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State Characteristics and Foreign Policy:

Industrialized Countries and the UNESCO Crisis

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ABSTRACT

In the UNESCO crisis the industrialized countries were confronted with the Third World's claim for a New World Information and Communication Order. To this challenge they reacted in many ways, ranging from support of Third World demands to withdrawal from UNESCO. In order to explain this variety, the policies of the United States, the Soviet Union, France and West Germany at the height of the crisis in 1983/84 are compared. Three competing approaches of foreign policy analysis are tested: foreign policy as 'interest-oriented behaviour', 'behavioural style', or 'emergent behaviour'. On the whole, 'interest-oriented behaviour' proves to be the most adequate model because the conflict behaviours of the four countries can be systematically related to their different interests. Only US and West German behaviours differed to a much greater extent than their interests. In a basic first cut the variety of UNESCO policies is therefore explained by variables assumed to influence foreign policy interests: the media systems, and the societal values they represent, as well as the positions in the overall international power structure. In a second cut this explanation is refined by looking at factors which might account for differences in US and West German foreign policy styles. In this respect, the differences in behaviours seemed above all to reflect differences in the belief systems of the German and American foreign policy elites.

1. Introduction

In the UNESCO crisis which lasted from the mid-1970s to the late 1980s, the industrialized countries were confronted with the Third World's claim for a New World Information and Communication

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Order (NWICO). They reacted to this challenge in many ways, ranging from full or partial support of Third World demands to withdrawal from UNESCO. How can this variety of state behaviour be explained? In order to answer the question we employ and test competing approaches of foreign policy analysis which attempt to attribute foreign policy behaviour to state characteristics. After a brief account of the UNESCO crisis (section 2), and of three basic approaches to the explanation of foreign policy by state characteristics (section 3), this article outlines our research design and presents an analytical model of the foreign policy process (section 4). Section 5 contains the conceptualization of the dependent variable and a description of the policies of four major industrialized countries at the height of the UNESCO crisis (1983/84): the United States, the Soviet Union, France and the Federal Republic of Germany. The results indicate that the approach of 'interest-oriented behaviour' can be applied to account for the differences in UNESCO policies. In section 6 we test subsystemic and positional hypotheses based on this approach. These provide a first tenable but not sufficient account of foreign policy behaviours. In a second explanatory cut we therefore include variables presumed to influence foreign policy styles in order to arrive at a more refined and complete explanation (section 7).¹

2. The UNESCO Crisis

The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization was established in 1945 as a specialized agency of the United Nations. The purpose of UNESCO, as stated in article 1 of its constitution, is

... to contribute to peace and security by promoting collaboration among the nations through education, science and culture in order to further universal respect for justice, for the rule of law, and for the human rights and fundamental freedoms which are affirmed ... by the Charter of the United Nations.

Growing East-West and North-South tensions have not left UNESCO unaffected. As in most other UN agencies, original Western dominance has decreased over the years, especially in the 1960s when dozens of newly independent Third World states joined

the organization, the more radical among them forming a tactical alliance with the Soviet bloc. UNESCO as the most 'intellectual' of the UN specialized agencies almost naturally became the battleground of fierce ideological debates, evolving in the mid-1970s into what is usually called the 'UNESCO crisis'.

The issues discussed during the UNESCO crisis can be summarized within three major categories: international information and communication order, organizational efficacy and efficiency, and politicization.²

(1) The programme of a NWICO, which stands in close relation to the New International Economic Order, has brought UNESCO criticism stemming mostly from the Western states. UNESCO's constitution requires in article 1 'to promote the free flow of ideas by word and image', thereby reflecting the Western view that governments ought not to interfere with or control communication across borders. In the course of growing Third World self-confidence in international organizations, this hitherto predominant Western view was attacked: Third World countries were displeased with the quality and quantity of news coverage of their territories by the predominantly Western controlled global media. Western media were accused of creating a one-way flow of information from North to South. As regards the content of information, they were criticized for the negative bias in their information about Third World events, e.g. the emphasis on such phenomena as corruption and coups d'état. Thus, Third World governments demanded a new order aimed at obtaining fair shares of communication facilities and of information flows for developing countries which lacked the necessary infrastructure. As early as in the 1972 Declaration on Satellite Broadcasting, the principle of 'free flow' was challenged by the new slogan of 'balanced flow of information'. The 1978 UNESCO Declaration on the Media contained a compromise formula demanding a 'free flow and a wider and better balanced dissemination of information'.

(2) Conflict in the field of organizational efficacy and efficiency focused on Western complaints about excessive budget growth and inadequate financial control. UNESCO was also criticized as being an overcentralized organization. Delays in making routine decisions, inflexibility, inadequate means of coordinating activities to avoid duplication, and the ineffective implementation of programmes were seen to be consequences of this centralization. The concentration of staff at headquarters in Paris was considered inappropriate. Charges

of mismanagement focused on the Director-General, Amadou Mahtar M'Bow.

(3) The Western complaint about excessive politicization was based on the argument that the tasks of specialized agencies were only technical, economic and social in nature. Therefore general foreign policy differences between states were not to be debated within UNESCO. The charge of politicization referred predominantly to discrimination against Israel. For example, at the 1974 General Conference of UNESCO a majority of states refused to admit Israel to the regional sub-group 'Europe' because of its alleged misbehaviour in the occupied territories. Moreover, UNESCO has been reproached for its peace and disarmament activities (mainly initiated by the Soviet Union) and for its support of national liberation movements.

Already in the early 1970s some of these conflicts brought about changes in the foreign policy behaviour of several states towards UNESCO, e.g. the temporary withholding of financial contributions to UNESCO by the US Congress and the Israeli cessation of participation in UNESCO from 1974 to 1978. However, in the period from 1978 to 1987, UNESCO went through a severe crisis which threatened its very existence. During that period the industrialized countries acted in very different ways. While the United States and Great Britain eventually left UNESCO, the Warsaw Pact countries strongly supported Third World demands. Between these poles, the Nordic states and France sought partly to accommodate the demands of the developing states. Other Western countries, e.g. the Federal Republic of Germany, strongly opposed any efforts to restrict the 'free flow of information' but chose not to leave the organization.

