



Cosmopolitan political science

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Abstract

Until recently, the term cosmopolitanism could rarely be found in modern political science literature. It was only in the 1990s that the term was rediscovered by political scientists in the critical discourse on globalization. In this article, I will explore the full potential of cosmopolitanism as an analytical concept for empirical political science. I will argue that the concept of cosmopolitanism should not be restricted to the analysis of global politics. Indeed, cosmopolitanism has much more to offer for political scientists. Properly understood, it enables – and necessitates – a re-invention of political science in the age of globalization, comparable to the behavioural revolution in political science in the 1950s. Such a paradigmatic shift should be based on a twofold transformation of existing disciplinary boundaries: A removal of the boundary between national (and comparative) and international politics on the one hand; and a re-definition of the boundaries between empirical and normative approaches on the other. As a result, cosmopolitanism may serve as a new, critical theory of politics based on the integration of hitherto separated fields and sub-fields.

Keywords: Cosmopolitanism; globalization; first and second age of modernity; transnational governance; political science; state theory

Introduction: globalization, cosmopolitanism and political science

Until recently, the term cosmopolitanism could rarely be found in modern political science literature. For a long time, its explicit use was limited to the narrow field of normative political theory where – in the tradition of Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, Christian Wolf and, most importantly, Immanuel Kant – cosmopolitanism appeared as a rather vague label for various types of global universalism, world citizenship, and a world republic. It was only in the 1990s that the term was rediscovered by political scientists in the critical discourse on globalization. Here, cosmopolitanism (sometimes also labelled

'cosmopolitanism' or 'cosmopolitics') was introduced as a normative concept to specify new political practices employed to cope with (mainly economic) globalization and its (mostly) negative consequences. At the core of these efforts is the concept of a 'cosmopolitan democracy', both as an institutional model and as a new political agenda for social democratic internationalism. Among the most prominent contributors to this debate have been Daniele Archibugi, David Held and Mary Kaldor, to name but a few (Archibugi 2003; Archibugi and Held 1995; Archibugi, Held and Koehler 1998; Held 1995, 2004; Kaldor 1999; Kaldor, Anheier and Glasius 2003; for a summary of this literature see Archibugi and Koehler-Archibugi 2003).

An excellent example of this new type of normative cosmopolitanism can be found in David Held's most recent writings. For Held, 'cosmopolitanism can be taken as the moral and political outlook which builds on the strength of the liberal multilateral order, particularly its commitment to universal standards, human rights and democratic values, and which seeks to specify general principles on which all could act. These are principles which can be universally shared, and can form the basis for the protection and nurturing of each person's equal interest in the determination of the institutions which govern their lives' (Held 2004: 171). These principles should constitute the basis of a 'new internationalism' in politics and they are expected to serve as 'the guiding ethical basis of global social democracy' (Held 2004: 178).

The weaknesses and shortcomings of such a normative concept of cosmopolitanism are obvious. On the one hand, it is too narrow in scope; hence, despite the increasing importance of globalization, its relevance in political science must remain limited. On the other hand, it is rather vague and imprecise. In particular, it fails to distinguish properly between universalism, internationalism and cosmopolitanism. Thus, cosmopolitanism tends to become a catch-all phrase for global universalism and a synonym for a 'new internationalism' – and as I will show in the following article, both uses of the term are problematic and inadequate.

The fact that most political scientists have thus far not used the term 'cosmopolitan' is not to say that they have not become aware of the emergence of a cosmopolitan situation. In fields such as international and comparative political economy or in European politics, for example, an increasing number of scholars have realized that the old categories based on a clear separation of national and international relations and between domestic and international politics have become outdated in the global age (see e.g. Risse-Kappen 1995; Milner 1998; Risse, Ropp and Sikkink 1999; Grande and Risse 2000; Albert, Jacobson and Lapid 2001; Zürn 2001; Fuchs and Kratochwil 2002; Berezin and Schain 2003; Grande and Pauly 2005a). These efforts have yet to amount to a paradigmatic shift in political science, however, and in most of these works the concept of cosmopolitanism has not been employed explicitly and systematically, if the term has been used at all. In brief, political science

has yet to meet the challenges and demands of the cosmopolitan situation that globalization has created.

In the following, I will argue that the concept of cosmopolitanism should not be restricted to the analysis of global politics. Indeed, cosmopolitanism has much more to offer for political scientists. Properly understood, it enables – and necessitates – a *re-invention of political science* in the age of globalization, comparable to the behavioural revolution in political science in the 1950s. Such a paradigmatic shift should be based on a twofold transformation of existing disciplinary boundaries: A removal of the boundary between national (and comparative) and international politics on the one hand (cf. Grande and Risse 2000; Beck 2000, 2006); and a re-definition of the boundaries between empirical and normative approaches on the other (Beck and Grande 2004). As a result, cosmopolitanism may serve as a new, critical theory of politics based on the integration of hitherto separated fields and sub-fields.

In this article, I will demonstrate the potential of cosmopolitanism for political science in four different fields of research. In each of these fields, I will address a key question of political science: (1) the problem of defining and establishing (territorial) boundaries; (2) the problem of institution-building and of democratization; (3) the problem of state autonomy and of governance; and (4) the problem of political conflict structures, political organization and identity formation. Of course, this is not meant to be an exhaustive list of the research topics in political science. However, it includes some of the main fields of research which have been constitutive for the discipline since its very beginnings as a modern social science (and even beyond). In my attempt to offer new, fresh answers to these traditional questions of political science, I will draw mainly on the results of two empirical research projects which have dealt with problems of globalization, Europeanization and the future of the nation-state in a global age. These projects have been part of the Munich research programme on ‘Reflexive Modernization’, directed by Ulrich Beck.¹ They have heavily benefited from interdisciplinary discourses with the various social sciences, in particular with sociology. Hence they not only demonstrate the need for a paradigmatic shift in political science, but also the huge potential for interdisciplinary co-operation, stimulated by the concept of cosmopolitanism in the social sciences.

