

## Commentary on van Dijk

# Power, Discourse, and Ideology: The Micropractices of Common Sense

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Common sense is the deposit of prejudice laid down in the mind before the age of eighteen.

— Albert Einstein

In his essay on discourse structures and power structures, van Dijk sets for himself the task of theorizing a bridge between, on the macroscopic side of the chasm, the embodiment of power in classes, groups, and institutions, and on the microscopic side, the enactment of power in face-to-face, social interaction. I, too, am at work on such a project, but I am beginning from a rather different assumptive site, and consequently I make use of quite different conceptual equipment. The aim of my commentary is to mark points along the two lines of work that constitute significant differences. It is with the implications of these differences that this commentary stakes its claim to value.

*Power, discourse, and ideology* stand together as the foundation for van Dijk's essay; they are the founding constructs for my commentary as well. The crucial differences are in the ways these constructs get defined and come to be used. More specifically, van Dijk and I share an interest in studying "the ways power is enacted, expressed, described, concealed, or legitimated by text and talk in the social context. We pay special attention to the role of ideology" (van Dijk, p. 18). I focus much more directly on discourse as discursive practices than I do on its textuality, and textual practices; van Dijk, at times,

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*Communication Yearbook 12*, pp. 60-75

60

appears to use "discourse" and "text" interchangeably. For me, "discourse" is performance and enactment whereas "text" is recorded, or otherwise inscribed, discourse. van Dijk chooses not to review work on the general relationship between "power" and "language," in order to focus on discourse as a "textual" form of language-use in the social context. I admit to not understanding what this qualification means. What is language besides its discursive performances and its textual productions and reproductions? On the matter of levels of conceptualization, van Dijk is interested in "social or societal power" rather than in "personal power" (van Dijk, p. 19). I choose not to make a distinction between the two "levels"; or rather, I don't know where to draw the line that separates the "personal level" from the "social level" of analysis. For me, the micropractices of conversation and the macropractices of institutions anchor two ends of a continuum. Power is, for my purposes, relational, and is expressed in and through embodied discursive practices; for van Dijk, power appears to be a property or attribute of persons and/or social formations.

Working in the European, critical Marxist tradition, I explicate the overdetermined and structurally causal relations of *power, discourse, and ideology*. This point of view draws its life from two, not always harmonious, intellectual traditions: first, from structuralism, as it is manifested in Saussure's (1960) linguistics, Lévi-Strauss's (1963; 1967; 1969) structural anthropology, Barthes's (1964; 1972) semiotics, Lacan's (1968; 1977; 1978) structuralist reading of Freud, and Althusser's (1971; 1977) structuralist reading of Marx; and second, from culturalism, as it is manifested in Hoggart's (1957) study of literacy, Thompson's (1963) study of the English working class, Williams's studies of television (1975), literature (1977), and the sociology of culture (1981), and Hall, Critcher, Jefferson, Clarke and Roberts's (1978) study of the social production of news.

I theorize *power, discourse, and ideology* as three facets of a multifaceted phenomenon; they become independent constructs only for purposes of analytic convenience. The task is to think of them as a totality. Toward that end, *discourse* becomes a constellation of communicative practices; *practices* are characteristic ways of communicating—of speaking and listening, of writing and reading. *Ideology* is discursively inscribed and deployed; it is evidenced in practice's characteristic, conventional, common, typical, ordinary styles. *Style* comprises these practices, whose effects are, among other functions, ideological. The *power* of ideological practices, then, is its seemingly transparent nature; insofar as ideology's practices are seemingly *both* transparent *and* minuscule, seemingly *both* conventional *and* innocent, seemingly *both* mundane *and* inconsequential, they are *both* overlooked *and* taken-for-granted.

The extent to which power is (wrongly) assumed to be only of macroscopic proportions, to be exercised by monolithic, reified agents, such as corporations and institutions, is the extent to which its capillarylike infrastructure of

interactional micropractices is overlooked. This is *not* to argue that macroscopic social formations do not exercise power. It is, rather, to argue that power works at all levels of experience, and to be confused on this point is to invite the conclusion that the individual is powerless when pitted against the State. The error is a mismatch of scale, a confusion at the level of theory (Laclau, 1983; LeFort, 1983). Power is *both* enabling *and* constraining, *both* productive *and* repressive, *both* microscopic *and* macroscopic, when adequately theorized (Foucault, 1980). Taking on such a theoretical project, however, is not possible in the limited space of this commentary, so I shall merely sketch out such an undertaking, but in sufficient detail to provide the grounds for an alternative reading of the discourse analytic and sociolinguistic material van Dijk reviews.

Section I of this commentary theorizes *ideology* from a structuralist-Marxist point of view; specifically, I develop *ideology* on a foundation of Althusser (1977), Hall (1985), Bakhtin (1984), and Volosinov (1973; 1976). Section II theorizes *discourse*, not as textuality, but as conversational practice, as the spatio-temporal practices of making time take place. The works of Bourdieu (1977), Bakhtin (1981), Certeau (1984), and Baudrillard (1981) are most pertinent to this theoretical discussion. In Section III, *power* is developed not at the macroscopic, societal level, but at the microscopic, mundane level; what Foucault would call the microphysics of power. The work of Certeau (1984) on the *narrative of tact* is pivotal to such a discussion of power.

#### IDEOLOGY

van Dijk formulates ideology in terms of a theory of social cognition; his rationale for this move is that a theory of social cognition provides a theoretical bridge between macro level and micro level analyses. Rather than moving "up and in"—"up" to a social level and "in" to a cognitive domain—I move "down and out"—"down" to a conversational level and "out" to the domain of practice. These two distinct approaches, I find, complement one another in some very heuristic ways.

The work of ideology is to maintain the conditions that ensure the production and reproduction of the relations of power and control in the contexts of everyday living (Barth, 1976; Larrain, 1983). On this view, *language* is a system of signed differences with no positive terms; it comprises the category system of codes that pass as reality. To theorize *language* as an avenue to ideology and consciousness requires, in turn, an explication of semiotic theory and its relations to a theory of discourse (Coward & Ellis, 1977; Fowler Hodge, Kress, & Trew, 1979; Kress & Hodge, 1979). The hallmark of critical theory is its positioning of language in the rethinking of consciousness and ideology. For Marx (1973), consciousness originates in

social relations, in the existing relations of production. Consciousness must express itself in concrete, material forms to be accessible to other subjects. One family of such concrete structural forms comprises conversational practices (Giddens, 1979). *Conversation* is a term designating a large but finite set of material practices. The question is: How are conversational micropractices and societal macropractices articulated?

Leaving aside, for the purposes of this discussion, the configuration of issues in the debate on the relations between the economic base and the cultural superstructure, and at the same time accepting the proposition that social formations are born of dominant modes of production, it follows that in order to continue to be productive, social formations must perpetually reproduce the conditions of their production. To maintain themselves, social institutions and cultural formations reproduce both the productive forces of production and the social relations that empower such production and reproduction. Althusser (1977) theorizes ideology as being essential to the production and reproduction of subjects capable of reproducing the relations of production, thereby underwriting State power. The power of the State is ensured by means of the Repressive State Apparatus—the police, the penal system, the army—and the Ideological State Apparatuses—education, religion, family, law, politics, trade unions, communications, culture.

The end-point of all ideology is the interpellation of people as subjects; the elementary ideological effect is that the practices that produce subjects are, themselves, transparent. The dominant ideological State apparatus, having replaced the church, is the school. Schools not only inculcate particular knowledges and skills, but inscribe the rules of good conduct and responsible citizenship (Apple, 1979; Burton & Carlen, 1979). For Althusser (1977), ideology represents the imaginary relationship of individuals to their real conditions of existence (p. 162); reflected in the imaginary representation of the world found in an ideology are the conditions of the existence of people, that is, their real world (p. 164). Hall (1985) paraphrases Althusser's formulation of ideology as, "systems of representation—composed of concepts, ideas, myths, or images—in which men and women live their imaginary relations to the real conditions of existence" (p. 103). Systems of representation are the codes of intelligibility, the formats for experiencing the material conditions of everyday life. These systems represent and mediate the immediate conditions of existence. It is impossible to experience real conditions immediately, thus all practices of representation are ideological, which does not imply that all representational practices are *nothing but* ideology. Conversational practices are formats that mediate our experience of the real conditions of existence, and mediated experience stands in an imaginary relation to the real. Such mediating practices deploy systems of representation, and they are, in that sense and to that extent, ideological.

The concepts of *cognition* and *cognitive/mental mediation* become unnecessary in the critical-theoretical formulation of ideology, consciousness,

and the subject. For Althusser (1977), our ideas materialize in actions, which, in turn, are inserted into practices governed by rituals, which are themselves defined by ideological apparatuses (p. 169). In short, ideas are material practices rather than idealist concepts, and the effectivity of such material practices is the production and reproduction of the category of the subject and its relations to its ideas and to those of other subjects. By way of extending Althusser, Coward and Ellis (1977) define ideology as representational practices that close off meanings and produce subjects as their supports. It is meaning, as closure, that delimits and fixes the individual as a subject of and for discourse. The work of ideology is the production of the continuity of the unitary ego as such a subject; by closing off the inherent openness of discourse and its contradictions, ideology produces the experience of meaning and of the singularity of the subject.

