

The discipline of international relations is witnessing a surge of interest in identity and identity formation. This development has definitely been permitted and facilitated by the general uncertainty of a discipline which feels itself to have spent the 1980s barking up the wrong trees. A lack of faith in the old has made it easier for the new to break through. And yet, having been foremost among the common concerns of social theory for years and years, it is hardly coincidental that 'the new' happened to take the study of identity formation as one of its major shapes. This article sets out to trace ideas about identity formation as they have evolved around the conceptual pair self/other down four different paths. This entails a good deal of rummaging in the broader field of social theory. The article then examines how the interest in identity formation entered the discipline in full force in the late 1980s and early 1990s. In conclusion, it is suggested that, by drawing on the literature on collective identity formation, the discipline may not only arrive at a fuller understanding of the international system of states, but it may also finally give an ontological status to the sundry subjects or 'actors' of world politics.

Identity Formation in Social Theory

Theoretical reflection on the relation of the self and the order begins in the city-states of the Eastern Mediterranean some time after around 1000BC. It corresponds to the human understanding that there is a choice to be made as to with whom and how one will live — that humans and human lives are and can be shaped by humans themselves. (Strong, 1992a: 9)

Thus wrote Tracy B. Strong in the introduction to a reader on the self as a political problem. Those working outside Western philosophy may like to trace this idea back to India (Mauss, 1985: 13). Anthropologists like Clifford Geertz (also Sampson, 1989) repeatedly warn against treating Western ideas about the self as somehow 'natural': 'The [modern] Western conception of the person as a bounded, unique, more or less integrated motivational and cognitive universe . . . is, however incorrigible it may seem to us, a rather peculiar idea within the context of the world's cultures' (Geertz, 1979: 229). However, the rest of this article will nonetheless concentrate on Western ideas of the self, the other and identity formation, for two reasons. First, in Erik Ringmar's (1995) lovely phrase, modern European man and the modern state were 'born at the same time, and they grew up together'. Almost the entire social theory literature on collective identity formation depends on an anthropomorphization of human collectives, and the human being that is being emulated is very much Renaissance Man. Secondly, due to the continued pertinence of its European cultural roots to international society and the continuing pertinence of

Neumann
Sprouts of
an
anthro.
in the
context of
myths.

international society to world politics, a 'Western' conception of the person continues to exert its influence on world politics everywhere, for better or worse (Bull and Watson, 1984).

The history of the Western self stretches back to the Roman idea that a persona could have general rights and duties through the idea of an inner life. In a sweeping generalization, Martin Hollis sees basically two orientations, the Humean and the Hobbesian:

Hobbes and Hume differ over the concept of a person. Hume . . . can find nothing but a bundle of perceptions from which to compose the self. Social theorists descended from him treat an agent as a set of ordered preferences, which action aims to satisfy. Those of Hobbesian persuasion add a presocial atom, whose preferences they are. (Hollis, 1985: 226)

The theorist who specifically relates the question of identity formation to the conceptual pair of self/other, however, is Hegel. He refines the idea that, by knowing the other, the self has the power to give or withhold recognition, so as to be constituted as self at the same time:

Each is for the other the middle term through which each mediates itself, and each is for himself, and for the other, an immediate being on its own accord, which at the same time is such only through this mediation. They recognize themselves as mutually recognizing one another. (Hegel, 1977: 112)

Marx incorporated this idea in his reformulation of Hegelian dialectics, notably when he grappled with the idea of self-alienation in the 1844 *Paris Notebooks* (Marx, 1994: 83-93). Whereas Hegel offers himself readily to what I shall contrast below as dialogical and dialectical readings of identity formation, Marx insisted much more strongly on the dialectical principle. In the end, it was Marx's version of a dialectical identity formation which became the dominant version in 20th century social theory, and the question of the other is constantly foregrounded by it. The theme of 'the Other' — and specially what constitutes the otherness of 'the Other' — has been at the very heart of the work of every major twentieth-century Continental philosopher', writes Richard Bernstein (1991: 68). Rodolphe Gasché (1986: 101) even insists that 'Western philosophy is in essence the attempt to domesticate Otherness, since what we understand by thought is nothing but such a project'. One could add that it has also been central to at least one social discipline, namely social anthropology, and that there has been a good deal of interest in other fields such as psychology, sociology and literary theory. It is, therefore, only with considerable trepidation that I venture to suggest that this theorizing has taken four different paths. These are what may be called the ethnographic path, the psychological path, the Continental philosophical path and the 'Eastern excursion'.

The Ethnographic Path

The ethnographic path has been trodden by those international relations scholars who have done work on nationalism, and may therefore be closest to home. The basic insight of this literature goes back to Durkheim's theory of the social division of labour, and is this: lineation of an 'in-group' must necessarily entail delineation from a number of 'out-groups', and that delineation is an *active* and *ongoing* part of *identity formation*. The creation of social boundaries is not a consequence of integration, but one of its necessary a priori ingredients (Durkheim, 1964: 115-22; Lévi-Strauss, 1978).

In the postwar period, it was mainly left to social anthropology to carry out a range of studies of self/other relations, the sophistication of which far surpassed what had been done in the other social sciences (e.g., Epstein, 1978). In a classic volume published in 1969, Fredrik Barth and colleagues proposed that ethnicity (and, one could argue by extension, collective identity formation generally) could most fruitfully be studied by taking the boundaries of ethnic groups as a point of departure. Up until then, studies tended to draw up unsystematic catalogues of cultural traits which seemed to be endogenous. Barth moved the focus by demonstrating how ethnic groups were reproduced by the very maintenance of their boundaries to other groups, who were seen to be constituted as other by their lack of this or that trait. In other words, he proposed that the self/other nexus be studied from the hyphen outwards/inwards, in terms of the boundary markers of identity, which he called diacritica. It is the great merit of this move that it wrests identity formation from the psychological path, which will be discussed below, and places it firmly in the sphere of *social interaction*. From the standpoint of world politics, however, one must guard against the bias inculcated by the subject matter of ethnography: when ethnographers set out to study collective identity formation, they will immediately settle for the study of ethnic groups, subcultures, villages and other small-scale collectives. And yet, while the lingering hegemony of nationalism makes ethnically-based collective identities particularly prone to being inscribed with political meaning, there are also republicanism (Mouritsen, 1995), gender (Olesen, 1994), class (see below on the Continental philosophical path). For our purposes, a scale upgrade is needed.

Ethnography's break with psychological conjecture does not mean that psychological insights lose their relevance altogether. An anthropologist like Jonathan Friedman may still refer to early socialization processes and argue that otherness 'begins at home, with our primary others. We become egos, it is said, via the internalization of significant others' objectification of ourselves. Our unity is located in the *regard-l'autre*' (1991: 99). It means,

however, that there is no excuse for simply postulating this or that psychological mechanism, the other as a 'looking-glass self', for example, and neglecting the actual research which it takes to analyse the formation of particular self/other nexuses. For example, it is easy to follow theorists of nationalism like Anderson (1983; see also Gellner, 1983) in asserting that the nation is an 'imagined community'. This, however, is only a starting point. It is a research question, and not a question of conjecture, to decide which are the diacritica that mark a particular self/other nexus, between nations as well as between other human collectives.

Barth has recently (1994: 179) remarked casually that 'the selection of such diacritica is far less haphazard than I may have indicated in 1969'. But which are they? If one takes into consideration the effects of globalization (Robertson, 1992) — of a 'world time' to which more and more collective identity formation sequences have to relate — and if one still grants hegemonic force to the idea of the nation, then language may be expected to be a crucial marker. As suggested by Eriksen's (1993) study of nationalism, for example, it tends to have a 'modular quality' whereby the imagining of each new nation tends to draw on some of the diacritica evolved in earlier imaginings of nations.¹

Barth's insistence on a certain regularity where boundary markers are concerned does not of course rule out any phenomena ipso facto, anything may be inscribed with meaning as a politically relevant boundary marker. Most international relations scholars (but not most anthropologists) were surprised that song festivals were among the key diacritica when the Baltic states inscribed their collective identities with ever more political meaning — in this case human collectives actually sang themselves towards sovereignty. Language has been a crucial marker of national identity (if only inversely so: in Arab-speaking countries, there exist strong sanctions against making spoken forms relevant for written ones, since this is held to constitute an onslaught on the commonly held Arab identity which is in all these countries one of the overlapping political identities). What makes language an important bearer of national identity, however, is not necessarily its distance to other languages relevant to the social setting in question. To take but one example, in terms of etymology, syntax and pronunciation, the distance between Croatian and Serbian or Russian and Ukrainian is negligible compared to the distance between Finnish and Swedish or Hungarian and Romanian. This, however, does not seem to disqualify Croatian and Ukrainian as markers of national identity (yet, nation builders seem to feel a certain unease about the affinities: ongoing attempts at standardizing written Croatian and Ukrainian generally imply privileging those variants of vocabulary and syntax whose distance from Serbian and Russians are deemed the greater). The pervasiveness of the view that these things are of political

¹ In Anderson's
in *Imagined
Communities*

Diacritica
(Achtungsmarkens
marker)
as here
Semantics →

focus directly on the nexus between the self and the other (see Bloom, 1990 for a recent example). What made these studies less persuasive than they might otherwise have been was probably their treatment of language as an unproblematic vessel for the transformation of meaning from one bounded individual to another, instead of focusing on transformations inherent in language itself to understand those social relations which should be the object of study.

