 30). Soviet news organizations operated according to long-range political plans and stockpiled stories and editorials to meet political needs (Remington, 1988: 116). The sense of immediacy taken by Western media to be a requirement of news (and often taken by critics to be an ideologically loaded weakness of journalism) is not, the Soviet case would suggest, an invariant feature of bureaucratic organization, occupational routines, or a universal diurnal human rhythm. It is rooted instead in a nation-specific political culture.

So one need not adopt assumptions about universal properties of human nature and human interest (although I think it would be foolish to dismiss them out of hand) to acknowledge that there are aspects of news-generation that go beyond what sociological analysis of news organizations is normally prepared to handle. Richard Hoggart has written that the most important filter through which news is constructed is 'the cultural air we breathe, the whole ideological atmosphere of our society, which tells us that some things can be said and that others had best not be said' (Bennett, 1982: 303). That 'cultural air' is one that in part ruling groups and institutions create but it is in part one in whose social context their own establishment takes place.

The cultural air has both a form and content. The content, the substance of taken-for-granted values, has often been discussed. Gans (1979) describes the core values of American journalism as ethnocentrism, altruistic democracy, responsible capitalism, small-town pastoralism, individualism, and moderation. They are the unquestioned and generally unnoticed background assumptions through which the news is gathered and within which it is framed. If these elements of content fit rather well conventional notions of ideology or the common sense of a hegemonic system (Gans calls them 'para-ideology'), aspects of form operate at a level more remote from ideology as generally understood.

By 'form', I refer to assumptions about narrative, story-telling, human interest, and the conventions of photographic and linguistic presentation that all of the news media produce. Weaver (1975) has shown some systematic differences between the inverted-pyramid structure of print news and the 'thematic' structure of television news; Schudson (1982) has argued that the inverted-pyramid form is a peculiar development of late nineteenth-century American journalism and one that implicitly authorized the journalist as political expert and helped redefine politics itself as a subject appropriately discussed by experts rather than partisans; Hallin and Mancini (1984) demonstrate in a comparison of television news in Italy and the USA that formal conventions of news reporting often attributed to the technology of television by analysts or to 'the nature of things' by journalists in fact stem from features of a country's political culture. All of this work recognizes that news is a form

of literature and that one key resource journalists work with is the cultural tradition of story-telling and picture-making and sentence construction they inherit, with a number of vital assumptions about the world built in.

If there is a general cultural air journalists breathe along with others in their society, there is also a specifically journalistic cultural air tied to the occupational practices of journalists. The 'routines' of journalists are not only social, emerging out of interactions among officials, reporters, and editors, but literary, emerging out of interactions of writers with literary traditions. More than that, journalists at work operate not only to maintain and repair their social relations with sources and colleagues but their cultural image as journalists in the eyes of a wider world. Robert Manoff shows how television news reporters deploy experts in stories not so much to provide viewers with information but to certify the journalist's 'effort, access, and superior knowledge' (1989: 69). Barbie Zelizer (1990) has demonstrated the ways that reporters in American broadcast news visually and verbally establish their own authority by suggesting their personal proximity to the events they cover. Regardless of how the news was in fact 'gathered', it is presented in a style that promotes an illusion of the journalists' adherence to the journalistic norm of proximity. The reality journalists manufacture provides not only a version and vision of 'the world' but of 'journalism' itself.

Cultural form may also refer to language itself. Prognostications of a 'global village' unified by new globe-spanning satellite communications founder on the persistent strength of local and regional language loyalties and national identities. While CNN (Cable News Network) was by 1993 available in 140 countries, relatively small proportions of viewers regularly tune in. Euronews, a five-language satellite-transmitted news channel begun in 1994 and available to millions, similarly, if on a smaller scale, is already experiencing the difficulties of one-world broadcasting in a multinational, multicultural human scene (Parker, 1994).

## Conclusions

The approaches to the study of news I have reviewed often ignore possibilities for change in the nature of news. When William Rivers (1962) studied Washington correspondents in 1960, a generation after Leo Rosten (1937) had studied them, asking some of the same questions Rosten had asked, he found reporters more free from directives from their home offices than they had been in the 1930s. When Leon Sigal studied changes in the front pages of the *New York Times* and the *Washington Post*, he found that from the 1950s to the early 1970s news stories were more likely to be based on more than one source and to include material gathered from (sometimes disaffected or dissident) bureaucrats lower down in the organizational hierarchy. My own research (Schudson, 1982) found that in the 1880s news stories of presidential addresses did not try to summarize the key points of a speech, but that by 1910 a 'summary lead' was a standard form, an assertion, in a sense, of the authority of the press to *définir* the key political reality of the day. Anthony Smith (1980) found major changes in the nature of newswork in British

journalism in his review of changes in journalistic values and practices. Accounts of the Soviet press in its last days make it clear that Glasnost rapidly and radically altered the content of the news; frank reports of accidents, disasters and political protests were printed that would never have appeared in the past (Mickiewicz, 1988; Remington, 1988). In general, historical studies of the press reveal significantly different patterns of newsgathering and newswriting over time that are rarely referenced or accounted for in contemporary media studies.

