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DETERRENCE AND THE BISHOPS: A TRANS-ATLANTIC COMPARISON

JOHN W. COFFEY



THE AUTHOR: Dr. Coffey is Staff Assistant on the Long-Range Policy Staff of the Office of Negotiations Policy, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy. This article was completed before he assumed his present position in late 1985, while still an Associate Professor of Political Science at Rockford College in Illinois.

IN BRIEF

When the German, American and French Roman Catholic episcopacies issued, in 1983, their respective pastoral letters on the subject of war and peace in the nuclear age, commentators tended to credit the European bishops with greater prudence and realism than their American counterparts. Yet, a more careful comparison shows that, while the European churchmen evinced nominally greater recognition of the fundamental conflict of human and moral values that underlies the current global confrontation — in contrast with the ostensible moral neutralism displayed by the American bishops toward the two superpowers and their culpability for mankind's present predicament — all three letters reflect scant understanding of the critical issues relevant to deterrence, nuclear weapons and strategies, and their myriad implications. Indeed, notwithstanding degrees of tolerance expressed toward deterrence as a provisional phenomenon, the bishops' appeals and prescriptions, if followed, would have the effect of stripping Western deterrence doctrines of all credibility. This applies particularly to their elevation of survival as the supreme value, their deference to pacifism as a harbinger of man's transformation, and their common Utopian vision of a one-world order.

In 1983 the German, American and French Roman Catholic episcopacies issued pastoral letters on the subject of war and peace in the nuclear age. Both before and after its final draft the American letter received broad attention in the United States. Perhaps understandably, far less scrutiny was

French and German texts, viewed them as offering "the most reasonable and effective option for human beings who want to remain free and to avoid war," and Thomas Molnar declared that the French letter "reads like a counterstatement to the American pastoral letter."¹

treatment of the political and military dimensions of nuclear deterrence, paying special regard to the solution proposed by all three: arms control leading to disarmament and world government. These clerical reveries merit the rebuke Edmund Burke directed at the political divines in his time, who embraced the cause of the French Revolution:

The cause of civil liberty and civil government gains as little as that of religion by this confusion of duties. Those who quit their proper character, to assume what does not belong to them, are, for the greater part, ignorant both of the character they leave, and of the character they assume. Wholly unacquainted with the world in which they are so fond of meddling, and inexperienced in all its affairs, on which they pronounce with so much confidence, they have nothing of politics but the passions they excite.²

The Issue of Systemic Conflict

An understanding of nuclear deterrence and the arms race must begin with a recognition of the radical antagonism between political regimes. At stake in the global struggle is the survival of republican self-government based upon the dignity of man possessing certain natural rights, threatened by an aggressive totalitarian empire grounded upon the degradation of man and bent on world hegemony. Unless its citizens are convinced that the West is confronted by a dedicated enemy with whom differences are significant enough to present a clear moral choice for free men and to require sacrifice and risk, the task of deterrence cannot be sustained. By the same token, if the United States and the Soviet Union are portrayed as morally equivalent superpowers equally responsible for the disorder and tension in the world, then nuclear weapons themselves become the principal evil and inevitable confusion blurs the issues of peace.³ A grasp of the regime conflict, however, is a necessary but insufficient prerequisite for sound security policy.

The American bishops display scant comprehension of the political context of deterrence. Although the European bishops, particularly the French, are nominally more realistic, they fail to draw the hard conclusions for Western security.

Toward the middle of their letter, the Amer-

ican bishops assert that the present perilous relation between the superpowers is adventitious, yet they claim to "understand how it came to exist": namely, in a world of sovereign states lacking a "central authority" and possessing nuclear knowledge, certain choices were made (by whom they do not specify), some bad and others of a mixed nature (presumably, no good choices were made), leading to the current crisis.⁴ Belatedly, at the end of their letter, they discuss "the superpowers in a disordered world" where, despite a nod to Soviet military power and imperial ambitions, both are blameworthy: "To be sure, our own system is not without flaws."⁵