However, there does exist a body of Lacanian psychoanalytical literature which redresses this by studying identity formation as an attempt to overcome a lack, as a process of desire for the power of the other, that produces an image of the self. That is, it treats language as relational rather than referential. Anne Norton (1988) has followed this line of inquiry, and has foregrounded and illuminated the role played by the socially marginal. 'The categories of self and other', she writes,

... are shown to emerge with clarity as categories only where they are empirically dubious. ... Individual and collective identities are created not simply in the difference between self and other but in those moments of ambiguity where one is other to oneself, and in the recognition of the other as like. (Norton, 1988: 4, 7)

for Paste
or 1904-1981
turbulent

One notes the affinity of Norton's proposal to study identity formation where self and other ambiguously overlap (particularly what she calls 'liminar' groups) and social anthropology's insistence on studying boundary markers. Norton suggests that the capacity to recognize the other as like is tied to a certain external, *bodily* similarity. The political significance of this seems enormous. Norton draws attention to Rousseau's dictum that the citizen's body is the body politic, quoting him to the effect that 'the words subject and Sovereign are identical correlatives, the idea of which reunites itself under the single word "citizen"' (1988: 28). The parallel drawn between the body and the body politic is then used as a launching pad for an intriguing suggestion:

Accompanying this conviction is another: that likemindedness is coextensive with a likeness of physiological constitution; that all men, insofar as they have the same bodies, have the same capacity for reason, the same emotions, the same desires. This conviction, which has lent particular ferocity to debates over racial and sexual difference, denies the role of politics and language in the constitution of the mind. (Norton, 1988: 42)

This is an interesting starting point not least for the study of how collective identity formations are 'gendered'. The semiotician Yuri Lotman (1990) discusses an example which may throw further light on Norton's discussion of the role of the liminar for identity formation. Seventeenth century

importance means that even states which profess to having the same state language will make differences of vocabulary a matter of political identity. For example, Austria's recent protocol of accession to the European Union (EU) included a list of 23 objects for which one word (for example, *Kartoffel*) is used in Germany, and another (for example, *Erdaepfel*) is used in Austria. When potatoes are referred to in an EU document, it is laid down that both words must be given in the German text. Thus, every time an EU document involving one of these word pairs is published, it will have the effect of confirming that the German language is connected to two different political identities. The dividing line between self and other (Germany/Austria) will be maintained, often perhaps without readers being aware of it (that is, it will happen on the level of practical and not discursive competence, cf. Giddens, 1991). Other relevant identities, for example a German-speaking Swiss one, will not be implicated and so not confirmed.

The Psychological Path

The working of the boundary between an 'us' and a 'them' is the home turf of social psychology, which has belaboured 'ethnocentrism' and sundry related phenomena throughout the 20th century:

... a differentiation arises between oneself, the we-group, or in-group, and everybody else, or the other-groups, out-groups. The insiders in a we-group are in a relation of peace, order, law, government, and industry to each other. Their relation to all outsiders, or other-groups, is one of war and plunder, except so far as agreements have modified it. (Hogg and Abrams, 1988: 17)

One should expect the social identification approach to be of immediate interest here. It sees self-categorization as an explanation of how individuals are turned into groups:

Just as we categorize objects, experiences and other people, we also categorize ourselves. The outcome of this process of self-categorization is an accentuation of similarities between self and other ingroups and differences between self and outgroups, that is self-stereotyping. To be more precise, self-categorization causes self-perception and self-definition to become more in terms of the individual's representation of the defining characteristics of the group, or the group *prototype*. (Hogg and Abrams, 1988: 21)

However, I do not intend to discuss this literature further as it is akin to the literatures on attribution theory and cognitive consistency which made their imprint on the discipline of international relations in the 1960s and 1970s. When the foreign policy analysis literature on perception, belief systems, operational codes, *Feindbilder* and so on failed, it was because it tended to begin and end with a self which was not socially situated, and so did not

Russians defined themselves in relation, among other things, to a group which was resident on their territorial borders and was known to them as *svoi pagany* — our pagans. Being of orthodox religion was the main marker of Russian-ness at this point in time-space. Yet the existence of a group which was somewhat heterodox, but nonetheless (and ostensibly impossibly) 'our', embodied the inevitable ambiguity of identity formation and the inherent uncertainty of the categories us/them and self/other.

The Continental Philosophical Path

The Continental philosophical path, that high road of modernity, is, as I have already intimated, paved with Marxian dialectics. One meets the self and the other as raw material for a possible *Aufhebung* in the name of reason and progress in a number of different loci, for example in Sartre:

It is strange that the problem of Others has never truly disturbed the realists. To the extent that the realist takes everything as given, doubtless it seems to him that the Other is given. In the midst of the real, what is more real than the Other? (Sartre, 1957: 223)

As part and parcel of Habermasian 'discourse ethics', the dialectically framed self and other are still with us as unsuspecting victims of the march of reason and progress. Here they are ideally lodged in 'ideal speech situations' — abstracted from power and indeed from the multiplicities of social bonds other than that of reasoned discourse. It is probably because of this lack of social placement that the most striking thing about the theorizing which has followed this path is its seeming inability to offer new insights about collective identity formation. One exception is Charles Taylor's book *Sources of the Self* (1989; see also Connolly, 1985), which provides a magisterial overview of ideas of the self in the Western tradition. He proposes that these ideas can be found along three dimensions. There is, first, the idea of fully fledged goal, a pre-given narrative into which the fullness of a self's biography should fall. The two major and vying contemporary narratives, Taylor suggests, is that of the hero script and that of the affirmation of everyday life: according to the one, the self should assert itself and soar above its fellows, while according to the other, he or she should simply go on going on. A vista opens up for studying different human collectives in terms of the different scripts by which selves and others are constituted. Third, there is the idea of presentation of self. Developments along the last two dimensions will obviously have an impact on dynamics along the first. To give but two examples, if what is found along the third dimension is a non-reflective mode of self and social order, of the type which is to be found in the Homeric poems, then ideas about the other will necessarily seem

rather different from what they would look like in a reflective order. Again, if what is found along the second dimension is basically a hero script, then this will also have immediate repercussions.

The 'Eastern Excursion'

To turn now down the fourth and last path along which theorizing of collective identity may be found, the 'Eastern excursion' is not a well-trodden path like the high road of modernity but began as more or less isolated little forays into unchartered territory. I shall mention but four of these. Besides trying to theorize the self/other nexus, what they have in common is their marginality to the high road and, hardly unrelated, that there has been a surge of interest in their writings over the last couple of decades. There is, first, Simmel (1970), who discusses the importance of the margin of the collective self, what he refers to as 'the stranger':

The state of being a stranger is of course a completely positive relation. . . . The stranger is an element of the group itself, not unlike the poor and sundry 'inner enemies' — an element whose membership within the group involves both being outside it and confronting it. (Simmel, 1970: 148)

Strangers — the sociologically marginal — play an important role in collective identity formation inasmuch as their very presence brings the question of who is self and who is other to the fore. The ambiguity of strangers may serve to highlight the possible ambiguity between these two categories themselves. Norton's liminars are exemplified and embodied in groups of strangers.² Then there is Schmitt, who maintained that the state defines itself by being the unit which distinguishes the public enemy (*Feind*) from the friend (*Freund*). If a given state fails to do so, its authority will immediately be challenged by some other unit which will take on this burden. Schmitt sees the public enemy in our epoch exclusively as a concern of the political unit, which to him is the sovereign nation-state. This public enemy,

. . . does not have to be morally evil, he does not have to be aesthetically ugly, he does not have to appear as an economic competitor, and it can . . . even be advantageous to have business dealings with him. He is nevertheless the Other (*Andere*). (Schmitt, 1936: 14)

If Simmel draws attention to the margin between self and other and Schmitt proceeds to pare politics down to the act of distinguishing between them, it is Nietzsche's great contribution to begin to dissolve these categories (Dallmayr, 1981: 27). Nietzsche stressed that the world does not simply present itself to human beings, but that the activity of knowing is a formulation of the world. This knowing cannot take place from any solid

foundation, and so the self will know the other and everything else only as a series of changing perspectives, not as a foundational fact. Indeed, it is the knowing that makes the self, not the other way around. Nietzsche's perspectivism assesses 'that "I" am a number of different ways of knowing and that there is no such entity as a permanent or privileged self' (Strong, 1992b: 174). At the same time, he warns about the dangers of *ressentiment*, that is, of taking one's identity from the postulation of a negative other:

Ressentiment, born of weakness, is no one more harmful than to the weak man himself — in the opposite case, where a rich nature is the presupposition, a *superfluous* feeling to stay master of which is almost the proof of richness. (Nietzsche, 1992: 46)³

If it is a defining trait of these three more or less to break with a dialectical understanding of the self/other nexus, it was left to the fourth to flesh out a fully-fledged alternative to it. Mikhail Bakhtin's work was an attempt to redress exactly what he saw as the hollowness in philosophizing about the self:

... from his very earliest work Bakhtin is highly critical of what he calls 'epistemologism', a tendency pervading all nineteenth- and early twentieth-century philosophy. A theory of knowledge devolves into mere epistemologism when there is posited 'a unitary and unique consciousness ... any determinateness must be derived from itself [thus it] cannot have another consciousness outside itself ... any unity is its own unity'. In [Bakhtin's philosophy of] dialogism, the very capacity to have consciousness is based on otherness. (Holquist, 1990: 18)

That is, 'the other' has the status of an epistemological as well as an ontological necessity, without which there can be no thinking self. Whereas Bakhtin thus actively chose to put distance between himself and the broad path of Continental philosophy, this distance was further enhanced by the fact that he carried out his work inside the Soviet Union. He was removed further from contact with that tradition, even should he have wished to maintain a more active relationship with it.⁴ The importance of all this to the present concern is first and foremost to do with how Bakhtin's theorizing of the self/other nexus was re-confronted with the high road of modernity exactly at the time when a number of theoreticians veered off this road in Paris. One recalls that 1967 was the year when Derrida published no less than three seminal books, *On Grammatology* being foremost among them. And it was around this time, in 1966, that Julia Kristeva introduced Bakhtin to a 'Western' readership. As pointed out by Kristeva's editor Toril Moi, this happened by means of a text which bore the marks both of the 'high structuralism' which Kristeva and others were writing themselves away from,

and of what was to come after structuralism. It is worth quoting Kristeva at some length here:

Bakhtin foreshadows what Emile Benveniste has in mind when he speaks about *discourse*, that is 'language appropriated by the individual as a practice'. ... Bakhtin, however, born of a revolutionary Russia that was preoccupied with social problems, does not see dialogue only as language assumed by a subject; he sees it, rather, as a *writing* where one reads the *other* (with no allusion to Freud). Bakhtinian dialogism identifies writing as both subjectivity and communication, or better, as intertextuality. Confronted with this dialogism, the notion of a 'person-subject of writing' becomes blurred, yielding to that of 'ambivalence of writing'. ... The notion of dialogism, which owed much to Hegel, must not be confused with Hegel's dialectics, based on a triad and thus on struggle and projection (a movement of transcendence), which does not transgress the Aristotelian tradition founded on substance and causality. Dialogism replaces these concepts by absorbing them within the concept of relation. It does not strive towards transcendence but rather towards harmony, all the while implying an idea of rupture (of opposition and analogy) as a modality of transformation. ... More than binarism, dialogism may well become the basis of our time's intellectual structure. (Kristeva, 1986: 39, 58-9)