The subject as a sign, however, is in process: ideology works to punctuate this process of becoming, which produces the momentary appearance of a monadic subject speaking with a singular voice originating from within a corporeal body. Bakhtin (1984) maintains, in his study of Dostoevsky's poetics, that the subject/heroes that Dostoevsky creates speak themselves into conscious being in the very process of speaking. Rather than creating a finished and completed subject speaking monologically, Dostoevsky writes subjects who speak themselves into their own autonomous consciousness in a world inhabited by other polyphonic subjects in the process of becoming conscious in the ongoing stream of speech. Subjects speak utterances structured by their material circumstances that then form up and flesh out their experience.

Speaking dialogically is speaking with a multiplicity of other voices, rather than speaking for others and their experience. Dialogical discourse is speech that opens onto the threshold of crisis and possibility at every moment. Its speaker is not a finalized subject, but a subject in process, a subject always coming to consciousness by means of speaking the truth of his or her experience. From such a theoretical perspective, speaking dialogically clarifies events and experiences for a subject such that the truth at which a speaker is arriving is the truth of its own consciousness; it is speech that is conscious of itself, speech productive of a self-conscious subject (Bakhtin, 1984, pp. 259-422).

As dialogical speech, conversational practices surround corporeal bodies; these bodies are the material embodiments of language. Speaking dialogically is both a matter of the body—the body as a surface for, as well as a field of, inscribed signifiers—and a matter other than the body. The body is not a causal mechanism driven by cognitive machinery, but is a materially embodied configuration of signifiers that speaks its material consciousness, and, in so doing, speaks its material context. Consciousness cannot be located inside a monadic subject, any more than reality can exist on a single plane (Schaefer, 1981). Reality is not an external backdrop against which internally driven subjects interact.

Volosinov (1973) maintains that the notion of a qualitative difference between the inner and the outer is illusory (pp. 25-26). The structure of experience is as social as is the structure of ideology, and as the structure of ideological experience, an utterance is a Janus-faced act; it is directed simultaneously toward the addresser and toward the addressee. The two faces constitute the two poles of a continuum along which experience congeals ideologically. The "I experience," at its extreme, loses its ideological structuration, and with it its sociological apprehendability. It approaches the physiological reaction of animality in losing its verbal delineation. At the other extreme is the "we experience," characterized by a high degree of differentiation, which is characterized as the mark of the growth of consciousness (pp. 38-40). The more differentiated the collective in which a subject orients itself, the more vivid and complex its conscious experience.

Consciousness, then, is inherently ideological; it is constituted in the polyphony of subjects conversing the truth of their experience of material reality. Outside the embodiment of material signs, consciousness is an illusion; embodied utterances, as gesture and speech, configure experience by tying life together and sharpening its differentiations. Volosinov uses the term *behavioral ideology* to delineate the unsystematized speech that endows every act, and therefore every conscious state, with meaning (pp. 83, 91-93). To characterize speech as ideological is to grant it ontological status. As discourse, conversed speech is thought actualized as social practice. When speech is distributed conversationally, which is to say, when it is dialogical and polyphonic, it calls for a response. An utterance stands as a challenge to a precedent; it summons a riposte from an other subject bodying forth to consciousness. Such consciousness of self as subject rests on a semiotic foundation of division, difference, opposition, contradiction, claim and counterclaim, challenge and riposte: It rests on conversation.

Bourdieu (1977) concerns himself with the logic of exchange systems, whose underlying structure is challenge/riposte. A synchronic system of gift-exchange, temporally inflated into a diachronic model, is a political economy whose currency is gifts and whose logic is dialectical. The rights and obligations of differentially distributed power materialize at the same time they are hidden from themselves in temporality: hidden in the irreversible process of giving gifts. Giving a gift is taking a turn, it is presenting a challenge to reply, it is reciprocating in kind but not in identity. Escalation is the most apparent way to engage in the regulated improvisation of such an autopoietic exchange system. In the very same moment that a challenge becomes a riposte, the power claimed by the turn hides itself in its appearance as a gift, a seemingly cooperative gesture. In this way, a conversational turn is a doubled structure; two transformations are produced in a single stroke: challenge becomes riposte and cooperation becomes contestation.

This dialectic of challenge/riposte articulates the exchange systems of Foucault's (1977) microphysics of power insofar as such power is not a determinate effect of the dialectic, but is the structural ambivalence of the

domain of practice. It is the region of socioideology, the slip space between individual style and sociocultural tempo. The generative principles for the movement of this dialectic of exchange are not located in abstracted and disembodied rules. Rather, practical consciousness is inscribed on and embodied in the infant from its earliest moments of life. An infant becomes the material sign, signifier, and signified configured as codes in sociocultural circuitries of exchange. The infant's body is the material of socioideological formations.

### DISCOURSE

When an infant is born, it is deposited into the symbolic realm of language; it enters a speech community comprising discursive practices that have locative positions for individuals to occupy as subjects. For their subject, the discursive practices make sense; they make meaning. As a subject *of* and *to* these practices, an individual is both *per-formed* and *pro-noun-ced* as a speaking/listening subject articulated to an interpersonal circuitry of social relations and formations. Making meaning in and through subjects is hardly an innocent activity. It is a material struggle, a struggle over the interpretation of events, and a struggle over the power of subjects. Conversational practices presuppose underlying, unstated codes of reality, performing them rather than saying them. Ideology, then, takes its material form in and through the effect of discursive practices that make sense when the underlying codes are presupposed.

For Bourdieu (1977), these configured codes, these socioideological formations, these *dispositions*, are learned—without being explicitly modeled, taught, or instructed—in and through daily participation in the practices of everyday life. *Dispositions*, then, are conversed subjects; they are the material embodiments of everyday practices (p. 72). As discursive practices, conversed language shapes the experiences of its subject's consciousness with the enclosed meanings to sociohistorical conditions. It is the articulation of meaning to experience, the closing off of both meaning and experience, that constitutes the ideological nature of conversational practices. Such practices sustain productive relations and structure in dominance; they laminate meaning to experience, producing conscious subjects; they produce historical continuity in the very process of reproducing sociocultural formations. In this fashion, conversational practices mediate consciousness and ideology simultaneously.

Located at the axis of speech/language, conversational formats interpellate subjects who, in turn, interanimate the production and reproduction of everyday life. The verb *to converse* consists of two Latin root terms: *con* and *vertere*, which means *to turn together in a continuing process of reversal*.

Conversational formats are discursive practices whose movement is doubled, whose turning and reversing interpellate authorial positions as both fixed pronouncements and as unfinished subjects-in-process. Insofar as language is that which all its collusional members assume they know—what goes without saying—language is a practical consciousness, a *common* sense. Speech, however, is a discursive consciousness, an *individuated* sense, insofar as it is that which must be said precisely because it cannot go without saying. So, speech can be thought as the discursive appropriation of practical consciousness, what Bakhtin (Clark & Holquist, 1984), in "The Architectonics of Answerability," calls the *utterance* (pp. 63-94).

It would be a mistake to theorize conversation as a totality, as a coherent and unitary phenomenon. The critical task is to deconstruct the construct of conversation, to describe the micropractices that interpellate an individual into discursive formations as a conversed subject, to explode that totalized gloss into the ideological practices that are the small change of everyday life. The hailing of an individual into the realm of language as a speaking subject is, in large measure, the inscription of identity and difference, of presence and absence, of sound and silence, of self and other. In the realm of language, an individual is alternately subject and object. Subjectivization, then, is division and oscillation coded in conversational formats and performed by means of exchanging.

The giving and taking of turns inscribes a world of subjects, objects, and their interpenetrated relations. Inasmuch as turns are valued, sought, avoided, given, and taken, the way in which conversation is distributed among its members can be thought in politico-economic terms. As with any political economy, the organization of distributional rights and obligations reproduces the very material conditions it organizes. Conversational practices are the structures of sharing and community insofar as turns are distributive; by that, I mean conversational practices are turn-taking systems. Much of social existence is structured in and around the taking of turns. Ideologies are conventionally transparent arrangements for assessing who has what rights and obligations in the scheme of things.

To illustrate: common goods is a fundamentally different mode of distribution than is individual portioning. The analogy is to buffet dining as opposed to à la carte dining. For a buffet, the choices are all present and available. For a la carte, someone presupposes the right to determine for you how much you get and how often. The more fascist the dining, the more the regime presumes the right to serve the portions. The rights of distribution come to be centrally controlled rather than locally administered. The analogy is apposite for conversation; in a family system, for instance, turns are distributed somewhere along the buffet/à la carte continuum. The variety of a subject's tactics for taking turns is either maximized or minimized, either liberated or constrained. Control, to the extreme of passivity, is the objective

of fascism; freedom, to the extreme of chaos, is the objective of anarchism. Somewhere along that continuum, a system formulates a communal ideology in the material forms of rights and obligations.

