

of SPSSI research, writing, and action programs over its 50-year history have been the "three P's"—prejudice, poverty, and peace.

Bringing that tradition up to date, the *Journal of Social Issues* has published three issues on aspects of international peace in the last three years: "Beyond Deterrence" in 1987, "Psychology and the Promotion of Peace" in 1988, and this issue on "The Image of the Enemy" in 1989. The papers included here are interdisciplinary in scope and contain much fresh thinking and new research findings on this crucial topic of our nuclear age.

In addition, this issue contains two special addresses that are both highly relevant to the topic of international peace. They are the 1988 Kurt Lewin Memorial Award address, given by Robert L. Kahn on "Nations as Organizations," and the 1988 SPSSI presidential address, delivered by Jeffrey Z. Rubin on "Assumptions About Conflict and Negotiation." Taken together, these 11 papers provide a welcome up-to-date demonstration that psychologists and other social scientists have many and varied contributions to make to research and policy regarding international relations.

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## On the Psychology of Enemy Images: Introduction and Overview

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*Over the past two centuries, enemy images have affected U.S. responses to a number of different nations. Since World War II, they have played an important role in stimulating and perpetuating the nuclear arms race. After reviewing the research traditions within psychology relevant to an understanding of the topic, we discuss the aspects of the psychology of U.S. images of the Soviet Union that are addressed by the papers in this issue. These papers demonstrate that psychologists can apply a wide range of methods and theories to investigating, and perhaps ameliorating, the causes and effects of the exaggerated enemy images of another nation that the people of one nation may hold.*

With the growth of stockpiles of nuclear weapons and the ever-present threat of their proliferation to many other nations, sustained progress toward peace and disarmament has become mandatory. Several barriers stand in the way of such progress, however. Some of these barriers are rooted in geopolitics and economics, but some are psychological in nature. (See White, 1986, for a collection of articles dealing with many of these psychological processes.) The papers presented here examine the proposition that among the more important psychological barriers to peacemaking are the effects of *enemy images*, and they consider the vicissitudes of American images of one officially designated enemy—the Soviet Union.

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### Historical Context

Ordinarily, when two nation-states are at war, each considers the other its enemy. And traditionally, the wartime propaganda of each nation attempts to inculcate in its people and military personnel a similar image of the enemy as inherently hostile, filled with hatred and a rage to conquer and dominate others, treacherous, cruel, and—in a word—evil (White, 1949). For example, a former president of the United States had the following to say about a foreign country:

We concur in considering [its] government as totally without morality, insolent beyond bearing, inflated with vanity and ambition, aiming at the exclusive domination of the [world], lost in corruption, of deep-rooted hatred towards us, hostile to liberty wherever it endeavors to show its head, and the eternal disturber of the peace of the world. (Ford, 1848, p. 519)

The year of writing was 1815 (when the passions of the war of 1812 had not yet subsided), the ex-president was Thomas Jefferson, and the country he was exhorting was England. Even a leader so renowned for erudition, sophistication, and humanitarianism was either under the influence of a war-born image of the enemy or was trying to propagate it as a felt necessity.

Presumably the intent of such a national leader in time of war is to motivate a national will to fight and make whatever sacrifices seem necessary, and to justify the destruction or at least the conquest of the opponent. The fighting men especially need such indoctrination to overcome their natural reluctance to kill fellow human beings who are more like themselves than different. In times of war, then, the enemy is usually depicted as not really human—of an inferior "race" if that is plausible, animal-like, or demonic. As Erikson (1985) has put it, the process is one of "pseudospeciation." The recent publication of Harry S. Truman's papers reveals vivid evidence that the president himself thought of the Japanese enemy as "savages, ruthless, merciless and fanatic" (Truman, 1980, p. 55). It seems likely that this enemy image had an influence on his decision to use atomic bombs against a tottering Japan that was suing for peace.

Recent decades have presented a new phenomenon—the cold war. At the beginning of the Truman administration, the U.S. and the USSR were allies in the great war against Adolf Hitler. By its end, after Stalin's refusal to remove his troops from the zone of east European buffer states, Truman and his advisors found it expedient to promulgate the "Truman Doctrine" to prevent any further expansion of the USSR (Larson, 1985). To sell this reversal to Congress, he gave an ominous speech, interpreting Soviet moves in the worst possible light and warning of an imminent takeover of Europe. Thus began the cold war, a period in which the Soviet Union was treated as an enemy in every way except actual military operations. Not only Congress but the American electorate had to be persuaded that the heroic defenders of Stalingrad and former comrades-in-arms

in the defeat of Hitler were actually treacherous, hostile, power-hungry, heartless monsters.

