

THE PEACE MOVEMENT AND THE THIRD WORLD*

Eboe HUTCHFUL†

This paper explores the nature of the relationship between the peace movement in the West and the Third World. Western countries lack, individually and collectively, the materials essential for the smooth functioning of their armament industries and require easy access to cheap supplies from well-endowed Third World countries. This appropriation is facilitated by their manipulation of the capitalist world economy which is dominated, after all, by the United States and, where possible, by their control over Third World countries, often with the collusion of their ruling elites.

Liberation from this asymmetric relationship is imperative for the peoples of the Third World who are engaged in a desperate struggle for survival. However, Western countries do not tolerate such developments and, in fact, consider any nation that supports liberation struggles (especially the Soviet Union) as an enemy to be destroyed—if necessary, in

a "winnable nuclear war." Since the Soviet Union, China, and their allies support liberation movements as a matter of course, the Third World, instead of being peripheral, is actually central to the current climate of nuclear confrontation and superpower rivalry.

And actually, the liberation struggles in the Third World are the corollary of the struggles of the peace movement in the West: that is, if the focus of the peace movement in the West were adjusted to stress liberty and justice as vital ingredients of peace. It is important to grasp this nexus, not only to preclude one party working against the other, but also to encourage their joining forces to work toward their goals more effectively. Clearly, this sort of cooperation will require the peace movement to enlarge its program of action. The paper concludes on this note by proposing some amendments to the current agenda of the peace movement.

Introduction

The resurgence of the peace movement in the West is unquestionably one of the major political events of the early 1980s. Its extent and influence can be clearly seen in the massive peaceful demonstrations (400,000 in Amsterdam in November 1981; 550,000 in Bonn; 700,000 in New York in June 1982) and the not-so-peaceful protests (riots in Berlin, bombings in France, Germany and Ita-

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†Department of Political Science, University of Port Harcourt, Harcourt, Nigeria.

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store the nuclear balance in Europe by installing 572 intermediate-range cruise and Pershing II nuclear missiles on European soil beginning in 1983; (c) the emergence of conservative governments in the West (particularly the Reagan administration in the U.S.) that seem prepared to contemplate not just deployment but actual use of nuclear weapons; and (d) prolonged economic stagnation and crisis in major Western industrialized countries which are exacerbated by national policies to increase defense spending at the expense of social programs and welfare benefits.

Such an aggressive U.S. posture has been justified in terms of the need to combat warlike Soviet intentions against Europe or America. According to the Reagan administration, renewed American armamentism is necessary to prevent the "spread of totalitarian power," to promote the "defense of free institutions," and to defeat the Kremlin's attempts to "get power over the whole world."¹ Yet, the essentially defensive intentions of Soviet nuclear policy have consistently been stressed both by the Soviet leaders themselves and by responsible American commentators. Even at the height of the Cold War, in the 1960s, this was implicitly admitted to be the case:

The theme of Soviet aggressiveness has been repeated so often and so loudly in the past during the last quarter-century that it is now accepted by most Americans as a fact—as little to be questioned as night following day. And yet, paradoxical though it may seem, we know of no serious analyst of Soviet society and Soviet policy who really believes it.²

More recently, even normally anti-Soviet sections of the American press have admitted that, "despite their willingness to rely on brute force, the Soviet leaders have shown no inclination to risk nuclear war with the United States. By nature they tend to assume the worst and to prepare for the worst, which is why they arm as they do."³

Clearly, the origins of the current hostile situation in Europe need to be sought elsewhere. In this article, it will be argued that the actual sources of tension are: (a) the erosion of American hegemony in the Third World by the tide of revolutions, often supported militarily by the Soviet Union; and (b) the fear of attenuated American influence in Europe, arising from the paradoxical combination of a West European peace movement and growth in Soviet military power. As *Time* magazine accurately (if unwittingly) observed, the "sequential triumph of leftist revolutions" in the Third World is the fundamental problem for the U.S.⁴ To this extent, the ongoing race to build more nuclear weapons, each faster, more accurate and deadly than before, can be conceived as the ultimate attempt to check and reverse these revolutions. It is another aspect of a more general militarization of the international environment to respond to revolutionary struggles in the Third World.

ly) that broke out after the 1979 NATO decision to deploy U.S. missiles in Europe. Even more so than during the Vietnam War protests in the 1960s, it appears that the peace movement now enjoys an extremely broad base of support that cuts across traditional socio-political categories: women, youth, labor, clergy, environmentalists, progressive intellectuals, and even political conservatives. Drawing these disparate groups together is their common perception of danger in an increasingly militarized and nuclear environment.

It should be mentioned that the term "peace movement" is used to describe this phenomenon simply for expediency. Only in the broadest sense of the word can an association embracing socialists, the Green Party, and the National Conference of American Catholic Bishops be seen to constitute a single movement. The heterogeneity of the movement is a source of both strength and weakness. The unity of these diverse social strata on certain common minimum programs to defuse the nuclear threat has brought together a popular constituency that no government dare ignore. At the same time, however, such coalitions inhibit an objective understanding of the root causes of the nuclear threat today, leading to unrealistic and even contradictory "solutions." For nuclearization *per se* is not the source of the problem, only its effect. Fundamental and enduring solutions cannot be engendered by short-term measures such as a "freeze" or controls over specific nuclear weapons. Rather, a real solution must seek to eradicate the social contradictions producing nuclearization and militarization.

And this is where the basic problem lies. While some view the nuclear threat in moral and theological terms (and even within the churches there is no consensus on the practical implications of such arguments), others see it as stemming inherently from the conditions of production and distribution under advanced capitalism and, increasingly, under Soviet socialism as well. The struggle for peace in the West, then, can be considered a split within Euro-American capital (and its constituency) over the appropriate method to deal with the deepening contradictions of contemporary advanced capitalism: a fascist right wing seeks a final confrontation with the forces of socialism and is ready to extirpate social struggles with nuclear weapons; a liberal-theological faction treats the problem as a "moral and religious issue" and, like all religious thought, sees no systemic roots of militarism; and, finally, a progressive wing sees nuclearization as the culmination and deadliest manifestation of the excesses of capitalism.