It may at least be the best starting point for the study of collective identity formation. As stressed by Kristeva, by doing away with the totalizing belief in progress inherent in dialectics, dialogism definitely offered itself as an alternative path along which to theorize identity. Indeed, it seems clear that the dialogical understanding of identity formation evolves out of a growing dissatisfaction with the dialectical interpretation and the political practices it inspired. In the case of Bakhtin, his writing self is directly implicated in this break. Writing, as he did, in a situation where public discourse had been all but mopped up by Stalin, and the possibility of public face-to-face discourse had all but vanished, he presented as an alternative the idea that texts could carry on a dialogue with one another across time and space. Kristeva came to read Bakhtin while growing up in Bulgaria, where she was also exposed to a grinding grounding in Marxian dialectics. The writing and reception of her piece were part of a general reorientation away from modern totalizing analysis. I have chosen to call this path 'Eastern' because of the pivotal role played by Bakhtin, and an 'excursion' because of the force with which Bakhtinian and, to an even greater degree, Nietzschean insights grew into a path in their own right and curved back to offer an alternative to the Continental philosophical path. This is the story of the arrival of 'post-structuralism'. Indeed, in his aforementioned *tour d'horizon* of the intellectual landscape of the 1990s, Richard Bernstein goes as far as to juxtapose what is left of the high road of modernity and post-structuralism as together

making up the 'new constellation' of social theorizing. Collective identity formation was a major concern of the new arrivals, as is evident, for example, from the way Foucault explained why he had adopted Nietzsche's genealogical pose:

The purpose of genealogy, guided by history, is not to discover the roots of our identity but to commit itself to its dissipation. It does not seek to define our unique threshold of emergence, the homeland to which metaphysicians promise a return; it seeks to make visible all of those discontinuities that cross us. . . . If genealogy in its own right gives rise to questions concerning our native land, native language, or the laws that govern us, its intention is to reveal the heterogeneous systems which, masked by the self, inhibit the formation of any form of identity. (Foucault, 1977: 156, 162)

There is one more reason why I have called this path the 'Eastern excursion', however, and it has to do with the importance here of the writings of Emmanuel Levinas. Whereas Levinas has only reached a broader readership in the 1990s, not least his importance as a source of inspiration for Derrida and other post-structuralists makes him part and parcel of the general development under discussion.⁵ Levinas himself grew up and received important impulses as a practising Jew in pre-revolutionary Vilna, often called 'the Jerusalem of the East' (Kemp, 1992). Like Kristeva, then, he came to Paris from an East not only in a geographical, but also in a philosophical sense.

Having just insisted on rooting the study of self/other relations in space and time, it may seem paradoxical to turn to a transcendental thinker like Emmanuel Levinas for an example of how otherness is treated. Yet, since besides Bakhtin he is the thinker on otherness *par excellence*, and perhaps even less known among IR scholars than is Bakhtin, I will nonetheless do so. Levinas condemns an ontological approach to the self as basically a violent one, and therefore insists on the need to take a transcendental approach. In this way, the story of the self becomes sacred but also *social* history, derivative from the appearance of the other, mediated in language. The face of the other summons the self into existence:

To be sure, the other (*l'Autre*) that is announced does not possess this existing as the subject possesses it; its hold over my existing is mysterious. It is not known but unknowable, refractory to all light. But this precisely indicates that the other is in no way another myself, participating with me in a common existence. The relationship with the other is not an idyllic and harmonious relationship of communion, or a sympathy through which we put ourselves in the other's place; we recognize the other as resembling us, but exteriority to us; the relationship with the other is a relationship with a Mystery. The other's entire being is constituted by its exteriority rather than its identity, for exteriority

is a property of space and leads the subject back to itself through light. (Levinas, 1989: 43)

This meeting has a timely, historical dimension, inasmuch as the other, because of its association with death — that ultimate other whose coming is certain — defines the future.⁶ The other emerges more clearly as a social entity as Levinas turns towards the sphere of everyday life:

If the relationship with the other involves more than relationships with mystery, it is because one has accosted the other in everyday life where the solitude and fundamental alterity of the other are already veiled in decency. One is for the other what the other is for oneself; there is no exceptional place for the subject. The other is known through sympathy, as another (myself, as the alter ego. (Levinas, 1989: 47)

Once we have fallen to earth, as it were, ontology seems to have re-entered the story. There remains a tension between the fact that the other is an alter ego and the fact that 'the other is what I myself am not'. Levinas stresses the possible asymmetry of power here, where the I may be rich and powerful, whereas the other may be poor and weak. And he stresses that the other cannot be conceived of as freedom, because freedom invites either submission or enslavement, thus leads to its own extinction. Thus enters the problem of *collective* identity formation, i.e. politics. The other upsets order, simply by being other, and what to do when there is a multiplicity of them?

Indeed, if there were only two of us in the world, I and one other, there would be no problem. The other would be completely my responsibility. But in the real world there are many others. When others enter, each of them external to myself, problems arise: Who is closest to me? Who is the Other? Perhaps something has already occurred between them. We must investigate carefully. Legal justice is required. There is need for a state. (Levinas, 1989: 247)

This is where Levinas self-consciously begins to engage with the canon of theorizing on the modern state. The point he wants to make is about the contrast between his own concern and the general thrust of that canon:

But it is very important to know whether the state, society, law, and power are required because man is a beast to his neighbour (*homo homini lupus*) or because I am responsible for my fellow. It is very important to know whether the political order defines man's responsibility or merely restricts his bestiality. It is very important, even if the conclusion is that all of us exist for the sake of the state, the society, the law. (Levinas, 1989: 247–8)

There is a tension here. On the one hand, his transcendent thinking makes him sceptical to the totalizing demands of the state, the state of Caesar is 'the last refuge of idolatry':

... developing from the form it received from the Graeco-Roman world, the pagan State, jealous of its sovereignty, the State in pursuit of hegemony, the conquering imperialist, totalitarian, oppressive State, attached to a realist egoism. As such it separates humanity from its deliverance. Unable to exist without adoring itself, it is pure idolatry. This striking vision arises independently of any text: in a world of scruples and of respect for man derived from monotheism, the Chancellor, with its *Realpolitik*, comes from another universe, sealed off from sensibility, or protest by 'beautiful souls', or tears shed by an 'unhappy consciousness'. (Levinas, 1989: 274)

Yet on the other hand, since he does not pry into the case of the state in its generality, but into the specific state of Israel, he does not leave the matter there. Initially, his is a seemingly universalizing move on behalf of the state form as such.

The sovereignty of the State incorporates the universe. In the sovereign State, the citizen may finally exercise a will. It acts absolutely. Leisure, security, democracy: these mark the return of a condition, the beginning of a free being. This is why man recognizes his spiritual nature in the dignity he achieves as a citizen or, even more so, when acting in the service of the State. The State represents the highest human achievement in the lives of western peoples. The coincidence of the political and the spiritual marks man's maturity, for spiritual life like political life purges itself of all the private, individual, sentimental chiaroscuro on which religions still nurture themselves. (Levinas, 1989: 259-60)

Yet it immediately becomes clear that Levinas is not simply celebrating the state of Israel as one state among many. Israel also has a messianic side, which soars above the 'political book-keeping' of the 'proud West'; it is more than 'a State like any other' (1989: 283). Israel is a state harbouring a great civilization, and

A great civilization ... is universal, that is to say it is precisely capable of whatever can be found in any other civilization, of whatever is humanly legitimate. It is therefore fundamentally non-original, stripped of all local colour. Only those civilizations labelled exotic (or the exotic and perishable elements of civilizations) can be easily distinguished from one another. (Levinas, 1989: 265)

Levinas was born in Vilna in 1906, when it was still part of the Russian empire. One of the lasting influences on him from that time onwards has been the writings of Dostoevsky, and particularly *The Brothers Karamazov*, from which he quotes repeatedly. It is not hard to see how Alyosha Karamazov's idea of everybody as responsible for everybody else would appeal to the philosopher of alterity, or the similarities between Dostoevsky's treatment of the relationship between state and spirit (the Grand Inquisitor

and the staretz) and Levinas's way of approaching that problem. And yet, if Dostoevsky the novelist is widely known and lauded, his political pamphlet-er self, as a Great-Russian nationalist, is not. Dostoevsky supported imperial Russian rule not only throughout the territory which it possessed during his lifetime, but also believed in its expansion into Constantinople, perhaps even to India. The way Dostoevsky mustered support for these claims among his compatriots was exactly by appealing to a transcendental version of the commonplace 19th-century ideas of historical and unhistorical nations, namely that of the all-human Russian civilization: 'Yes, the Russian's destiny is incontestably all-European and universal. To become a genuine and all-round Russian means perhaps to become a brother of all men, a *universal man*, if you please' (Dostoevsky, 1954: 979).

If Levinas simply takes Dostoevsky's outpourings on the historical mission of Russia and applies them to Israel is a question that must be further studied; my claim for now is simply that their textual moves are similar. The importance of this for our undertaking will become clear in a moment. Dostoevsky constructed his claim by maintaining that Russia was more generous and more capable of universalism than 'Europe': He thus invoked a comparison, and established a hierarchy. What about Levinas? To him, Israel is the chosen people of the Book because it is better at taking responsibility for the other than others: 'It is a strange and uncomfortable privilege, a peculiar inequality that imposes obligations towards the Other which are not demanded of the Other in return. To be conscious of having been chosen no doubt comes down to this' (Levinas, 1989: 286). Levinas is aware of the enormity of this claim, guarding against criticism as he presents it by saying that others may see here nothing but a petitioning nationalism. Where this reader is concerned, this is indeed so. But there is more. According to Levinas, 'the Third' must stand in relation to the self and the other as 'a sovereign judge who decides between two equals' (quoted in Bauman, 1992: 113). Levinas is on record as having had a chance to try out this role. In an interview about Israel's responsibility for the massacres in Sabra and Chatila in 1982, Shlomo Malka and the philosopher of alterity exchanged words as follows:

S.M.: Emmanuel Levinas, you are the philosopher of the 'other'. Isn't history, isn't politics the very site of the encounter with the 'other', and for the Israeli, isn't the 'other' above all the Palestinian?