Since then, the American people have been told in many ways and by many spokespersons that they are engaged in a vital struggle with a wily and implacable enemy who is bent on conquering the world and whose basic values are the antithesis of everything that democratic countries believe. The task was made easier because, during the period between the Bolshevik revolution and Hitler's 1941 attack on Russia, the U.S. public had been deluged with anticommunist and anti-Soviet propaganda. (For some tidbits from this "red scare" era, see Silverstein and Flamenbaum, this issue.)

These historical circumstances are responsible for the unusual situation in which we find ourselves: nominally at peace with what has become the only other "superpower," which has nevertheless been treated by each successive American administration in many ways as if overt hostilities were about to begin. No wonder that many Americans have thought of the Soviet Union (or the "Russians") as an enemy, possessing many of the traits Jefferson had attributed to the British.

The nations treated as evil enemies by the United States have changed over time, from England, Mexico, and Spain in the 18th and 19th centuries to Germany and now the USSR. Sometimes these nations have constituted threats to the United States, as England did in 1815. Sometimes, as in the case of Mexico in 1848, they have not. In either case, exaggerated enemy images led Americans to treat the nation in question as despicable and not a fit partner for diplomacy and negotiation. Notice that in this way, when a nation has been psychologically conditioned for warfare, nonviolent and cooperative means of resolving disputes and conflicts are made less feasible; at the extreme, the only available option is war. In an age when both superpowers have stockpiles of nuclear weapons capable of killing about 12 times more people than inhabit the earth (Sivard, 1987), the potential costs of foreclosing peaceful ways of settling issues between nations can be measured in trillions of dollars and billions of lives.

### History of the Topic in Psychology

By the term image (as in "image of the enemy"), we mean a cognitive-affective complex, which may or may not have literally iconic, representational aspects. In the narrowest usage, images of the enemy mean mental or concrete visual portrayals, such as the illustrations in Keen's (1986) collection of propaganda posters. For the most part, however, the literature on this topic refers to subjective psychological phenomena, including much more than imagery in its strict sensory meaning: concepts, beliefs, attitudes, values, stereotypes, emotions (chiefly aspects of fear and hatred), motives, and intentions. Thus, a full

understanding of these cognitive-affective configurations, their causes and effects, calls for the perspectives of many areas of psychology, including developmental, social, cognitive, clinical, and personality. Moreover, these psychological perspectives need to be informed by those of other behavioral sciences, especially history and political science.

Psychologists are not so different from other citizens. When the United States was involved in World War II, which had enormous support throughout the society, the psychological profession was mobilized like any other in support of the war effort. It would have seemed most inappropriate to have engaged in the study of how people developed their images of the Nazi enemy and what effects that had upon their cognition and other behavior. But before, and even more, after the war, several research traditions developed that are relevant to an understanding of the working of enemy images.

The pioneering work of Adorno et al. (1950) had a great deal of influence, beginning a spate of publications on authoritarianism and prejudice. In their classic work, the Berkeley group developed instruments for measuring prejudice (more broadly, negative attributions) toward Jews, blacks, and other minorities, and they painted vivid portraits of authoritarian people who tended to hold scornful stereotyped images of people not like themselves. Authoritarian American students tended (among other characteristics) to be extremely nationalistic superpatriots with strongly anticommunist convictions. Tested with instruments growing out of the preceding decades' work on radicalism-conservatism treated as a single continuum, they earned extreme scores on the conservative end of the scale. In cognitive-structural terms, prejudiced individuals exhibited intolerance of ambiguity, tending to view the world in sharp blacks and whites rather than shades of gray.