Sources of contemporary peace protests

The immediate causes of peace protests are relatively easy to ascertain and can be traced to the following: (a) the development of a new generation of sophisticated and super-accurate nuclear weapons (Soviet SS-20s, American cruise and Pershing II missiles) with "first strike" capabilities; (b) NATO's plans to re-

Paradoxical growth of East-West trade

It is necessary to consider general socio-economic conditions in assessing the peace movement and nuclear policy. In spite of temporary setbacks (such as the Soviet invasions of Czechoslovakia and Afghanistan), Soviet relations with Western Europe over the last two decades have been characterized by peaceful coexistence and expanding trade, industrial, scientific, and cultural exchanges. While it remains true, as Samuel Pizar observes, that "commercial transactions between East and West take place in a highly complex and volatile environment, subject to recurrent cycles of conflict and accommodation,"⁵ an undeniable feature is its steady growth.

Between 1966 and 1972, Soviet exports to NATO economies grew by an average of 11.3% per annum and imports by 10.5%. In 1966, Soviet exports and imports to and from the West constituted about 22% and 25% respectively of total Soviet world trade; in 1972, the comparable figures were 22% and 28%. Following this upward trend, in 1982, Soviet trade with the West had increased to 31.6% of its total foreign trade, compared with 14.1% for the underdeveloped countries.

These expanding commercial relations should be seen in the context of the problems of both capitalist and socialist modes of production in Europe at that time. With American domination of the world capitalist market, increasing competition from Japan, and stagnation in domestic West European economies, West European governments and firms (as well as those of Canada and Japan) were encouraged to exploit Eastern European markets. The West German "economic miracle," in particular, needed and found an export outlet to the East. For smaller West European economies, the socialist countries offer a "vast and rapidly expanding market" for commodity exports as well as "lucrative prospects for industrial, technological and managerial cooperation."⁶

Conversely, for the Soviet Union, lagging technological developments in nonmilitary industries, a series of bad harvests, and persistent problems in agricultural production, chronic shortages of consumer goods, and so on had led to large food imports, and the import of technically advanced machinery and other equipment. The principle governing these exchanges was peaceful coexistence, the assumptions that "the economic system of both communism and free enterprise will survive into the indefinite future," and that "neither side will probably dismantle its own social structure or try to overwhelm the other with military force."⁷ As Pizar puts it, "Today, the prevailing view rejects the notion of the two hostile non-communicating economic orbits as not only untenable, but downright harmful to the interests of the East."⁸

In the late sixties and early seventies, there was an increase in long-term trade and industrial and scientific cooperation agreements between the East and the West in Europe. These included large-scale joint ventures with state

organizations in Yugoslavia, Rumania, and Hungary; mammoth agreements with the West German steel industry (and to a lesser extent also with Italian and Austrian firms) for delivery of large-diameter rolled steel and construction of pipelines in return for supplies of Soviet natural gas; and agreements with Japanese firms to develop the Soviet Far East. The largest beneficiaries of this "opening to the East" were West Germany and a number of individual European firms, such as Fiat (Italy), SECAM and Renault (France), ICI, BAC, and Leyland (Britain). Considerable liberalization of trade relations with the Eastern bloc, in violation of NATO restrictions, took place among most Western European countries. Further liberalization was constrained, however, more because of fundamental differences between the two economic systems and by fears of the sales practices of East European state-run trade organizations disrupting the West's markets than by any ideological differences. In fact, individual EEC governments and banks had competed to extend liberal export credits to most East European countries during this time (a move which many have cause to regret in the 1980s).

Dependence on Third World resources

Since its mercantile genesis, modern capitalism has been an international system and could only grow and survive as such. Postwar developments have made this bent even more evident. The technological revolutions in nuclear, aerospace, electronics and other industries allowed for an unprecedented growth in the scale and complexity of production in both civil and military industries. These advances accentuated the importance of basic energy resources, and created a demand for new mineral inputs, raising the strategic significance of minerals such as vanadium, titanium, molybdenum, tungsten, uranium, and thorium.

Because the major capitalist countries have little or none of these raw materials, they became even more dependent on external sources of supply, most of which are Third World countries. The United States, traditionally the most self-sufficient of the Western capitalist countries in the area of raw materials, is now dependent on imports to an absolute or "critical" degree for a large and growing number of strategic materials. Current U.S. import dependence is 100% for thallium and thorium, over 90% for tantalum, mica, and asbestos, 80% for nickel, columbium, flourine, graphite, platinum, and bauxite, between 60% and 75% for cobalt, manganese, chromium, tin, and mercury, and about 50% for zinc and tungsten.⁹ Military applications form an important proportion of total U.S. consumption of these imports, ranging from about 25% for thallium and germanium, to over 15% for copper, cobalt, and thorium (mainly in aircraft and aerospace engines), and 8% to 10% for manganese, tungsten, chromium, antimony, nickel, tantalum, beryllium, cadmium, and zinc. For

some of these metals, such as manganese (which is indispensable for the removal of sulphur impurities during steel manufacturing) and cobalt (used in jet engines, missiles, gas turbines and generators for corrosion resistance at extremely high temperatures), there are simply no substitutes. Shortages of these materials will clearly have serious repercussions for the United States.¹⁰ It has been estimated that the U.S. has within its own borders only up to 10% of the reserves necessary to meet demand up to the year 2000; and with only 8% of its present population, the U.S. will require 50% or more of the known reserves in the capitalist world.