E.M.: My definition of the other is completely different. The other is the neighbour, who is not necessarily kin, but who can be. And in that sense, if you're for the other, you're for the neighbour. But if your neighbour [ostensibly Lebanese Phalangists] attacks another neighbour [ostensibly Palestinians] or treats him unjustly, what can you do? Then alterity takes on another character, in alterity we can find an enemy. (Levinas, 1989: 294)

It is hard to make sense of this; why should this imply a 'completely different' understanding? In one context, Levinas treats the Jewish people as an entity which can be meaningfully discussed as constituted by an other for which it takes more responsibility than that collective other takes for it. And yet, when presented with a case where this clearly did not happen, the propensity to collectivize the other evaporates. Levinas makes the political choice of being a nationalist first, and the philosopher of alterity, who ostensibly has a responsibility to bear witness, second. The question arises, then, whether the uneasiness inspired by this shirking of responsibility on the part of Levinas is simply the result of an idiosyncrasy on his part — his failure to act as what he calls 'a sovereign judge' — or whether it is intrinsically linked to his framing of the political. As Levinas is among the authors on whom recent work on international relations draws, there will be a chance to return to this question as part of the discussion of how the issue of collective identity formation entered the discipline.

International Relations as Self/Other Relations

If it may safely be said that Levinas does not engage fully with the political, one must also note that there is a general reluctance to address the concerns of the discipline of international relations in the vast literature on collective identity formation. In turning to a discussion of how these insights were piloted into the discipline, however, one notes immediately that the first full-length study to address world politics concerns did not appear from inside the discipline. It was the work of a literary critic, Tzvetan Todorov, who, as a Bakhtinian (1984) of Bulgarian background and mentor of Julia Kristeva, was also part of the 'Eastern excursion'. His book *The Conquest of America. The Question of the Other* first appeared in French in 1982. The book treated the early 16th-century Spanish legal-clerical debate about the status of 'the Indians' of the New World. In addition to demonstrating the importance of the meeting of civilizations to the discipline of international relations (cf. Alker, 1992), Todorov suggested that one may 'locate the problematics of alterity' along at least three axes:

First of all, there is a value judgment (an axiological level): the other is good or bad. . . . Secondly, there is the action of rapprochement, of distancing in relation to the other (a praxeological level): I embrace the other's values, I identify myself with him; or else I identify the other with myself. I impose my own image upon him; between submission to the other and the other's submission, there is also a third term, which is neutrality, or indifference. Thirdly, I know or am ignorant of the other's identity (this would be the epistemic level). (Todorov, 1992: 185)

Todorov demonstrated how the relation between self and other cannot be

grasped on one level alone by comparing the relations of people like Cortés and Las Casas to 'the Indians'. Where axiology is concerned, Las Casas loved the Indians more than Cortés (discussions of whether or not a given creature is 'human' or not would also belong along this axis). On the epistemic level, however, Cortés's knowledge of the Indian was superior to that of Las Casas. On the praxiological level, both proposed a relationship of assimilation — the submission of the other. Todorov's distinction explodes the kind of easy thinking which is based on the premise that, if only human collectives came to know one another better, they would also act less violently towards one another.⁷ His typology seems useful. One may, for example, specify the critique made of Levinas above by maintaining that his value judgment singles out Jews as a human collective possessing a unique mission. I would hold that such a view cannot but have consequences along the praxiological axis, for example, by inducing a proclivity to disregard Israeli culpability in Israeli-Palestinian relations. What a specific self/other nexus would look like in terms of these three axes must, however, remain an issue for empirical research, and not a matter of conjecture.

If Todorov's monograph was the first fully-fledged application of the self/other problematic to a historical discursive sequence, the monograph which extended this kind of analysis into the discipline of international relations was arguably James Der Derian's genealogy of diplomacy (1987). The human collectives which served as Der Derian's selves and others were states, and the focus of his analysis was their mediation of estrangement. The tension between a dialectical and a dialogical reading of the relations between selves and others was a main theme of the first section of this article, where it was discussed as a dividing line in social theory at large. Now, I will argue that it is also a feature of Der Derian's work. I suggested that a dialectical and a dialogical reading could be seen to be perching uneasily in Kristeva's Bakhtin article from 1966, where she traced them both back to Hegel. To repeat a quote, 'The notion of dialogism, which owed much to Hegel, must not be confused with Hegel's dialectics, based on a triad and thus on struggle and projection' (Kristeva, 1978: 58). In Der Derian's work on diplomacy, the theoretical accent was firmly on the idea of alienation, with all the dialectical baggage that term entails. And yet, Bakhtin made an unreferenced cameo appearance, a reference to 'this year's Other' suggested a very much looser relationship between the self and the others than that postulated by a dialectical reading, and the book's conclusion was indeed dialogical: 'until we learn how to recognize ourselves as the Other, we shall be in danger and we shall be in need of diplomacy' (Der Derian, 1987: 167, 297, 209). The point I am trying to make is simply that, at the moment when the self/other problematic finally reached the discipline of international relations, there was a repetition of the shift away from a dialectical

to a dialogical reading which had taken place in social theory at large some 20 years earlier.

Drawing particularly on Baudrillard, Der Derrida has since gone on to suggest that the entire business of identity formation has become hyperreal and thus no longer involves human collectives as others, only simulations thereof: 'we [the US] have become so estranged from the empty space left by the decline of American hegemony and the end of the Soviet threat that we eagerly found in cyberspace what we could no longer find in the new global disorder — comfort and security in our own superiority' (Der Derrida, 1991: 15).

Another theorist who introduced self/other theorizing to the discipline was Michael J. Shapiro. Having remarked off-handedly in 1988 that foreign policy generally is about making an other, he went on to apply a number of the insights discussed above to questions of war and peace. Clausewitz is usually read as having a purely instrumental view of war, as treating it epistemologically: an actor reacts to an externally perceived threat in such and such a way. However, Shapiro offered a reading which argues that war for Clausewitz is actually an ontological phenomenon, that 'war is a major aspect of *being*, it emerges as a production, maintenance, and reproduction of the virtuous self, a way (for men) to achieve an ideal form of subjectivity' (Shapiro, 1992: 460). His main textual evidence is a long quote from *On War*, the gist of which is that war is a 'trinity — composed of primordial violence, hatred, and enmity . . . within which the creative spirit is free to roam . . . the first of these aspects mainly concerns the people; the second the commander and his army; the third the government'. Now, if it is the job of a government to nourish ontological enmity, this makes for a rather different relation between governments than if its job is an instrumental continuation of politics by other means.

Shapiro begins to undertake the mapping of the hero scripts which have been and are at work in studies in international relations. Self/other relations have to be understood in their historicity, they are aspects of historically contingent ideas of self, which again are rooted in historically contingent ideas about time and space. Shapiro gives as an example the way technological change automizes and speeds up the process of telling friend from foe during warfare, with an unintended consequence being that soldiers die from friendly fire. Another example concerns the implications of real-time network news from the battlefield for identity formation and questions of political legitimacy.

In an analysis of the nature of the social bond which drew heavily on Lacan and availed itself, of all things, of de Sade's writings, Shapiro remarked that:

In the Sadean scenes, what may appear to be mere cruelty, when one causes pain in another, can be read as the desire by the perpetrator to identify with the pain of his/her victim. . . . Lacan saw Sade as one who helped to recognize that the problem of the self is not one bound up with a harmonious nature and the good life but rather one of a dynamic involving law and transgression. (Shapiro, 1993: 117, 127-8)

This is certainly another view than the one presented by Levinas, where the other is seen as something in the order of an angel (cf. Lyotard, 1988: Levinas note)! In such situations, seen from the other's side of the self/other nexus, the others may, as suggested by Sartre, seem to be hell. Yet, by being assigned the role of victim, the other is still not denied its humanity. Here is one notion, that of there being one single humanity, which has certainly informed recent world politics and which simply cries out to be analysed. Shapiro (1993: 90-100) has briefly turned his attention to the social construction of humankind at large in terms of self/other relations when he points out that, under present conditions, humankind have to 'man' two different frontiers. The need to man the frontier against the rest of animate nature — which partly, as Norton would have us expect, happens as a meditation on the nature of animals seen as marginal to man, apes and monkeys — has been with the species since the time of man's first cave paintings. Furthermore, the growing technological refinement of cybernetic organisms (cyborgs, replicants etc.) has added an anxiety in popular culture as well as among social theorists about how to delineate man and machine. It follows that there is no need to postulate an invasion from outer space in order to demonstrate how the largest human collectivity imaginable constructs itself socially in terms of a delineation from others.

If Shapiro, having announced that foreign policy is about making others, does not proceed to demonstrate what an analysis along these lines would look like, this is exactly the task that David Campbell sets himself in the monograph *Writing Security. United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity* (1992). Campbell programmatically quotes Judith Butler to the effect that 'The construction of identity is not the deconstruction of politics; rather, it establishes as political the very terms through which identity is articulated' (Campbell, 1992: 259). The book is a thick description of US foreign policy as a seamless web of discourse and political practice which has played itself out through a series of engagements with others from the time of Cortés up to the Gulf War. The US self is understood as a narrative structure, and it is argued that 'For a state to end its practices of representation would be to expose its lack of prediscursive foundations; stasis would be death' (Campbell, 1992: 11). Due to the role played by immigration in its genesis, the United States is presented as the imagined community *par excellence*, and this is seen as an additional factor which

increases its need of having its representational practices recognized and confirmed.