Structures and codes of turn distribution become conventionalized as familiarity and common sense (see van Dijk's discussion of sexism in "Conversation Between Women and Men," and racism in "Racist Talk"). A subject's identity, then, is a conventional collection of discursive micro-practices: Tactics for giving and taking turns. A turn is an opening, a possibility to be and to do. But what is done with turns is integrally related to how and when turns materialize and how turns are fleshed out with particular content (see van Dijk's discussion of "Job Interviews," "Doctor-Patient Interviews," and "Discourse in Court"). Coming to language as a conversed subject is coming to pragmatic, ethical, aesthetic, political, and spiritual consciousness. There is, in the very production and consumption of conversational practices, a morality whose ideology glosses the appropriation of time, and informs the necessary relations of production and consumption (see Foucault, 1985, pp. 25-32). The ideological effectivity of conversational practices is the production and consumption of an ordinary everyday life of common sense and common places.

The property of conversational practices most responsible for the production and reproduction of this ordinariness and mundanity are their transparent methods of *cutting out* and *turning over*, of animating social action. In his critique of Foucault's (1977) microphysics of power, and Bourdieu's (1977) notion of *habitus*, Certeau (1984) argues that each theoretical discourse *cuts out* a particular phenomenon from its naturally occurring context and then inverts it, or *turns it over*. In Foucault's case, the "it" is the microphysical practices of surveillance and discipline, and in Bourdieu's case, the "it" is the domestic practices of *habitus*. The discourse cuts one of its features out of its context and turns it into the principle that explains everything.

My argument here is that conversational discourse operates in much the same fashion; conversational practices privilege the position of the speaker, and, in so doing, turn the speaker into an *authority*. Conversational practices cut out individuated subjects from the social collectivity and invest those subjects with the authority produced by its logic of valued differences, its logic of status. Baudrillard (1981) stipulated four different sociologies: (1) a *functional logic* of use value, which is a logic of practical operations or a logic of utility, the object of which is the *instrument*; (2) an *economic logic* of exchange value, which is a logic of equivalence or a logic of the market whose object is the *commodity*; (3) a *logic of symbolic exchange*, which is a logic of ambivalence, a logic of the gift whose object is the *symbol*; and (4) a *logic of sign value*, which is a logic of difference, a logic of status whose object is the *sign* (pp. 66, 67). Conversational practices predicated on a *logic of exchange value* produce objects as commodities. The logic of equivalence, which is a

logic of the market, cuts out subjects from the social collectivity and turns them over into commodified objects whose values are determined by this market logic of equivalence.

Practices predicated on a *logic of symbolic exchange* operate on a logic of ambivalence as opposed to equivalence, and produce symbols rather than commodities: The paradigmatic symbol is the gift (Mauss, 1970). The conversational practices of symbolic exchange produce symbols, here broadly defined to include everything from glances, smiles, frowns, and gestures of all sorts, to teasing, joking, and tokens of familiarity whose value is their meaning and worth on a relationship market. On a relationship market, symbols are differentially valued and exchanged, much like commodities on an economic market. However, the symbol, exchanged as a gift, is not intended to be appropriated by an individual subject and accumulated as part of one's economic worth, but to affirm and reaffirm the relationship that its exchange reconstitutes. The gift is not *kept*; in fact, it dissolves in its being given: What remains is its memoric and historical traces. What comes into sharper relief is the circuitry of exchange, the political economy of relationship.

Conversational practices predicated on a *logic of sign value*, which is a logic of difference and status, produce signs as markers of differences. For Baudrillard, this logic of sign value is the logic of the production of commodity consumption as signs of status difference. Or perhaps more succinctly, consumption is its own form of production, and what is produced in consumption is the network of signs marking out status differentiations. In terms of conversational practices, conversing is an act not of accumulation but of consumption. Conversational practices produce the differences among codes at the same time they consume the temporary alliances among them. So vertical contradictions are transformed into horizontal differences. The differences have the status of signs in the political economy of sign value systems, which is to say that contradictory meanings are appropriated by conversational practices and made over into the surfaces of different significations.

## POWER

Why would a body break into the silence of anonymity with the sounds of identity? In large measure, because conversational practices are the media of everyday life. They are a way of living as well as a way of knowing; they are ontological as well as epistemological. They are practical from beginning to end insofar as they are ways of doing: Subjective identity becomes a conversational's traces. Conversational practices, then, are ways of taking and giving turns, ways of appropriating and surrendering places in time as a speaker among speakers, an authority among authorities. They are ways of uttering speech to articulate the collaboration and collusion of language. They

are ways of marking, locating, and positioning conversed subjects in relation to one another.

Corporeal bodies are inscribed as mobile repositories of memory and consciousness, and it is in this discursivized sense that conversational practices organize ways of knowing into forms of doing, of putting practical knowledge into discursive practice. It is the immediacy of the contradiction of collective living that conversational practices mediate by informing and formatting them as experience, as more or less coherent structures of feeling and thinking. This mediatization produces the identities and commonplaces required for the production and consumption of the common sense of everyday life.

Conversational practices mediate the immediate vertical circumstances by turning and inverting them into horizontal differences, thereby transforming meaning into signification. In undercutting and dispersing problematic contradictories, in horizontalizing vertical dilemmas, in laying to rest inscrutable paradoxes, conversational practices are ideological through and through. Their per-forming mediates the immediate, re-presents the present, and empirically evidences the way things are, at least for the time being. Turns produce their speakers as interlocutors, as bricoleurs, as interpellated subjects taking what they find, mediating it, thereby refashioning it. The ways a turn takes what it finds—and what it finds are the material conditions of the imaginary relations to the real conditions of existence—and produces an utterance, necessarily rearranges, reforms, and reproduces the material conditions which are its raw materials.

Once the analogic relations of practical knowledge are digitalized via their transformation into the discursive practices of conversation, gaps and absences are produced; the continuity of practical knowledge becomes the discontinuity of discursive practice. The turning and reversing of conversing break up analogic experience into digital, circumstantial experience, the formats of which are the performative structures of conversed speech. It is this digitalizing of the analogic that produces the gaps and absences that, in the same stroke, define and separate the codes of our material circumstances. It is these gaps and lacunae that are the spaces for *occasions*—the places for time to appear as the experience, memory, and practical intelligence that momentarily bridge the gap by filling it in with what's missing, thereby producing the temporality of meaning. But in so doing, of course, it also produces, as a consequence of having rearranged those circumstances in the production of meaning, the spatiality of significance by producing other gaps and spaces between the codes of material circumstances. What must be said and done to fill in the gaps and ruptures between codes of changing circumstances, thereby stitching together the seams of temporary coherence, changes with each utterance, which summons another turning reversal to address and redress the newly produced gaps—the spaces for the possibility of new occasions. *Utterance*, here, is the name for the ways and means of the turning, of the

practices for making time take place in the conjunctures of everyday life circumstances.

Bourdieu's (1977) concern with the individual operations of exchange locates the practicing subject within the moment of the practice's production, rather than outside of practice and time. He aims at a science of the dialectical relations between theoretical and practical knowledge that includes scientific as well as everyday practices. Instead of positioning it outside of everyday temporality, and off to one side of the dialectical relation—the better to reconstruct its possibility conditions and operating rules—he locates the practicing subject as close to the seam of space/time as possible.

The operation of the practices of everyday life presupposes that subjects do not recognize, are not conscious of, the rules and mechanisms of the exchange system that an analyst's model exposes by temporarily collapsing it, rendering diachronic practice as synchronic structure. As a temporally deflated structure of layered relations, practices now appear to be reversibly granularized rather than irreversibly temporalized. Inflating the structuralist model with the time of the subject's practices produces a dialectic of two opposing truths: The reversible sign value system of relations of power is as true as, even if overshadowed by, the irreversible symbolic exchange system.

Temporalizing the structural relations of power doesn't invalidate the political economic model, but instead produces a symbolic exchange model, and each system generates the possibility of the other. Time is the medium through which the spatio-structural contradictions are worked out, and concern shifts to the practices of and for *making time take place*. For Bourdieu, such practices are *strategies*; for Certeau, they are *tactics*. Both refer to temporal practices that materialize in space but are not inscribed "once and for all." Intervals between durations of actions constitute the temporal embodiments and amplifications of contradictions that are resolved, more or less adequately, by *tempo*. Variable intervals of time between actions accommodate the acceptable array of contradictions to be taken account of practically, to be appropriated and worked on in time, and that materialize in practice.

*Conversation* is a gloss for this broadly deployed set of practices of selection and realization for producing and reproducing the substantive tempo of everyday life, a tempo whose structure resolves appropriate contradictions and suppresses the materialization of others. As a multi-mediated set of practices, *conversation* is the play of a spontaneous semiology that orchestrates the regulated improvisation of practices whose region of production lies somewhere between the seemingly open set of mundane practices of everyday life, and the more constrained practices of custom, ceremony, and ritual (Turner, 1982); between individual style and social custom. Conversation consists of those practices for being carried along, without being carried away or carried beyond practical knowledge, which is the ground of the very possibility of conversing.

In the format of utterances, conversational practices break into the silent stasis of practical consciousness by taking place momentarily, and, in so doing, putting into practice (i.e., discursivizing) whatever is done at that moment. The taking of turns is possible to the extent that subjects presuppose a covenant: A subject grants a speaking turn to Other, and, in so doing, produces an implicit promise or a subsequent turn and continued access to the turn-taking economy. Much as a plastic overlay organizes without obscuring that which it covers, the turn-taking formats of speaking and listening organize that which appears to be transparent common sense. The ideological labor of conversational micropractices is to appear to be neutral and labor-free. Their purpose is to conceal themselves, making room for the content that takes its place. Formats of micropractices constitute the seemingly transparent contexts in and through which the content of common sense is routinely inscribed.