The politics of boundary construction: constituting and organizing transnational policy regimes

One of the most striking features of globalization, and of the process of reflexive modernization more broadly, is its capacity to re-shape and re-define boundaries. This holds not only for territorial boundaries, but applies to every boundary which is constitutive for the first age of modernity (e.g. for the

distinction between nature and the individual, life and death, war and peace). As a consequence, we can observe a plurality of new types of individual and collective behaviour, and of social institution building. The result of this process, however, is neither a 'de-territorialized' society (Elkins 1995; Sassen 1996), nor a 'borderless world' (Ohmae 1990). Territorial fixations have not completely lost their significance, and existing boundaries have not simply disappeared; rather, they have been transformed in at least three different respects:

- First, boundaries have become *ambiguous*. The process of reflexive modernization has been creating new *zones of ambiguity* (Agamben 1998), in which clear-cut designations are impossible.
- Second, boundaries have become *incongruent*. Economic, political, cultural boundaries may still exist, but they no longer *co-exist*. The scopes of economic transactions, political responsibilities and cultural identifications are diverging in the global age, and they do so at an accelerating pace.
- Third, as a consequence, boundaries have become *contingent*. They can no longer be taken as pre-given and for granted, they are the subject of individual and collective decisions and, what is more, they have to be *decided* permanently (Beck and Lau 2004).

This creates both a methodological and a political problem. From a methodological perspective, territorial boundaries can no longer be regarded as a constant factor; they now have to be treated as one of many variables. As a consequence, our *units of analysis* may vary in this respect too. Political actors, however, are confronted with a similar problem. In their case, it is not the unit of analysis but the *unit of action* which has been liquefying. If the boundaries of their activities are no longer defined by the nation-state and the international arenas established by it, they have to re-constitute their respective units of action according to their own criteria – whatever these might be.

From a national perspective, this problem was conceptualized by Stein Rokkan as early as the 1960s. His political sociology is centred on the institutionalization of political authority in modern, democratic nation-states (cf. Rokkan 1999). According to Rokkan, political systems must combine two dimensions: territoriality and membership. These dimensions constitute two different kinds of boundaries, territorial and social; and ideally, in the modern nation-state, these two boundaries overlap. For good reason, Rokkan, has been mainly concerned with the internal consequences and conflicts of defining and defending external boundaries in the process of modern state-building in Western Europe, for example the conflicts between centre and periphery within nation-states.

In the global age, some of the problems shaping the process of nation-state building have once again become acute. From a cosmopolitan perspective, 'world risk society' (Beck 1999b) is confronted with the challenging task of establishing new systems of political interactions whose (territorial and social)

boundaries to a large extent remain undecided. What is at stake is essentially a new balance between territoriality and membership on a global scale. If we follow Rokkan's basic argument we should expect this process to be accompanied by far-reaching institution building on the one hand and penetrating new conflicts on the other.

For a cosmopolitan political science, which cannot take the territorial boundaries established by nation-states as a starting point for analysis, the basic research question therefore changes substantially. The crucial question is not only *where* to fix territorial boundaries and *how* to integrate the political communities thus constituted. The cosmopolitan question is much more fundamental. Cosmopolitan political science must ask first of all: *Which criteria can political actors apply in a globalizing world to establish boundaries, if territorial boundaries have become ambiguous, incongruent and contingent? How can they define the unit of their actions, the scope of their activity, and how can they grant individual or collective membership?*

In principle, there are four criteria available, which can be used to constitute transnational spaces of action:

- First, they can be constituted on the basis of common *historical* experience. In Europe, for example, it seems as if the 'dialectics of Enlightenment' (Horkheimer and Adorno 1971) have the potential to establish a common normative frame of reference which reflects on both the universal principles of human rights and their brutal negation by the dictatorships of the twentieth century (Levy and Sznajder 2002, 2004; Delanty and Rumford 2005).
- Second, they can be established on a *functional* basis, i.e. on the basis of common transnational problems of regulation (Coleman 2005). In this case, the unit of activity is defined by the functional scope of a specific problem of transnational regulation, e.g. the regulation of the Internet, the taxation of transnational corporations, the problem of global warming etc.
- Third, transnational units of action can be constructed by common *social* practices and conflicts. Transnational organizations can construct their identities by integrating – or excluding – specific types of actors, e.g. private actors such as international non-governmental organizations.
- Finally, transnational units of action can be constituted by novel forms of *institution* building. Their boundaries will then be defined by the scope of legal norms, jurisdictions and formal competencies.

These criteria are not exclusive. One of the most striking features of most of the *transnational policy regimes* we can observe is that although they are constituted on a functional basis, they combine the other criteria in various ways – and they even make use of territorial demarcations in their internal organization. As a consequence, a multiplicity of highly varied new organizations and institutions has been established beyond the nation-state (Slaughter

2004; Held 2004). The outcomes of these developments are complex new architectures of political rule-making, the formative principles of which differ in principle from the nation-state.² In detail, these new forms of governance are typified by at least *three distinguishing features*:

- First, their *transnational scope*: in one way or another, the new policy regimes integrate differing territorial levels of policy action above and below the nation state, and various types of public and private actors. Most importantly, they transcend the traditional separations of domestic and international politics, ‘inside/outside’ and ‘public/private’, by integrating different types of actors and organizations. In addition to nation-states, transnational policy regimes may be composed of different international organizations (IMF, WTO, OECD), supranational forms of regional integration (EU, NAFTA, APEC), international ‘regimes’, and of a variety of national and transnational interest groups and social movements. Correspondingly, the territorial scope of such policy regimes is enormously variable.
- Second, their *functional policy orientation*: transnational forms of governance are dominated by a strong functional problem orientation, both within individual policy areas and embracing several policy areas. Correspondingly, transnational policy regimes are delimited not by territorial boundaries but by *functional scope of policy problems* – they may, however, be divided geographically.
- Third, their *complex and partial systemic character*. The sphere of transnational policy-making is, despite all its institutional complexity, typified by a high degree of organizational anarchy (Peters 2005). Participation is open and variable, and the interactions are only partly directed by formal rules and legal frameworks. Instead, informal arrangements and the use of power play an important role.