All three approaches reviewed here tend to be indifferent to comparative as well as to historical studies. Comparative research is cumbersome, of course, even in the age of word-processors and computer networking. More tellingly, I think, media studies are genuinely linked to national political issues — they are an academic meta-discourse on the daily defining of political reality. The motive for research, then, is normally conceived in isolation from comparative concerns. If this strengthens the immediate political relevance of media studies, it weakens their longer-term value as social science.

All three approaches, even so, have greatly advanced our understanding of the media by focusing on the specific institutions and the specific processes in those institutions responsible for creating the cultural product we call news. They have sought to abandon broad functionalist guidelines that understand the media by positing some general social function the media serve (although the political economy perspective is not yet free of a functionalist orientation). This, I think, has been to the good. Still, an implicit normative functionalism has been smuggled into many studies: the idea that the news media *should* serve society by informing the general population in ways that arm them for vigilant citizenship. I am sympathetic to this as one goal the news media in a democracy should try to serve but I do not think historically it is a very good approximation of what role the news media have played — anywhere. The news media have always been a more important forum for communication among elites (and some elites more than others) than with the general population. In the best of circumstances, the fact of a general audience for the news media provides a regular opportunity for elites to be effectively embarrassed, even disgraced, as Brent Fisse and John Braithwaite (1983) show in their cross-national study of the impact of publicity on corporate offenders. The combination of electoral democracy with a free press, economist Amartya Sen has argued, has prevented famines even when crops have failed (Sen and Dreze 1989). But even here the 'audience' or the 'public' has a kind of phantom existence that the sociological study of news production has yet to consider in its theoretical formulations.

## References

- BAGDIKIAN, R., 1983: *The Media Monopoly*. Boston: Beacon Press.
- BAKER, C. E., 1994: *Ownership of Newspapers: The View from Positivist Social Science*. Cambridge, MA: Joan Shorenstein Center on Press, Politics, and Public Policy, Research Paper R-12, Harvard University.
- BRASLEY, M., 1993: 'Newspapers: Is There a New Majority Defining the News?' In P. J. Creedon (ed.), *Women in Mass Communication*. Newbury Park, CA: Sage.
- BENNETT, T., 1982: 'Media, "Reality," Signification'. In Gurevitch, M., Bennett, T., Curran, J. and Woollacott, J., *Culture, Society and the Media*. London: Methuen, 287–308.
- BREED, W., 1952, 1980: *The Newspaperman. News and Society*. New York: Arno Press.
- , 1955: 'Social Control in the Newsroom: A Functional Analysis,' *Social Forces* 33, 326–355.
- COHEN, B. C., 1963: *The Press and Foreign Policy*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- COHEN, S. and YOUNG, J. (eds) 1973: *The Manufacture of News: A Reader*. Beverly Hills: Sage.
- COOK, T. E., 1989: *Making Laws and Making News: Media Strategies in the U.S. House of Representatives*. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution.
- CROUSE, T., 1973: *The Boys on the Bus*. New York: Ballantine.
- CURRAN, J., DOUGLAS, A. and WHANNELL, G., 1980: 'The Political Economy of the Human-Interest Story.' In Anthony Smith (ed.), *Newspapers and Democracy*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, pp. 288–342.
- CURRY, J. L., 1990: *Poland's Journalists: Professionalism and Politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- DASSIN, J., 1982: 'Press Censorship and the Military State in Brazil'. In Curry, J. L. and Dassin, J. R., *Press Control Around the World*. New York: Praeger, pp. 149–186.
- DE MATEO, R., 1989: 'The Evolution of the Newspaper Industry in Spain, 1939–87', *European Journal of Communication*, 4, 211–26.
- DREIER, P., 1982: 'Capitalists vs. the Media: An Analysis of an Ideological Mobilization Among Business Leaders', *Media, Culture and Society* 4 111–132.
- DUNNE, D. P., 1969: *Public Officials and the Press*. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.
- EPESTEIN, E.J., 1973: *News From Nowhere*. New York: Random House.
- FELDMAN, O., 1993: *Politics and the News Media in Japan*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
- FISHMAN, M., 1980: *Manufacturing the News*. Austin: University of Texas Press.
- FISSE, B. and BRAITHWAITE, J., 1983: *The Impact of Publicity on Corporate Offenders*. Albany: State University of New York Press.
- GALTUNG, J. and RUGE, M., 1970 'The Structure of Foreign News: The Presentation of the Congo, Cuba and Cyprus Crises in Four Foreign Newspapers'. In J. Tunstall (ed.), *Media Sociology: A Reader*. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, pp. 259–298.
- GANS, H. J., 1979: *Deciding What's News: A Study of CBS Evening News, NBC Nightly News, Newsweek and Time*. New York: Pantheon.
- , 1985: 'Are U.S. Journalists Dangerously Liberal?' *Columbia Journalism Review* (November/December) 29–33.
- GARNHAM, N., 1990: *Capitalism and Communication*. London: Sage.
- GIEBER, W., 1964: 'News Is What Newsmen Make It'. In Dexter, L. A. and White, D. M., *People, Society and Mass Communications*. New York: Free Press.
- GILLIN, T., 1980: *The Whole World Is Watching*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- GOLDENBERG, E., 1975: *Making the Papers*. Lexington, MA: D. C. Heath.
- GRANT, J., 1988: 'Internal Reporting by Investigative Journalists in China and Its Influence on Government Policy', *Gazette* 41, 53–65.
- GUREVITCH, M., BENNETT, T., CURRAN, J. and WOOLLACOTT, J., eds. 1982: *Culture, Society and the Media*. London: Methuen.
- HAALUN, S., 1973: 'The Determination of News Photographs'. In Cohen, S. and Young, J. (eds), *The Manufacture of News: A Reader*. Beverly Hills: Sage, pp. 176–190.
- HAALUN, D. C., 1994: *We Keep America on Top of the World*. London: Routledge.
- , 1986: 'The Uncensored War: The Media and Vietnam'. New York: Oxford.
- HAALUN, D. C. and MASCINI, P., 1984: 'Speaking of the President: Political Structure and