3. State Characteristics and the Explanation of Foreign Policy

In order to explain the variation in state behaviour during the UNESCO crisis, our study focuses on the characteristics of the state actors involved. This focus is justified because in UNESCO — in contrast to the ILO, for example — only governments are represented and able to act directly. However, our understanding of 'state characteristics' is broad enough to include the position of a state in the international system as well as the type of relationship it maintains with domestic societal groups. This allows us to analyse foreign policy in UNESCO from a single perspective, that of the state, while neglect-

ing neither international (systemic) opportunities and constraints nor societal demands (or supports) influencing state behaviour.

How do state characteristics determine foreign policy? Explanations of foreign policy behaviour by state characteristics can be subdivided into three main ways of causation:

(1) Foreign policy as interest-oriented behaviour is understood as the pursuit of state or 'national' interests. According to this approach, behaviour can be conceptualized as goal-oriented action and states as rational or intentional actors (Allison, 1971). Therefore, it is sufficient to account for the interests of a state in explaining its concomitant external behaviour. However, whereas the classic rational actor model is either not concerned with the nature of the goals pursued (e.g. in game theory) or posits an invariable 'national interest' like the 'eternal quest' for power and independence (realism), we assume that foreign policy interests have to be empirically determined with reference to specific demands and values in each case.

(2) Foreign policy as behavioural style refers to a national tendency to prefer certain foreign policy instruments and strategies and discard others. A style is seen as at least partially independent of the issues at stake and state interests: In contrast to the assumption of interest-oriented behaviour, states may well have identical interests and yet pursue them by very different means. Following this approach it is possible to describe a state's foreign policy, for instance, as 'aggressive' or 'low profile'. The well-known hypothesis about 'peace through democracy' belongs in this kind of explanation.

(3) In the study of foreign policy as emergent behaviour, the external behaviour of states is attributed neither to defined interests nor to preferred styles but to the outcome of an interplay between societal and governmental actors or between various governmental actors. The 'decision-making approach' (Snyder et al., 1962) and the 'bureaucratic politics paradigm' (Allison, 1971) are examples of models that explain foreign policy behaviour on the basis of this approach.

For each of these three causal paths we can further distinguish between 'second image' and 'third image' reasoning (Waltz, 1965). 'Second image' approaches focus on the internal characteristics of states or their societies in explaining foreign policy behaviour, i.e. on foreign policy interests caused by domestic demands and values, on domestically shaped foreign policy styles, and on the interplay of domestic groups and organizations. Among these internal characteristics we furthermore distinguish between institutional factors that

refer to the durable characteristics of a state, situational factors that are at work only in a specific conflict situation, and dispositional factors which contain the cognitive and subjective dimensions of foreign policy-making. These categories correspond to the structural, the situational and the cognitive modes of foreign policy explanation.³ 'Third image' approaches assume foreign policy behaviour to be mainly determined by the positional characteristics of states which describe their positions in relation to each other and in the international system. However, our study is intended mainly to assess the influence of domestic, subsystemic factors on foreign policy. Positional variables are therefore represented in smaller numbers and regarded rather as control variables.

Which state characteristics determine foreign policy? Hypotheses explaining external state behaviour by state characteristics can be drawn from several strands of research on international relations (IR).

(1) In peace research the explanation of peaceful behaviour by actor characteristics has a long tradition. In recent years it has focused on the relationship between democracy and peace and has established as one of the few laws in IR that democracies do not go to war with each other (cf. e.g. Doyle, 1983; Russett, 1990). However, the inquiry into which specific features of democracies determine this behaviour has not yet gone very far. Although we are not dealing with a peace or war situation here, we take up some of the more prominent state characteristics held responsible for the peaceful interactions of democracies in order to test their explanatory power in accounting for cooperative or non-cooperative foreign policies.

(2) In research on international organizations and regimes, the lack of subsystemic approaches to the explanation of international institutions has occasionally been lamented but rarely been tackled systematically (Zürn, 1993). Our study, therefore, is intended to test promising subsystemic hypotheses about state behaviour conducive (or opposed) to building and strengthening international institutions.

(3) Since the mid-1970s, a rich body of literature on the security and foreign economic policies of Western industrialized countries has emerged. Studies such as those on the 'strength of the state', the 'trading state' and 'neocorporatism' relate societal, governmental and international variables in an innovative way.⁴ However, foreign cultural policy has been widely neglected as a distinct object of research. Therefore, it would be interesting to see whether the hypotheses

developed for the analysis of security and economic issues also hold up in this more ideologically charged field.

4. Research Design and Analytical Model

Several demands on our research design and analytical model ensue from this overview.

(1) Our study has to allow for the testing of substantive hypotheses and of formal approaches. The analytical model and the hypotheses therefore have to distinguish not only state characteristics assumed to influence foreign policy, but also the ways of causation or process patterns by which this influence is assumed to be exerted.

(2) In order to fit within the broad stream of both conflict research and research on international governance, from which we draw our hypotheses for the most part, the dependent variable 'foreign policy' will have to be conceptualized in the terminology of conflict theory.

(3) Furthermore, the dependent variable has to be split into two dimensions, one substantive or interest dimension, the other behavioural. This is necessary if we are to evaluate the 'interest-oriented' vs. the 'foreign policy style' approach, but also follows from an analytical distinction fundamental to conflict theory.⁵ We label the interest dimension of foreign policy 'conflict position' and the behavioural dimension 'conflict behaviour'.