The outcome of this development is a system of complex governance that differs in two ways from the nation-state and its mode of collective problem-solving. First, the *national level* is losing its monopoly in the production of collective solutions to collective problems. The nation-state is being replaced by a new architecture of governance in which different levels of action are institutionally differentiated and integrated. In this new architecture, the nation-state continues to play an important and indispensable part, but it is no longer sovereign in the traditional sense (Held 2004; see also Jessop 2003; Habermas 2004; Grande and Pauly 2005a). Second, with the new forms of complex governance the state *form* also loses its monopoly position in the production of collective solutions to collective problems. Collectively-binding decisions are no longer taken by the state alone or among sovereign states, but rather with the involvement of various types of societal actors, sometimes even ‘without governments’ (cf. Cutler, Haufler and Porter 1999; Cutler 2003; O’Brien et al. 2000; Hall and Biersteker 2002).

The cosmopolitan threshold: institutionalizing cosmopolitan principles of governance

Although there is considerable evidence that the nation-state is mutating into a new form of governance, this must not necessarily imply that the result is a 'cosmopolitan state', as suggested by Ulrich Beck (cf. Beck 2000, 2005, 2006). Such an argument can be contested from two sides. On the one hand, there may be serious doubts whether the new forms of governance qualify as 'states'. Following Habermas (2004), it might be more appropriate to conceive these new institutional architectures as being composed by states (although not exclusively), but without possessing the form of a state. In this context, it seems to be one of the most challenging tasks of a cosmopolitan political science to invent new conceptual tools and typologies to identify and classify the new forms of governance established in the recent process of globalization.

While there are good theoretical reasons to assume that modern societies must be conceived as 'world society' (Luhmann 1972; Meyer et al. 1997), or 'world risk society' (Beck 1999b), their internal structures are still discussed highly controversial. The concepts suggested range from extremely loosely organized, highly anarchical garbage can models, to more stable, institutionalized and integrated forms of 'policy spaces', 'policy networks' and 'policy regimes' and to a tightly integrated post-modern global 'empire' (Hart and Negri 2000). A large part of this controversy can be settled with reference to empirical variation. While there is hardly any empirical evidence for the existence of a fully integrated global political system, we can observe a rich variety of different institutional architectures of transnational political deliberation, rule-making and rule enforcement both across policy areas and over time. The results of these developments show two remarkable features. First, there has been a significant increase in the internal complexities of transnational policy spaces or regimes and in the degree of their internal integration (cf. Coleman 2005). This seems to indicate that the 'systemness' (Giddens 1984) of transnational politics has been increasing over the past decades. Second, however, the institutional configurations resulting from these developments are still remarkably different from the organization of domestic politics and, most importantly, do not possess the properties of modern political systems – whatever type of systems theory we use.

On the other hand, we should not take for granted that every new form of governance transcending the nation-state can actually be ascribed some cosmopolitan quality. At closer inspection, the multiplicity of policy networks and regimes which occupy transnational policy spaces is highly ambiguous in its character. They can be both *more* than traditional forms of international organization and co-operation, and *less*. They can be emerging forms of institution building, which lead to one of the ordinary forms of international organization, which respects and reconfirms national sovereignty. Or they can be some

new form of institutionalization which transcends it. It seems that most of the institution building taking place in international politics is still firmly based on the principle of national sovereignty (Krasner 1999); hence, most of the transnational policy regimes are less rather than more ambitious forms of institution building than conventional international organizations. Following the distinction made by the editors between the ‘cosmopolitan condition’ and the ‘cosmopolitan moment’, it is highly possible that, as a consequence of globalization, the structural opportunities for the establishment of cosmopolitan forms of political authority have been increasing, while their realization remains way behind.

For this reason, it is important to clearly distinguish between ‘internationalism’ and cosmopolitanism. As Timothy Brennan (2003) has argued convincingly, the two are not identical, rather they represent two completely different, and at least partly incompatible concepts of global politics. While internationalism is firmly based on the concept of national sovereignty, cosmopolitanism transcends it and emanates in new forms of ‘complex sovereignty’ (Grande and Pauly 2005a). But how can we identify the grain of cosmopolitanism in the sea of formal and informal institutional arrangements established over recent decades? How can we distinguish cosmopolitan forms of institution building from conventional international relations and organizations? This is the second challenge for a cosmopolitan political science. Basically, the task is to identify criteria which would allow us to separate the chaff from the wheat, and to identify unequivocally new forms of cosmopolitan political authority.

If we take the normative principles defining cosmopolitanism as a starting point, ‘cosmo-politics’ can be characterized by two basic requirements: first, they must transcend the duality of national and international; and second, they must offer ways of accommodating social differences based on mutual recognition and tolerance. Applied to the field of governance, the *cosmopolitan threshold* is first of all defined by the sovereignty of the nation-state, both internally and externally.³ The cosmopolitan moment, properly understood, essentially *transcends national sovereignty*. This can be done in various ways:

- by establishing international (or European) law, which restricts or even superimposes national law;
- by establishing decision-making procedures which restrict or even abolish the veto powers of individual states;
- by establishing organizational capacities to control and to enforce transnational rule-making;
- by establishing a transnational public space able to influence national agendas of decision-making and deliberation;
- by integrating different ethnic groups and communities in the centres of national (and supranational) power, i.e. in parties, parliaments, governments and interest groups;

- by establishing institutionalized forms of democratic accountability and participation beyond the nation-state.