The dependence of Western Europe and Japan on imports is even greater. For example, West Germany imports 100% of its chromium, copper, manganese, antimony, platinum, asbestos, and a high proportion of its energy needs. The picture is not substantially different for Japan and the other West European countries. In sharp contrast, the Soviet Union and China are self-sufficient in most minerals and raw materials, including oil. These two countries also possess the bulk of the world's reserves and many strategic materials.

Investment opportunities

Optimum development of capitalist productive processes require the concentration of capital in large units, illustrated, for instance, in the emergence and growth of the giant American corporations. The rising organic composition of capital and the falling rate of profit at home, the much larger profits to be made abroad (from a combination of cheap labor and energy, virgin markets, lower taxes, etc.), and the need for new and secure sources of raw materials all combined to induce corporations to expand their operations overseas. For example, Texaco, a U.S. oil company, has assets which include oil and gas exploration in 6 Western hemisphere and 22 Eastern hemisphere countries, ownership or part-ownership through subsidiaries and affiliates of 50 refineries in 30 countries, and extensive marketing interests in petroleum products, petrochemicals and natural gas in 150 countries.

There is a similar concentration of assets and internationalization of operations in the banking system. In 1971, the 13 largest U.S. banks together controlled a total of \$195 billion in assets and maintained 822 foreign subsidiaries; in 1976, the 10 largest banks controlled \$348 billion in assets and 1069 foreign subsidiaries. The largest bank, BankAmerica Corporation (1976 assets: \$72.2 billion), derived 15% of its total profits from foreign operations in 1971 and 40% in 1975. Citicorp, the second largest bank (1976 assets: \$63 billion), and also the one with the most extensive foreign lending operations (much of it concentrated in the Third World), derived 40% of its profits in 1970 and 72% in 1976 from overseas operations.

The tendency for capital to expand outward is most marked in the case of the United States, the leading imperialist country. American foreign direct investment grew from \$56.6 billion in 1967 (53.8% of all foreign direct investment) to \$137 billion (but only 47.6% of the total) in 1976. Similar growth, albeit on a smaller scale, occurred during the same period for the UK (from \$17.5 to \$32.1 billion), West Germany (\$3.0 billion to \$19.9 billion), Japan (\$1.4 billion to \$19.4 billion), and France (\$6.0 billion to \$11.6 billion). However, an important distinction must be made here: Western Europe shares cooperative economic relations with the Third World in addition to direct foreign investment, while United States interests in foreign direct investment clearly supercede any possible tendency toward non-exploitative relations of economic cooperation and peaceful coexistence.

Contradictory forces

Export of capital is proceeding under increasingly severe and apparent contradictions: rivalry between the leading capitalist powers; competition between capitalism and socialism; and confrontations between imperialism and national liberation. After all, if capital cannot maintain its rate of surplus value without producing these revolutionary tendencies under conditions of monopoly, then it can hardly internationalize itself without simultaneously internationalizing the class struggle.

Indeed, it can be said that national liberation is a response to monopoly capitalism. And since socialism is considered the inevitable product of capitalism, it is not surprising that national liberation movements found a natural ally in socialist governments, which have provided them with financial, diplomatic, and military support. The result of this aid is a series of successful revolutions: first in North Korea, North Vietnam, and Cuba; and since 1975, in Cambodia, South Vietnam, Laos, Angola, Mozambique, Iran, Nicaragua, and Zimbabwe.

With its extensive and valuable investments in the Third World accruing large profits, and its dependence on foreign sources of raw materials, the U.S. clearly stands to lose heavily from these revolutions. Its response has been to step up a global military machine, enter into alliances with repressive and reactionary regimes, and intervene against revolutionary movements. The internationalization of capital in its monopoly phase thus produced its necessary corollary in militarism. Baran and Sweezy's remark that "the real battlefield between capitalism and socialism have for years now been in Asia, Africa and Latin America—in Korea, Vietnam, Algeria, Cuba, the Congo" is no less true now than when it was first stated in 1966.

Growing revolutionary movements abroad and persistent stagnation at home were the two realities that swept President Reagan and a number of conservative governments into power in the West. The crises at home and abroad accel-

erated existing tendencies toward militarization in the capitalist countries. Prolonged recession led to greater emphasis on arms production to sustain employment and the balance of payments. Given their monopolistic position, almost limitless funds for research and development, and guaranteed profit margins, defense contracts were an ideal way for firms to escape the consequences of a general fall in the rate of profit. Increasing technical sophistication, the necessity of volume production, prohibitive research and development costs, and the growing competition abroad, all meant that the major arms producing countries could not arm themselves without also arming the rest of the world. Indeed, not only can armamentism arrest the decay of capitalist hegemony, it is also, quite clearly, an effective tool with which to repress revolutionary fervor.

Objectives of the armamentist policies

Previous experiences have shown the U.S. that it cannot hope to defeat all wars of liberation. And it is in this context that the significance of Alexander Haig's threat to "go to the source of revolutionary unrest" (i.e. the Soviet Union and Cuba) has to be understood. The deployment of U.S. cruise and Pershing II missiles in Europe, for example, was not intended to provoke a nuclear war with the Soviet Union. On the contrary, its real objectives are: first, to force the Soviet Union to withdraw support from national liberation struggles and protect its own territory; and second, to stop the process of European integration so that the decay of America's European empire (particularly West Germany) would be delayed. These Euromissiles are extremely fast and accurate, threatening directly the Soviet homeland. Faced with such weapons, the USSR has to direct more resources toward its own defense, and less to support Third World liberation movements. The resulting polarization and increased tension in Europe will also work to the advantage of the U.S. as Western Europe looks to it for help once again.

Pisar has argued that the "progressive integration of the area [Europe] is accepted as an established fact" in Western and Eastern Europe. If this is correct, such integration would have major geopolitical implications, with the most obvious loser being the United States. And actually, given the increasingly suspect commitment of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe to socialist transformation at home and abroad, in addition to the limitations of the socialist division of labor as presently constituted, the possibility of an inter-European integration should not be discounted.