Our analytical model (Figure 1) is defined as openly as possible in order not to exclude or predetermine any correlations or ways of causation from the start. The variables listed in the model have been assigned to ways of causation according to hypotheses in the literature and considerations of plausibility. They refer to the hypotheses which will be put to the test in sections 6 and 7.⁶

(1) State characteristics assumed to cause interest-oriented behaviour can be found in the upper part of the model. Hypotheses based on this approach start from the assumption that foreign policy is determined by basic societal values and goals, rational cost/benefit assessments as well as causal beliefs of the state actors, and externally influenced by the state's position in the international power structure. These factors explain the foreign policy interests of a state expressed in its conflict position (A arrows). It is further assumed that 'conflict position' is the real dependent variable of which the conflict behaviour is a direct and undistorted consequence (B arrow). Thus, the implicit




FIGURE 1 Analytical Model

correlation between conflict position and conflict behaviour is: The greater the conflict intensity (i.e. the distance of one actor's position from that of another), the more uncooperative the behaviour toward this other actor.

(2) Hypotheses about foreign policy styles are derived from the assumption that foreign policy behaviour is mainly influenced by established internal policy styles and the normative and cognitive setting in which foreign policy decisions are made. As a possible external cause of foreign policy styles we also consider the degree of the states' enmeshment in international institutions. These variables are listed in the lower parts of the model. It is assumed that these factors work in part independently of the goals at stake in a concrete conflict situation, and that they intervene in the relationship between conflict position and conflict behaviour (C arrow) systematically distorting the outcome which would have been expected in accordance with the idea of interest-oriented behaviour. In our comparative design, hypotheses about foreign policy styles can only be tested if the conflict position is controlled for, i.e. held constant: The possible existence of different foreign policy styles is then indicated by identical or similar conflict positions but divergent behaviours of two or more states.

(3) The perspective of emergent behaviour is treated here as residual. Only if the foreign policy behaviour cannot be attributed to any of the aforementioned ways of causation, or to any combination of them, would we consider the interplay of societal and governmental actors as a possible explanation. Although it should be possible to formulate generalized statements about the effect of the decision-making process on foreign policy, the 'decision-making approach' and the 'bureaucratic politics paradigm' offer only a checklist of relevant factors, not testable hypotheses (Haftendorn, 1990). Furthermore, it is mainly according to this model that we expect foreign policy to be the result of idiosyncratic factors working more or less at random, of characteristics specific to one country, one situation or one leader. If that is the case, there cannot be any hypotheses which explain cooperative or uncooperative behaviour across countries.

In contrast to the quantitative, data-based analysis predominant in the American 'Comparative Foreign Policy' movement of the 1970s, we follow the more recent scholarly work on the foreign economic policy of industrialized states in using a qualitative case study design. Our research is oriented towards the method of structured, focused

comparison with a few selected cases (George, 1979). The UNESCO policies of the United States, France, West Germany and the (former) Soviet Union were intentionally selected based on prior knowledge that these cases extend over the whole spectrum of values of the dependent variable 'conflict behaviour'. At the same time, these cases have a number of basic characteristics in common: All four countries are industrialized countries with a developed communications infrastructure, and they are not 'small states'. The selection also unites three major liberal-democratic countries which, however, differ significantly with respect to their internal organization. Although our number of explanatory variables is too high, the number of cases too small, and their selection too biased to 'yield strong causal inferences' (King et al., 1991: 142), we expect to narrow down the number of plausible hypotheses and generate new ones that can be put to a more rigidly designed test with a greater number of cases.

5. Foreign Policy in the UNESCO Crisis: The Dependent Variable

5.1. Conflict Positions

With regard to the interest dimension of the dependent variable, the requirement is to measure conflict intensity in terms of the size of the difference between the positions of Third World and industrialized countries. Since Western criticism of UNESCO covered several issue-areas and every country accentuated its criticism differently, it is necessary to differentiate the various issue-areas in a systematic way. Table 1, therefore, (a) lists the major issues of the UNESCO crisis in the three areas of international information and communication order, organizational efficacy and efficiency, and politicization as briefly discussed in section 1, (b) indicates the mainstream Third World positions, and (c) orders actors' positions⁷ on the issues according to three degrees of conflict intensity. This disaggregated approach to analysing the UNESCO crisis is necessary because we cannot assume that each industrialized country deviates equally from the Third World position on all issues and because we do not want to make any rash judgments on the relative importance of these issues for the crisis.⁸

Table 2 adds a qualitative re-categorization of the positions in the conflict about the NWICO (part A of Table 1): a typology of possible

TABLE 1
Issues and Conflict Positions in the UNESCO Crisis

Issue	Difference of Positions/Degrees of Conflict Intensity			
	Third World Position (0)	Weak (1)	Medium (2)	Strong (3)
A. International information and communication order				
A.1 Quantitative news flow	Elimination of market mechanisms	Limited protectionist measures	Free flow plus supporting measures	Absolute free flow
A.2 Third World access to communication technology	Free of cost	Development aid, reduced cost	Market conditions plus financial and technical support	Pure market conditions
A.3 Influx of foreign information	National control, prior consent	National control and prior consent under certain conditions	No national control or prior consent, but appreciation of the problem, recommendations	Absolute free flow
A.4 Control of communication contents	Ban on racist and militarist contents	Limited, partial ban	No restriction, but appreciation of the problem, recommendations	Absolute freedom
B. Organizational efficacy and efficiency				
B.1 Budget	Constant rise	Reduced growth	Freeze	Reduction or bilateralization
B.2 Management and programme	Centralization, no criticism	Minor changes	Some reform measures in the direction of decentralization and de-bureaucratization	Thorough restructuring