America, for instance, supports repressive regimes in the name of freedom, conducts "repugnant covert operations," and falls short of ensuring equal rights for all its citizens. American foreign policy, the bishops conclude, must aim not at protecting the national interest or preserving the orbit of freedom in a savage world, but at promoting human rights, and "any attempts to justify, for reasons of state, support for regimes that continue to violate human rights is all the more morally reprehensible in its hypocrisy."⁶ The implication lingers that an incompletely just regime is unworthy of resolute defense. The bishops ostensibly reject superpower equivalency; yet, they hold both equally responsible for the global crisis and impute to both the same interest in not using nuclear weapons. On the other hand, a better future is up to the United States alone, not the Soviets, if only we do not suffer a "hardness of heart."⁷

In contrast, the German bishops acknowledge the philosophical root of the East-West conflict in the clash between a system based on class warfare and world revolution and one which affirms the worth of the individual in a regime of freedom.⁸ Unlike the Americans, the German bishops place the danger of the arms race in the political context of the totalitarian threat to human dignity and freedom: "... we do not overlook the fact that these two sources of danger, however different the causes and facts may be, are connected with each other and reciprocally augment one another — a situation which many regard as hopeless."⁹ The West must not flinch from waging a vigorous ideological war against communism. The totalitarian threat "requires, first and foremost, a continual confrontation

with the ideological basis of Marxism-Leninism at the political, intellectual and moral levels — i.e., a constructive confrontation which bears in mind the foundations of free democratic states and their social system.”¹⁰

The French bishops, especially, have an undeluded perception of the enemy and of the consequences of a policy of appeasement. The French letter depicts the “aggressive and dominating character of Marxist-Leninist ideology” in which “everything, even the aspirations of nations for peace, must be utilized for the conquest of the world.”¹¹ This ugly reality means that a policy of appeasement “leads a nation to every kind of capitulation,” and disarmament would “provoke the aggression of one’s neighbors by feeding the temptation to seize a prey which is all too ready for the taking. . . .”¹² The French Bishops harbor no illusions about the efficacy of virtuous motives in the teeth of communist predation: “In a world where one man still preys upon another, to change oneself into a lamb could be to provoke the wolf.”¹³

The Political Shadow of Military Power

Statements like these won for the European bishops acclaim for hard-headed realism, but their political analysis is not coupled with a coherent security policy. This becomes evident when we consider the Europeans’ assessment of the political problem of nuclear blackmail and their recommended deterrence strategy. How one casts the central issue of the East-West struggle is crucial. Some years ago John Courtney Murray warned that making survival the main issue in the contest with the Soviets would be disastrous. The Soviets would never risk their survival by a resort to arms, whereas America’s strategy was designed to guarantee its survival but not to fight a just war for limited ends. Until we remove the question of survival from the problem of war, Murray maintained, we cannot have a strategy conforming to moral reason that requires justice in war and to military reason that demands success in war: “We have got the problem of ‘survival’ and the problem of

iom that a disparity in military power disrupts the balance of politico-diplomatic power and that superior military power in place yields political leverage.

The French bishops grant that a Western disavowal of nuclear defense would entice Soviet blackmail. Perhaps mindful of the blatant Soviet propaganda campaign preying on European fear of war in order to abort INF modernization and decouple European security from America, the French compare the Soviet attempt to Finlandize Europe to Hitlerian blackmail:

The present situation is not without analogy. While former democracies are maintained by force in the Eastern heartland, a constant pressure is placed upon Western democracies for the purpose of neutralizing them and having them enter, if possible, into the sphere of influence of Marxist-Leninist ideology.¹⁵

Like the French, the German bishops are cognizant of the potential for Soviet nuclear blackmail. Western renunciation of the right and duty to use force in self-defense “may be understood as weakness and possibly as an invitation to perpetrate political blackmail” and “may foster the very things which it is designed to prevent, namely, the oppression of the innocent and the infliction of suffering and brutality upon them.”¹⁶

In contrast, the U.S. bishops evince no understanding of the political utility of military power and the problem of nuclear blackmail. At the outset of their letter they characterize the contemporary crisis in the manner fostered by Soviet propaganda: nuclear weapons threaten the end of the world; weapons themselves, not the men holding them, cause the problem; cordial relations with the Soviets are paramount because survival is the ultimate good. “The crisis of which we speak arises from this fact: Nuclear war threatens the existence of our planet; this is a more menacing threat than any world has known. It is neither tolerable nor necessary that human beings live under this threat.”¹⁷

life, but in fact invite the conditions of violent anarchy that can threaten survival. As Richard Pipes has written:

Survival in itself cannot be a proper objective for nations any more than it is for individual citizens. To view escape from danger as the supreme good is to give license to those who habitually rely on violence as a means of suasion, and thereby help tear apart the fabric of national as well as international communities. As everyone seeks to safeguard his life and abandons all else to its own fate, societies become atomized, making it possible for forces which place a lower value on life to gain their ends. Once this happens, war ceases to be a threat and turns into a permanent condition.¹⁸

Furthermore, the greater political realism of the European bishops does not help them arrive at rational conclusions for Western military strategy, as is evidenced by their common refusal to support any credible strategy of deterrence.

The Positions on Deterrence

The American bishops' stance on deterrence has been detailed by this author elsewhere and needs only to be outlined here.¹⁹ On the fundamental question of deterrence, all episcopal groups concur with Pope John Paul II: Deterrence is still morally acceptable, not as an end in itself but as a step toward disarmament; the danger of nuclear war must be balanced against the protection of justice and freedom. The American bishops condemn the policy of deliberate, direct counterpopulation warfare under any circumstances, but they are ambiguous on the issue of a limited use of nuclear weapons. Deeming it impossible to conduct a limited nuclear war, they express doubt that initiating even a restricted use of nuclear weapons can be morally justified. However, they qualify their earlier repudiation of NATO's policy of flexible response entailing the possible first use of nuclear weapons. They encourage NATO to adopt a "no-first-use" policy concurrently with the development of an adequate conventional defense.

The American bishops' condemnation of the

they contrive a contradiction by disapproving of the acquisition of hard-target weapons that would give the United States the discriminate capability of striking Soviet military assets. The bishops cannot have it both ways: either they must accept the doctrine of Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD), or they must endorse the alternative of limited nuclear options. By their rejection of a limited war-fighting capability, their support of a nuclear freeze, and their evasion of the harsh choices in conventional defense, the American bishops would reduce deterrence to a dangerous bluff.

Those expecting greater realism from the European bishops will be disappointed. The French bishops desire to select a prudential mean between the extremes of forsaking ethical judgments altogether and of making "peremptory judgments of the deductive type"²⁰ belittling the complexity of problems. Despite this laudable intention, they effectively undercut France's deterrence strategy.

The French bishops admit that a deterrent threat must be believable in order to work: "In order not to allow a possible aggressor to have illusions about the credibility of our defenses, we must show ourselves ready to use our weapons if deterrence should fail."²¹ At the same time, however, they maintain that one may merely threaten what it is never permissible in fact to do:

But the moral legitimacy of this move from possession to use is more than problematical. This is all the more true in France because our deterrence is a "deterrence of the strong by the weak," a poor man's deterrence: Because of the lack of diversified means of deterrence, our deterrence still rests on an anti-city strategy, itself clearly condemned, without appeal, by the Council. . . .²²

In the absence of a strategy that combines military and moral sense, the French bishops, like the Americans, reduce deterrence to a hollow and dangerously self-denying bluff.

Along with the Americans and French, the German bishops condemn the indiscriminate slaughter of civilians but, with the French, explicitly approve the threat of the "impermissible" as a lesser evil than capitulation. "It

Deterrence and the Bishops

At points the argument of the German bishops displays a vener of realism, but this quickly vanishes under contradictions similar to those of their French colleagues. According to the Germans, prevention of all war comprises the sole, legitimate goal for deterrence strategy, the credibility of which rests upon the flexibility of weapons and range of military options available to a government. But while they gingerly avoid express mention of NATO's first-use doctrine, the German bishops strongly hint that even limited nuclear use in retaliation should be proscribed:

Can weapons designed to deter and to prevent war be meaningfully used in a war pursuant to the principle of the proportionality of means? Is not the danger of escalation from their use — however limited — so great that one cannot imagine any situation in which one could accept responsibility, after consideration of all factors, to use atomic weapons?²⁴

As in the French bishops' position concerning the *force de frappe*, nuclear deterrence of conflict in Europe rests upon bluff. The German bishops do not face this conclusion of their own argument, resorting instead to pious hope: "We hope and pray that a situation will never occur in which somebody is confronted with such decisionmaking."²⁵