Thus, U.S. nuclear brinkmanship could be seen as a reaction to the threat, not of an European war, but of an European peace. Nigel Harris has noted, quite properly, that the "underlying aim of American defense policy [is] to control Western Europe as much as Eastern Europe," and exaggerated estimates of Warsaw Pact force levels obviously would contribute toward that end.¹¹ In

fact, the U.S. Euromissile ploy appears to be working. Already, the USSR has been worried enough to attempt to pressure Western Europe by threatening various dire consequences. As *Pravda* (1/8/83) warned West Germany:

The deployment of American missiles will lead to a dangerous growth in military confrontation. There will also be a certain complication of relations with the countries who [sic] have accepted the American nuclear presence. This particularly concerns West Germany, whose government has accepted the deployment of the first-strike weapon Pershing II. The military threat for West Germany will be greatly multiplied. Its well-developed contacts with Socialist states will be threatened, and it will only be able to see East Germany across a bank of missiles. (emphasis added)

The European "missile debate" must also be seen in terms of inter-imperialist rivalries and the different needs of the main capitalist nations relative to the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Short on energy and raw materials, unable to compete elsewhere against the U.S. and Japan, European capitalism finds Eastern Europe's markets increasingly crucial to its survival. Also, for military, geographical and economic reasons, Western Europe does not wish to compete militarily with the Soviet Union. The U.S., however, with a prodigious military machine whose sole *raison d'être* for almost four decades has been the "red threat," has deep interests against the normalization of relations. This military machine serves as the pretext for keeping European communists and Third World radicals out of power, as well as to guarantee United States domination throughout the capitalist world. While an inter-European peace offers important economic benefits to Western Europe, it will be difficult to achieve because it requires painful adjustments in the American psyche, economy, and domestic and foreign policy.

The U.S. is not the only superpower that is reacting to the prospect of peace with increased armamentism. The consequences of peace would be only slightly less profound for the Soviet military-industrial complex which has subordinated all economic rationality to itself. Partial reintegration into the world economy has, in fact, enhanced the USSR's military profile abroad. The greatest hindrances to Soviet trade with the West have persistently been balance of payments problems and shortage of hard currency. To fill the gap, the Soviet Union has increased arms sales to Third World countries. Next to crude oil, arms sales are the largest single Soviet source of hard currency. Recently, to maintain oil exports to the West, the Soviet Union increased its arms-for-oil deals with the Middle East: for example, in 1982, Libya more than tripled its oil exports to the Soviet Union in order to pay its huge arms debt. This drift in Soviet policy from arms for liberation to arms for commerce logically follows from its rapprochement with capital and the abandonment of autarky.

In sum, the military-industrial complexes of both the United States and the Soviet Union have significant stakes in perpetuating the status quo, and resisting nuclear disarmament and peace. The peace movement, however, offers a

viable policy alternative. Within the present structure, the Third World can only rely on the First World if the First World perceives Third World struggles as beneficial to armamentist policies. Under the alternative provided by the peace movement, however, the Third World would not be a mere extension of armamentism but could be an integral part of the establishment of World Peace.

Implications and Initiatives for the Third World

This paper sought to show the intricacies in the relationship between the First and Third Worlds within an East-West perspective. Two points are especially salient: first, that the armaments industries in the West depend heavily on the Third World for raw materials; and second, due to United States domination of world capitalist markets, Western Europe will increasingly tend toward tight, peaceful bonds with Eastern Europe. To this extent, Europe will no longer need to maintain its alliance with the United States (or the Soviet Union) and will be free to help Third World liberation struggles.

Being virtually the only non-nuclear region of the world and, more important, the source of many of the requisite minerals, the Third World is in a unique position to promote peace and disarmament. Initiatives taken in the Third World, if supported by the East and the West, hold great promise for the peace movement and global security concerns. While that may seem somewhat idealistic, certain short-term objectives can be adopted now by both the Euro-American peace movements and progressive groups in the Third World to defuse the growth of armamentism. These include:

- (a) Securing sovereignty over the strategic minerals, many of which have direct military applications—such as thallium, germanium, garnet, thorium, and uranium—that Third World countries possess. Practical policies to advance national sovereignty and control over these resources could constitute a potent peace policy by themselves;¹²
- (b) Resisting the stationing of foreign military bases and deployment of nuclear weapons, and/or movement of nuclear missiles across or over national territory, airspace, or waters;
- (c) Supporting the demand for the establishment of nuclear-free zones.

Conclusion

Third World anti-imperialist struggles are, in fact, the reverse side of Western peace movements. In many ways, they are even the functional equivalent. However, the objectives of liberation struggles are not necessarily consistent with some of the major ideological trends within the peace movements. To the extent that "peace" is conceived as a moratorium on social struggles, or the

unfettered expansion of capital, it can only be indifferent, if not outright hostile, to struggles for national liberation. Such struggles are then driven to take recourse in armed struggle, which seems antithetical to "peace." But then "peace" is not and should not be conceived merely as the abolition of the more horrendous forms of armamentism; it is also the eradication of the social traditions that constitute the systemic roots of armamentism.

Notes

1. See interviews in *Time* magazine, 29 March 1982, pp. 14-15.
2. Paul A. Baran and Paul M. Sweezy, *Monopoly Capitalism: An Essay on the American Economic and Social Order* (London, 1975), p. 184.
3. *Time*, op. cit., p. 24.
4. "Essay," *Time*, 8 August 1983.
5. Samuel Pisar, *Coexistence and Commerce: Guidelines for Transactions Between East and West* (New York, 1970), p. 2.
6. *Ibid.*
7. *Ibid.*, p. 1.
8. *Ibid.*, p. 23.
9. Much of the data presented here is drawn from Heige Hveem, "Militarization of Nature: Conflict and Control Over Strategic Resources and Some Implications for Peace Policies," *Journal of Peace Research*, XVI (1979).
10. *Ibid.*, p. 7.
11. Nigel Harris, *Of Bread and Guns: The Crisis in the World Economy* (London, 1983), p. 222.
12. For a discussion of this, see Hveem, op. cit.