This list of criteria might not be exhaustive but it includes some requirements which are indispensable for the institutionalization of cosmopolitan political authority. It is important to emphasize that in such an understanding, the concept of ‘cosmopolitanism’ is not simply an idea, a vision, or a set of normative principles. Cosmopolitanism should not be taken as a new variety of idealism in international politics. For this reason, I am less interested in its cultural or ideological manifestations, although they may exist and although they are certainly important (on Europe, see Delanty and Rumford 2005). Instead, this concept highlights the *institutionalization* of the basic normative principles of cosmopolitanism, rather than their social and political construction.

Defined in such a way, these criteria can first be taken as *empirical indicators* to identify and assess the cosmopolitan quality of those new types of political authority which are replacing the nation-state and contesting its monopoly of rule making and rule enforcement. This must not be an ‘either/or’ decision. Since fully developed forms of cosmopolitan political authority do not yet exist, it is important to identify those components of their institutional design and their political processes which possess some cosmopolitan features. In a second step, these criteria could then be used to compose a nominal scale which would allow measuring the degree of ‘cosmopolitanization’ in existing inter-, trans- and supranational institutions. Roughly speaking, the more of these six criteria which can be observed in a specific case, the stronger its cosmopolitan quality.

The European Union is an excellent example with which to illustrate both the need to refine the concept of cosmopolitanism and the benefits of such an elaborated concept.⁴ The EU can be taken as the paradigmatic case of a ‘Super-Supra-Inter-Post-Neo-Trans-Nation state’ (Beck 2000: 80) which escapes familiar concepts in political science, law and sociology. There is widespread consensus that it is neither a state nor an international regime nor any type of international organization – but what else is it? Is it already the perfect manifestation of a cosmopolitan ‘dream’, as claimed by Jeremy Rifkin (2004) only recently, or should the concept of cosmopolitanism rather be employed to find new solutions to the ongoing crisis of the European project? The criteria presented above indicate, first of all, that the process of European integration has actually included a strong cosmopolitan momentum since its very beginning. It differed from other forms of regional integration, e.g. the North American Free Trade Agreement NAFTA or the Asian-Pacific Economic Cooperation APEC, by the very fact that it transcends the idea of the nation and the nation-state and that it transforms national sovereignty (cf. Buzan and Weaver 2003; Katzenstein 2005). Since the early 1950s, with the establishment of the European Coal and Steel Community, the European Communities were

supposed to be – and have aspired to be – more than just another of the usual forms of inter-governmental co-operation. They were founded on the basis of their own institutions, some of them partly independent from the member states, and on a legal framework which has successfully claimed priority over national law. Cosmopolitanism in the European project has therefore not only been based on a strong European ‘idea’ but, much more importantly, it has been firmly and formally institutionalized. The result of this process can be labelled an *institutionalized cosmopolitanism* (Beck and Grande 2004: 36f.). The core of European cosmopolitanism has thus been constituted by newly established institutions at the European level, in particular the European Commission, the Council of Ministers, the European Court of Justice and the European Parliament.

However, emphasizing the importance of common supranational institutions does not necessarily mean the identification of cosmopolitanism and supranationalism. Supranationalism can be conceived in ‘national’ categories as well, as exemplified in the concepts of a ‘pan-European nation’, a ‘European national-state’ or of a ‘European federal state’ (see e.g. Coudenhove-Kalergi 1953; Mitrany 1966). In these cases, national categories are not replaced by new, cosmopolitan categories; rather, their territorial scope should be expanded. As a consequence, these varieties of supranationalism are intolerant to national and local peculiarities. Their solution to the outrage of nationalism in Europe is its amalgamation into a new form of pan-European nationalism, rather than its reconciliation. Hence, supranationalism bears some risk of degenerating into a European super-nationalism.

If it is not the supranational institutions as such, where else are cosmopolitan principles institutionalized in the EU? On closer inspection, we can find that it is not a single institution or set of institutions, but the institutionalization of two conflicting principles which make for the institutionalization of cosmopolitanism in the EU: supranationalism *and* intergovernmentalism. In the European case, intergovernmentalism is an indispensable counterweight against the unifying forces of supranationalism, both in the overall institutional framework of the EU and within individual institutions such as the Commission and the Council. As a result, nation-states, their interests and their sovereignty are transcended *and protected* at the same time in the EU.

This is not to say, however, that the EU is already the realization of a perfect cosmopolitan world. The empirical indicators suggested above can not only be used to identify cosmopolitan forms of institution building; they can also be used to criticize them. Cosmopolitan political science as a critical theory of politics should be able to provide normative principles and empirical indicators with which to criticize existing forms of institution building and established political routines and processes. In the case of the EU, this means in particular to criticize its insufficient democratic accountability and its underdeveloped transnational public space. For this reason, the EU in its present

state should rather be considered as a form of incomplete or deformed cosmopolitanism than the perfect realization of a cosmopolitan vision (see Beck and Grande 2004: ch. 5).

The example of the EU clearly demonstrates the potential of the concept of cosmopolitanism both as a normative and an empirical theory. It allows both the identification and criticism of existing forms of cosmopolitan institution building. At the same time, the European case indicates how difficult it is to distinguish cosmopolitan principles from established concepts of internationalism, transnationalism and supranationalism – and how important it is to make such distinctions. Hence it is one of the major tasks of cosmopolitan political science to properly define or redefine these concepts and to develop empirical indicators which allow the use of the concept of cosmopolitanism in empirical research.