- Representational Form in U.S. and Italian Television News.' *Theory and Society* 13, 829-850.
- HARTMANN, P. and HUSBAND, C. 1973: 'The Mass Media and Racial Conflict', pp. 270-83 in S. Cohen and J. Young (eds) *The Manufacture of News: A Reader*. Beverly Hills: Sage.
- HERMAN, E. S. and CHOMSKY, N. 1988: *Manufacturing Consent*. New York: Pantheon.
- HESS, S. 1981: *The Washington Reporters*. Washington DC: The Brookings Institution.
- 1984: *The Government/Press Connection*. Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution.
- HUGHES, H. M. 1940: *News and the Human Interest Story*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- KEANE, J. 1991: *Liberty of the Press*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- LAHAV, P., ed. 1985: *Press Law in Modern Democracies: A Comparative Study*. New York: Longman.
- LEE, J. B. 1985: *The Political Character of the Japanese Press*. Seoul: Seoul National University Press.
- LICHTER, S. R., ROTHMAN, S., and LICHTER, L. S., 1986: *The Media Elite: America's New Powerbrokers*. Bethesda, MD: Adler and Adler.
- LIPSTADT, D. 1986: *Beyond Belief: The American Press and the Coming of the Holocaust 1933-1945*. New York: Free Press.
- MANOFF, R. K. 1989: 'Modes of War and Modes of Social Address: The Text of SDI,' *Journal of Communication* 39, 59-84.
- MICKUSWICZ, E., 1988: *Split Signals: Television and Politics in the Soviet Union*. New York: Oxford.
- MILLS, K. 1988: *A Place in the News*. New York: Dodd, Mead.
- MILLS, R. D. 1981: 'The Soviet Journalist: A Cultural Analysis.' Ph.D. dissertation, University of Illinois. Ann Arbor: University Microfilms International.
- MOLNICH and LESTER, M. 1974: 'News as Purposive Behavior: On the Strategic Use of Routine Events, Accidents, and Scandals.' *American Sociological Review* 39, 101-112.
- MORTENSEN, E. and SVENDSEN, F. N. 1980: 'Creativity and Control: The Journalist Betwixt His Readers and Editors.' *Media, Culture and Society*, 2: 169-177.
- MURDOCK, G. 1982: 'Large Corporations and the Control of the Communications Industries.' In Gurevitch, M., Bennett, T., Curran, J. and Woollocott, J., *Culture, Society and the Media*. London: Methuen. 118-150.
- MURDOCK, G. and GOLDING, P. 1977: 'Capitalism, Communication and Class Relations,' pp. 12-43 in Curran, J., Gurevitch, M. and Woollocott, J. (eds), *Mass Communication and Society*. London: Edward Arnold.
- PALEZ, D., REICHERT, P. and MCINTYRE, B. 1971: 'How the Media Support Local Governmental Authority.' *Public Opinion Quarterly* 35, 80-92.
- PARK, R. E. 1923: 'The Natural History of the Newspaper.' *American Journal of Sociology* 29: 273-289.
- 1922: *The Immigrant Press and Its Control*.
- PARKER, R. 1994: 'The Myth of Global News.' *New Perspectives Quarterly* 11, 39-45.
- PEARCE, F. 1973: 'How To Be Immoral and III, Pathetic and Dangerous. All At the Same Time: Mass Media and the Homosexual,' pp. 284-301 in S. Cohen and J. Young (eds) *The Manufacture of News: A Reader*. Beverly Hills: Sage.
- POLJIMBAUM, J. 1993: 'Professionalism in China's Press Corps' in R. V. Des Forges, L. Ning, and W. Yen-bo (eds), *China's Crisis of 1989*. Albany: SUNY Press, pp. 295-311.
- 1994: 'To Protect or Restrict: Points of Contention in China's Draft Press Law' in P. B. Potter (ed.), *Domestic Law Reforms in Post-Mao China*. Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, pp. 247-269.