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THE PROBLEM OF WAR - AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT

Beverly WOODWARD*

Taming a war system

Anarchists seek the abolition of the state; Marxists, the abolition of social classes; pacifists, the abolition of war. The American left includes many with pacifist leanings as well as a smaller number of "absolute pacifists." These have generally supported and acted in favor of arms reductions (and against the acquisition of new weapons and weapons systems) and have resisted particular wars, such as the Vietnam war. The American left, though, has lacked a cohesive and radical program aimed at the abolition of war.

This failure might be seen as due in part to the rather remote possibility that any program with this aim could succeed. The abolition of war, like the other objectives noted above, may seem quite utopian, i.e. unrealizable. Even if the "nature of man" or the "forces of history" do not preclude war's eradication, war's "utility" to a variety of parties may appear to preclude its abandonment.

Given, however, the disastrous potential of the war system in its current stage of historical development, many reject the conclusion that organized warfare must be a permanent feature of human political life. From an initial readiness to sacrifice some human lives and some human artifacts in the pursuit of political objectives, the system has reached a state where there is an implicit readiness to sacrifice (if "unavoidable") all human lives and all human artifacts - or, in a somewhat less extreme case, "merely" to wipe out industrial civilization as we know it.

While many still hope that the war system can be tamed (for example, through outlawing particular acts of war or particular weapons), not a

*Coordinator, International Seminars on Training for Nonviolent Action, Box 515, Welham, Mass 02254, USA.

few have concluded: We must abolish war or war will abolish us (and itself). But even though this perception is quite widely shared, it has not provoked widespread thought about the structural changes that a world without war would require and entail. The elimination of war would be a revolutionary change, perhaps the most revolutionary political change since the dawn of "civilization," but this goal has inspired relatively little revolutionary thought, either at the level of general theory or of tactics. Peace is a goal in the misty beyond. In the meantime various interim strategies - some incomplete, others misguided - are advocated. An indication of the inadequacy of these strategies is that to date no peace movement or campaign has put a major dent in the war system.

A few examples will illustrate some of the key strategies favored by the pacifistically-inclined left.

1. Informing the public ("raising consciousness") regarding the horrors of war (past, present, or future)

A time-honored tactic of activists against war is to disseminate information regarding the dreadful consequences of war. The focus may be on a particular war, or a particular type of war, or it may be on war in general. Of course, this is not merely a tactic. Those who write and speak of the horrors of war are usually deeply affected by what has happened or by what they fear may happen where there is a resort to arms.

A recent example has been the campaign of the Physicians for Social Responsibility (PSR) to sensitize the medical profession and the general public more acutely to the dangers of nuclear war. PSR has placed advertisements in *The New York Times* and other newspapers and has held symposia on this theme in numerous cities across the country. While these efforts have increased public awareness of the consequences of nuclear war, there is little evidence that they have moved the public to political action. As an organization PSR has manifested an unwillingness itself to engage in activity that might be deemed "politically controversial," although in 1983 it did become involved in supporting the Nuclear Weapons Freeze Campaign and a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.¹

2. Campaigns against specific weapons or weapons systems, e.g. ABM, B-1 bomber, MX, Trident

The B-1 bomber campaign of the 1970s provides an example (although in some respects it was better conceived than most of these campaigns). In

general, the campaign stressed that the B-1 was too costly, would waste scarce resources, and was unnecessary from a military point of view. The logic of military thinking was thus assumed rather than confronted. In striving to defeat the weapon, campaign participants largely avoided challenges to deeply held preconceptions of the public; thus they did not raise questions about the purposes of our armed forces, current notions concerning "enemies," or the acceptability of using the threat to kill as a means of carrying on international affairs.

Some of the campaign workers, however, did use the campaign as an opportunity to promote thinking about "alternatives." George Lakey of the Movement for a New Society was a leader of this group and helped gain the acceptance of "peace conversion" as the positive side of the campaign. "Peace conversion" as a political program includes the rechanneling of funds and production efforts away from the military to the civilian sector, the democratization of the economy and (even) consideration of "ways of defending human values without violence."

While the positive side of the B-1 campaign did have some lasting effects and did at least help some to understand better the role that military production plays in the domestic economy (and why, therefore, even without foreign antagonists Congress might be motivated to continue to fund arms production), this part of the campaign never constituted its main thrust. There was in fact practically no discussion of "ways of defending human values without violence." Further, the demand that resources be channeled away from the military to meet "human needs" (an approach that has also been emphasized by the Mobilization for Survival) is not in itself a radical demand. An appeal to people's perceived economic and social needs does not in itself put the war system in question. In any case, the emphasis throughout the B-1 campaign was on the "impractical" characteristics of a particular weapon. Even this message, it appears, was not widely absorbed. In 1983, the B-1 was back on the Congressional agenda and production was authorized (in the House the vote was 255-164). It is now planned to build 100 of these bombers by 1986.²

3. The rejection of offensive wars and weapons along with the acceptance of "defensive" wars and weapons

This is the position adopted by the Boston Study Group in their book *The Price of Defense*.³ This book, published in 1979, has been useful as the first serious effort in recent times to consider what kind of armed forces the United States might need, if our foreign policy and military objectives were only "defensive."

The term "defense" is open to many interpretations. The authors of *The Price of Defense* make clear how far its meaning has been stretched by US policy-makers. They prefer a narrow interpretation: defense is territorial defense. By this definition only a very small fraction of the US defense budget actually goes for defense. This is because the US is not threatened by invasion and occupation (unless one counts the threat that our State Department tells us is posed by the many Haitians, Salvadorans, and other impoverished and oppressed citizens of countries south of our borders who would prefer to live in this "rich industrialized country").⁴ The key threat to the territorial United States is the threat of nuclear attack (the extent of this threat is, to be sure, not clear). Against *this* threat there is no defense, Presidential fantasies notwithstanding.