Utterances, thereby, articulate subjects to spatio-temporal contexts, and may be formulated in a variety of grammatical tenses, but the structures of experience being encoded can, and do, come from times and places other than the tense in which the turn is currently being produced. Furthermore, a *here* of a speaker is separated from a *there* of a listener; a *now* of speaking and listening is articulated to a *then*, of memory and imagination. In this perpetual articulation and disarticulation, *utterances make time* (now/then), *take place* (here/there). Memory and history are the products of the ideological labor of reproducing forms of communal life and structures of experience produced in other times and places. Structures of experience, initially inscribed in infancy and early childhood, are reproduced throughout a subject's lifetime. In fact, an individual comes to be recognized as a subject having an identity, as being the selfsame subject over time, to the extent that he or she reproduces identical and near-identical formats of speech and structures of experience. Space/time, then, is a doubled structure, produced by means of conversational practices; there is the spatio-temporal positioning of the speaking subject's corporeal body, and there is the grammatico-historical positioning of the language being spoken.

The pivotal concern in all of this is how the practical consciousness of existence gets discursively distributed as the coded formats of communal life. How do the dialectical relations get deployed in the material and spiritual structures of everyday experience? Conversational practices are mimetically valid and ideologically productive; their self-imitation remains transparent. The beginning of a turn announces a possible future moment in which speaking will have ceased and another subject will have been articulated to a turn. As attention and orientation are managed in and through conversational turn-taking, possibilities come into view, collapse, dissolve, and fold back the imaginable. In this mimetic fashion, conversational practices format and distribute the experiential world by means of structuring turns of speaking and listening. Turns are taken and given in *particular ways*, and it is the *style*

of the taking and giving, the tactical flair, that captures attention or fails to capture attention. It is through the seeming transparency of conversational codes that the traces of intentionality are evidenced. Agreement, disagreement, deference, patronage, status, control, knowledge, racism, sexism, integrity, trust, honor, hatred, desire, are only a handful of such structures coded in the micropractices of conversation (in addition to van Dijk's extensive bibliography, see Benthall & Polhemus, 1975; Coulthard & Montgomery, 1981; Craig & Tracy, 1983; Goodwin, 1981; Halliday, 1978; Heritage, 1984; Sandyywell, Silverman, Roche, Filmer, & Phillipson, 1975; Spacks, 1985; Stubbs, 1983).

Taking a turn by producing an utterance is, at one and the same moment, a radical assertion of individuality and difference, and a repressive insistence on punctuating reality in the narrative formats of tradition and convention. The conversational practices of making time take place are simultaneously fascistic and revolutionary. Fascistic insofar as individuals are obligated to be subjects of conventional turns as evidence of membership and good faith; and revolutionary insofar as a turn can be taken that violates convention and tradition, and foundationally reorganizes both practical and discursive knowledge along with their attendant power relations. Ways of inscribing spaces of time are, then, by their very nature, both an assertion and a repression; as such, turns are moves in the relations of power and signification. Power relations are evident in the most microscopic of social practices, evident because the nature of collective living marks differences that become, upon their materialization, signs of values—commodities marking status difference—and power relations. To live in the everyday world of postmodern capitalism is to live in a world of constantly shifting alliances with signs. Conversational practices are ways of modifying one's positionality among signs of power, means of shifting alliances, methods of accommodating individuated benefits, and techniques for taking care of one's practical affairs. This lateralization of contradictories is a narrative movement; the formats informing experience are narrative, and these narratives are the structures of feeling of our imaginary relationships to our real conditions of existence (Jameson, 1981).

Insofar as theory encodes practices, and practice informs time, conversation is a discourse that is both memory and practice: the *narrative of tact*. Certeau (1984) characterizes an "art" as a practice for which there is no enunciation, it is practical knowledge that has yet to be discursivized; it is use value without the commodifying algorithm to produce exchange value. For Certeau, speaking is such an art, an art of doing and of thinking, constituting theory and practice simultaneously. In short, it is the art of story telling (p. 33). As an art of speaking, story telling produces effects, not objects; narration, not description. As the narrative of tact, conversation is the style of the tactics for taking turns that enact memory and produce experience.

The circuitry of interpersonal relations, the domain of time-bound experience, is a temporary one at best; it comprises temporary islands of interpersonal alliances in spatial seas of ever-accelerating changes. The question is not so much one of taking over the centralized, repressive State apparatus, but is more a matter of how to live everyday life at the margins, within the workings of the ideological State apparatuses, with subjects whose tactics for producing and consuming experience form up the dialectics of conversational practices for the enactment of transient communities and relations. And the narratives of legitimation change as macroscopic technological innovations extend the spatial boundaries of reality. It falls to the time binding micropractices of conversing to produce and reproduce narratives whose legitimacy is decreasingly grounded in the spatial and increasingly grounded in the temporary.

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Ideologies, viewed chiefly as collections of cognitive and sociocognitive concepts, are centrally regulated and imparted "from the top," manipulating attitudes and public opinion. The effect is assumed to be unidirectional.

In what follows, I give my approach to the dominant aspects of "power and discourse." To save space, I have briefly outlined the main points we will engage.

*The relational character of power:* Of prime importance here is power viewed as the interaction between the powerful and the powerless. Power and powerlessness, and the powerful and the powerless, must be specifically defined for each situation and setting. One must also distinguish between the different forms in which power is exercised; these may be subtle or very obvious (through "feelings of guilt," brute force, or even extermination).

The *effect of power* on those subjected to it: Whether it be exercised through fear, threats, force, punishment, feelings of guilt, and so on, power, as a psychological phenomenon, requires irrational and emotional levels in order to sustain itself (see Strotzka, 1984). In *Massenpsychologie und Ich-Analyse*, Freud described—and almost seemed to predict—the dialectic interplay between the *Führerkult* (cult of the leader) and the dutiful masses. Through identification and projection, people regress at times, give up their "superegos," and are trustingly obedient. Understanding, reflection, and cognitive awareness are thus almost inoperative.

From the viewpoint of microanalysis and *verstehende* description, the *manner in which power is affected* is multileveled, multidimensional, often dysfunctional, subtle, affective, systematic, and unique to each situation. The unidimensionality of van Dijk's static categories and his empirical quantitative methods are not adequate for a detailed treatment of such interactions. Participatory observation, case studies, and qualitative methods are necessary. It is only by employing both methods (quantitative as well as qualitative, *verstehend* and descriptive, external and internal) that social language behavior as the manifestation of the exercising of power can be subtly differentiated and explained.

Finally (and critically), the *theoretical concepts of the non-English-speaking world are ignored*, as is the long tradition of sociolinguistics, which has, since its beginnings, been concerned with the phenomenon of power (see Bernstein, 1981; Dittmar, 1985a, 1985b; Ehlich & Rehbein, 1986; Wodak, 1981, 1984, 1986, in press-a, in press-b; Bourdieu, 1982; Soeffner, 1979; Lutz & Wodak, 1987; Pfeiffer, Strouhal, & Wodak, 1987). Because of the limited space available to me, I will restrict myself in the following to Arendt's and Habermas's concept (see next) and dispense with a critical survey of the literature. Similarly, I will limit myself to van Dijk's description of supple- mental perspectives rather than overburden the reader with a comprehensive review of the research in the area (see Ammon, Dittmar, & Mattheier, 1988).

van Dijk does consider both the relational character and the significance of interaction in his framework. Concepts such as domination, authority,

## The Irrationality of Power

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No matter how one looks at it, the command in its self-contained, complete form—that is, the form in which we find it today after a long period of development—has become the single most dangerous element in the social life of man. One must have the courage to resist it and undermine its power. Ways and means must be found to keep the majority of mankind free from it. One dare not allow it to do any more than just scratch the skin. Its barbs must become no more than harmless leeches, which can easily be brushed off.

Canetti (1980, p. 371)

As a complex, interdisciplinary phenomenon, power requires an interdisciplinary approach that includes sociology, social psychology, sociolinguistics, history, economics, psychoanalysis, and discourse analysis. Whereas van Dijk concentrates on sociopsychological, economic, and cognitive concepts, I would like to base my investigation on psychoanalytical, sociological and sociolinguistic aspects. Only an analysis of all the aspects can do justice to the problem of who is powerful or powerless, where, why, and how.

Therefore, I would like to proceed from the *internal perspective* and from the *irrationality of power*, from the level of feelings, from the *interaction* between the powerful and the powerless, and from their motives. I am chiefly interested in the *dialectic* between the *internal* and the *external perspectives*, between the masses and the individual, between collective and private discourse. Ideologies and power can be productive only if they can be related to everyday experience and prevailing sentiment. Thus newspapers can print only what their readers understand and expect, though these expectations can also be titillated and reinforced.

van Dijk, on the other hand, takes as his starting point the power of the elite over the masses, which is especially exemplified by the power the former exercises over the media. (However, he ignores Bourdieu's [1982] innovative and very useful concept of "symbolic power" [see Wodak, in press-b]).