Out of social psychology came an emphasis on how group processes can amplify intergroup tension and hostility, and exaggerate tendencies to stereotype members of competing outgroups. Much work was stimulated by the "realistic conflict theory" that developed out of the Robbers' Cave studies (Sherif et al., 1961). This theory situates the causes of group conflict, including what we are terming "enemy images," in threats resulting from struggles over scarce resources. The subsequent development of "social identity theory" by Tjajfel and Turner (1986) and their colleagues has enriched this tradition by demonstrating that the mere perception of belonging to two different groups is sufficient to provoke intergroup competitiveness and discriminatory or stereotypic responses on the part of the ingroup.

A third body of research built upon the concept of stereotypes, a term introduced from outside psychology by Lippmann (1922), which stimulated a tradition of research on prejudice. While most of this work was focused on racial prejudice, some of it (e.g., Bogardus, 1925; Lambert & Klineberg, 1967) studied stereotypes of people from other nations. The early Gallup studies of the

adjectives chosen by Americans to describe the peoples of various nations (described by Yotani & Bramel and by Holt, both in this issue) came out of this tradition.

Thus, psychologists have been studying concepts related to enemy images for many years. In the early 1950s, with the onset of the cold war, and in the late 1950s and early 1960s, with the decline of McCarthyism, psychologists turned their attention to American attitudes toward the Soviet Union. A pioneering work by Smith, Bruner, and White (1956) examined in considerable qualitative depth the opinions of 10 men about the Soviet Union at the time the Truman Doctrine was being promulgated; it demonstrated the embeddedness of their attitudes in the subjects' personalities and the functions these attitudes served. Much of the other early work done on the topic was reviewed in a volume on the psychology of international relations edited by Kelman (1965) and published by SPSSSI, and the chapter, "The Image of the Enemy," in the influential book by Jerome Frank (1967) gave it a label that has stuck.

In recent years, stimulated by the threat of nuclear annihilation, psychologists have again begun to employ their research skills in attempting to understand how the superpowers come to view one another as enemies, how these attitudes and images act as barriers to peacemaking, and how they might be changed. Here we present a sampling of this emerging new literature.

### Limitations

Our plan for this issue was to explore the present status of the psychology of enemy images, using American attitudes toward the USSR as a specific empirical focus, even though interesting work has been done with other national foci on other enemy images, most notably the mutual enemy images of Israel and the Arab nations (e.g., Heradstveit, 1974; Kelman, 1979). Given the importance to the world of the nuclear arms race and of U.S.-USSR relations, we felt this restricted focus would not only allow for greater coherence of presentation but also might more strongly stimulate the development of psychological research on the enemy images that presumably fuel the arms race. As the field of enemy image research grows, similarities and differences between the processes by which various nations come to see one another as enemies will eventually have to be confronted.

We also wanted to include work on Soviet images of the United States. However, the work done on this topic to date has taken one of two forms, each of which we believed inappropriate for inclusion here. American scholars' research on the topic (e.g., Griffiths, 1984) has been done by political scientists, historians, or Sovietologists, has relied upon content analyses of published material, and has focused on descriptions of the images of the United States held by Soviet elites, not (with very rare exceptions) on attempts to test hypotheses regarding

the causes and effects of such images. While this work is important, we chose to focus on tests of psychological hypotheses about images of the enemy. Until quite recently, the work done by Soviet scholars on the topic has been primarily theoretical and largely devoted to describing the dangers of enemy images, particularly U.S. images of the Soviet Union as enemy (e.g., Melville, 1988). With the rise of *glasnost*, researchers in the Soviet Union have paid increased attention to surveying the attitudes of the Soviet people, which should allow for more empirical work on Soviet images of the United States. Several relevant studies of this sort are in their early stages (e.g., Chivian, 1986) but, to our knowledge, none were completed in time for inclusion here.

Similar difficulties beset our attempts to include work done on other aspects of the problem. While we strove for as much breadth in focus and method as possible, we decided to limit the articles included here to those that reported empirical research. We strongly felt such work would be of greatest interest to the readers of *JSI*, even though this decision resulted in severe limitations, particularly in four important areas. For example, although several of the articles included here do discuss the issue of what motivates the formation of enemy images, the conception that they may result from the projection and/or displacement of hostility and fear (probably the most popular motivational focus among psychologists writing in this area), is barely touched upon. While there has been some empirical work on this hypothesis in earlier years (see Silverstein, 1989, for a review of this work), recent writing on the topic has been primarily theoretical (Kovel, 1983; Volkan, 1985; Zur, 1987) or takes the validity of the hypothesis for granted (e.g., Keen, 1986). The empirical research being done in the area of *motivation* had not progressed enough to be included here.