Campbell's is an ethical concern — he follows Connolly (1991) in arguing that the knack is for a human collective to be able to carry out its practices of representation while living in difference; that is, without 'othering' other collectives. This, however, is exactly what the United States has failed, and is still failing, to do. One of the consequences is that it is perpetually on the look-out for new collectives to other:

If we take the cold war to be a struggle related to the production and reproduction of identity, the popularly heralded belief that we are witnessing the end of the cold war embodies a misunderstanding: while the objects of established post-1945 strategies of otherness may no longer be plausible candidates for enmity, their transformation has not by itself altered the entailments of identity which they satisfied. (Campbell, 1992: 195)

Campbell gives a detailed reading of how foreign policy, with its focus on border maintenance, is a particularly apposite practice for identity formation, but also stresses the internal consequences of this. His reading of early US cold war diplomacy and the work of the Washington State Legislative Fact-Finding Committee on Un-American Activities, for example, stresses how

... concomitant with this external expansion was an internal magnification of the modes of existence which were to be interpreted as risks. Danger was being totalized in the external realm in conjunction with its increased individualization in the internal field, with the result being the performative reconstitution of the borders of the state's identity. In this sense, the cold war needs to be understood as a disciplinary strategy that was global in scope but national in design. (Campbell, 1992: 172-3)

As landmark studies tend to do, Campbell's overstates the case by insisting on its uniqueness. Detailed work along the ethnographical path has shown how human collectives are not more or less 'real' for being imagined, and for sustaining themselves by means of narratives of selves which involve the whole gamut of metaphor; they all do. In the light of this, it makes little sense to insist that the United States should be 'more imagined' than other collectives. Being the state of an immigrant society, the state could not latch onto territory and history — the chronological and spatial dimensions of collective identity — in the same way as could contemporary European states. What is at issue, then, are the diacritics involved in delineating or 'limning' the US self from others, and not the degree of imaginedness. Campbell, furthermore, admirably demonstrates how, after the fall of the Soviet Union, there was no break in the US narrative of self as constituted in opposition to one major other, but rather a groping for a new 'object' of enmity which could take its place, for example, drug traffickers and users,

Japan, Iraq. An opportunity to restructure the narrative of self was missed. Yet, in the era of nationalism, it is at least arguable that such a reification and demonification of 'the other' is business as usual in international relations (but to downplay the specificity of USSR/US mutual othering, a constitutive trait of the Cold War, hardly adds to our understanding of that particular constellation of collective identities). To give but one example, there is the case of the Soviet Union of the 1930s. In this case, there was indeed something close to a collapse of the internal and the external other, as an even sharper line was drawn between the *Homo Sovieticus* of the future and the tired inhabitants of old bourgeois and feudal worlds. By thus separating friend from foe, the security of the former would ostensibly be assured; a representative *Pravda* passus (from 10 March 1938) held that:

By exterminating without any mercy these spies, provocateurs, wreckers, and diversionists, the Soviet land will move even more rapidly along the Stalinist route, socialist culture will flourish even more richly, the life of the Soviet people will become even more joyous.

Yet, contrary to stated expectations, what ensued was not an increased sense of security of self, but, on the contrary, a heightened sense of insecurity, brought on by the very insistence on excluding the foe. Since actions and views could 'objectively', that is, unintentionally, benefit the enemy, any one Soviet citizen was in constant danger of running the enemy's errand. The word *dvurushnik* — 'double-dealer' — was widely used to denigrate people who were trying to pass themselves off as friends, but who were shown by some spurious means to do the dirty deed of foreign spies and their domestic associate wreckers. There was pervasive fear of being exposed as being with 'the other' (camp). The point here is not that the US of the 1950s was 'better' than the Soviet Union of the 1930s in this respect, but that it certainly was not 'worse'.

A question mark of a more general kind could be attached to the empirical line of criticism. Do power discrepancies and hegemonical status *in themselves* make for fiercer othering, a point often made in discussions of US and European identities (for example, Davics et al., 1993)? This is a theoretical non sequitur. There is also empirical discursive evidence which may be mustered against the idea, for example in the construction of a central European identity, which definitely evolved from a position of weakness but was no less othering for that (Neumann, 1993). Assumptions to the effect that the less powerful are necessarily less othering may be due to a lapse into a view of power as a negative and not also a productive force, and to a general proclivity to blame the powerful for everything, that is, to what Nietzsche called *resentiment*.⁸

Finally, the impression of the US as a special and somewhat frictionless case is reinforced by Campbell's choice not to deal with the US practices that resisted the dominant narrative of the US self. One of the similarities which warrants the use of the label 'post-structuralism', is the insistence that, since meaning resides in language, and language is context-bound and therefore unable to preserve stable meaning over time, contradiction resides in identity formation itself: 'It is because contradiction is always anterior to the discourse, and because it can never therefore entirely escape it, that discourse changes, undergoes transformation, and escapes from its own continuity. Contradiction, then, functions throughout discourse, as the principle of its historicity (Foucault, 1974: 151). By backgrounding heterodox narratives of the US self, the discontinuities are shaved away and the impression of a closed-down monolithic script for the US self becomes much more unequivocal than it would otherwise have been.

Mention should also be made of Campbell's later work, where he has attempted to draw on Levinas for his discussions of international ethics.⁹ In Campbell's work on the Gulf War, Levinas's insistence on ethics as first philosophy is invoked as a benchmark by means of which to pass judgement ex post on a US 'we':

It is the idea of affirming life that is the important criterion — and perhaps, albeit ironically, the overriding principle — here; for in a situation of an-arche, of radical interdependence, one does not seek final justifications, or commands, or morals, or rationalizations, or answers to the 'why' outside of life, beyond the nexus of being and acting. . . . precisely because of our collective failure to acknowledge our prior responsibility to the Other, we have — as the case dealing with Iraq forcefully demonstrated — backed ourselves into a corner such that military combat seems to be the only decisive (although undesirable) option. Had we . . . recognized earlier our intrinsic interdependence with the problem we seek to handle, the range of choices might not have been so limited. (Campbell, 1993: 96–8)

One may characterize this as a healthy, self-reflecting antidote to an American 'can do' attitude. One may also characterize it as a well-intentioned, sympathetic and incredibly vague piece of advice. Perhaps sensing this, Campbell has recently followed the lead of Simon Critchley (1992) in carrying out a twin reading of Levinas and Derrida. The result is an exhortation for the purpose of politics to be 'the struggle *for* — or *on behalf of* — alterity, and not a struggle to efface, erase, or eradicate alterity' (Campbell, 1994: 477). Quite appropriately, this new reading of Levinas is offered as a 'starting point for rethinking the question of responsibility *vis-à-vis* ethnic and national conflicts', and as such it seems to find a response within the subfield of international ethics (see Warner, 1995 for a

response).¹⁰ It does not, however, seem to offer new insight into collective identity formation beyond the moral call always to reflect on how the other summons the self.

To return to Campbell's main contribution, his choice to study only the dominant project to pin down an American self is even more surprising since state-society relations, which make up one important site for clashes of this kind, have been impressively theorized by two international relations scholars to whom Campbell and also Der Derian acknowledge a debt, namely Richard Ashley and R.B.J. Walker. 'In modern discourse', writes the former, 'the sovereign figure of man, defined in terms of a necessary limitation and set in opposition to historically contingent limitations, supplies the constitutive principle of both (a) the modern state, as sovereign *subject* of rational collective violence and (b) domestic society, as *object* domain subordinated to the state's sovereign gaze' (Ashley, 1989: 268). The representatives of states construct an international realm, yet this community is set up *complete with smokescreen*, since it passes itself off as a 'state of nature' and thus not a community at all, yet remains a bounded field where the exclusive competence of statesmen, and this practice only, has any business: 'Together the two effects of the realist double move set up an irony of no small proportions. They constitute a community whose members will know their place only as an absence of community' (Ashley, 1987: 420). Walker foregrounds the repercussions in terms of identity/difference:

The principle of identity embodied in Christian universalism was challenged by the principle of difference embodied in the emerging state. This was perhaps not much more than a change in emphasis. But this change in emphasis had enormous repercussions. From then on, the principle of identity, the claim to universalism, was pursued within states. International politics became the site not of universalistic claims but the realm of difference itself. Here lies the essential ground of the relationship between the political theory of state and civil society ever since. (Walker, 1993: 117)

One should perhaps also stress how this development was further elaborated by the coming of nationalism. If the setting up of the states system institutionalized the realm of the international as the realm of difference, the coming of nationalism raised the insistence on identity inside the state to new heights. A theme developed by German romantic nationalists, the conviction that anthropomorphized nations would live peacefully together once they were established as homogenized political selves' through the merging of the state and the nation found perhaps its most explicit form in the writings of Giuseppe Mazzini:

Natural divisions, the innate spontaneous tendency of the peoples will replace the arbitrary divisions sanctioned by bad governments. The map of Europe will

be remade. The Countries of the Peoples will rise, defined by the voice of the free, upon the ruins of the Countries of the kings and privileged castles. Between these Countries there will be harmony and brotherhood. (1912: 52)

This was hardly an accurate prediction. It is, among other things, the ongoing falling apart of states and nations which makes for the renewed interest in the workings of collective identity. If it has been somewhat occluded by Campbell, these clashes of political projects in order to define competing selves has been made the home turf of another corner of the field. It has no name and is too small to be called a 'Scandinavian School', but could at least in jest be called the Copenhagen coterie of international relations. Acknowledging their debt to the theorizing of Ashley and Walker (Hansen, 1996; Wæver, 1996), the common denominator of the work done on self/other relations by these writers is that it focuses on identity formation and self/other relations in terms of the clash of different discursive practices. There is, first, the case of how states clash with the societies for which they have traditionally claimed the role of power container and identity arbitrator (Wæver et al., 1993). In Europe, friction between leaders and politics on issues of migration and EU integration may be seen to reveal contending conceptions of security, where the states' insistence on the pooling of sovereignty clashes with the societies' insistence on maintaining the borders between ethnically defined nations. Where Campbell sees the US as one discursive practice, such analysis brings out how an evolving view of the self as covering a multi-national formation among state-bearing strata, clashes with a longer-held view of the self as covering only one nation. To paraphrase Campbell's point of departure, it shows how the very terms through which identity are articulated reproduce political institutions such as the state and the European Union, and how this is always an internally contested practice. With the battles waged in the US over the adoption of the NAFTA fresh in the memory, it is unlikely that such a problematic should not apply to North America as well.

The Copenhagen coterie has also produced studies of how self/other relations impinge on the possibilities for international cooperation. The collective self is predicated on certain key political ideas — what constitutes a 'state', a 'nation', etc. — and will try to make these ideas the basis for institutionalization when they partake in political cooperation. As more than one project of what could be referred to as isomorphism — the attempted reconstruction of social structures in new environments — will invariably be involved, the ensuing political clashes can be studied as the very stuff of world politics. Thus, the key figure of the coterie, Ole Wæver, may insist that this way of studying foreign policy offers a fully fledged identity-based

alternative to traditional foreign policy analysis (Wæver, 1994; see also Holm, 1993; Neumann, 1995; Wæver, 1992; Wæver et al., forthcoming).