On this basis one might conclude that the US hardly needs its non-nuclear forces at all (whether a nuclear deterrent is needed is a separate issue). The Boston Study Group was not prepared to espouse such a radical stance, at least not for the short run. They wrote:

Although we continued to use the "defense" requirement as our guiding objective throughout the study, we gradually came to the conclusion that it would be both unrealistic and unwise to recommend that in one stroke U.S. military policy should be reoriented so as to be confined exclusively to the territorial defense of the United States. Such a purely defensive policy would probably cost no more than a few per cent of our present military spending. Both domestically and internationally, the change would be revolutionary. We believe that it is important not to propose an immediate change in the size of the U.S. military establishment and budget on a scale which could reasonably be expected to have disruptive impact on international relations. This might cause upheavals or increased tension in other countries and result in increased militarization and greater likelihood of war than exists today . . . [Therefore] we propose to maintain the most important, traditional U.S. defense commitments to other countries and to retain the portion of the general-purpose forces needed to meet these commitments.⁵ (Emphasis added.)

Here we see how easily (perhaps inevitably, perhaps justifiably) the term "defense" gets stretched, even by those disinclined to do so. Within the global war system defense is always going to be interpreted to mean something other than just defense of the homeland. In general, armed forces exist not just to defend territory and lives (not the same thing incidentally), but to defend and promote ways of life, economic and political interests, belief systems, etc. We can imagine particular states moving to more modest views about what they are obliged or willing to defend. It is quite a bit more difficult to imagine how the war system can be reformed so that there are no global military powers.

The Price of Defense, to be sure, does propose a substantial retrenchment in the US global role by means of a considerable reduction in US "power projection" possibilities. Some of its recommendations for arms and force

reductions will in fact appear quite drastic to most Americans, e.g. cuts in the number of aircraft carriers from 13 to 3 and in the number of amphibious warfare ships from 63 to 10, reduction of the Marine Corps by more than half. These changes are meant to reduce US capabilities for imperialistic behavior.

One person's imperialism, however, is another's defense against the forces of evil in the world. The evil that we are fighting in Central America, the Reagan administration tells us, is not that different from the evil we are trying to prevent through our commitment to NATO in Western Europe. In brief, the defenders of US military power assert that US power projection is always defensive. The Boston Study Group rightly rejects this claim, but their own political analysis does not provide the conceptual apparatus for clearly distinguishing between the offensive and the defensive. Their arguments against intervention in the Third World are made briefly and are mainly pragmatic. Vietnam, they explain, has shown that the US does not do well in such encounters.⁶

In place of a political critique of the system of alliances in which the US is engaged and a thoroughgoing review of how "defense" and "intervention" are to be distinguished, *The Price of Defense* offers a series of recommendations with regard to weapons and force reductions. These recommendations permit the retention of many general-purpose forces that they concede can be used either for defensive or for "policing" and interventionary purposes. Without a profound political reorientation it appears likely that such forces would continue to be used in both ways.

Deeper political analysis is probably avoided here (as in the case of the first two flawed antiwar strategies) because of a fear of "controversy." A focus on the characteristics of weapons and weapons systems may seem more likely to be palatable to the general public than an analysis of the political and economic forces that impede this country (and certain others) from adopting a less assertive and interventionary stance.

In my view, if this kind of analysis were undertaken, one would have to look at the global war system itself as a generator of aggressive behavior. The war system in some measure produces imperialistic powers (now one country, now another) a point that receives relatively little attention. Furthermore, the imperialistic powers seek to have allies. Even small countries that might otherwise assume a purely defensive military posture are brought through the system of alliances into other, less benign roles.⁷ In sum, while political critiques of aggressive military behavior are desirable and necessary, and while the acquisition of particular weapons systems that facilitate aggression must be strongly resisted by citizens movements, there is little reason to believe that military aggression will vanish

from the world as long as the resort to large-scale violence is a prerogative of the nation-state (or any alternative political entity).⁸

My argument thus far may appear ill-conceived. It may appear that I have merely criticized reformists for being reformists. Not everyone, after all, believes that the use of organized violence is an unacceptable way of conducting human struggle or that the war system is only barely amenable to reform and control - and that therefore a more radical program is required. Do not reformists have the right to be reformists?

The real question here, however, is not whether reformists have a right to follow their convictions (they do, of course). The real question is why those holding more radical convictions (including many of those espousing the strategies just described) have so often failed to act in accord with these convictions; in short, why they have failed to develop a thoroughgoing program against the *institution* of war, and not just against its particular manifestations. In my view, this failure is common to both the traditional pacifists, who quite some time ago announced their rejection of war, largely on ethical grounds, and the newer "pacifists," many of whom believe that the use of violence in specific contexts may be (or at least may have been) "justified," but that the war system as a whole presently poses such grave threats to humankind that it must be opposed and, if possible, eliminated. I would add that I think the number of latent members of the second category is very great indeed, but that no one (and no group) has been able to make effective political use of this fact.

For many years the "ethical pacifists" have made one principal demand - unilateral disarmament. In considering the merits of this demand, we may leave aside those cases where some measure of unilateral disarmament is urged on nonpacifist grounds, e.g. with the argument that from a military point of view we do not really need *all* those weapons. (In these cases those who believe that from a military point of view we *do* need all those arms will, of course, mount a vigorous counterattack.)

The demand of the ethical pacifists that we disarm unilaterally is based on the perception that killing people and destroying the human habitat are morally repugnant ways to achieve one's ends, even when the ends are laudable. To outlaw most forms of individual killing and yet to tolerate the many forms of mass killing that warfare, and particularly modern warfare, permits is grossly inconsistent. If we cannot obtain universal agreement to outlaw this conduct, at least we need not participate in it.