TABLE 1 (continued)
Issues and Conflict Positions in the UNESCO Crisis

Issue	Third World Position (0)	Difference of Positions/Degrees of Conflict Intensity		
		Weak (1)	Medium (2)	Strong (3)
B.3 Staff policy	Recruitment strictly according to membership	Recruitment favouring a more balanced regional representation	Recruitment slightly favouring major contributors	Recruitment strictly according to contributions
B.4 Support for Director-General	Support for M'Bow	Support for another Third World radical	Support for Third World moderate	Replacement of M'Bow by a Western DG
C. Politicization				
C.1 Palestinian question	Condemnation of Israel, expulsion (from certain programmes)	General discussion, condemnation of Israel, but no sanctions	Only UNESCO issue-specific discussion, but no condemnation	No discussion
C.2 Fight against colonialism, racism, Apartheid	Main orientation in UNESCO policy and programming	One issue among others in UNESCO policy and programming	Discussion, but no UNESCO programmes	No discussion

policies towards the international information and communication order based on the preferred principles of control. This typology is necessary in order to test some of the hypotheses in section 6. Furthermore, this re-categorization attempts to develop more concrete and aggregated foreign policy types which facilitate the comparison of foreign policies across issue-areas.⁹

We now turn to a general description of the conflict positions taken by the Soviet Union, France, the Federal Republic of Germany and the USA and then to a more formalized assignment of values of conflict intensity according to Table 1. However, we only cover the positions at the height of the crisis, i.e. approximately 1983/84, and

TABLE 2
Foreign Policy Types Concerning the International Information and Communication Order

Control of International Information and Communication	Economic	Ideological
Liberal	Informational free trade (A.1: 2.3; A.2: 2,3)	Freedom of communication (A.3: 2.3; A.4: 2,3)
Nationalistic	Protectionism (A.1: 0.1; A.2: 0.1)	National control or censorship, prior consent (A.3: 0.1; A.4: 0.1)

neglect changes over time which actually occurred in most countries with respect to some of the issues.

The Soviet position toward the international information and communication order can be clearly characterized as nationalistic: The international information flow was not to be regulated by the market forces of supply and demand but by national control of the amount and of the content of foreign information allowed to cross state borders. The Soviet Union constantly emphasized the principles of national sovereignty and national responsibility in the field of communication. The USSR was especially concerned with the content of information: All states should be obliged to ensure that only information which strengthened peace and mutual understanding was to be disseminated from their territories (Kolosov and Cepov, 1983). On organizational issues, the Soviet Union regularly expressed its discontent with Soviet (and East European) underrepresentation in the UNESCO administration and programmes, the institution of permanent contracts and the oversized and expensive UNESCO bureaucracy.¹⁰ The general interest in this area was to prevent the UNESCO administration from becoming independent of the member states and to increase the number of (party controlled) Soviet officials in the UNESCO bureaucracy. The politicization of UNESCO was undoubtedly the most important general orientation of Soviet UNESCO policy. Although the Soviet Union in the early 1980s was mainly interested in turning UNESCO into an instrument of its 'peace propaganda', Third World emphasis on 'anticolonialism' was welcomed

provided that it was clearly directed against Western influence in the South.

As to the French position toward the international information and communication order, we have to distinguish two perspectives. From the ideological perspective, the French position could be characterized as liberal insofar as French political actors demanded that UNESCO must adhere to its constitutional values. Soviet-inspired attempts to slip in a legitimization of censorship into UNESCO's documents, for instance, provoked fierce French opposition. At the same time, however, there was a strong undercurrent in French policy opposing an alleged American cultural hegemony. Stressing cultural identity became a kind of synonym for the protection of markets for the French-based communication industry. Especially in its former African colonies France tried to defend its economic and political interests. At the same time, however, it rhetorically supported the claims of the developing nations to create their own communications infrastructure. In the issue-area organizational efficacy and efficiency the French position is characterized by only weak differences of position. France wished to demonstrate its support for the organization by accepting moderate budgetary growth rates. The French only slightly criticized UNESCO's centralized management techniques because they — at least partly — follow French traditions and were elaborated by M'Bow's predecessor, the Frenchman René Maheu. France favoured a slightly better representation of developing countries in the Secretariat but cautiously avoided picking out that issue as a central theme because of its own overrepresentation in the Paris-based organization. Not until the French government finally realized that M'Bow's tenure could eventually lead to a break-up of UNESCO did it dissociate itself from him. As to the position of France towards politicization we can conclude that it generally opposed discussing anti-Israeli or disarmament draft resolutions because they threatened to paralyze the organization. Moreover, the French were eager not to spoil things either with their Arab friends or with Israel and the West by being forced to cast a vote on controversial resolutions.

The positions of the Federal Republic of Germany in the various issue-areas can be described as follows: German politicians readily acknowledged the asymmetry of the news flow and the necessity to assist developing countries in establishing their own media structures. They accepted a formula of a NWICO being described as an evolutionary process which is largely dependent on the elimination of all

obstacles to the free flow of information. A substantial number of communication projects in Third World countries was funded by the Federal Ministry of Economic Cooperation. Germany's stance in respect to communication contents can be characterized as rigidly liberal. It was not prepared to accept any restriction of the freedom of the press. Less importance but still high priority was assigned to the management and budgetary problems of UNESCO. As a major financial contributor Germany demanded a zero-growth budget. Only after hard bargaining did it accept a budget providing for (reduced) growth rates as a gesture of goodwill. As the crisis escalated with the British announcement to withdraw, the budgetary stance of the Federal Republic became more uncompromising. Furthermore, the government demanded thorough organizational reforms. M'Bow's obvious favouritism towards personnel of African origin did not pose a substantial problem for Germany although it often criticized the fact that the number of Germans working in the Secretariat did not match Germany's role as a major financial contributor. The question of M'Bow's succession was not openly discussed until 1986. Politicization did not play an exceedingly important role for the German government. In contrast to Anglo-Saxon positions, Germany never denied UNESCO the right to discuss political topics — provided, however, they fell within the scope of the organization's mandate.