The cosmopolitan constellation: state capacities and policy change in a globalizing world

Cosmopolitanism not only enables us to better understand the diverse processes and the variety of forms of institution building beyond the nation-state. Contrary to its dominant use in globalization research, we should not simply take it as a normative ideal for the organization of a global polity. Such a narrow understanding of cosmopolitanism would render much of its analytical potential unused. Properly understood, cosmopolitanism might also be employed to analyse the autonomy and the capacities of *domestic* politics in the age of globalization. My claim is that we can no longer understand national politics, with its opportunities and constraints, if we analyse it exclusively in national categories. In a globalizing world, it is the dynamic interaction between national and inter-, trans- and supranational political actors and institutions, which *constitutes new cosmopolitan political spaces*; and these new cosmopolitan political spaces do not only constrain national politics, they also offer new strategic opportunities for political action (Beck 2006).

In order to make this argument clearer it is useful to contrast it with the dominant approaches in the recent globalization literature. This debate has been dominated by two competing approaches: an *external constraints approach* on the one hand, and a *domestic structures approach* on the other. The external constraints approach argues that the autonomy of politics and the capacity of states have been substantially reduced by external factors, economic factors in particular. Because of the increasing mobility of transnational capital, domestic policy instruments lose their effectiveness and the state is forced either to retreat completely (Strange 1996) or to transfer part of its sovereignty to new forms of transnational governance (Held 1995, 2004; Held et al. 1999; Habermas 2001; Zürn 1998). From this perspective,

domestic politics has been mainly shaped or constrained by external (economic) factors over the last two decades. This approach has been challenged by two arguments. First, critics of globalization maintained that the pressures of globalization are weaker than those expected by the advocates of the external constraints approach (Hirst and Thompson 1995). Second, and even more important, the proponents of the domestic structures approach argue that states still enjoy significant autonomy from markets and that they can use this autonomy to achieve important political objectives, e.g. high levels of employment. From this perspective, the success or failure of domestic politics in the age of globalization is mainly explained by 'domestic structures', i.e. the national institutional frameworks which determine national politics (Garrett 1998; Weiss 1998, 2003; Scharpf and Schmidt 2000a, 2000b; Swank 2002).

Both approaches suffer from the shortcomings of methodological nationalism, because they are both based on the false dichotomy between the internal and the external, between endogenous and exogenous, and between domestic and international factors. As a consequence, they not only fail to adequately understand the *constraints* on states and their governments in the age of globalization, but also their *strategic opportunities*. This holds for both the relevance of external constraints and for the role of domestic structures. The external constraints approach takes the intensity of external pressures as an objective fact which is beyond the reach of politics. On closer inspection, however, we find that the pressures which result from globalization on domestic politics are the *combined* result of external constraints and domestic needs to adapt. It is the specific *constellation of external and internal factors* which accounts for the domestic need for policy change. For this reason, we not only find remarkable cross-national variation in domestic policy responses in the same policy sector, e.g. banking regulation, the regulation of financial markets, tax policy, or innovation policy (Busch 2003; Lütz 2002; Ganghof 2000; Prange-Gstöhl 2004); we can also observe striking contrasts between the extent of policy change on the one hand, and economic performance on the other hand. Among the industrially advanced countries, we can identify at least three types of countries:

- First, there are countries with a low policy profile, i.e. with a limited range of policy change, and a weak economic profile (e.g. high unemployment, low growth, high public debts). One of the most prominent cases in this category is Germany, which is blamed for being a 'blocked state', unable to decide upon necessary policy reforms despite the considerable need for policy change. This case fits best into the categories of fundamentalist critics of globalization, which pretend that politics has lost its capacities for policy change.
- Second, there are countries combining a low policy profile with a strong economic performance, although they are economically vulnerable because of

- their open economies. Switzerland is an excellent case in point. Such a constellation cannot be explained by the absence or weakness of external pressures. In this case, it is more important that the domestic policy structures (industry structures, labour market regulations, tax policies, social security systems) have already been rather well adapted to external economic pressures (Katzenstein 1985; Castles, Leibfried and Obinger 2005).
- Third, however, there are countries with open economies combining strong economic performance with a high policy profile, i.e. with a wide range of far reaching policy reforms (e.g. in labour market regulation, innovation policy, tax policy, or the organization of the welfare state). Among them are, in particular, small European countries with highly developed welfare states such as the Netherlands, Denmark, Sweden and Finland. From the perspective of the external constraints approach, this is the most unlikely constellation, but apparently it is a possible constellation.

How can we explain such an astounding policy profile? Is it mainly the domestic institutional setting which explains the successes of these countries, as the domestic structures approach would suggest? Or is there something else which must be neglected by an approach which focuses exclusively on internal factors? The results of our comparative empirical analysis indicate that domestic structures in fact do play an important role in these cases. The number of institutional veto players and the availability of corporatist arrangements to overcome political resistance can explain a great deal of the existing cross-national variation (Grande, Prange-Gstöhl and Wolf 2005). However, this is only part of the story. Closer inspection reveals that in addition, external *political* factors play an important role too. Successful policy change not only depends on requisite domestic structures, but also on external political factors, in particular on the degree of political de-nationalization⁵ of a policy field and the embeddedness of domestic politics in inter-, trans, and supranational political arrangements. Most surprising, and in strong contrast to the expectations of the external constraints approach, there seems to be a *positive* correlation between the degree of de-nationalization of a policy field and innovative domestic policy change. The existence of international or supranational institutions and the transfer of political authority to them must not invariably weaken national politics, it can also strengthen it. This ‘paradox of weakness’ (Grande 1996), the virtue of ‘golden handcuffs’ (Beck 2006), has been well observed in European politics and it seems to exist in cosmopolitan political spaces too (Beck and Grande 2004; Beck 2006).