This insistence marks a shift in writing practice which is of key importance to the application of collective identity theorizing to international relations. The international relations theorists who have extended this theorizing into the discipline have insisted on 'speaking the language of exile', working from 'the margins', 'living on borderlines' (Ashley, 1989; Ashley and Walker, 1990; Der Derian and Shapiro 1989). Exile from, margin of, borderlines to modern practice *tout court*, that is. The analyses of the 'Copenhagen coterie', however, come from a position which is not explicitly marginal in relation to such an all-encompassing entity. It contents itself with attempting to write in the margin of the main text of the discipline itself (for an explicit example, cf. Neumann and Welsh, 1991).

The text which firmly and unequivocally transposed the question of collective identity away from the margins and into the mainstream of the discipline was, however, Alexander Wendt's 1992 article 'Anarchy is what states make of it: the social construction of power politics'.¹¹ The way he did it was simple enough. The article starts out by identifying the debate between neorealists (like Kenneth Waltz) and neoliberals as the discipline's central 'axis of contention'. The former privilege structure as an explanatory factor, whereas the latter opt for process. Wendt then makes two claims: first, the structuralist claim that the dichotomy between these two is false, and secondly, that neoliberals have no systematic theory of process understood as complex learning processes.¹² He then sets out to formulate such a theory by drawing on 'constructivist' work. The 'constructivists' are, of course, none other than the international relations theorists who have just been shown to have extended theorizing about collective identity into the discipline. Wendt gives as his reason for calling them 'constructivists' that he wants to 'minimize their image problem', and castigates them for having devoted 'too much effort to questions of ontology and constitution and not enough effort to the causal and empirical questions of how identities and interests are produced by practice in anarchic conditions' (Wendt, 1992: 393, 425). In this way he manages to acknowledge the importance of this theorizing for his own writing; while at the same time marking off distance to it, so making the ensuing theory more *Salonfähig* for the mainstream to which his theory is offered. Wendt then subsumes the identity formation approach under the neoliberal preoccupation with institutions, and relates this to the discipline's core concern with anarchy and self-help:

An institution is a relatively stable set or 'structure' of identities and interests. . . . institutions come to confront individuals as more or less coercive social facts, but they are still a function of what actors collectively 'know'. Identities

and such collective cognitions do not exist apart from each other; they are 'mutually constitutive' . . . Self-help is an institution, one of various structures of identity and interest that may exist under anarchy. Processes of identity-formation under anarchy are concerned first and foremost with preservation or 'security' of the self. (Wendt, 1992: 399)

The meaning of the 'structure' of anarchy to states is thus undergoing a constant reinscription as their identities change. The intersubjectively constituted structure of identities and interests in the system must be acknowledged by international theorists as a structural, endogenous and constitutive factor. Now, I would argue with Timothy Dunne (1995) that this has been the core concern of the English school of international relations for years. Their concept of an 'international society' encompasses exactly such an intersubjective structure as the one discussed by Wendt (see, for example, Bull, 1977). The great merit of Wendt's analysis in this regard lies in the way he explicitly links this problematic with the question of collective identity formation. He then goes on to discuss how states constitute one another's identities by borrowing a key assumption from symbolic interactionists:

Conceptions of self and interest tend to 'mirror' the practices of significant others over time. The principle of identity-formation is captured by the symbolic interactionist notion of the 'looking-glass self', which asserts that the self is a reflection of an actor's socialization. (Wendt, 1992: 404; cf. Bronfenbrenner, 1961 for an early example)

Thus, 'alter' and 'ego' would each other by taking up different 'roles' and playing them out in a 'path-dependent' way: 'The fact that roles are "taken" means that, in principle, actors always have a capacity for "character planning" — for engaging in critical self-reflection and choices designed to bring about changes in their lives' (Wendt, 1992: 419). Wendt gives as an example of how, in a variation of what game theorists call 'Trollope's play' — to take someone up on an offer that has not been made — Soviet 'new thinking' attempted to make 'the West' act in a way that would allow a new Soviet identity in international relations.

So, by kitting out the issue of collective identity formation in the ritual 'neorealist vs neoliberal' attire of an *International Organization* article, Wendt managed to eke this concern towards the centre stage of the discipline. Everybody doing work on collective identity formation in IR will benefit from this widening of working space. There was, of course, a price to pay. Attention should be drawn, then, to this price, that is, to what now runs the risk of being sacrificed on the altar of what Wendt refers to as 'rationalism', 'systematic theory', 'Science'. One such concern is acknowledged by Wendt himself, when he justifies his unequivocal focus on states by

insisting that 'Any transition to new structures of global authority and identity — to "postinternational" politics — will be mediated by and path-dependent on the particular institutional resolution of the tension between unity and diversity, or particularism and universality, that is the sovereign state' (Wendt, 1992: 424). Indeed, as noticed above, this is one of the themes that the Copenhagen coterie has made their own. However, Wendt's state-centrism is not in and of itself the major sacrifice. The main problem is not specifically that states are singled out as the collective actors to be studied, but rather the more general insistence that human collectives are *unequivocally bounded actors*. And then there is the throwback to the psychologizing assumptions which were so popular within the discipline in the 1960s, and which patently led nowhere, when these unequivocally bounded actors are rigged with the psychological make-up of a modern, unequivocally given, self. Wendt explicitly brackets the way in which the struggle to delineate self from other in international relations must simultaneously be a struggle to pin down the identity of one among many possible and rivaling selves. The price is the reification of the very category of self. In the event, the possibility of studying the *multidimensional* formation of identity formation is ceremoniously sacrificed (ceremoniously and not unceremoniously since Wendt (1992: 394, note 12) explicitly sides with 'modernist' against 'postmodernist' constructivists, thus implying that he treats the self as a foundation).

In a later article, Wendt (1994: 386) goes on to make a number of additional suggestions, for example that 'Identification is a continuum from negative to positive — from conceiving the other as anathema to the self to conceiving it as an extension of the self'. As demonstrated by Todorov, however, what is at stake here — the value judgement made of the other — is only one of three axes along which self/other relations may be studied. When Wendt postulates his continuum, he runs the risk of reducing the question of the other to one of various degrees of assimilation or submission. In terms of ethics, furthermore, Levinas's insistence that the other cannot be conceived of as freedom, because freedom invites either submission or enslavement, might be kept in mind. Wendt (1994: 389) also postulates rising interdependence and the emergence of a "common Other", whether personified in an external aggressor or more abstract threat like nuclear war or ecological collapse' as factors which may facilitate collective identity formation. They may. However, as demonstrated in Shapiro's work on collective identity formation, since the social construction of humankind necessarily involves delineation from other animate species as well as from cyborgs, the social construction of humankind in and of itself involves delineation from 'common others'. Thus, Wendt's candidates for that role are simply extras.

There are problems also with the activation of rising interdependence here, and they may be treated together with Wendt's claim that the transnational convergence of domestic values may also facilitate collective identity formation: 'As heterogeneity decreases, so does the rationale for identities that assume that *they* are fundamentally different from *us*' (Wendt 1994: 39). Does it? Normatively, it is an appealing thought that closer acquaintance makes for less othering, yet it is simply an erroneous claim. Empirically, it is refuted by the work of a thousand anthropologists. Two points should be made here. First, since what is at issue in delineation is not 'objective' cultural differences, but the way symbols are activated to become part of the capital of the identity of a given human collective, it is simply wrong that global homogenizing trends make it less easy to uphold delineation. Any difference, no matter how minuscule, may be inscribed by political importance and serve to delineate identities, as shown by the example of the *Kartoffel/Erdapfel* case given above. Secondly, increase in knowledge about the other (which may go together with 'homogenization') has to do with what Todorov calls the epistemic axis, empathy with the axiological axis, and action with the praxiological, and they may not be positively correlated. Todorov's example of how Cortés knew more about Indians than did Las Casas, yet he 'loved' them less, and Bauman's insistence that those who helped refugees from the Holocaust did not necessarily know more or think in a particular way about them beforehand, come to mind. Wendt's work has had the great merit of propelling the study of collective identity forward in the sense that he has placed it before a wider IR audience. And yet, if his insensitivity to the multidimensional character of identity formation is taken up by the discipline as *de rigueur*, it may easily hamper the further theorization of collective identity formation in international relations.

Conclusion

The discipline of international relations may draw on a rich and multifaceted literature for its study of collective identity formation, and it may do so in a number of ways. Since it is a pervasive theme of this literature that the formation of the self is inextricably intertwined with that of its others, and that a failure to regard the others in their own right must necessarily have repercussions for the formation of the self, it would be paradoxical to bring this article to a halt by excluding certain approaches in the name of a chosen one. This notwithstanding, certain insights stand out as particularly important analytical 'how-tos'. There are, first, the basic insights from the anthropological path, that delineation of a self from an other is an *active* and ongoing part of identity formation. The creation of social boundaries is not

a consequence of integration, but one of its necessary *a priori* ingredients. The focus for studies of identity formation should therefore be the socially placed one of how these boundaries come into existence and are maintained. Students of international relations have studied physical and economic borders for a long time. The concern with these types of boundaries needs to be complemented by a focus on how social boundaries between human collectives are maintained. Since strangers and other marginal elements of human collectives 'embody' their borders, the role played by these elements in the identity formation of the collectives at large stands out as a particularly promising concern.

Any social field will harbour more than one type of politically relevant collective identity. Particular care must be taken not to prejudice analyses by singling out only one type of human collective, say, nations, and neglecting others. Similarly, when studying, for example, the self/other nexus of two states, attention must be paid to the way those states are at the same time involved in maintaining their collective identities vis-à-vis other types of human collectives — societies, say, or an organization of which they both are members. Collective identities emerge as *multifaceted*, and must be studied as such.

This argument may be extended to incorporate a perspectivist approach, where it is stressed that a certain collective identity cannot be privileged unequivocally, because self and other are not only mutually constitutive entities, but also necessarily unbounded. The self and the other merge into one another. It has been one theme of this article how this merging used to be understood dialectically — self and other were seen to merge into some kind of a new entity as part and parcel of the progressive flow of reason. Some 30 years ago there was a shift away from this understanding and towards a dialogical understanding, whereby no such goal or even development is posited for the exchanges between self and other. A similar shift in sensibilities may be observed in the discipline of international relations' study of collective identity formation, since it somewhat belatedly got under way at the end of the 1980s.