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Communication Yearbook 12, pp. 76-94

ideology, control, and manipulation are defined with regard to the sociocognitive concept he uses as his basis, while historical, sociolinguistic, and sociopsychological considerations are incomplete. His concept, however, remains too deterministic, monocausal, and restrictive; mediating agencies and social dialectics are missing. In the end, he limits himself to an external perspective and to an analysis of control over the means of production (as well as of texts) as the basis of power. Paying particular attention to historical and social consideration, I would like to expand on the subtle and irrational forms of power by examining each individual situation without bringing the materialistic argumentation into question.

#### AN APPROACH TO UNDERSTANDING POWER: HABERMAS'S COMMUNICATIVE CONCEPT

Weber (1968) defines power as the possibility of imposing one's own will on others, even in the face of resistance. Hannah Arendt (1986) regards power as a political institution, "as manifestation and materialization of power" (p. 64). Parsons (1986) prefers to view power in the sense of the institutionalization of authority and, therefore, as "the rights of collective agents to mobilize performances and define them as binding obligation" (p. 97). Finally, Foucault (1977) presents interesting relationships between power structure and the structures of discourse, especially the limitations they impose in institutions by means of the principles of division, exclusion, and brevity (p. 47). These "procedures" (Foucault, 1977, p. 7) of discourse control, selection, and organization in institutions must be investigated, with particular reference to samples of texts. They are indeed a question of power: Who is in the position to control, select, organize, and channel it? Which of these procedures are legitimate in an institution (e.g., in a hospital) and which are not? Where does one draw the line? (see Lalouschek, Menz, & Wodak, 1987).<sup>1</sup>

Nevertheless, Habermas's definition appears to be the more practical, because it does not limit power to institutions and hierarchies, but considers behavior in a wide range of situations. I would like to use this broader view as a departure point, dealing above all with communicative models. My concept of language behavior, therefore, involves the inclusion of both cognitive and emotional factors, as follows:

Power arises from the human ability to act (or to do something) as well as to come together with others and get along with them. The fundamental phenomenon of power is the instrumentation of an alien will in communication that is directed towards understanding. (Habermas, 1982, p. 104)

We therefore constantly ask ourselves: Who exercises power over whom, how, where, and with what means; who accepts it, and how; who resists it, and how; who refuses to comply with it, and how; who goes along with it; who does

not? To explore these questions from the internal perspective—the psychoanalytical point of view—I would like to investigate the dialectic of collective and individual discourse in the dissemination of ideologies and power using examples from research on prejudice.

#### INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL PERSPECTIVES: DISCOURSE AND POWER AS TOPIC AND CHALLENGE

As mentioned, power must be defined in relation to a particular situation and to particular discourse. This stance points to the discrepancy between two strategies of research, that is, between systems research and *Lebenswelt* research. In order to be able to describe "power and language" and "power and discourse," both a macrosociological and a sociolinguistic description of the system (the institution) and a multilevel analysis of various and unique interactions (language behavior) with a microlinguistic basis will be necessary. In the end, what we want to understand is the why, when, where, and how of who is powerful, how power develops, and what its effect is, and finally, what role language plays in it (Wodak, 1988).

It is Dittmar's (1985a) view that theory construction is possible only if one can succeed in "building a constructive interdisciplinary bridge between the *language system and language use*, and the culture-specific "Lebenswelt and the institutionalized social system." Dittmar thereby takes up the question posed by Habermas (1981), who describes the discrepancy between two types of research. On the one hand, one observes an individual's behavior from the *internal perspective* and attempts to understand it; on the other hand, one looks at the social institutions from an *observer perspective* and abstracts from the subjects' behavior. This difference corresponds to the conflict between qualitatively oriented research and quantifying methods (see also Ehn, 1986; Auwärter, 1983). Habermas (1981) suggests a resolution, as follows:

A connection between the two is possible, however, namely through the *semanticization of the interactions* and by means of the *shared language*. With every shared definition of a situation, they, the participants, determine the boundaries between external nature, society, and internal nature, while at the same time renewing the delimitation between themselves as interpreters on the one hand, and the outside world and their perspective inner worlds on the other hand. (p. 186)

Communicative behavior is based, therefore, on a cooperative process of interpretation, in which the interactors always refer simultaneously to something in the objective, in the social, and in the subjective world, even if sometimes (or usually) only one component in an utterance is explicitly focused on.

Habermas's approach appears to me to be especially pertinent here. For if language and culture are constituents of the *Lebenswelt* (p. 190) and if "culture" at the same time represents a "developmental process for particular institutions and relationships involving domination" and if language and culture are created, maintained, and orally passed on by participating subjects, then such a dichotomy is not necessary but can be integrated by means of a theory of communicative behavior and by means of a theory of socialization and culture.

The entities that should be subsumed under the external perspective of an observer's systems-theoretical concepts must be identified in advance as the "Lebenswelten" of social groups and be understood in terms of their symbolic structures. (Habermas, 1981, p. 227)

This statement refers to the interaction and the dialectic between external and internal perspective. It claims that identification and understanding can be achieved only through language. A sociolinguistic theory of power that seeks to link microanalysis and macroanalysis must, therefore, attempt to combine both perspectives, not only in the formation of hypotheses, but in the method used.

The *ethnopsychanalytical approach* (Erdheim, 1984) could certainly be taken as a model. Without explicitly carrying out a linguistic analysis, this school is able to conclusively demonstrate both the theoretically and empirically founded connection between the individual, the *Lebenswelt*, identity, and personality structure on the one hand, and social processes, domination, power relationships, and culture on the other. Erdheim considers two relevant points: (1) socialization within the family, and (2) the tensions between the individual, the family, and culture. These points bring us to the cornerstones of the language barrier theory, that is, to "social inequality and power" and "socialization, planning strategies, and codes" (see also, Bernstein, 1981). As I have discussed socialization in a more detailed manner elsewhere (see Wodak, in press-a), here I will limit myself to the issue of "power and language."

In his work on mass psychology, Freud (1976) shows that *institutions function like individuals*, though the price that must be paid for this is high: "institutions function like individuals, but only by robbing their members of their characteristic qualities" (Erdheim, 1984, p. 190).

Because, however, institutions are based on individuals, or participating subjects, they can also be understood from the internal perspective. While institutionally "robbed" of his or her characteristics, the individual feels comfortable in the security of the institution and initially does not question it because the institution possesses his or her characteristics. Of relevance to the issue of the development of a sociolinguistic theory of power is that the individual and the *Lebenswelt*, as well as society, the institution, and culture do not stand at opposite poles and are not different "entities," but that they are

related to and can be understood through each other. Society, collective consciousness and subconsciousness, rituals, ceremonies, myths, and ideologies can also be explained by taboos and the suppression of wishes and drives typical to the individual (see Wodak, Menz, Lutz, & Gruber, 1985).

What specific significance does this have both for a sociolinguistic theory of "discourse and power" and for empirical research (see Wodak, 1986, in press-d)? (a) The incompatibility of internal and external perspectives must be rejected. (b) Thus a theory must combine the linguistic manifestations of the family, of socialization, and of power and society. (c) It must operate with a *multimethod approach*, proceed qualitatively and quantitatively, and combine static and dynamic categories (see Dittmar, 1985a, p. 2). (d) *Several levels* must likewise be involved in the *interpretation*, whereby it is expedient to include as much information as possible from a wide range of sources on the topic under investigation (see Wodak, in press-b). (e) *Microanalyses* should not neglect the social framework, and *macroanalyses* should be supplemented by *verstehende*, qualitative microresearch. (f) The *interdisciplinary nature* should be emphasized. Language analysis must include a sociopsychological communication theory and a historical and social context as well as a social theory. (g) Because power is never only rational and functional, the *cognitive dimension* should not be overemphasized. The linguistic behavior of both the powerful and the powerless is the result of conscious and unconscious processes, as well as automatic and spontaneous ones. It is imperative that the *affective* and *emotional* levels not be ignored.

#### THE IRRATIONALITY OF POWER:

#### THE PSYCHOANALYTIC AND PSYCHOLINGUISTIC APPROACH

Affective and irrational factors as well as the mechanisms of mass psychology, which in turn require concepts from individual psychology, are not often considered in the analysis of power, even in the literature of sociology and social psychology. How is power exercised and by whom? Why is it accepted, tolerated, and even acceded to?

Obviously power does not have only a negative effect; one is sometimes ready to identify with the powerful and put one's own values and identities last. And even if power is not affected by means of total control as in Orwell's *1984* (as it is not in a pluralistic society), fear or a self-indulging helplessness can still be the result. Let me take the "family" as an example: It is not necessary to beat children, shout at them, and bring them up in a completely repressive environment in order for them to be obedient and to recognize guilt and fear. More subtle mechanisms are at work (see Wodak, 1984; Wodak & Schulz, 1986).

In my view, the psychoanalytic approach is well suited to arriving at an answer to the questions just posed. By extending psychoanalytic concepts

through ethnopschoanalysis (Erdheim, 1984), the individual-psychological level can be socially integrated (see the foregoing comments and Wodak, 1988).