In regulatory policy, for example, the emergence of multi-level systems of regulation in Europe served to break up established distributive coalitions and to avoid regulatory capture. It is no coincidence that the efficiency of public regulation is highest in the sector in which Europeanization is most advanced, i.e. in the telecommunications sector, and that it is lowest in the railway sector

in which Europeanization is still particularly low (Grande 2005). A similar pattern can be observed in environmental policy, a policy field with advanced de-nationalization. In the last two decades, countries such as the Netherlands have been very successful in combining ambitious domestic policy change with an active role at both the European and international level. The Netherlands has been very eager to export its advanced policy concepts on the one hand, and has very skillfully made use of international pressure for further domestic reforms (Lieverink 1997).

A similar pattern has been observed by Thomas Risse and his team of researchers in the case of human rights policies (Risse, Ropp and Sikkink 1999; Risse, Jetschke and Schmitz 2002). In their country studies on the domestic recognition and implementation of human rights norms in Latin America, Africa and Asia, they identified a 'boomerang effect' between domestic opposition groups, international human rights activists and networks, international organizations, and domestic policy change. On the bases of this dynamic effect between domestic actors, institutions and policies, and transnational and international actors and organizations they have developed a 'spiral model' of policy change which integrates different kinds of actors and organizations at different territorial levels into a common cosmopolitan policy space. As in the case of policy change in European countries, it is the *cosmopolitan constellation*, i.e. the combination of internal and external factors, which accounts for a complete explanation of policy change.

This is not to say that the pressures of globalization have produced such a cosmopolitan constellation in every country and in every policy field to the same extent. Actually, we can observe remarkable cross-national and cross-sectoral variations in the degree of political de-nationalization. And it seems as if these differences matter. In the case of European countries, the explanatory power of domestic structures increases the lower the degree of de-nationalization in a policy field. This becomes most obvious in fields with a particularly low degree of de-nationalization such as tax policy, labour market or social policy (see Scharpf and Schmidt 2000a, 2000b). The importance of domestic structures has also become apparent in the case of human rights policies. Here, it is the existence of a functioning state with an intact monopoly of legitimate coercive power which is indispensable for the implementation of policy changes initiated by transnational actors and international organizations. Hence, a cosmopolitan perspective to the analysis of policy change denies neither the existence of external pressures nor the importance of domestic structures. Rather, it allows us to integrate them into a common conceptual framework and to assess their relative importance. The claim of a cosmopolitan political science then is that the contribution of the various exogenous and endogenous variables to policy change only becomes fully apparent if they are analysed from a cosmopolitan perspective.

Beyond left and right: the transformation of political cleavages in a cosmopolitan perspective

What are the consequences of globalization for the structure of political conflicts? How are political conflicts organized and articulated in the second age of modernity? And, more specifically, how does the transformation of territorial boundaries affect the scope and content of political conflicts? The old framework of political sociology is firmly based on the assumption that the scope of political conflicts is defined and contained by national boundaries. In the process of nation-building, political conflicts are transformed from local or regional conflicts into national ones; and in those cases in which they persist they form the basis of a new type of conflict between the national centre and the periphery. It is one of the most astounding results of the process of nation-building that in modern democracies electorates have become national electorates and that the most relevant political parties are national parties constituting national party systems (Bartolini 2000; Caramani 2004).

If we put the recent process of globalization in a Rokkanean perspective (see Rokkan 1999; Lipset and Rokkan 1967), we may conceive of the contemporary transformation of territorial boundaries as a new ‘critical juncture’ which is likely to result in the formation of new political cleavages, i.e. a new structural conflict between ‘winners’ and ‘losers’ of ‘de-nationalization’. A cosmopolitan political science accepts this assumption, but it extends the Rokkanean perspective in two respects. On the one hand, it aims at analysing these new cleavages not only within the nation-state, but at least at two levels: at the national level; and, moreover, beyond the national context, and it pays particular attention to the interplay between these levels. On the other hand, it offers a set of normative principles which permits the qualification of the ideological dimensions of the political conflicts emanating from the transformation of territorial boundaries and their consequences.

What does this mean for the empirical analysis of conflicts in Western societies, the traditional domain of political sociology? Although the scope and the significance of the structural changes induced by reflexive modernization and in particular by globalization, is still a point of controversy in political science and sociology (cf. Hirst and Thompson 1994; Albrow 1996; Beck 1999a; Held et al. 1999; Held 2004; Goldthorpe 2002; Wolf 2004), an empirical analysis of the new cleavages resulting from these processes should be based on at least three assumptions⁶:

- First, we must consider that the consequences of globalization are not the same for all members of a national community – and among national communities. We should expect globalization (and Europeanization) to give rise to new disparities, new oppositions, and new forms of competition.

- Second, we can assume that most citizens perceive these differences in a specific way, i.e. between ‘winners’ and ‘losers’ of globalization (and Europeanization); and that political conflicts are articulated in exactly these categories by political parties, national and transnational political movements.
- Third, we may expect that these new oppositions are not aligned with, but crosscut traditional structural and political cleavages.

The literature on globalization and de-nationalization has identified at least three mechanisms which contribute to the formation of winners and losers of globalization: *economic competition*, *cultural diversity* and *political integration*. First of all, globalization has resulted in an increase in transnational economic competition. In advanced welfare states, this has led to a dramatic erosion of protected property rights and the streams of income linked to them (Schwartz 2001). In the postwar decades, these countries have introduced a variety of measures to disconnect income streams (in the form of wages, employment, or profits) from the outcome of the market. The increasing transnational mobility of capital has now produced a significant downward pressure on domestic regulations, tax rates, and wages (cf. Scharpf and Schmidt 2000a, 2000b). The individuals and the firms most directly affected by this erosion are those who worked in ‘sheltered’ sectors, i.e. sectors that were protected from market pressures through public regulation, and which are now exposed to international competition. As a consequence, within industrially advanced countries, economic globalization tends to produce a new *sectoral* cleavage, which at least partially cuts across the traditional class cleavage and gives rise to cross-class coalitions. At the same time, it may create a new global conflict between those integrated into the global economy and those excluded from global markets and ignored by transnational capital.