The Central Issue of Limited Nuclear War

It has become axiomatic that deterrence of war depends on the possession of credible war-fighting capability — that is, the kind of flexible forces that, if deterrence fails, would enable us to use nuclear weapons in a limited, controlled fashion permitting a rational defense of national interests.²⁶ Yet, although it is not stated forthrightly, all three pastoral letters effectively prohibit any use of nuclear weapons. As Robert Tucker noted of the U.S. bishops: "There is no way by which American nuclear policy — past, present or probable future — can be reconciled with the bishops' position."²⁷

Over the past twenty-five years little has

if some use is possible and may be necessary to prevent totalitarian domination, then "the terms of the public debate are set in two words, 'limited war.' All other terms of argument are fanciful or fallacious."²⁸ To those contending that limited nuclear war is impossible, Murray answered:

In the face of this position, the traditional doctrine simply asserts again, "the problem today is limited war." But notice that the assertion is on a higher plane than that of sheer fact. It is a moral proposition, or better, a moral imperative. In other words, since nuclear war may be a necessity, it must be made a possibility. Its possibility must be created.²⁹

Technological advance has responded to Murray's "moral imperative." Today, improvements in the accuracy and reduced destructiveness of nuclear weapons, their eventual — if partial replacement — by "smart" conventional weapons and, above all, the promise of strategic defense make possible the limitation of nuclear war and, gradually, a diminished role for nuclear weapons in world politics.³⁰

The case for strategic defense — which the U.S. Administration has not made as persuasively as it might — is not that it will render nuclear weapons obsolete and pave the way for their worldwide elimination. Nations will never entirely forfeit such potent offensive weapons, and an impregnable defense is no more achievable than an invincible offense. Rather, the promise of strategic defense is that it can, in the near future, significantly degrade the military utility of nuclear weapons, especially in a preemptive first strike, and thereby also devalue their political utility. That accomplished, less reliance on nuclear weapons can lead to a substantial reduction in their number, albeit not an extremely low level where marginal increments are more meaningful. Political and technical objections may be raised against strategic defense, but it is difficult to conceive of a compelling moral argument against making nuclear war less

gripped by a faith in the transformation of political life. The American bishops place arms control at the center of national security policy; — in fact, arms control becomes a substitute for security policy. They call for deep cuts in the nuclear arsenals of both superpowers and “immediate, bilateral, verifiable agreements to halt the testing, production, and deployment of new nuclear weapons systems.”³¹ The ultimate goal is complete disarmament: “Nuclear deterrence should be used as a step on the way toward progressive disarmament. Each proposed addition to our strategic system or change in strategic doctrine must be addressed precisely in light of whether it will render steps toward ‘progressive disarmament’ more or less likely.”³²

For the German bishops as well, “All military means must be compatible with effective mutual arms limitation, arms reduction and disarmament.”³³ Since disarmament has thus far eluded us, we must intensify our search, pursuing “our own disarmament strategy” to reduce the “mutual threat.”³⁴ Disarmament would free us to beat our swords into plowshares, “changing over arms production to civilian production.”³⁵

The French bishops do not specifically address the issue of arms control, but their treatment of pacifism tells much about their vision of the future. As do the other bishops, the French are careful to defer to present realities and to exclude pacifism as a state option. Still, we should listen to the pacifists’ message. Pacifists “serve the common good by preventing the logic of the short term from closing its infernal circle.”³⁶ Pacifists are not idealists; they are tomorrow’s realists. “It is realistic,” claim the French, “to call forth the possibility for transformation which can be found residing in the reality of today — perhaps they are pioneers of the future.”³⁷

All three episcopal groups commit the cardinal error of an apolitical approach to arms control: separating it from the regime conflict, arms control becomes an end in itself.³⁸ One searches these documents in vain to find an understanding of arms control as one instrument among many, including the implements of war, by which a nation must protect its

hostility. Despite their ostensibly more realistic view of the Soviet Union and its objectives, the German and French bishops join the American churchmen in holding that the arms race constitutes a prime cause, not an effect, of the political conflict — that weapons themselves, not men leading nations with clashing interests in a disordered world, pose the principal obstacle to peace.