In analysing the self/other nexus, it is particularly hard not to ponder the ways in which the writer is implicated in what he or she writes about. Writing is also a normative concern, and the question of responsibility cannot be ducked. It is not enough to reflect on what we do (that is, why we study this or that slice of world politics) and why we do it. We must also pay attention to what that which we do, does. If our analyses are used in order to facilitate the 'othering' of this or that human collective, say the house of Islam or China, by another, say 'the West', then this raises the question of how we are implicated in the unfolding of world political practice. Since consequences cannot be foreseen in their full range, perhaps such effects cannot be helped

(that, of course, is no argument against reflecting on the possibility). And yet, certain analyses — Huntington's (1993) essay on the clash of civilizations comes to mind — seem to offer 'othering' as a piece of practical policy advice for how to glue a particular human collective together. Integration and exclusion are two sides of the same coin, so the issue here is not *that* exclusion takes place, but *how* it takes place. If it is proposed to achieve integration at the price of active othering, that price seems to be too high to pay. Analyses of collective identity formation should contribute, however timidly, to our living in difference, and not to some of us dying from otherness.

That normative concern is there, and it loses none of its force for not always being heeded. But the study of collective identity formation offers *more* than moral exhortations. It offers a way of studying what the English school of international relations calls international society as an inter-subjectively constituted structure of identities and interests which is endogenous and constitutive to the international system. There is more. To a discipline which has had notorious problems in pinning down its subjects and has often defined them in terms of their alleged and abstract 'interests', it offers no less than a possibility finally to theorize the genesis and maintenance of the human collectives of world politics. Analyses of self/other nexuses hold out the promise of a better understanding of who 'the actors' are, how they were constituted, how they maintain themselves, and under which preconditions they may thrive. If these are marginal concerns, they are marginal only in the sense that they may best be studied by an examination of the margins of world politics.

Notes

Earlier versions of this article were presented to the annual International Studies Association conference in Washington, 1994, to the Nordic International Studies Association's seminar on the agency/structure debate, 1994, and to research seminars at Oxford University and Copenhagen University in 1992 and 1995. I would like to thank Andreas Behnke, David Campbell, Lene Hansen, Keith Krause, Heikki Patomäki, Alex Pravda, Alexander Wendt, Mike Williams, the *EJIR* referees and particularly James Der Derian for fruitful engagements (but definitely not for authorization). I also thank the Norwegian Research Council for financial support.

1. Fabian (1983) has discussed what he calls chronopolitics, by which he means the projection by ethnographers of universal time onto universal space, so that other cultures may be depicted by them as 'allochronic', and by implication, anachronistic — overtaken by 'the West'. I certainly would not like to present a 'chronopolitical' analysis and suggest that *all* collective identities necessarily have to relate to 'world time'.

2. One notes the affinity of Norton's concerns with those of Simmel's. One notes that Lacan's psychoanalytical analysis inspires Kristeva. One notes that categorizations invariably break down.
3. Gayatri Spivak (1987: 102) draws out the immediate implication for social analysis when she argues that, if one defines oneself as an outsider, then one consecrates an inside which is not worthy of being consecrated as such. One has, she goes on, 'to break down these distinctions, never once and for all, and *actively* interpret "inside" and "outside" as texts for involvement as well as change.'
4. In Bakhtin's own terms, relationships may also be between texts, and one may thus have a dialogue even with an author long dead. As anyone who has ever been infatuated knows, however, there are certain dimensions of relationships which simply cannot be maintained in this way.
5. According to Critchley (1992: 11), Derrida's essay 'Violence and Metaphysics', written in 1963, was 'the only extended analysis of Levinas's work to appear in either French or English during the 1960s, and it has largely determined the reception of Levinas's thinking, particularly in the English-speaking world. A sigh in that essay prefigures Kristeva's discussion of the dialectical and the dialogical in Hegel: 'Levinas is very close to Hegel, much closer than he admits, and at the very moment when he is apparently opposed to Hegel in the most radical fashion. This is a situation he must share with all anti-Hegelian thinkers, and whose final significance calls for much thought' (Derrida, 1978: 99). Clearly, Derrida is also implicating himself here. This kind of self-reflection on how the other about whom one writes is implied in the constitution of the writer is, unfortunately, rare in the discipline of international relations.
6. This is more complicated, however, since 'God is not simply the "first other", the "other par excellence", or the "absolutely other", but other than the other, other otherwise, other with an alterity prior to the alterity of the other, prior to the ethical bond with the other and different from every neighbour, transcendent to the point of absence, to the point of a possible confusion with the stirring of the *there is*' (Levinas, 1989: 246). The passage from the other to divinity is 'a second step' (Levinas, 1989: 246), which need not concern us further here.
7. Todorov's point of the discreteness of what takes place along the axiological and the epistemic axes is paralleled by Bauman's (1992) suggestion that there is no necessary affinity between how humans order social space cognitively and morally. People who helped refugees from the Holocaust at their own peril (moral spacing) were not necessarily informed by a 'cognitive spacing' which suggested that they would do so.
8. I leave the entire business of whether comparing othering practices ethically is possible given Campbell's stated epistemology; it seems to me that Connolly (1991: 60) is right in asserting, no less than five times, that it is, and that Linklater (1990: postscript) is wrong in holding that it is not.
9. Levinas enters IR literature for the first time in Campbell and Dillon (1993), where he is lauded.
10. The discipline may also run the risk here of repeating an argument which has already been made better elsewhere, as when Bauman argues that:

'In a world construed of codifiable rules alone, the Other loomed on the outside of the self as a mystifying, but above all a confusingly ambivalent presence: the potential anchorage of the self's identity, yet simultaneously an obstacle, a resistance to the ego's self-assertion. In modern ethics, the Other was the contradiction incarnate and the most awesome of stumbling-blocks on the self's march to fulfilment. If postmodernity is a retreat from the blind alleys into which radically pursued ambitions of modernity have led, a postmodern ethics would be one that readmits the Other as a neighbour, as the close-to-hand-and-mind, into the hard core of the moral self, back from the wasteland of calculated interests to which it had been exiled; an ethics that restores the autonomous moral significance of proximity; an ethics that recasts the Other as the crucial character in the process through which the moral self comes into its own' (1992: 84)

11. One notes that in a constructivist perspective, everything must necessarily be what everybody makes of it.
12. "'Strong" liberals should be troubled by the dichotomous privileging of structure over process, since transformations of identity and interest through process are transformations of structure' (Wendt, 1992: 393).

References

- Alker, Hayward R. (1992) 'The Humanistic Moment: Thucydides and Las Casas', *International Studies Quarterly* 36 (4): 347-71.
- Anderson, Benedict (1983) *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*. London: Verso.
- Ashley, Richard (1987) 'The Geopolitics of Geopolitical Space: Toward a Critical Social Theory of International Politics', *Alternatives* 12 (4): 403-34.
- Ashley, Richard (1989) 'Living on Border Lines: Man, Poststructuralism, and War', in James Der Derian and Michael J. Shapiro (eds) *International/Intertextual Relations. Postmodern Readings of World Politics*, pp. 259-321. Lexington, MA: Lexington.
- Ashley, Richard K. and R.B.J. Walker (1990) 'Reading Dissidence/Writing the Discipline: Crisis and the Question of Sovereignty in International Studies', *International Studies Quarterly*, Special Issue, Speaking the Language of Exile 24 (3): 367-416.
- Barth, Fredrik (ed.) (1969) *Ethnic Groups and Boundaries*. Oslo: Norwegian University Press.
- Barth, Fredrik (1994) 'Nye og evige temaer i studiet av etnisitet' *Manifestasjon og prosess*, pp. 175-92. Oslo: Universitetsforlaget.
- Bauman, Zygmunt (1992) *Postmodern Ethics*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Bernstein, Richard J. (1991) *The New Constellation. The Ethical-Political Horizons of Modernity/Postmodernity*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Bloom, William (1990) *Personal Identity, National Identity and International Relations*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

- Bull, Hedley (1977) *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics*. London: Macmillan.
- Bull, Hedley and Adam Watson (eds) (1984) *The Expansion of International Society*. Oxford: Clarendon.
- Bronfenbrenner, Urie (1961) 'The Mirror Image in Soviet-American Relations. A Social Psychologist's Report', *Journal of Social Issues* 17 (1): 45-56.
- Campbell, David (1992) *Writing Security. United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity*. Minneapolis, MN: Minnesota University Press.
- Campbell, David (1993) *Politics without Principle: Sovereignty, Ethics, and the Narratives of the Gulf War*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.
- Campbell, David (1994) 'The Deterritorialization of Responsibility: Levinas, Derrida, and Ethics after the End of Philosophy', *Alternatives* 19 (4): 455-84.
- Campbell, David and Michael Dillon (eds) (1993) *The Political Subject of Violence*. Manchester: Manchester University Press.
- Connolly, William E. (1985) 'Taylor, Foucault, and Otherness', *Political Theory* 13 (3): 365-76.
- Connolly, William E. (1991) *Identity/Difference. Democratic Negotiations of Political Paradox*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Critchley, Simon (1992) *The Ethics of Deconstruction. Derrida & Levinas*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Dallmayr, Fred R. (1981) *Twilight of Subjectivity. Contributions to a Post-Individualist Theory of Politics*. Amherst, MA: The University of Massachusetts Press.
- Davies, Merryl Wyn, Ashis Nandy and Ziauddin Sardar (1993) *Barbaric Others. A Manifesto on Western Racism*. London: Pluto.
- Der Derian, James (1987) *On Diplomacy. A Genealogy of Western Estrangement*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Der Derian, James (1991): 'Genealogy, Security and the Gulf War: A Case for a Poststructural Approach', paper presented to the annual BISA conference, Warwick, 16-18 December 1991.
- Der Derian, James and Michael J. Shapiro (eds) (1989) *International/Intertextual Relations. Postmodern Readings of World Politics*. Lexington, MA: Lexington.
- Derrida, Jacques (1978) 'Violence and Metaphysics: An Essay on the Thought of Emmanuel Levinas' in *Writing and Difference*, pp. 79-153. London: Routledge.
- Dostoevsky, Fedor Mikhaylovich (1954) *The Diary of A Writer*. New York: George Braziller. (Originally published, 1876-81.)
- Dunne, Timothy (1995) 'The Social Construction of International Society', *European Journal of International Relations* 1 (3): 367-89.
- Durkheim, Emile (1964) *The Division of Labour in Society*. New York: Free Press.
- Epstein, Arnold L. (1978) *Ethnos and Identity. Three Studies in Ethnicity*. London: Tavistock.
- Eriksen, Thomas Hylland (1993) *Ethnicity and Nationalism*. London: Pluto.
- Fabian, Johannes (1983) *Time and the Other: How Anthropology Makes its Object*. New York: Columbia University Press.