The American position toward the international information and communication order can be characterized as strictly liberal. While the United States acknowledged some concerns of the Third World toward a certain imbalance of the news flow — IPDC¹¹ is an American invention — it opposed any attempts to restrict free trade or impose state control on the media. As far as organizational efficacy and efficiency is concerned, the USA adopted an uncompromising zero-growth position in the budget-issue combined with the demand for a thorough reform of the management. Confronted with the Third World claims for a better representation of their nationals in the Secretariat, the Americans reacted by criticizing the fact that many staff members from the Third World had been employed by M'Bow for purely political reasons. This can be interpreted as a position slightly favouring the major contributors because their reservoir of skilled personnel is larger. Although the US Administration did not directly demand the resignation of M'Bow, it is clear that they would have preferred another Director-General. Politicization was a major issue for the USA. It refused discussion of topics like Palestine,

Apartheid and disarmament. Even a discussion of issue-specific topics such as the educational situation in the occupied territories was rejected as serving the propagandistic aims of the Soviet bloc and its radical Third World allies.

Table 3 presents an attempt to summarize numerically the degree of conflict intensity for each issue between the selected industrial countries and the Third World at the height of the UNESCO crisis. These findings allow the following conclusions:

TABLE 3
Degrees of Conflict Intensity at the Height of the UNESCO Crisis¹

Issue	Soviet Union	France	West Germany	United States
A.1	0	1	2	3
A.2	1	1	2	2
A.3	0	2	3	3
A.4	0	2	3	3
B.1	1	1	2	2
B.2	0	1	3	3
B.3	1	1	2	2
B.4	0	0	2	2
C.1	0	3	2	3
C.2	1	3	2	3
Median	0	1	2	3

¹ Ordinal scale values according to Table 1.

(1) The conflict intensity for the individual countries is certainly not identical across issue-areas and issues. Nevertheless, distinct general tendencies can be identified for all four countries. Although one should be cautious using descriptive statistics here — differences of positions are not standardized — they convey a fairly clear picture and rank order of the overall intensity of conflict with regard to Third World claims: Medians, or central values, of conflict intensity are 0 for the Soviet Union, 1 for France, 2 for West Germany and 3 for the USA.

(2) The countries' positions also cover a wide range of possible control mechanisms for the international information and communi-

cation order (Table 2). Whereas the Soviet Union preferred a nationalistic control for both the ideological and economic dimensions of information, France took a protectionist stand with regard to the economic dimension only. The West German as well as the US positions can be characterized as liberal, although the United States tended more towards liberal orthodoxy.

5.2. Conflict Behaviour

With regard to the behavioural dimension of the dependent variable, policies have to be classified according to their conduciveness to co-operation and international institution-building. Among the various classifications proposed in the literature, two suit our purposes best:

(1) The first is a standard classification based on the dichotomy of cooperative and uncooperative behaviour, which can be operationalized as follows: *Cooperative behaviour*: The actor is ready to negotiate, to compromise and to make prior concessions unconditionally and independently of the other party's behaviour. *Conditional behaviour*: The actor makes his readiness to negotiate or to make concessions dependent on the behaviour of the other party (e.g. linkages, reciprocity, tit-for-tat). *Uncooperative behaviour*: The actor is not ready to negotiate or to make concessions and ignores or refuses the other party's offers.

(2) The second is based on a typology originally used by Albert Hirschman (1974) to classify different reactions to dissatisfaction with the performance of an enterprise or an organization: *Exit*: The actor withdraws from the organization or at least from certain parts of it. *Voice*: The actor expresses his dissatisfaction or manages the conflict within the organization. *Loyalty*: The actor adapts to the majority position. The conflict behaviour disappears.

With regard to these categories, we can now give a broad outline of the conflict behaviour of the Soviet Union, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, and the United States at the height of the UNESCO crisis.

Soviet behaviour during the UNESCO crisis was generally in support of Third World positions. The Soviet delegation regularly voted in agreement with the overwhelming majority of Third World countries and defended Third World claims and UNESCO policy against Western criticism. This is not surprising since Third World and Soviet interests matched on almost all issues. Although Soviet commentators

invariably declared the NWICO to be a demand of the 'liberated countries' and not of the 'developed socialist countries', it was said to merit Soviet support insofar and as long as its main thrust was 'anti-imperialist' (cf. e.g. Kanaev, 1984: 170f.). For the same reason, the Soviet Union was willing to play down the modest conflict it had with the Third World on some organizational issues and on whether the issues of 'peace/disarmament' or 'anticolonialism' were the most important ones for 'UNESCO' programming. In sum, Soviet behaviour can be characterized as 'loyalty' according to Hirschman and 'cooperative' towards the Third World.

French behaviour in UNESCO can be characterized by the attempt to prevent conflicting interests from clashing and to bridge the gap between Third World and Western countries. Playing a mediator's role, France hoped to be able to avoid the risk of alienating friends by taking sides. Wherever possible, France sought to initiate compromise solutions. However, there was always a limit beyond which France did not yield. While it ostentatively supported UNESCO and its Senegalese Director-General by regularly voting in favour of the draft budget and by defending M'Bow against attacks, France neither succumbed to a condemnation of Israel nor abandoned basic Western values in texts on communication issues. When the US announced its withdrawal, French reactions were mixed. The British withdrawal, however, and the prospect of other members turning their backs on UNESCO led to a hardening of the French stance towards M'Bow and his management style. In sum, French behaviour consisted of some 'loyalty' but mainly 'voice' according to Hirschman and can be classified as 'cooperative' because of its readiness to find negotiated solutions.

The Federal Republic of Germany's behaviour during the UNESCO crisis is characterized by the attempt to find a solution for UNESCO's problems without yielding to the pressure to withdraw which was exerted by the right-wing faction of the governing coalition and by the US government. In close cooperation with France, the Federal Republic was searching for acceptable compromise formulas in the media debate. Like other Western countries West Germany voiced its reservations concerning the Third World demands and only reluctantly accepted the consensus formulated in the Media Declaration. At the same time, the Federal Republic was comparatively generous in its support for the IPDC, hoping thus to deradicalize Third World demands. Unlike France, with its close relations to

former colonies and its special status as host country, Germany always sought to act in a framework of strong European concertation. Several times — 1980 and 1983 — it abstained in the vote on the budget. Financial contributions were temporarily withheld in 1984 to step up reform pressure. As in other countries, mismanagement was heavily criticized but not until M'Bow publicly declared that he did not want a third mandate did Germany actively seek an alternative candidate. Germany has always voted against resolutions on politicized issues like Palestine or disarmament. German behaviour, therefore, can be classified as 'voice'. It was 'cooperative' in some issue-areas but preponderantly 'conditional'.