More generally, the bishops evince what Eugene Rostow has called a faith in arms control as “peace magic,” a sort of “wand we can wave to produce peace without tears.”³⁹ Their faith seems undaunted by the historical record on arms control. Nor is there any mention in their statements of the amply documented record of contemporary Soviet violations of existing arms agreements.

A One-World Order

The bishops do not come to terms with the thorny issues of deterrence and arms control because they are enthralled by the vision of a new international order. According to the American bishops, the theological unity of the human family and the fact of growing material interdependence in the world point toward moral and political integration. The world’s problems, along with our very survival, require that we replace the nation-state with the combined effort of a united mankind. It is imperative for the United States more vigorously to support the United Nations as the vehicle for achieving a disarmed, peaceful and prosperous world under one governmental authority.⁴⁰ As an interim step toward this goal, we must institute a global political body that can maintain surveillance over the entire earth and have the power to prevent any nation from making preparations for war.⁴¹

The European churchmen are not to be outdone in utopian vision. The German bishops similarly affirm that only one-world political authority can guarantee peace, justice, freedom and safety for all men. World government “must not be created along the lines of a centralist unitary state,”⁴² although a world court of justice would have to be established with the power to adjudicate disputes and enforce its decisions. This would the Germans support

asking a lady to surrender part of her chastity.) The Germans concede that their ideas "may appear utopian," yet they have a model for their future world society of freedom and justice. The Church, they say, can provide this model, although all men will have to be converted to the imitation of Christ.⁴³

For the French clergy, pacifists bear witness to the already emergent "transformation" of human nature. They propose an international agreement to outlaw war and the formation of world government, a "universally acknowledged public authority vested with effective power to ensure security for all, regard for justice and respect for law. . . ." (The French fail to recall a similar such agreement: the Kellogg-Briand Pact signed by fifteen nations in 1928, which renounced war as an instrument of national policy and promised to settle international disputes by "peaceful means" — only to be followed by the most sanguinary war in human history.) Men must construct a lasting peace here and now, although this will depend upon "a real conversion of hearts." Good intentions to obtain permanent peace, unless grounded upon truth, justice, solidarity, liberty and human rights are only so many "deceptive Towers of Babel."⁴⁵

Hans Morgenthau once described three conditions essential for preserving domestic peace whose absence in international life renders world government illusory.⁴⁶ First is the presence of "suprasectional loyalties." As Morgenthau put it, there must be a multiplicity of competing social groups among which an extensive overlapping of roles by different members of society moderates the conflict between them. More importantly, members of the contending groups must give overriding loyalty to a set of shared customs, values and beliefs which unite and restrain them, thereby further mitigating group conflict.

World government is chimerical because a global political and moral community binding all men together and underlying that government manifestly does not exist. Governments evolve from the experience, habits and values of a people, and the history of states mirrors

has been pleased to give this one connected country to one united people — a people descended from the same ancestors, speaking the same language, professing the same religion, attached to the same principles of government, very similar in their manners and customs. . . ."⁴⁷

The second factor necessary for domestic peace, but missing on the international plane, is an "expectation of justice" — that is, a consensus on the principles defining the common good and a trust on the part of opposing groups in the efficacy of peaceful means for satisfying their claims to justice. The bishops' one-world dream blinks the fact that the absence of such a consensus precisely accounts for the global turmoil. World government cannot exist because no agreement on the ends of government exists among men. Tension and danger of war do not stalk the world, as the bishops imagine, because nations possess arms, but because nations perceive a threat to their values and existence.

Finally, the third factor indispensable to civic peace and absent from international life is "overwhelming power" the monopoly of force by the state and an irresistible social pressure by which society upholds public peace. Even within a community enjoying a remarkable political consensus, such as the American polity, the unaided rule of law cannot suffice. Winston Churchill, who more modestly than the bishops considered a type of world community based upon regional groupings of states with common values and interests, acknowledged the need for unmatched military power to keep peace and secure justice. In a speech at Bristol University in 1938, Churchill stated:

That surely is the supreme hope by which we should be inspired and the goal towards which in the last resort must be the defence of right and reason. But it is in vain to imagine that the mere perception or declaration of right principles, whether in one country or in many countries, will be of any value unless they are supported by those qualities of civic virtue and manly courage — aye, and by those

species of humans starkly different from the present one. Despite their professions about man's sinful nature, the enduring presence of evil in the world, and the heavenly abode of true peace and justice, the bishops appear to believe that regenerate human natures and an age of perfection are incipient in history. If they did not believe so, they could not muster the utopian vision of a disarmed, harmoniously united mankind.