The strength of the demand for unilateral disarmament lies in the strength and clarity of the moral vision which supports it. Nevertheless, this demand is insufficient if we really wish to transform the war system

and to delegitimize armed struggle. Taken in itself, the demand for unilateral disarmament is inadequate in three main respects:

(1) The goal appears negative rather than positive. It arouses the fears of those who believe that an armed defense is necessary without offering an alternative vision of how to carry on the struggle, deal with conflict (which will continue in the best of all possible worlds), etc. In itself it does not contain a vision of the alternative institutions and practices that would be necessary for a nation or for a world that had renounced the use of arms. Some ideas on these matters have been developed over the years - by civilian defense strategists, by thinkers on world federalism and world order, by Gandhians, by experts on conflict resolution, etc. But the campaigners for unilateral disarmament have yet to take them and meld them into a single coherent program.

(2) The demand is just that - a demand. A justifiable demand in my view, but a demand is not an analysis. The achievement of a disarmed nation, and eventually of a disarmed world, will require a process. We may call this the "peace process." The peace process as a whole will both require and entail great economic, technological, psychological, social and cultural changes. These changes need to be analyzed and promoted in concrete detail (just as Marxists have tried to analyze the changes that socialism necessitates). Apart from some efforts in the field of economic conversion, we see little activity of this sort. Even the efforts to promote economic conversion sometimes fail to acknowledge the depth of the changes necessary if American industry is to be devoted only to peaceful pursuits. It is not just a matter of shifting some tax dollars from bombs to buses.

(3) The demand appears to assume that moral vision can overcome fear. This may be true for some, but for many it is not. The moralists need to be a bit more frank about the reality of fear and about the difficulty of starting on a new course. To engage in the peace process will cost us something. We cannot know exactly what the cost will be, but we should not imagine that it will be negligible. To be sure, one way of dealing with this obstacle to action is to show that we have even more to fear if we continue on our present course. There are risks, however, in this approach. To confront the unpersuaded with an even greater fear may paralyze rather than activate them. If paralysis is to be avoided, an agenda for a peace process must inspire some hope and must provide some new experiences of human solidarity. Only in this way can the peace process attract a large following - and it must attract a large following if it is to have a serious impact.

In his eloquent essay "Protest and Survive," E.P. Thompson writes that "the deformed human mind is the ultimate doomsday weapon" and calls

struggle (he proposes civilian-based nonviolent struggle), it is not only the means of struggle that distinguish a peace system from a war system. Even though it will not be possible to put all the elements of a peace system in place at once, we require an understanding of what the different elements of such a system need be under contemporary circumstances, and we need to work out a multi-pronged strategy for their realization.

Some discussion of this kind has already been going on for a number of years. In the United States it has remained restricted to a small circle. In Western Europe, with the emergence in recent years of the "ecological" parties, a larger fraction of the politically active population has debated and advocated radical nonviolent alternatives. For example, in a draft manifesto of the Green and Radical parties of the European Community we find a program which links together support for political decentralization, the democratization of production, maximum reliance on renewable resources, and transarmament to civilian defense.¹⁰ The goal is a "non-violent, non-exterminating human society . . . a self-reliant Europe of regions" (not nations). The Preamble of the Statute of Italy's Radical Party makes of nonviolence a principle with no exceptions, "even where legitimate defense is concerned." Britain's Ecology Party, less successful at the polls than the German Greens and the Italian Radicals, has made similar statements supporting resource conservation, economic self-sufficiency, demilitarization and active peacemaking.

In Europe there is considerable interest in nonviolent defense, no doubt partly because the nations of Europe have repeatedly suffered invasion (as E. P. Thompson has noted, war in Europe is not something that happens "over there").¹¹ In the Netherlands, Sweden, and Norway there have been official studies of the possibilities of nonviolent defense. In Britain the Alternative Defence Commission has considered civilian-based defense as one of several strategies that Britain might adopt if it renounced its position as a nuclear power. Given NATO's seeming lack of confidence in its ability to defend Western Europe by "conventional" means (clearly expressed in its refusal to renounce "first use" of nuclear weapons), many Western European activists have concluded that the choice they face is between a policy of nonviolent resistance to occupation and a policy that seriously risks the nuclear annihilation of their countries. Understandably, the interest in nonviolent resistance has increased in these circumstances.

For a number of years, leading nonviolent activists in Europe have argued that defense should be conceived of not only as a means of dealing with foreign invaders, but as a means of protecting social progress within a society. The achievements of nonviolent campaigns, which may range from the removal of a polluting industry to the implementation of a plan

*See Addendum

for "an alternative logic, an opposition at every level of society." It is with respect to the generation of "an alternative logic" that I believe war resisters have most significantly failed. It appears that the force of the prevailing logic is so great that an *a priori* decision is often made: An alternative way of thinking and acting would not be understood. We must approach the general public and the decision-makers on their own terms, the terms of the old logic.¹²

This version of "pragmatism" would be more impressive if its results were more impressive. Since they are not, we should consider a more forthright and consistent approach. Such an approach requires keeping clearly before the public our real goals and our reasons for espousing these goals. If we believe that the violence of the state - not just this or that weapon, not just this or that policy - is the "enemy," then we must say so. If we believe that in the nuclear age "politics as usual" is a formula for disaster, then we should say so. If we believe that the challenge we face is, at least in part, a moral and spiritual challenge of a high order, then we should not be embarrassed to say so (though we need not, and had better not, claim any particular insight into God's will). So-called average human beings are quite capable of understanding pronouncements of this kind. Some, of course, will reject them (though not necessarily forever). Others will sense their validity, but be fearful of their implications (with justification, one might note). And still others will be relieved that such things are being said.

A serious discussion about the abolition of war must include discussion about the alternative behaviors and institutions that will be needed if conflict and struggle are to be carried on nonviolently. It must include as well discussion about the political, economic, and psychological dynamics which currently impede the adoption of these alternatives. Such discussions should probe as deeply as possible and be carried on as publicly as possible. (Let it not be thought that we can conceal from the powers that be that we would like to change their status in the world.) Out of such interchanges should arise our short- and long-term strategies for political transformation.