- Foucault, Michel (1974) *The Archaeology of Knowledge*. London: Tavistock.
- Foucault, Michel (1977) 'Nietzsche, Genealogy, History' in Michel Foucault (David Bouchard, ed.) *Language, Counter-Memory, Practice. Selected Essays and Interviews*, pp. 137-64. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Friedman, Jonathan (1991) 'Further Notes on the Advents of Phallus in Blunderland', in Lorraine Nencel and Peter Pels (eds) *Constructing Knowledge. Authority and Critique in Social Sciences*, pp. 95-113. London: Sage.
- Gasché, Rodolphe (1986) *The Tain and the Mirror. Derrida and the Philosophy of Reflection*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Gellner, Ernest (1983) *Nations and Nationalism*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Geertz, Clifford (1979) 'From the Native's Point of View: On the Nature of Anthropological Understanding', in Paul Rabinow and W.M. Sullivan (eds) *Interpretive Social Science*, pp. 225-41. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
- Giddens, Anthony (1984) *The Constitution of Society. Outline of the Theory of Structuration*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Giddens, Anthony (1991) *Modernity and Self-Identity. Self and Society in the Late Modern Age*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Hansen, Lene (1996) 'R.B.J. Walker: Deconstructing a Discipline', in Iver B. Neumann and Ole Wæver (eds) *Twelve International Relations Theorists Reassessed. Masters in the Making?* London: Routledge.
- Hegel, Georg Friedrich von (1977) *Phenomenology of Spirit*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Hogg, Michael A. and Dominic Abrams (1988) *Social Identifications. A Social Psychology of Intergroup Relations and Group Processes*. London: Routledge.
- Hollis, Martin (1985) 'Of Masks and Men', in Michael Carrithers, Steven Collins and Steven Lukes (eds) *The Category of the Person. Anthropology, Philosophy, History*, pp. 217-33. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Holquist, Michael (1990) *Dialogism. Bakhtin and his World*. London: Routledge.
- Holm, Ulla (1993) *Det franske Europa*. Aarhus: Aarhus Universitetsforlag.
- Huntington, Samuel (1993) 'The Clash of Civilizations?' *Foreign Affairs* 72 (3): 22-42.
- Kemp, Peter (1992) *Emmanuel Lévinas. En introduktion*. Gothenberg: Daidalos.
- Kristeva, Julia (Toril Moi, ed.) (1986) 'Word, Dialogue and Novel', in *The Kristeva Reader*, pp. 34-61. Oxford: Blackwell. (Originally published, 1966).
- Lévinas, Emmanuel (Sean Hand, ed.) (1989) *The Levinas Reader*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Lévi-Strauss, Claude (1978) 'Race and History', in *Structural Anthropology*, Vol. II, pp. 323-62. Harmondsworth: Penguin. (Originally published, 1973.)
- Linklater, Andrew (1990) *Men and Citizens in the Theory of International Relations*, 2nd edn. Basingstoke: Macmillan.
- Lotman, Yuri M. (1990) *Universe of the Mind. A Semiotic Theory of Culture*. London: I.B. Tauris.
- Lyotard, Jean-François (1988) *The Differend. Phrases in Dispute*. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minneapolis Press.

- Marx, Karl (Joseph O'Malley, ed.) (1994) 'From the Paris Notebooks', in *Early Political Writings*, pp. 71-96. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Mauss, Marcel (1985) 'A Category of the Human Mind: The Notion of Person; the Notion of Self', in Michael Carrithers, Steven Collins and Steven Lukes (eds) *The Category of the Person. Anthropology, Philosophy, History*, pp. 1-25. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Originally published, 1938.)
- Mazzini, Giuseppe (1912) *The Duties of Man and Other Essays*. London: J.P. Dent.
- Mouritsen, Per (1995) 'Liberty, Solidarity, and Patriotism: A Republican Idea of Political Identity', mimeo, European University Institute.
- Neumann, Iver B. (1993) 'Russia as Central Europe's Constituting Other', *East European Politics and Society* 12 (2): 349-69.
- Neumann, Iver B. (1995) *Russia and the Idea of Europe. A Study in Identity and International Relations*. London: Routledge.
- Neumann, Iver B. and Jennifer M. Welsh (1991) 'The Other in European Self-Definition: An Addendum to the Literature on International Society', *Review of International Studies* 17 (4) 327-46.
- Nietzsche, Friedrich (1992) *Ecce Homo*. Harmondsworth: Penguin. (Originally published, 1908.)
- Norton, Anne (1988) *Reflections on Political Identity*. Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Olesen, Virginia (1994) 'Feminisms and Models of Qualitative Research', in Norman K. Denzin and Yvonna S. Lincoln (eds) *Handbook of Qualitative Research*, pp. 158-74. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
- Ringmar, Erik (1995) 'On the Ontological Status of the State', mimeo, London School of Economics and Political Science.
- Robertson, Roland (1992) *Globalization. Social Theory and Global Culture*. London: Sage.
- Sampson, Edward E. (1989) 'The Deconstruction of the Self', in John Shotter and Kenneth J. Gergen (eds) *Texts of Identity*, pp. 1-19. London: Sage.
- Sartre, Jean-Paul (1957) *Being and Nothingness. An Essay on Phenomenological Ontology*. London: Methuen.
- Schmitt, Carl (1936) *Der Begriff des Politischen*. Munich: Duncker & Humblot. (Originally published, 1932.)
- Shapiro, Michael J. (1988) *The Politics of Representation*. Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press.
- Shapiro, Michael J. (1992) *Reading the Postmodern Polity. Political Theory as Textual Practice*. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press.
- Shapiro, Michael J. (1993) *Reading 'Adam Smith': Desire, History and Value*. London: Sage.
- Simmel, Georg (David N. Levine, ed.) (1970) 'The Stranger', in *On Individuality and Social Forces. Selected Writings*, pp. 143-9. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
- Spivak, Gayatri Chakravorty (1987) 'Reading the World: Literary Studies in the Eighties', in *In Other Worlds. Essays in Cultural Politics*, pp. 95-102. New York: Methuen.

- Strong, Tracy B. (1992a) 'Introduction: The Self and the Political Order', in Tracy B. Strong (ed.) *The Self and the Political Order*, pp. 1-21. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Strong, Tracy B. (1992b) 'Text and Pretexts: Reflections on Perspectivism in Nietzsche', in Tracy B. Strong (ed.) *The Self and the Political Order*, pp. 161-80. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Taylor, Charles (1989) *Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern Identity*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Todorov, Tzvetan (1984) *Mikhail Bakhtin: The Dialogical Principle*. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press. (Originally published, 1981.)
- Todorov, Tzvetan (1989) *Nous et les autres. La réflexion française sur la diversité humaine*. Paris: Seuil.
- Todorov, Tzvetan (1992) *The Conquest of America: The Question of the Other*. New York: Harper Perennial. (Originally published, 1982.)
- Wæver, Ole (1992) 'Three Competing "Europes": French, German, Russian', in *International Affairs* 44 (2): 477-93.
- Wæver, Ole (1994) 'Resisting the Temptations of Post Foreign Policy Analysis', in Walter Carlsnaes and Steve Smith (eds) *European Foreign Policy: EC and Changing Perspectives in Europe*. London: Sage.
- Wæver, Ole (1996) 'Beyond the Beyond of Critical International Relations Theory: Richard Ashley', forthcoming in Mark Hoffman and N.J. Rengger (eds). *Wæver, Ole, Barry Buzan, Morten Kelstrup and Pierre Lemaitre (1993) Identity, Migration and the New Security Agenda in Europe*. London: Pinter.
- Wæver, Ole, Ulla Holm and Henrik Larsen (forthcoming) *The Struggle for 'Europe': French and German Concepts of State, Nation and European Union*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Walker, R.B.J. (1993) *Inside/Outside: International Relations as Political Theory*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Warner, Daniel (1995) 'Buber, Levinas and the Concept of the Otherness in International Relations: A Reply to David Campbell', paper presented to the second Pan-European Conference in International Relations, Paris, 13-16 September 1995.
- Wendt, Alexander (1992) 'Anarchy is what States Make of it: The Social Construction of Power Politics', *International Organization* 46 (2): 391-425.
- Wendt, Alexander (1994) 'Collective Identity Formation and the International State', *American Political Science Review* 88 (2): 384-96.

The Dynamics of Public Opinion toward European Integration, 1973-93

CHRISTOPHER J. ANDERSON AND
KARL C. KALTENTHALER
Rice University and Rhodes College

What are the aggregate dynamics of public support for European integration in the 12 EU member states? And how can they be explained? Given that mass support for integration varies both across time and across countries, the article tests the proposition that both types of variation can be explained with the help of national economic conditions, timing of entry into the Union, and length of membership in it. Using aggregate Eurobarometer polls for the period between 1973 and 1993, we find that all three factors have significant impacts on support for a united Europe. However, the results also indicate that length of membership in the EU is somewhat more important than economic performance. The paper spells out some of the possible ramifications of these results.

Public support for European integration has been in decline since 1991. It dropped from a high of 81% among EU¹ citizens in favor of efforts to unify Europe in 1991 to 73% in the spring of 1994; from a high of 72% who thought their country's membership in the EU was a good thing, to only 54% who still agreed in the spring of 1994; and from a high of 59% in 1991 who would regret the dissolution of the EU, to a mere 40% who still thought so in the fall of 1993 (Commission of the European Communities, 1993, 1994). This decline in enthusiasm for the integration process manifested itself on other fronts as well, as the Danes voted against the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty in a referendum in June of 1992, and in France — one of the founding members of the European Union — less than 51% of the voters approved of ratifying the Maastricht Treaty in October of 1992.²