- REMINGTON, T. F. 1988: *The Truth of Authority: Ideology and Communication in the Soviet Union*. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press.
- RIVERS, W., 1962: 'The Correspondents After 25 Years,' *Columbia Journalism Review* 1, 4-10.
- ROBINSON, M. J. and SHEEHAN, M. A., 1983: *Over the Wire and On TV*. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.
- ROSTEN, L. C., 1937: *The Washington Correspondents*. New York: Harcourt, Brace.
- SAHLINS, M., 1985: *Islands of History*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- SCHUDSON, M., 1978: *Discovering the News: A Social History of American Newspapers*. New York: Basic Books.
- 1982: 'The Politics of Narrative Form: The Emergence of News Conventions in Print and Television,' *Daedalus*, 111, 97-113.
- 1994: 'Question Authority: A History of the News Interview in American Journalism, 1860s-1930s.' *Media, Culture & Society* 16, 565-587.
- 1995: *The Power of News*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- SEN, A. and PREZLE, J., 1989: *Hunger and Public Action*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- SIGAL, L. V., 1973: *Reporters and Officials*. Lexington, MA: Lexington Books.
- SMITH, A., 1980a: *Newspapers and Democracy*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- 1980b: *Goodbye Gutenberg*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- SPARKS, C. and SPICHAL, S., 1989: 'Journalistic Education and Professional Socialization,' *Gazette* 43, 31-52.
- THAYER, N., 1975: 'Competition and Conformity: An Inquiry into the Structure of Japanese Newspapers' in E. Vogel (ed.), *Modern Japanese Organization and Decision-Making*. Berkeley: University of California Press, pp. 284-303.
- TUCHMAN, G., 1972: 'Objectivity as Strategic Ritual: An Examination of Newsmen's Notions of Objectivity.' *American Journal of Sociology* 77, 660-679.
- 1976: 'Telling Stories,' *Journal of Communication* 26 (Fall): 93-7.
- 1978: *Making News: A Study in the Construction of Reality*. New York: Free Press.
- TWUMASI, Y., 1985: 'Social Class and Newspaper Coverage in Ghana,' in F. O. Ughoajah (ed.), *Mass Communication, Culture and Society in West Africa*. München: K. G. Saur, Hans Zell Publishers, 219-220.
- WEAVER, D. and WILHOIT, G. C., 1991: 2nd ed. *The American Journalist*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
- WEAVER, P., 1975: 'Newspaper News and Television News,' in D. Cater and R. Adler (eds), *Television as a Social Force*. New York: Praeger.
- WEBER, M., 1921, 1946: 'Politics as a Vocation,' in Gerth, H. and Mills, C. W. (eds), *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology*, pp. 77-128.
- WHITE, D. M., 1950: 'The Gatekeeper: A Case Study in the Selection of News,' *Journalism Quarterly* 27, 383-390. Also reprinted in Dexter, L. A. and White, D. M. (eds.), *People, Society, and Mass Communications*. New York: Free Press, 1964.
- ZELIZER, B., 1990: 'Where is the Author in American TV News? On the Construction and Presentation of Proximity, Authorship, and Journalistic Authority,' *Semiotica* 80: 37-48.

# Mass Media and Society

Second Edition

*Edited by*

**James Curran**

Professor of Communications, Goldsmiths' College,  
University of London

*and*

**Michael Gurevitch**

Professor, College of Journalism, University of Maryland

1996



A member of the Hodder Headline Group  
LONDON • NEW YORK • SYDNEY • AUCKLAND