Of Angels and Men

America's Founding Fathers built the edifice of republican liberty on a chastened, cautious view of human nature. In one of his state papers on political economy, Hamilton defined the duty of a statesman. He distinguished between the "true politician" and the "political empiric," the latter of whom

...will either attempt to travel out of human nature and introduce institutions and projects for which man is not fitted and which will perish in the imbecility of their own conception and structure, or without proposing or attempting any substitute they content themselves with exposing and declaiming against the ill sides of things, and with puzzling and embarrassing every practicable scheme of administration which is adopted. The last indeed is the most usual because the easiest course, and it embraces in its practice all those hunters after popularity who, knowing better, make a traffic of the weak sides of the human understanding and passions.⁴⁹

Taking human nature as they found it, Hamilton and Madison understood that political strife and war spring from "the constitution of man" and that, consequently, compulsion and the pitting of power against power cannot be exorcised from human affairs. The fate of limited government could not hinge upon the advent of a new man inspired by

lofty, selfless motives. Madison maintained that the separation of powers in republican government could be secured only through a delicate balance of power where interest countered interest. Power must be divided to check it and the various offices so arranged that the ambition and self-interest of their occupants would serve as a jealous sentinel on the exercise of power by one another. That is the best one can expect with non-angelic men:

Ambition must be made to counteract ambition. The interest of the man must be connected with the constitutional rights of the place. It may be a reflection on human nature that such devices should be necessary to control the abuses of the government. But what is government itself but the greatest of all reflections on human nature? If men were angels, no government would be necessary. If angels were to govern men, neither external nor internal controls on government would be necessary.⁵⁰

The Founders' political wisdom clearly illuminates relations among nations. In a world of non-angelic men, conflict and war cannot be wished away, and a balance of power offers the best possible guarantee of liberty and justice.

In this world of non-angelic men, moreover, American power and the cause of liberty are inseparable. The bishops do not serve Free World security by undermining the deterrence policy upon which it rests. Exciting men's fears about nuclear annihilation — and proffering utopian visions of a disarmed, peaceful and united world — will not promote the peace and justice on this earth that the bishops cherish. The "temple of liberty," as Lincoln called it, must rest on "the solid quarry of sober reason," not passion. The bishops' nostrums can only work to disarm and unbend the will of the West in the struggle against its enemies and to sap the fragile foundations of peace and justice in a brutal world.

NOTES

1. James V. Schall, S.J., "Introduction" to *Out of Justice, Peace (Joint Pastoral Letter of the West German Bishops) and Winning the Peace (Joint Pastoral Letter of the French Bishops)* (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1984), p. 26; Thomas Molnar, "The French Bishops' Bomb," *National Review*, January 27, 1984, p. 40. See also James E. Dougherty, *The Bishops*

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NOTES (Continued)