The behaviour of the USA was generally hostile towards Third World positions. Although the USA accepted the consensus found in the NWICO debate, US authorities remained suspicious and strongly committed to an essentially non-protectionist approach vis-à-vis the international information and communication order. The USA usually voted against the budget and was the only country to refuse the compromise found when the Nordic states proposed a budget ceiling of USD 374 million for the biennium 1983/84. Obviously, neither the consensus in the media debate, nor the reduced budget ceiling and the promise of reforms, was enough to prevent the USA from threatening to withhold its financial contributions for some time and then announcing its decision to withdraw. The US General Accounting Office, which was granted access to UNESCO in 1984 after heavy political pressure from the US Congress, produced a report which served as a factual basis of US demands for a thorough restructuring of the management. When UNESCO reacted with detailed reform plans they were refuted by the State Department as half-hearted and not far-reaching enough. While it became more and more clear that the US Government wanted M'Bow to resign, demanding it openly was scrupulously avoided. Confronted with draft resolutions condemning Israel or demanding disarmament, the USA harshly denounced them as anti-Western propaganda and voted against them. In sum, the behaviour of the USA in the years 1983/84 was oriented towards 'exit'. Even before it actually announced its intention to leave UNESCO, the US administration behaved 'uncooperatively' by constantly refusing to negotiate and to compromise.

From this account of the behaviour of the four countries at the height of the UNESCO crisis we draw the following conclusions:

- (1) The Hirschman and the conflict behaviour typology apparently

capture the same dimension of foreign policy behaviour and thus should be integrated into one typology. On the one hand, Hirschman's 'voice' category proved to be too broad because it contains French, West German and US behaviour before its withdrawal; it should be split up into the three categories of cooperative, conditional and uncooperative conflict behaviour. On the other hand, Hirschman's 'loyalty' and 'exit' are not covered by this typology and therefore should be added to it as the two extremes at which conflict behaviour disappears (Table 4).

TABLE 4
Conflict Behaviour at the Height of the UNESCO Crisis

Loyalty	Voice			Exit
	Cooperative	Conditional	Uncooperative	
Soviet Union	France	West Germany	United States	

(2) We found that Soviet, French, West German and US conflict positions and conflict behaviours co-vary systematically, i.e. the concidiveness of state behaviour to international cooperation decreases with the intensity of conflict as measured by the difference in conflict positions vis-à-vis the Third World. This finding generally confirms the implicit correlation between conflict positions and conflict behaviour inherent to the causal path of 'interest-oriented behaviour' and thus can serve as a starting-point for the evaluation of the competing approaches to foreign policy explanation. However, the comparison between the USA and West Germany reveals that whereas the conflict positions of both countries were quite similar, their respective behaviour at the height of the UNESCO crisis was far more disparate than the approach of 'interest-oriented behaviour' would lead us to expect. Thus, a more detailed look at the policy styles of these two countries will be necessary and will be undertaken in section 7. Nevertheless, the values for both dimensions of the dependent variable seem to warrant our, in a first and basic explanatory cut, concentrating on domestic and international factors presumed to influence foreign policy interests in the area of international communications policy.

6. Interest-oriented Behaviour: The Basic Explanation

6.1. Subsystemic Hypotheses

The hypotheses about domestic interest-oriented behaviour refer to the variables listed on the upper left-hand side of our analytical model. Each hypothesis explains the conflict position and the concomitant conflict behaviour. We begin with institutional, go on to dispositional and conclude with situational factors.

Rosecrance (1986) distinguishes between trading states and military-political states. Military-political states seek to be self-sufficient in order to achieve full independence. Therefore, we can assume that a military-political state strives for control over news flows and prefers a nationalistic international order. In contrast, the trading world is composed of functionally differentiated and interdependent nations. Therefore, we can assume that they are interested in a liberal international order. This leads us to the hypothesis:

H1: Trading states adopt a liberal position and act uncooperatively towards non-liberal positions concerning the international information and communication order; military-political states adopt a nationalistic position and act uncooperatively towards non-nationalistic positions concerning the international information and communication order.

A second important institutional hypothesis deals with the ideological determination of foreign policy. It is based on the idea of a 'domestic analogy', i.e. the assumption that states want their international environment to be ordered by the same values and principles as their domestic system. In the area of information and communication, societal values and principles are reflected in the media system.

H2: The more liberal the media system of a state is, the more liberal is its position in the conflict about the international information and communication order and the more uncooperatively it behaves towards non-liberal positions.

This hypothesis has a dispositional parallel. However, now it is not the ideological foundation of the social system but the ideological orientation of the government of the day that is held to account for a state's

foreign policy. It has been hypothesized in research on domestic policy that 'parties matter' particularly in issue-areas of high ideological import (Schmidt, 1982). According to this view, bourgeois parties are status-quo oriented and emphasize private initiative. In contrast, left-wing parties frequently criticize the existing North-South relationship and emphasize international solidarity. Because of that, one may suppose that left-of-centre governments are more open to the claims for a NWICO.

H3: The more a government is on the right of the ideological spectrum, the more liberal its position will be and the more uncooperatively it behaves towards non-liberal positions concerning the international information and communication order.

A dispositional approach which is closely linked to the rationalist mode of foreign policy explanation is cognitive mapping (Axelrod, 1976). Instead of focusing on normative beliefs it takes causal beliefs as its point of departure: Actors establish causal connections between concepts and act according to the situation so defined. However, it is difficult to derive general statements from this approach so that our hypothesis only reflects a simplified application of 'cognitive mapping'.