In the age of globalization, increasing economic competition is, however, not only defined in sectoral, but also in ethnic terms – ethnic taken here in a broad sense (including language and religious attributes). In Western Europe, this is a consequence of the massive immigration of ethnic groups who are in many respects distinct from the indigenous European population. Thus, Western societies are faced with an increasing *cultural diversity* (Albrow 2001), and one of the most crucial questions for their integration is how they cope with this new, culturally defined diversity. In the last two decades, there has been a tendency, reinforced by the EU’s eastern enlargement, to link cultural diversity to economic competition. In the immigration countries, then, ethnically different populations have been made symbols of potential threats to the collective identity and to the standards of living by the natives, resulting in cultural competition and conflicts. Furthermore, some European welfare states have been granting some of their social rights and privileges – though hardly any political rights – to the migrants, which increases the perception of competition for the same scarce resources on the part of the native population. As

a result, cultural diversity has the potential to create new political conflicts which clearly transcend the structure of those conflicts produced by the formation of the nation-state and of industrialization in Europe.

A third source of conflicts related to the transformation of borders is *political integration* and the transfer of political authority to institutions beyond the nation-state. This holds in particular in those cases in which such a transfer jeopardizes national political sovereignty. The result is an increase in political competition between nation-states on the one hand, and supra-, trans- and international political actors on the other, which creates winners and losers too. First of all, there may be material losers to the extent that a transfer of political authority may result in a reduction of the public sector at the national level. More importantly, however, winners and losers result from differences in their identification with national norms and institutions and the national community. Gorenburg (2000) has emphasized the importance of such identifications for understanding support for nationalism. Individuals who possess a strong identification with their national community and who are attached to its exclusionary norms will perceive a weakening of the national institutions as a loss. Conversely, citizens with universalist or cosmopolitan norms may perceive this weakening as a gain, if it implies a strengthening of a specific type of cosmopolitan political institutions, rather than a mere 'retreat of the state' (Strange 1996). The attachment to national traditions, symbols and values plays a prominent role here, as does the integration into transnational networks. And in neither case do the conflicts created by this political competition fit into the old categories of political cleavages.

The new groups of winners and losers of globalization constitute political potentials, which can – and must – be articulated by political organizations. However, given the heterogeneous composition of these groups, we cannot expect that the preferences formed as a function of this new antagonism will be closely aligned with the political divisions on which domestic politics has traditionally been based in the first age of modernity. As we can observe from the development of national party systems in Western Europe in the last two decades, this makes it difficult for established national political actors to organize these new potentials. At the same time, however, we may expect the composition of the groups of winners and losers to vary significantly between national contexts due to, among other things, different economic structures, cultural traditions, colonial inheritance, constitutional norms and institutional frameworks. Hence, we can assume that it is even more difficult to organize these heterogeneous groups at the supranational level, e.g. at the level of the EU. Therefore, this heterogeneity of conflicts and conflicting groups results in a twofold problem for the organization and articulation of political interests. First, it creates something we may call a *political paradox of globalization*: due to their heterogeneity, the new political potentials created by this process are most likely to be articulated and dealt with at the *national* level (Kriesi and

Grande 2004). Moreover, this heterogeneity first of all opens a 'window of opportunity' for the formation of *new* political parties and the restructuring of the national party systems.

Thus, a cosmopolitical perspective which transcends the boundaries of methodological nationalism and occupies a new position to observe political reality reveals that, paradoxically, it is the lowering and unbundling of national boundaries which renders them more salient. As they are weakened and reassessed, their political importance at least partly increases. More specifically, the destruction of national boundaries leads to a 'sectoralization' and 'ethnicization' of politics (Badie 1997), i.e. to an increased salience of differences between sectors of the economy and of cultural differences respectively, as criteria for the distribution of resources, identity formation, and political mobilization.

What are the consequences of these conflicts for the structuring of political spaces and the organization and articulation of political interests? The first results of an ongoing research project on six West European countries clearly reveal the transformative potential of globalization and reflexive modernization (see Kriesi et al. 2006). It seems as if reflexive modernization has the same revolutionary potential as those two great revolutions, the industrial revolution and the national revolution, which have been constitutive for the formation of West European party systems in the nineteenth century (Lipset and Rokkan 1967). This is not to say that globalization has produced an entirely new political cleavage; rather, it has resulted in the transformation of the existing cultural conflict dimension in European countries. The new conflicts described above have so far been integrated into the existing two-dimensional structure. While the cultural dimension has been dominated by issues linked to cultural liberalism and religion until the 1970s, new issues such as immigration or European integration have been integrated into this dimension in the last two decades. Most important in this respect has been immigration, a theme absent from the debate before the 1970s. Since then, however, it has become a salient and much polarizing issue. The same holds for the question of European integration in countries such as Switzerland, Britain, and the Netherlands.

If we employ the normative principles of cosmopolitanism, we can clearly identify the extreme poles of this newly transformed cultural dimension. On one extreme we can find nationalist positions towards immigrants and towards any supranational integration; and on the other extreme we find attitudes which are open for any form of political and societal integration. Therefore, we can speak of the new cultural dimension constituting the political spaces in Europe as a *structural cleavage between nationalism and cosmopolitanism*.

Furthermore, the results of our empirical analysis indicate that this cultural dimension has been gaining in importance as it has become the primary basis on which new parties or transformed established parties seek to mobilize their

electorate. This holds in particular for the parties of the populist right in Western Europe. These parties should be regarded as a genuine product of the new cultural conflicts rather than a response to the 'silent revolution' and the emergence of 'new politics' in the 1970s (for such an interpretation see Ignazi 1992, 2004). Most important, the parties of the populist right do not stand out for their economic profile. It is on cultural issues, where they support a neo-nationalist strategy much more strongly than mainstream parties.