The same can be said about work on the *development* of enemy images in children. During the 1940s, 1950s, and 1960s, published research relevant to this question included studies of the development of ethnocentrism and national stereotypes (Lambert & Klineberg, 1967), the development of nationalism (Piaget & Weill, 1951), and the relationship between attitudes toward the Soviet Union held by parents and by their children (Helfant, 1952). Coles's (1986) recent work on the political thought of children is also relevant. But once again, the current research on the development of U.S. enemy images toward the Soviet Union (e.g., Hesse, 1988) was not quite ready to be included.

Another important aspect of the topic is research on enemy images in the *mass media*. We had planned to include a study, by a leading journalistic scholar, of enemy images of the Soviet Union as presented in the American mass media, but the pressure of other commitments made it impossible for him to meet our deadline.

Finally, we would have liked to include much more on possible approaches to *solution*, or at least amelioration, of the problem of enemy images. A number of psychologists have developed techniques, workshops, and materials designed

to raise consciousness about the psychological processes relevant to enemy images (for a brief review, see Silverstein, in press). Psychologists for Social Responsibility has put together a resource manual to be used by psychologists in educating the public about the psychology of enemy images. But these materials and procedures have not been, or are only now in the process of being, scientifically evaluated. Attempts have been made to study the effectiveness of single lectures, film showings, or entire courses in combatting enemy images (e.g., Nelson, 1988). All such educational research that we have seen, however, suffers from statistical problems in discriminating real change from artifacts. The best empirical work on attempts to modify enemy images we could find is described in the article by Trost, Cialdini, and Maass (this issue).

Despite all the limitations listed above, the research collected here uses a wide range of methods—laboratory experiments and field studies, questionnaires, public opinion surveys, interviews, content analyses, and simulations—to investigate many aspects of the causes and effects of enemy images.

### Overview of This Issue

The issue begins with two papers that portray, from several points of view, the images that Americans hold of the Soviet Union. These papers help define some of the parameters of U.S. attitudes toward the Soviet Union, including (1) how they have changed over time, (2) how they compare to attitudes toward other enemies and nonenemies, (3) how they are manifested in attitudes toward the Soviet people, and (4) how they differ from attitudes toward personal enemies. Relying on different data bases, these two articles also come to somewhat different conclusions regarding the motivations that underlie U.S. enemy images of the Soviet Union.

The first of these two papers, a survey of surveys by Yatani and Bramel, reviews studies of U.S. public opinion regarding the Soviet Union over the past four decades. The general picture this research reveals is well summarized in their Figure 1, which shows the long-term changes in the general favorability-unfavorability of U.S. attitudes toward the USSR from 1953 to 1988. Much of the paper is devoted to an attempt to find the sources of these predominantly disapproving attitudes. They argue that the critical (and probably causal) variable for an understanding of American anti-Soviet attitudes is nationalism—seeing the Soviets as "national rivals in a competition for world dominance."

The next paper, Holt's study of stereotyped enemy images in college students, presents a somewhat different picture. After intensively interviewing and testing an undergraduate sample, Holt reports that students defined *personal* enemies primarily in terms of interpersonal conflict and hostility, denying that divergent values or policy positions were relevant to whether a person was a friend or enemy. When the topic changed to *nations*, the same students gave

nearly equal weight to threat/danger and to divergent values/policies, often stressing the latter almost entirely when discussing particular enemy nations. Using a modification of Gallup's adjective-choice method, Holt found that through more than 8 of each 10 students consider the Soviet Union an enemy, very few had classical enemy images of it.

The next three studies were written from the perspective of social cognition, and they describe biases in the way that information about the Soviet Union is processed. These studies might be considered to be describing some of the cognitive effects of holding an enemy image, which also become causes when they feed back to reinforce that image. Rather than conceiving of the biases demonstrated by these studies as effects or causes of negative attitudes or emotions directed at enemies, however, we may simply say that the studies define some of the cognitive aspects of the cognitive-affective complex termed an "enemy image." In that sense, all of the first five studies in this issue help define the structure of the U.S. enemy image of the Soviet Union.