In the discussions I envisage, the alternatives we shall need to be talking about include nonviolent defense (also called civilian-based defense or civil resistance), preventive and remedial peacemaking, the conversion to nondestructive technologies, law without violence (at all levels), and the principles of a nonimperialistic foreign policy. We shall need to formulate programs and documents that indicate the contribution of each of these elements (and others) to the replacement of the war system by a peace system. While nonviolence theorist Gene Sharp, for example, is certainly right to emphasize the need for an alternative to violent means of

Decentralism need not imply introversion.

11. Some of the thoughts of European researchers on this topic are represented in a special issue of the *Bulletin of Peace Proposals* on "Alternative Defence and Security," vol. 9, no. 4, 1978.
12. Theodor Ebert, "Defense and the Ecology Movement," *IFOR Report*, June 1981, pp. 12-13.
13. Rajiv Vora, an Indian scholar and peace activist, has written: "What must be questioned is not just the role of industrial technology in giving birth to the tools of war, but more importantly its role in causing the cultural distortions which make people expect and prepare for war." See also the article by Vora and Rakesh Bharadwaj, "Disarmament: A Panacea or the Industrial Society's Variant of Peace?", in *Gandhi Marg*, vol. 4, no. 2/3: May-June 1982.
14. Space limitations have prevented me from discussing recent developments in Eastern Europe, the various efforts at nonofficial levels to think and act in new ways on behalf of peace. These efforts, even those on a small scale, are very important in my view. The following quotation by the Czech philosopher, Dr. Ladislav Hejzlanek, expresses convictions similar to my own: "Nowadays peace efforts are concentrated on nuclear disarmament. . . . This accent is far from self-evident, however. Does it mean that the world is meant to go back to old-fashioned weapons - 'less inhuman' ones? Is it merely, or at least primarily a matter of revulsion at certain forms of warfare instead of the rejection of all kinds of warfare? Can we take seriously those peace efforts that do not seek to abolish the real causes of war, but merely aim to moderate the form and nature of war?" (*Voices from Prague: Czechoslovakia, Human Rights and the Peace Movement*, edited by Jan Kavan and Zdena Tomlin, END and Palach Press Limited, London, 1983)
15. See, in particular, *The Politics of Nonviolent Action*, (Boston: Porter Sargent, 1973) and *Social Power and Political Freedom*, (Boston: Porter Sargent, 1980).

*Addendum

In an article on "green politics" in the April 21, 1984, issue of *The Nation*, Charlene Spretnak reports that the Green parties of Europe have made important progress towards a common program. "In preparation for the European Parliament election of June 14-17, the Green parties in Austria, Belgium, Britain, France, Ireland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Sweden and West Germany have formed the European Greens and have hammered out a platform on which candidates in each of those countries will campaign." (A footnote indicates some reservations on the part of the German Greens.) The platform rejects all weapons of mass destruction and supports security based on "social and non-violent defense."

1. The objective of the Nuclear Freeze Campaign is to halt the dynamics of the nuclear arms race by putting a "freeze" on the testing, production and deployment of nuclear weapons. The Campaign has been remarkably successful in providing a means whereby a large number of citizens have been able to manifest clearly their anxieties about the nuclear arms race. The Campaign has done little, however, to analyze the political and structural conditions which underlie the dynamics of arms acquisition. To date (December 1983), it has not profoundly affected the thinking of members of Congress, as has been made evident by their votes on the arms budget, military aid to Central America, etc.
2. Campaigns against particular weapons may seem imperative in view of the characteristics of those weapons. Such is the case with the latest generation of nuclear weapons and weapons systems: the cruise and PershingII missiles in Europe, the MX missiles and Trident submarines in the US. Campaigns against these weapons, however, appear unable to achieve their immediate goals. The longer-term impact of these campaigns will depend upon their capacity to raise fundamental political issues with the general public.
3. The Boston Study Group, *The Price of Defense: A New Strategy for Military Spending*, (New York: Times Books, 1979).
4. See Elliot Abrams, "Diluting Compassion," *New York Times*, op-ed page, 5 August, 1983.
5. The Boston Study Group (Note 3), pp. 49-50.
6. *ibid.*, pp. 181-182. The authors are more optimistic in this part of their discussion than the evidence seems to warrant. They write: "While the cold war concept of the containment of communism may appear superficially attractive, it must be remembered that it is nearly impossible to predict the future course of events in a third world country exploding into the twentieth century. Indeed, the record of the U.S.A. in choosing which political faction to support is so poor, that the lesson to stay out has been learned."
7. The work of the Alternative Defence Commission of Great Britain is aimed at formulating strategies for Britain that exclude any reliance on nuclear weapons. In writing about these strategies the Commission has underscored the tension between Britain remaining in NATO and adopting a stance that would be both non-nuclear and genuinely defensive.
8. I have not meant to imply that the study of defensive strategies can serve no useful purpose whatsoever. Such studies can provoke a citizenry to think more deeply about what "defense" might really be in the nuclear age. They may foster beneficial changes in the military policies of small and medium-sized countries. They may be linked to political analyses that lead to more enlightened foreign-policy decisions. The report of the British Alternative Defence Commission, *Defense Without the Bomb*, avoids many of the weaknesses of *The Price of Defense* by virtue of its more thorough political analyses and by virtue of the fact that Britain plays quite a different role in the world military system than the US.
9. Ethical pacifists may stop with the first conclusion - an alternative way of thinking and acting would not be understood - and not go on to adopt what I have called "reformist" strategies. In this case pacifist insights suffer no dilution, yet remain essentially negative.
10. There are tensions between the need for decentralizing political life and transnationalizing it. It is not impossible to imagine, however, global networks of relatively