The psychoanalytic approach to the problems of power lies on the one hand . . . in ideas of grandeur as well as in the impoverished relationship of narcissism; and on the other hand, it lies in the desire to dominate and to be dominated, as well as in the causes of suffering and in sadomasochistic suffering. (Strotzka, 1984, p. 69)

Certain character structures and personality types (see Adorno, 1973) predestine many people with a desire to exercise power. This determination is connected with fantasies of grandeur, an unstable identity, and uncontrollable aggression, whereby certain psychodynamic processes are held responsible in the development of the individual. The impaired self-esteem of such people is strengthened by the powerlessness of others. Their detachment makes the suppression of others possible without arousing guilt in themselves. Furthermore, such people know how to exploit their feelings of omnipotence in order to captivate others (charismatic personalities) (see Freud, 1976). But it is not only the powerful who have power—the powerless do as well.

The indirect power that the ill and the handicapped exercise over their surroundings is often considerable.

One might take the case of the elderly mother who does not release her child from the symbiotic relationship for the child's entire life thereby making it impossible for the child to have an independent existence; or consider the hysterical woman who tyrannizes her husband and children with her fits and threats to commit suicide; or the class at school or the group at work, which not only can drive their teacher or supervisor crazy merely by passive resistance, but can also reduce production to a minimum, regardless of what it consists of. Children's power over their parents and patients' power over their doctors are likewise often denied. (Strotzka, 1984, p. 51)

Powerlessness can be identified within the aspect of "sadomasochism," which Strotzka (1984, p. 69ff.) does not interpret as a sexual perversion. Just as there are typical powerful individuals, there are also typical powerless ones: They offer themselves as objects of suppression to the powerful, who need these masochistic types in order to develop (Strotzka, p. 71). Anticipation of punishment, therefore, means pleasure. This explains why, if it is in any way possible, there is not more resistance to violence, power, domination, and authority. Power plays, viewed by the outsider as awful, be they in the nuclear family, in partnerships, or institutions, and so on, are experienced subjectively and differently by the participants as pleasurable suffering.

Fromm (1980) distinguished between sadistic and destructive personalities. The latter attempt to destroy the object, whereas the former need it in order to dominate it and fear its loss. The desire for power is, therefore, the most important manifestation of sadism (see also Strotzka, 1984, p. 72ff.).

Subtle discourse analytic studies of political language and domination can also reveal these psychological, historical, and social components in their complexity. I refer the reader to Sauer (1987), Maas (1985), Wodak and Feistritzer (in press), and Gruber and Wodak (1987). Without this psychological-affective level it would not be possible—as Strotzka (1984, p. 208ff.) shows—to fully explain phenomena such as National Socialism (the particular role that illusion and myth play in the legitimization of domination will be examined next, especially the function of prejudice in the setting up of a scapegoat).

#### LANGUAGE AND PREJUDICE: LANGUAGE AND POWER

"If the Arguments Are Lacking, One Must Fall Back on the Jew."

Sociolinguistics can make an important contribution in explaining the phenomenon of the transmission of power through prejudice. Ideologies use language in varied ways and constitute themselves through them. Forms of the shaping of prejudice and of its effect on language use in the public sphere can be demonstrated through language analysis.

I would, at this point, like to make some general remarks about the dialectic interplay between language, ideology, and prejudice (see in detail Wodak, 1988; in press-a, in press-b; Wodak et al., 1985).

Ideology manifests itself linguistically, has its effect through language and on it, and is only made possible and established through it. Therefore, linguistic behavior has a direct impact on social practice.

Ideological language has a dual character: It is both an expression and a transmitter of ideological thought. It manipulates and is at the same time manipulated.

There are special "languages of ideology": Each is a complete, closed system with a claim to truth, and with its own values and meanings. Language is able to allow, thanks to its distorted mythical functionings, that which serves power to appear as "positive." This appearance occurs, for instance, in party platforms, manifestos, and in the "fundamental works" on ideology (see Wodak, in press-d; Wodak & Feistritzer, in press). This isolation does not, of course, exist in everyday language use.

Ideologies, as structures of myths, establish a secondary reality and thus also a social practice; they make the previous reality taboo and supersede it. A new dimension of meanings and values is produced that expresses itself in new concepts and connotations.

The elimination of reflection is achieved by means of stereotypes and clichés, which possess a systematic linguistic realization: Certain areas thereby become taboo, others are "automated," many are freed from history (or history is paraphrased or rewritten).

Such a closed, ideological structure for anti-Semitism existed only to a certain degree in the Third Reich. Clearly, present-day anti-Semitism is no

longer effective as such a total pseudoscientific, ideological system. However, it can very easily fall back on relics of Nazi anti-Semitism; one encounters linguistics borrowings from it everywhere.

In a linguistic analysis of anti-Semitic prejudices, it is not enough to investigate all the levels of linguistic utterances (vocabulary, sentence structure, the text level and linguistic strategies, and semiotic elements in posters or caricatures). Contributing factors in the production and reception of texts must also be considered. There is a dynamic interrelation between the individual who produces an utterance, the text, and the addressee of the utterance. Sociolinguistic factors (age, social status, sex, political socialization, and so on) must be taken into consideration, both in the production of texts (in the broadest sense) and in their reception. The participants' knowledge of the world, which influences their expectations, attitudes, and prejudices is "understood," that is, interpreted, as a linguistic utterance (see Lutz & Wodak, 1987; van Dijk, 1984).

The analysis of current forms of anti-Semitism requires asking: In the presence of what foreknowledge and in which social classes do forms of anti-Semitic discourse appear? This analysis can explain why we need only to operate with allusions to voice anti-Semitic prejudices in present-day political discourse, for example, when we speak of "certain groups" or dishonorable persons. It is enough to quote or allude to the expressions of the old anti-Semitism in order to achieve an anti-Semitic effect. Sociolinguistics can contribute to an understanding of subtle forms of utterances of prejudices and to making their functionings and power transparent. It can also make a contribution in cases in which prejudices are allegedly only quoted and the quoter wants to leave the anti-Semitism to the interpretations of the hearer, with the comment "*honnî soit qui mal y pense*." Moreover, whatever power anti-Semitism has, it no longer needs to be broken down into separate classes after the holocaust.

#### The Function of Anti-Semitic Prejudices

Anti-Semitism reveals itself to be too complex and multileveled a phenomenon for one explanatory approach to be adequate. Social psychology and prejudice research can certainly verify empirically that all people want to and must reduce the "complexity of the world" by means of certain stereotypes, experiences, and automations. But, why the Jews offer themselves as a target of aggression, as a scapegoat, as the enemy without, and as a projection surface, requires further explanation. In addition, we are struck by the apparent contradiction that anti-Semitism is at its strongest in Austria, in those places where there are hardly any or no Jews (anti-Semitism without Jews). And, certain linguistic patterns (quotes, allusions) allow taboos and the shifting of responsibility (anti-Semitism without anti-Semites).

What purpose then does anti-Semitism serve—*sui bono*? According to Adorno (1973):

The "irrational" Jewish cliché seems to fulfill similar functions [reduction of complexity]. For the extremely prejudiced person, they are stereotyped to the limit and, at the same time, are personalized in a stronger way than any other bogey. This is because they are not defined on the basis of profession or social role, but rather on the basis of their existence as such. . . . The foreignness of Jews seems to be the most convenient formula to deal with the alienation of society. Blaming the Jews for all existing evil lights up the darkness of reality like a headlight, which affords one a rapid and extensive orientation. The less anti-Jewish fantasies correspond to actual experience and the more they are kept "clean," so to speak, from the defilement of society, the less they are exposed to disturbances from the dialectic of experience, which is prevented by the rigidity of the stereotypes. Anti-Semitism is the panacea that ensures intellectual equilibrium, counter "kathexis," and a channeling of the desires for "change." (p. 123ff.)

Thus anti-Semitic clichés create an image of "the Jew" as the enemy in a stereotypical and rigid way as the continued presence of prejudice in history demonstrates. This usually has little to do with experience—one need not know any Jews in order to believe and use these concepts of the enemy. In fact, just the opposite is true: The less personal experience one has with Jews, the wider the door seems to be open to anti-Semitic projection. Although I cannot make a detailed analysis of this discourse within the scope of this article (see Maas, 1985; Wodak, 1988), I would like to point out at least three current typical groups of patterns of prejudice or anti-Jewish language use. For the present, I view these distinctions as purely heuristic:

- (1) *Relics of the Nazi period*: These are either neologisms from the ideological structure of the Third Reich or older concepts that were redefined ("Volk," "gassing," "mixed marriage").
- (2) *Direct and hostile injunctions* mainly appear in graffiti or implicitly in headlines ("kill the Jews," "dirty Jews").
- (3) *Argumentation and generalizations* are embedded in typical patterns of prejudice and, from a historical point of view, concern themselves with typical topics. I would like to present a taxonomy of five recurring topics that also have some bearing on our examples (the linguistic forms and the extent of their manifestation will be discussed with concrete examples in the following section): (a) *Conspiracy theory*: World Jewry owns and dominates the press, the banks, and so on; the Jews are a people without a country and are plotting a Zionist/communist/capitalist world conspiracy. (b) *Dishonesty*: Jews are usurers, sharks, liars, slippery, dishonest, and so on. (c) *Jewish intelligence*: Jews dominate art, science, and culture; they are revolutionary, subversive, self-destructive, domestic, fanatical, and threaten traditional values. (d) *Murderers of Christ*: The Jews killed Christ and are therefore the enemies of Christians. (e) *Being different*: Jews are foreign; they look different: hair, lips,

skin color, nose, hunchback; they are parasites on those who "serve" them; they are sexually perverse; and so on.