H4: The more negative a state evaluates the situation of UNESCO in the crisis period, the more its position differs from the position of the Third World and the more uncooperatively it acts during the UNESCO crisis.

Hypotheses about situational factors in the utilitarian mode of foreign policy explanation centre on the concept of costs and benefits. In our context, it is best specified as a problem pressure (Schwarzer, 1990). Transboundary communication is continually increasing. This creates great problem pressure for states which are forced to maintain an information monopoly because of their system of rule. Societies attaching high importance to the preservation of their cultural identity can also be expected to react adversely to a liberal international information and communication order.

H5: The higher the media political problem pressure within the liberal international information and communication order is for a state, the

TABLE 5
Values for Subsystemic Variables Influencing Interest-Oriented Behaviour

H	Variables	US	West Germany	France	Soviet Union
1	State type ¹	Military-political state	Trading state	Mixed	Military-political state
2	Media system (audiovisual media)	Commercial	Public	High state influence	State control
3	Parties in government	Conservative	Conservative-liberal	Social-democratic	Communist
4	Definition of the situation	Very negative	Negative	Mixed	Very positive
5	Problem pressure	No	Low	Medium	High
	CONFLICT INTENSITY	3	2	1	0
	CONFLICT BEHAVIOUR	Exit	Mainly conditional	Mainly cooperative	Loyalty

¹ Indicators used to determine state types were export and import quotas 1980, war involvement since 1945 and military expenses 1980.

more illiberal its conflict position and the more cooperative its behaviour towards non-liberal positions will be.

Taking a look at the values for the five independent variables as displayed in Table 5, we discover a good fit of almost all hypotheses. Only Rosecrance's typology of trading and military-political states seems unlikely to be helpful in explaining interests and behaviours in the field of international communication. As to the other variables, we assume that they are not independent of each other and can be put in causal order. Since the media system is the most basic and durable state characteristic among these factors, it is plausible to place this institutional factor at the beginning of the path of causation. Consequently, the problem pressure and causal beliefs, which in the ration-

alist mode of explanation are assumed to determine foreign policy, can themselves be attributed to the institutionalized values of a state. Whether 'parties matter' cannot be ascertained here, since their ideological orientation varies in parallel with the media systems. However, they may have had a reinforcing effect on the policy choice. Thus, we basically arrive at an ideological explanation of foreign policy because the different media systems represent fundamental assumptions about the good order of the state and the society.

If one accepts this way of causation, the explanation of the four selected countries' foreign policies during the UNESCO crisis might proceed as follows: The United States had an almost entirely commercial media system and thus the most liberal media order among the selected countries. Problem pressure was virtually non-existent, since this media system was perfectly compatible with the present liberal international information and communication order. There was no danger of foreign media dominating the American market. This and the conservative beliefs of the governing elite led the US administration to define the situation in UNESCO very negatively. That the US position was the most market-oriented and its behaviour the most uncooperative is exactly what our hypotheses would predict under these circumstances.

On the other side of the spectrum, the media system of the Soviet Union was completely controlled by the state and the party and, thus, the most authoritarian one among the selected countries. This national media order was in conflict with the uncontrolled flow of information typical for the international information and communication order, resulting in high problem pressure for a system of rule based on the monopoly of information. Therefore, the Soviet Union would have benefited from a NWICO. All these factors led to a very positive definition of a situation in which the Western-dominated international order was challenged. So the Soviet support for Third World demands for a nationalistic international information and communication order is highly understandable.

At the height of the UNESCO crisis, the media system of France was still characterized by a monopoly of state-owned audiovisual media. The dominance of American TV and movie productions was widely regarded as a threat to national culture and therefore created a marked problem pressure and a call for protectionism within the French polity. Therefore, France might have partially benefited from a more nationalistic international order. This led France to a mixed

definition of the situation which is reflected in its partially liberal and partially nationalistic position on the international information and communication order and its mainly cooperative conflict behaviour.

The media system of West Germany with public TV and radio was less government-influenced than the French and less commercialized than the US media system. Germany also took a more liberal stand than France, because the German weakness in the international media market was not an issue of public concern and therefore created no problem pressure in favour of a nationalistic policy. Moreover, the German government defined the situation in UNESCO less dramatically than the US administration. In particular, it did not share the negative American view of the United Nations system in general. This might also help to explain why German behaviour in UNESCO was so much more cooperative than US behaviour, although both supported the liberal international information and communication order. Let us now examine whether we can find a similarly convincing explanation by utilizing positional factors.

6.2. Positional Hypotheses

According to our analytical model, we can confine our search of positional state characteristics that explain conflict positions to the international power structure. The Realist school offers two hypotheses about the relationship between power position and foreign policy interests, one concerning the overall, the other the issue-area power structure.

The hypothesis about the overall power structure is based on a kind of 'common-sense Realism' rather than being deduced from any formulated theory. It starts from the assumption that the power competition between great powers and the type of relationship between them and the lesser powers account for different foreign policy interests and behaviours.

H6: In a bipolar international system both great powers support competing principles of the world information and communication order and react differently to challenges to this order. The more a state is dependent upon or allied to one of them, the more it supports the position of its leading power and the more it follows its behaviour.

The hypothesis based on the issue-area power structure was devel-

oped in the context of neo-Realist international political economy. According to the theory of hegemonic stability, a hegemonic power is both interested in a liberal world order and strong enough to guarantee international compliance with liberal rules. When its relative power declines, its policy becomes more self-centred: the 'benevolent hegemon' turns into a 'predatory hegemon' (Gilpin, 1987: 88 ff.). However, states, like the majority of Third World states, which are economically so weak that they cannot withstand global market pressures, favour nationalistic control (Krasner, 1985).