Silverstein and Flamenbaum present a theory of the cognitive and perceptual distortion inherent in enemy images, based upon previously published studies of ethnic, racial, and individual enemies. They derive support for the applicability of the theory to U.S. enemy images of the Soviet Union from the combined results of experiments, surveys, and content analyses of the media. Distortions enter many stages of information processing about enemies, including attention, recall, assessment of credibility, prediction of future actions, evaluation, and attribution. Parallels exist between the distortions that enter the processing of information about the Soviet Union by individuals and by the mass media.

Burn and Oskamp, using a questionnaire measure of both the attitudes and the attributions of a sample of community college students, demonstrate the ingroup biases that affect U.S. responses to the Soviet Union. Not only were the students in the sample more positive toward the U.S. government and people than they were toward the Soviet government and people, but they made more favorable attributions for actions taken by the U.S. government than for similar actions taken by the Soviet government. And the attributions made for the Soviet actions were significantly correlated with attitudes toward defense spending and toward the Star Wars project.

Sande, Goethals, Ferrari, and Worth focus more closely on attribution than the other articles. By using carefully constructed stimulus materials and a series of control groups, they were able to draw a number of conclusions about attributions made for Soviet actions. For both positive and negative actions, American high school and college students imputed more altruistic, less self-serving motivations to American actions than to Soviet actions. Attributions for the actions of a nonenemy nation were similar to those for the United States, demonstrating that the U.S.-Soviet differences were due more to anti-Soviet than to pro-U.S.

biases. Canadian students, however, did not exhibit differences in attributions for U.S. and Soviet actions.

With the exception of a few studies cited by Silverstein and Flamenbaum, all of the conclusions regarding the working of enemy images drawn in the papers described above were based on samples of the (usually American) public. While images of foreign nations held by the public may play a large role in international affairs, that role is indirect. It must work through the government advisors and decision makers who implement foreign policy.

Koopman, Snyder, and Jervis combined the methods of questionnaire, experiment, and simulation in an attempt to study effects of the images of the Soviet Union held by a sample of experts in international affairs, who may act as gatekeepers in the process of formulating military and foreign policy. They measured the beliefs of this elite sample about foreign policy, and gave them descriptions of a hypothetical crisis involving U.S. and Soviet forces in the Mideast, asking them to indicate the recommendations they would make were such a crisis to occur. Variations in the details of the crisis situation presented to different respondents, such as the balance of military forces in the region or the likelihood that the Soviets were acting defensively or aggressively, were significantly, but not strongly, related to the recommendations. Beliefs about foreign policy and about the Soviet Union were much more strongly related to the recommendations made by the respondents. That is, in this simulation, images of the Soviet Union held by a sample of experts were more predictive of the recommended responses to the crisis than were the details of the crisis situation. It appears that even experts are subject to the psychology of enemy images.

Finally, most studies of social problems derive their importance from the possibility of using the knowledge derived to implement positive change. An important focus of a psychology of enemy images therefore is, What can be done to ameliorate the effects of such images or to reduce the distortions they produce? Ralph White (1984) noted the need for "realistic empathy," the ability to see the world from the "enemy's" point of view. Psychologists and others have been using a range of techniques to moderate the U.S. enemy image of the Soviet Union and to promote realistic empathy for the Soviets among Americans.

The final paper in this collection, by Trost, Cialdini, and Maass, warns us that we must be careful to use our scientific hardheadedness even in areas where our socially minded softheartedness impels us to immediate action. They carefully evaluated the effects of a procedure designed to moderate hawkish, anti-Soviet attitudes. On the surface, it appeared to the developers of the "Firebreaks" simulation that having people play the roles of Soviet decision makers involved in a military crisis would help promote realistic empathy. For this reason, the Firebreaks simulation was widely used by groups working in the United States to promote peace. Trost and her colleagues found, however, that attitudes toward the Soviet Union of the American students who simulated the

roles of Soviet leaders did not improve, while the attitudes of students who simulated the roles of American leaders opposing the Soviets in the crisis actually became more negative toward the Soviet Union. Thus, a scientific evaluation showed the effects of this widely used procedure to be the opposite of what they were expected to be.

The issue concludes with the editors' reflections on the results obtained in these studies, on some needed next steps in research, and on policy implications.

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