The range of these anti-Semitic topics proves Adorno to be right: much of what is too difficult and incomprehensible in modern society is blamed on the Jews. The Jew is the scapegoat, and remains so despite so many terrible historical events and, as the most recent Austrian history shows, ultimately prove themselves to the prejudiced as "worthy" of their prejudice (for a detailed analysis and categories, see Wodak, in press-b; DeCillia, Mitten, & Wodak, 1987).

The following case studies (the contrast between prejudice discourse in the media and spontaneous oral arguments) should demonstrate the multilevel nature, the complexity, and the power of prejudices. The effect of these clichés, stereotypes, argumentation, and *Feindbilder* (concepts of the enemy) would not be explainable if one did not assume a connection between collective and individual discourse. This connection also makes the unconscious adoption of collective experience and organization of the world apparent. The effect and the successful implementation of anti-Semitism in present-day Austria would not be conceivable without the historical dimension up to the last century and the family tradition of the time.

#### Some Examples from *Die Kronenzeitung* and *Die Presse*

In the following, I want to examine some passages in regard to the presentation strategy used and also in regard to the extent to which anti-Semitic language use manifests itself. It is especially interesting to see if both newspapers employ similar strategies or if their anti-Semitic language use is reader-dependent (i.e., oriented toward a target group). The analysis is qualitative and, for the present purposes, disregards further indicators inherent in the text (along the parameters of text linguistics) (see Wodak, 1984). A quantification is also not included (see Wodak, DeCillia, Blüml, & Andraschko, 1987). The prejudices, stereotypes, and clichés that are to be found in the passages are representative examples of the public discourse allowed in Austria and thus, are representative, in part, of the collective norm. The examples are presented under headings describing the strategy employed. (Items emphasized by the author indicate especially pertinent sections.)

Both newspapers from which these examples are taken claim to be nonpartisan. During the 1986 election campaign, they were both strongly pro-Waldheim, although this position manifested itself in different ways. *Die Neue Kronenzeitung* (NKZ) circulation during the week is about 1,020,000 and on Sunday over 1,400,000. It is the most widely read newspaper in Austria. It characterizes itself as "independent" and is a daily tabloid; it is conservative, but it cannot be categorized as party-bound.

*Die Presse* belongs to the Austrian *Wirtschaftsbund* (Business Federation). Its weekly circulation is about 55,000 and on Saturday over 70,000. It follows a middle-class, right-wing-liberal line and is not a party organ, although its sympathies lie with the conservative Austrian People's Party (*Volkspartei*).

#### Turning the Persecuted into the Persecutor<sup>2</sup>

Items: The Jews are the Persecutor, Waldheim as the Persecuted

The World Jewish Congress and the media that it influences persecuted Waldheim and threatened Austria, which brought forth an act of defiance on the part of the Austrians . . . (NKZ, May 4, 1986, p. 2).  
No, the *deliberate attack* on Waldheim was totally merciless. (*Presse*, April 3, 1986, p. 1)

Items: Jews Create Anti-Semitism

The man who wants to make a *Nazi-monster* out of Waldheim and in doing so evokes at most *abominable anti-Semitic reactions*. (NKZ, April 3, 1986, p. 3).  
In regard to the discussion about a possible wave of anti-Semitism in Austria due to the activities of the World Jewish Congress . . . (*Presse*, March 26, 1986, p. 4)

#### Group Solidarity as a Product of the Creation of "Feindbilder"

Items: Identification with Waldheim

Any *decent* person who still retains the ability to judge must be *deeply shocked* by the humiliating events in New York and Israel. (NKZ, June 19, 1986, p. 8)  
The patriotism which expressed itself in the election results was of a different kind: it was sparked off by the *horrible and total defamations* that this country was subjected to. The motto was not "*Now more than ever*" ["*Jetzt erst recht!*"] but obviously, "*Just to spite you*" ["*Justament!*"]. For the first time in a long time, the Austrians have again demonstrated something like national pride. (*Presse*, June 9, 1986, p. 1)

Items: "Interference" Will Not Be Tolerated

Severe measures must be taken to quell the continuing *insistent interference* from abroad. (NKZ, letter to the editor, May 1, 1986, p. 20)

No matter what Kurt Waldheim has done—is it the World Jewish Congress' business to pass judgement, or that of the Austrian people? (*Presse*, March 25, 1986, p. 1)

#### Scapegoat Strategy (Against the World Jewish Congress)

Items: Producing a Demon (Jewish Trick)

The World Jewish Congress, which, because of its connections, has access to the Reagan administration, has been named as the *manipulator* of all the

"intriguing." That's where Waldheim was bad-mouthed. (NKZ, April 26, 1986, p. 2)

The "propaganda machinery of the World Jewish Congress" (*Presse*, March, 29/30/31, 1986, p. 1)

Items: Degradation—Qualification

But, my young ladies and gentlemen of the World Jewish Congress, that is not how the situation was then! (NKZ, April 20, 1986, p. 6)

And that Waldheim, the insignificant first lieutenant and clerk on the staff of the "Wehrmacht," is supposed to be a "Nazi" is so outrageous that one should not really concern himself further with it at all. (NKZ, June 1, 1986, p. 6)

"Christ" (= Waldheim) Murderers

It is not difficult to understand that Israel too has joined the World Jewish Congress' slaughtering of Waldheim. (NKZ, May 25, 1986)

Title: "Politics on Good Friday"

There they are, those who wash their hands in innocence, in the same way today as then, the crowds, who called out to a cowardly judge: "Crucify him!" (*Presse*, March 28, 1986, p. 1)

#### Analysis and Interpretation

The gross, blatant anti-Semitism, and the exploitation of these prejudices for deliberate political maneuvering is shocking. Especially striking are the affective adjectives ("abominable," "insistent") in the passages, as are the degrading address (for example, to the World Jewish Congress—"my young ladies and gentlemen"), the pairs of opposites, and the deliberate use of colloquial words ("bad-mouthed"). From the point of view of argumentation, *Die Presse* is certainly subtler, although the choice of words has the characteristics of slogans, and emotionally loaded concepts dominate. One does not even stop at blatant abuse. Not "Justament"! That the name of the World Jewish Congress naturally lends itself to an association with "world conspiracy" is fully exploited.

What differences can we find between the two newspapers (about the anti-Semitic tendencies, there is no doubt)? Differences were apparent even at first glance; I have selected a few, as follows.

#### *Die Presse*

The anti-Semitic utterances in *Die Presse* are subtler and tend to be built into the argumentation rather than being expressed in blatant stereotypes. Although Jewish persons and communities are referred to, they are seldom

explicitly named. Insinuations are employed, but in such a way as to make the newspaper less open to attack. Therefore, a macro- and a microlinguistic analysis are especially necessary to identify the pseudo-logical argumentation in *Die Presse* columns. Even in the case of the item "Crucify him," the World Congress is not explicitly named. Allusions make a hypocritical "retreat" possible.

#### *Die Kronenzeitung*

The use of anti-Semitic language is blatant here. The vocabulary, the adjectives, the repetitions, the trivializing, and colloquial usages in very simple syntax are easy for everyone to understand and are openly defamatory. The writers certainly do not mince words; allusions and quotations do not seem to be at all necessary (this method indeed differs from Reimann's "famous" series, 1973; see Marin, 1983; DeCillia, Mitten & Wodak, 1987). It is both surprising and alarming that the most widely read Austrian daily paper dares to be so openly anti-Semitic. And we should not be astonished that the "new" anti-Semitism could assume such forms given the possible effect of this media propaganda.

Both newspapers are directed at their respective readership (on the one hand, at business and at the intellectual, and on the other hand, at the average citizen). The danger inherent in the more subtle argumentation is certainly greater, since it has the appearance of being more factual and objective. In contrast, the striking anti-Semitism makes an impression more easily with its sloganizing.

#### Anti-Semitic Language in Spontaneous Speech: The Memorial Vigil

In June 1987, a memorial vigil took place on St. Stephen's Square in Vienna, directly in the center of the city. It had been organized by the "Republican Club," a left-liberal organization that had been formed mainly to counteract the anti-Semitism that surfaced during the 1986 presidential election campaign but that continues to concern itself with similar issues. The vigil commemorated Austrian war victims, especially those who had been killed in concentration camps.

The memorial vigil caused quite a sensation. Clusters of people formed spontaneously. Many seemed to consider the mere presence of those maintaining the vigil a provocation that invited, if not demanded, a response. In point of fact, many did feel provoked and began—out of the blue—to express opinions and attitudes, to vent aggression, tell stories, and so on. We recorded these discussions on a daily basis, since we had never had the opportunity to obtain material of this sort. There were discussions and arguments about a myriad of topics, for example, social benefits and pensions, the election campaign, Austria's past, and the Jews.

Since a detailed discourse analysis of these discussions would exceed the scope of this article, I shall concentrate on the content of one text and the lines of argument it contains. This is done in order to suggest the symmetry, if not in fact the symbiotic indispensability, between the stereotypes, clichés, allusions, and so on, employed therein (as examples of anti-Semitic language use) and the discourse found in the mass print media.

#### A Brief Summary of the Content

In the passage chosen (for a complete analysis, see Wodak, in press-d), there is an argument about who is responsible for resurrecting the discussions about Austria's past. One speaker is clear that the Jews are to blame. Another participant attempts to refute this contrational discourse, but does so by introducing as an argument the cliché about how much the Jews have done for Austrian culture.