The fact that globalization has resulted in a transformation of national political spaces, cleavages and conflict structures, however, does not necessarily imply that political spaces are still exclusively national and that the structure of political conflicts is still clearly demarcated by national boundaries. Even if there are good reasons to assume that the formation of political identities, the articulation of political preferences and the organization of political activity mainly takes place at the national level and that the nation-state will continue to exercise a strong power to condition them, the concepts employed in empirical analysis must be open and sensitive to changes caused by the transformation of territorial boundaries. In contrast to the standard approach in comparative politics, which still takes nation-states as sharply separated units of analysis, a cosmopolitan political science should be able to include transnational actors, cross-border activities and cross-cutting preferences, multiple identities etc. into its research design.

What does all this mean for an analysis of political cleavages and conflict structures? How can we identify transnational structures of political conflict? And, most important, what is our unit of analysis if we leave the 'container' of the nation-state? Can we simply take the global, i.e. 'world society', as a new frame of reference, or do we need to find other units of analysis which are more appropriate for our research questions? Cosmopolitanism as a research methodology suggests treating the 'national' as a variable and constructing new units of analysis which take the varying territorial scope of politics as one of its defining properties. For an analysis of political cleavages and conflict structures, for example, we suggest employing a new concept, that of 'political campaigns'. This concept allows focusing the empirical analysis on mainly two variables: variations in *actor constellations* (e.g. political parties, transnational organizations etc.), and variations in the *territorial scope* of political activities. Such an analytical concept offers the possibility of covering different forms of political mobilization and articulation under the same heading, and analysing their inherent structure of political conflict. Most important, it allows the inclusion of exclusively national activities (e.g. national election campaigns) and their comparison with various types of transnational political activity (ranging from supranational elections to transnational anti-globalization movements).

Conclusions: cosmopolitanism and the new dialectics of de-nationalization and re-nationalization

The empirical studies presented above suggest at least three general conclusions. First, there is sufficient evidence to assume that globalization has created new types of *cosmopolitan political spaces* which clearly transcend national boundaries and integrate national, inter-, trans- and supranational actors, organizations, networks, institutions and norms. These cosmopolitan political spaces are not merely the result of a re-organization of traditional international organizations and relations. Such a re-organization undoubtedly takes place, although still at slow speed and often with insufficient results. However, the cosmopolitan political space is neither identical to a global space, nor is it congruent with a specific type of international political order. Its distinguishing characteristic is its ability to integrate different territorial levels, different types of actors and different kinds of activities.

Second, we should assume that the emergence of cosmopolitan political spaces integrating various territorial levels, actors and activities creates new types of conflicts and cleavages. These conflicts and cleavages constitute a new type of political dynamic: that of the *dialectics of de-nationalization and re-nationalization within the cosmopolitan space*. In my understanding, this is the most crucial aspect of 'cosmopolitics'. Thus, political cosmopolitanism should neither be reduced to a specific methodology, nor to a coherent set of normative principles. Rather, it should be conceived as the stressful and conflicting integration of *antagonistic* principles which constitute the cosmopolitan space and which make for its internal dynamics.

Third, it is not the least due to these conflicts and dynamics that the cosmopolitan potential created by globalization has so far not been exploited fully in order to re-constitute political authority in a cosmopolitan way. Despite the increasing economic, ecological and security interdependencies which are constitutive for 'world risk society', the scope of transnational governance is still limited. A hard core of national power and authority remains firmly in place and is especially visible with regards to the main issues of foreign policy, security policy, and welfare policies (Grande and Pauly 2005b: 292f.). The persistence of national categories, concepts, actors and institutions in politics is the combined result of two processes. On the one hand, it is the consequence of the resistance of the 'old' national, i.e. of national interests, national institutions and national sovereignty, against its cosmopolitization. The outdated 'national' constellation is still forceful and defends its domains and demarcations against any transformative change. On the other hand, however, it is the product of the counter-powers and counter-movements created by cosmopolitanism itself (cf. Beck 2006). Cosmopolitanism permanently provokes counter-attacks, and these counter-attacks can well – although they must not necessarily – take the form of the national. This 'new' type of the national, the

neo-nationalist reaction and counter-movement *within* cosmopolitanism, constructs and stylizes the same boundaries and demarcations, which already served as a defence mechanism against the very cosmopolitan transformation.

How these new dialectics of de-nationalization and re-nationalization work out in detail and how national and transnational forces intermingle to create cosmopolitan political spaces is first of all an empirical question. The answers to this question should not be pre-defined by the concept of cosmopolitanism. Whatever the answer will be, however, there is one thing which should have become clearer through this article, which is that we need a cosmopolitan political science to recognize these new conflicts and dynamics and to find new, cosmopolitan ways of coping with them.

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Notes

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2. For the following, see also Grande and Pauly (2005b: 286ff.).

3. On the concept of sovereignty see in particular Bartelson (1995), Fowler and

Bunck (1995), Krasner (1999) and Philpott (2001); on its most recent transformations see Camilleri and Falk (1992), Hart and Negri (2000) and Grande and Pauly (2005a).

4. On the following see Beck and Grande (2004: 36f.).

5. Following Zürn (1998), I will use the term 'de-nationalization' for any kind of change in the territorial dimension of politics. It not only includes the transfer of political authority to institutions above the national level (i.e. to inter-, trans- and supra-national organizations), but also below it (e.g. a decentralization, devolution and regionalization of politics).

6. The following analysis follows Kriesi and Grande (2004) and Kriesi et al. (2006).

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