2. Edmund Burke, *Reflections on the Revolution in France*, Conor Cruise O'Brien, ed. (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1968), p. 94.
3. See James V. Schall, "Intellectual Origins of the Peace Movement," in *Justice and War in the Nuclear Age*, Philip F. Lawler, ed. (Lanham: University Press of America, 1983), pp. 27-59; and "Religion and National Security," *International Security Review*, Summer 1982, pp. 135-154; also William V. O'Brien, "The Challenge of War: A Christian Realist Perspective," in Judith A. Dwyer, S.S.J., ed., *The Catholic Bishops and Nuclear War* (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 1984), pp. 37-63. Schall and O'Brien discuss how the absence of a real enemy for the U.S. bishops permits them to engage in an abstract preoccupation with things. Vladimir Bukovsky, "The Peace Movement and the Soviet Union," *Commentary*, May 1982, pp. 25-41, argues that peace is impossible until the Soviet regime changes. This point is developed at length by Richard Pipes, *Survival Is Not Enough: Soviet Realities and America's Future* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1984).
4. "The Challenge of Peace: God's Promise and Our Response" (The American Bishops' Letter on War and Peace) in *Origins* (Washington, DC: NC Documentary Service, May 19, 1983), p. 13.
5. *Ibid.*, p. 23.
6. *Ibid.*
7. *Ibid.*, p. 24.
8. "Out of Justice, Peace," pp. 34, 60.
9. *Ibid.*, p. 83.
10. *Ibid.*, p. 76.
11. "Winning the Peace," p. 104.
12. *Ibid.*
13. *Ibid.*
14. John Courtney Murray, *We Hold These Truths: Catholic Reflections on the American Proposition* (New York: Sheed & Word, 1960), p. 245.
15. "Winning the Peace," p. 103.
16. "Out of Justice, Peace," p. 68.
17. "The Challenge of Peace," p. 2.
18. Pipes, *op cit.*, pp. 280-281.
19. John W. Coffey, "The American Bishops on War and Peace," *Parameters*, December 1983, pp. 30-38.
20. "Winning the Peace," p. 107.
21. *Ibid.*, p. 110.
22. *Ibid.*
23. "Out of Justice, Peace," p. 83.
24. *Ibid.*, pp. 81-82.
25. *Ibid.*, p. 82.
26. Valuable collections of essays on all aspects of nuclear deterrence are those by R. James Woolsey, ed., *Nuclear Arms: Ethics, Strategy, Politics* (San Francisco: Institute for Contemporary Studies, 1984); and Ernest W. Lefever and E. Stephen Hunt, eds., *The Apocalyptic Premise: Nuclear Arms Debated*
27. Robert W. Tucker, "The Nuclear Debate," *Foreign Affairs*, Fall 1984, p. 19.
28. Murray, *op cit.*, p. 270.
29. *Ibid.*, pp. 270-271.
30. On limited and just war and particularly the role of strategic defense therein, see Albert Wohlstetter, "Bishops, Statesmen, and Other Strategists on the Bombing of Innocents," *Commentary*, June 1983, pp. 15-35; William V. O'Brien, "A Just-War Deterrence/Defense Strategy," *Center Journal*, Winter 1983, pp. 9-29; William A. Stanmeyer, "Toward a Moral Nuclear Strategy," *Policy Review*, Summer 1982, pp. 59-71; and Angelo Codevilla, "Justice, War, and Active Defense," in Lawler, *op. cit.*, pp. 83-97.
31. "The Challenge of Peace," p. 18.
32. *Ibid.*
33. "Out of Justice, Peace," p. 81.
34. *Ibid.*
35. *Ibid.*
36. "Winning the Peace," p. 113.
37. *Ibid.*
38. Illuminating discussions of this fatal flaw in the American approach to arms control may be found in Richard F. Staar, ed., *Arms Control: Myth Versus Reality* (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1984), especially chapters 1, 6, 12 and 14; also Thomas F. Payne, "The Amoralism of Arms Control," in Lawler, *op. cit.*, pp. 61-82; and Colin S. Gray, "Arms Control: Problems," in Woolsey, *op. cit.*, pp. 153-169.
39. Eugene V. Rostow, "Arms Control," *National Review*, August 19, 1983, p. 992.
40. "The Challenge of Peace," pp. 22-23.
41. *Ibid.*, p. 30.
42. "Out of Justice, Peace," p. 75.
43. *Ibid.*, p. 86.
44. "Winning the Peace," p. 113.
45. *Ibid.*, p. 116.
46. See Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, 5th ed. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1973), pp. 479-495. Even a sensible critic of the religious peace movement is susceptible to the delusion that the American republic provides a model for a disarmed world under the rule of law. See George Weigel, *The Peace Bishops and the Arms Race: Can Religious Leadership Help in Preventing War?* (Chicago: World Without War Council, 1982).
47. *The Federalist*, No. 2, Clinton Rossiter, ed. (New York: New American Library, 1961).
48. Quoted in Kenneth W. Thompson, *Winston Churchill's World View: Statesmanship and Power* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1983), p. 289.
49. Alexander Hamilton, "Defense of the Funding System," in *The Mind of Alexander Hamilton*, Saul K.