Later in the discussion the initial speaker relates a "prejudice story," in which a specific (presumably apocryphal) anecdote is used to illustrate a general prejudice, namely, that of the cutthroat Jewish businessman and usurer. This story is, in turn, followed by a second prejudiced discourse, different from the first in that the generalized statements it contains (Jews take work away from others, all psychiatrists and lawyers are Jews, and so on) are not accompanied by corresponding illustrative examples.

The exchange ends with a summary admonition: Let things be; there are more important things to discuss.

#### The Line(s) of Argument

The examples from this one discussion reveal several of the stereotypes and many of the argumentation strategies currently in the public discourse in contemporary Austria.

The first speaker feels that he is being attacked as an Austrian and aligns himself with Waldheim against the "bad outside interference." This particular attitude reached a peak during the 1986 election campaign with the Waldheim campaign slogan "We Austrians will elect whom we choose"—"Now more than ever" (see Wodak, 1988). The German expression "*das Ausland*" (the foreigner) is a singular usage that imputes a unity or oneness of things non-Austrian, and as such is more potentially emotive and threatening than the plural "foreign countries," its closest English equivalent. The language is to a certain extent coded, for when speakers referred to *das Ausland* they normally meant the United States. This was clear from the initial speaker's further line of argument: After excoriating the pernicious interference from abroad, he turned to the United States where, he claimed, Reagan and Meese (Meese's name was known in Austria principally as a consequence of the "watch list" decision) were themselves mere marionettes of the Jews. Thus

even when the ostensible target is *das Ausland* the images of the Jews as the genuine enemy, and the conspiratorial theme that suggests that the world at large acts at their behest, are never far from the surface.

A second speaker argues in a matter-of-fact way and attempts to refute the generalizations and correct what he considers the distorted picture of the past. In this effort, he receives support from others gathered in the group.

A third speaker then offers the "let the past be" argument. Those who were guilty, she maintains, have been punished anyway, while the rest are, in an innovative turn of phrase, "innocent perpetrators."

At this point, yet another speaker enters the discussion by introducing what I would like to call the *Judaeus ex machina*, the Jew as scapegoat for all occasions. The anecdote refers to a Jew who had entered into a business arrangement with a farmer, but who had cheated the farmer by respecting his part of the bargain, that is, for acting like a businessman. The spectre of the village Jew thus enters the discussion. That this anecdote should illustrate "the other side" of anti-Semitism—that there is something to it, as the speaker concludes—is, however, possible only by means of a straightforward double standard of rights and duties. It also suggests the speaker's readiness to convert the persecuted into the persecutor.

Other participants in the discussion do not sense, or at least do not react to, the convoluted logic and inapplicability of the chosen story for the intended messages; the form seems to appeal to familiar patterns of experience. The arguments his opponents use to counter this anecdote are predictable enough: *One* story is not sufficient, one says, but this concedes the legitimacy of the anecdote as an argument.

This storyteller then brings up all the others who died in the war (those who "did their duty"), asks why the Jews are a "chosen people," and why the Jews are deserving of any special sympathy. One previous speaker then contributes the ambiguous remarks, "I don't see any dirty Jews." From the context it becomes clear that she is referring to Jews who do manual work, but such slips are certainly not accidental. The collocation, "dirty Jew" can also refer in general to East European Jews, when it is not intended as a blanket attributive adjective. That this might indeed be the case is suggested by the string of generalizations she then introduces, encouraged by the story about the farmer: Jews are lazy; they do not do manual work; they are psychiatrists (i.e., they have power over people—a possible latent allusion to Freud); the Jews are to blame for the recent anti-Semitism; they arouse feelings of anti-Semitism in others by stirring up trouble and threatening jobs; and so on.

Having found common ground, the storyteller and the woman together make a general appeal to sympathy—one should feel concern for all victims—and to tolerance—one should let things be. In the end, however, the Jews are guilty, because they (presumably) exhibit neither quality. The conditional nature of these appeals is obscured by the superficial universality of the

## NOTES

1. In our participatory study in a clinic in a large Viennese hospital, it could be seen just how complex the structure of power is, and in what a contradictory way latent functions and official hierarchies often operate. Certain myths also play a role in the exercising of power in a hospital: for example, omniscience, time, curability, and efficiency. Both doctors and patients believe in these myths and cooperate as they interact with one another. If this were not the case, it would be difficult to explain why a conversation "works" and is accepted despite a minimum of eight interruptions, three new beginnings, and a great deal of misunderstanding. Power expresses itself in manifest and subtle ways: In a manifest way, when the patient is addressed with "Who is she?" in a subtle way when "there's just enough time [to deal with a patient]"; referencing time as money (see Lalouschek, Menz, & Wodak, 1987).

2. The opposition *persecuted/persecutor* represents the least undesirable rendering of the German *Opfer/Täter*. The German *Täter* implies a more neutral form of agency than the more obviously normative *persecutor*. Elsewhere the word *Täter* is rendered, although also unsatisfactory, as *perpetrator*.

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formulations. Those who do not share these assumptions make themselves *eo ipso* guilty.

We have already encountered all these lines of argument (as strategies) in the newspaper analysis. The mechanisms of repression and of shifting the blame; where and in what ways a quasi-logical argument lapses into incoherence, only to be rescued by the Jews, who suddenly appear as perpetrators, manipulators, troublemakers, usurers, lazy intellectuals, and so on, are all typical of the scapegoat syndrome. The three principal mottoes could be: "Let us be," "The Jews are guilty," "We are innocent perpetrators."

## Collective and Individual Anti-Semitic Discourse

I would now like to compare the strategies and clichés in the newspapers with those in the spontaneous discussion: Conspiracy theory, turning the persecuted into the persecutor, having a scapegoat and a Manichean portrayal of events, all appear in both. Only religious motifs are missing. Political anti-Semitism dominates the discussion. The counterarguments adhere to the official line: the Jews are a people just like any other; Waldheim is not Austria, and the Jews have contributed a lot to Austria's culture. The individual discourse reflects the political climate: Prejudices have assumed a public character; the media influence the languages employed and link up exactly with the individual experience schemata and the prejudiced utterances that were previously tabooed or at most were permissible among a closed circle of friends. However, in contrast to the newspaper, insults and negative judgments appear more in the argumentation, in the general statements and in the stories, not blatantly in the choice of words, as in *Die Kronenzeitung*. Whether this can be attributed to the fact that it was a public discussion (who knows what else the storyteller and the woman might have had to say to each other) or whether it is still indeed taboo cannot be determined on the basis of these examples.

Our case study suggests that power and manipulation work in at least two ways: Certainly the power of the elites, even in pluralistic societies, controls the mass media, the information dissemination, and also which information is transmitted in what qualitative way. However, to see this process of manipulation as unidirectional would be far too simplistic. The qualitative analysis of our spontaneous speech data confirms our claim that previous experience, knowledge, attitudes, and prejudices must be collectively shared. Otherwise the mass media would not be successful.

Thus the purely sociocognitive, quantitative, and unidirectional approach to power—demonstrated by van Dijk both in his analysis of print media and in his microanalysis of prejudice stories—is too narrow. In place of this we propose a more differentiated approach, the use of qualitative data and a multilevel analysis. For only such a conception can adequately comprehend irrational forms of power and of powerful persons.

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## 2 Coherence: A Meaningful Adhesive for Discourse

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Rejecting relevance, topicality, cohesive devices, syntactic structure, and comprehension as synonymous with and as necessary and/or sufficient for coherence, this chapter develops coherence as a cognitive judgment on the meaningful state of a text. This judgment of meaningfulness is determined by the relationship between the inferential demands of a text and the knowledge structures (schemata) available to the individual to accommodate those demands. Text therefore can be brought into the domain of coherence by varying knowledge structures.

THE varying uses of the term *coherence* make it difficult to understand the concept. A sampling of definitions of coherence find it described as a well-structured text (Badzinski, 1985), what makes a set of sentences form a text (Frederiksen, 1977), how one utterance follows another in a rational, rule-governed manner (Dascal & Katriel, 1979), the requirement that each succeeding sentence connect with what has already been introduced (e.g., Kieras, 1978), successful topic management (Tracy, 1985), the presence of a knowledge-based relation (van Dijk, 1977a), the cognitive correlate of cohesion (Moe & Irwin, 1986), the rational relation an utterance bears to some goal (Jacobs & Jackson, 1983), and a property assigned to another's continuous action (Sorensen, 1981).

To add to the confusion, these definitions vary in terms of their level of analysis, identification with cohesion, presumptions of connectedness, and concern with relevance. In terms of level of analysis, some scholars (e.g., Langleben, 1983) talk about the coherence of a sentence; others reject the applicability of coherence to such a small fragment of discourse (e.g., Garnham, Oakhill, & Johnson-Laird, 1982; Hobbs, 1982, 1983). The question argued here is whether coherence resides at some micro or macro level of the text. Cohesion is often viewed as being nested inside coherence, with cohesion being the local or micro level of *textual* (macro, global) coherence. Other scholars, however, use the words *cohesion* and *coherence* interchangeably.

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*Communication Yearbook 12*, pp. 95-129