H7: The more powerful a state is in international communication, the more liberal is its position on the international information and communication order and the more uncooperatively it behaves towards non-liberal positions.

TABLE 6
Values for Positional Variables Influencing Interest-Oriented Behaviour

H	Variables	US	West Germany	France	Soviet Union
6	Power status	Great power	Closely allied	Loosely allied	Great power
7	Issue area	502,000	56,800	345,000	296,000
	power (news agencies, ¹ flow of TV programmes ²)	2% import 64.3% export	20% import	17% import	8% import 1.1% export
			Western European export (F > West Germany)	14.9%	
	CONFLICT	3	2	1	0
	INTENSITY				
	CONFLICT	Exit	Mainly conditional	Mainly cooperative	Loyalty
	BEHAVIOUR				

¹ Amount of words sold by national news agencies (US: AP, UPI; West Germany: dpa; France: AFP; Soviet Union: TASS) to Third World regions in 1984. Cf. Hühne (1984).

² Import of TV programmes in percent of total broadcasting time; export of TV programmes in percent of world market (except for Asia) in February 1983. Data based on: International Flow of Television Programmes (UNESCO Reports and Papers on Mass Communication, No. 100). Paris: UNESCO 1985.

Table 6 compares the power values to conflict positions and conflict behaviour. The evidence for hypothesis 7 is mixed. Certainly, the US position in the world media market can be called hegemonic: The USA not only controls the world market of programmes for the most important mass media, but US news agencies also maintain a leading although certainly not dominant role in the Third World. Thus, the expected 'hegemonic liberalism' has been confirmed. However, this hypothesis cannot conclusively account for the interests of the other countries investigated. It most strikingly fails to explain why West Germany, with its relatively small national news agency and small share of exports, takes such a liberal stand on communication issues.

The evidence obviously supports hypothesis 6: Third World claims for a NWICO and a more politicized role of UNESCO were widely perceived by both superpowers to reduce Western, i.e. above all American, global influence in the case of their success and to open the door for increased Soviet influence in the Third World. This readily explains the Soviet Union's sustained support as well as the United States' fierce resistance to these claims. West Germany was closer allied to and more dependent on the USA for security reasons than France, which was not part of NATO's military integration and disposed of its own *force de frappe*. Therefore, France — in the Gaullist tradition — was free to pursue a more mediating policy and to seek a more independent role with regard to the Third World than West Germany. However, German behaviour deviated strongly from the American, which, according to H6, could not be expected in view of the close relationship between the two countries. Once again, it seems worthwhile to look into the policy styles of these two countries for an explanation to this discrepancy.

Our discussion of hypotheses based on the approach of 'interest-oriented behaviour' has produced two explanations — one subsystemic or 'second image', the other quasi-systemic or 'third image' — which account to a large extent for the overall variance in the foreign policies of our four selected countries. Although it is not possible clearly to determine which explanation is superior in the context of this limited study, it should be considered an achievement to have narrowed down the number of plausible approaches and hypotheses. Moreover, it is not necessary at this point to make a decision.

(1) Both the domestic ideological and the international power political causes are compatible to a large degree. Given the issues at stake, it is highly plausible that both motivations come into play: In

the context of East-West relations, questions of ideology have always been closely linked to those of power. And any given international information and communication order is of high importance both to the domestic media system and to the distribution of cultural power on the international level. Finally, both explanations are complementary: The competing universalistic ideologies on which the media systems are based are able to explain the world political rivalry of the Soviet Union and the USA, whereas the power political hypothesis also covers the issue of politicization which is left unexplained if one looks only at domestic factors.

(2) Both causes were present in the motivations and intentions of the actors. For the Soviet Union it was at least as important to ensure a general 'anti-imperialist' thrust of UNESCO as to promote an international information order that would better protect its own territory from Western media and to strengthen its position in the 'propaganda war'. The USA was as much concerned about the freedom of the press as about Third World radicalism and Soviet influence in the developing countries. French policy reveals a preoccupation with the Americanization of French culture and the decline of the *francophonie* side by side with the effort to preserve its close relationship with Third World countries. For Germany, the accomplishment of measurable reforms of UNESCO attained top priority in order to defend and justify its general cooperative policy line towards international organizations against domestic and international pressure.

However, whereas this explanation is able to account for the conflict positions and conflict behaviours of the four countries in relation to each other, it has two flaws. First, it does not sufficiently explain 'absolute' behaviour: Neither does it seem to be inevitable that the USA withdrew from UNESCO nor that West Germany acted mainly conditionally rather than uncooperatively. The other flaw has already been mentioned: The explanation based on 'interest-oriented behaviour' does not sufficiently explain variations in the distances between the conflict positions on the one hand and the conflict behaviours on the other for a given pair of countries. This is particularly unsatisfactory in the case of the USA and West Germany in which conflict positions are much closer than conflict behaviours. Hopefully, this flaw can be remedied by taking into account hypotheses assumed to explain differing foreign policy styles.

7. Policy Styles: Accounting for the Difference in US and West German Behaviours

The hypotheses about policy styles refer to the variables listed in the lower part of our analytical model. We begin with institutional, go on to dispositional factors and conclude with a positional hypothesis about policy styles.

The central institutional subsystemic hypothesis has been proposed by Czempiel (1981). He sees a relationship between the states' modes of domestic value allocation and their foreign policy behaviour. On this basis, we can assume an analogy between the modes of domestic conflict management and a state's foreign policy conflict behaviour:

H8: The more cooperative a state's domestic policy style is, the more cooperative its foreign policy style will be.

For investigating this hypothesis we refer to several concepts dealing with a state's domestic policy style. The first of these approaches emphasizes the strength of a state (Katzenstein, 1976; Krasner, 1978). Strong states are able to push their interests through in domestic affairs even if they encounter opposition by societal groups. Therefore, they do not have to develop cooperative strategies. However, weak states are forced to cooperate with societal interest groups in order to achieve their goals. Thus, one can assume that weak states (provided that they are capable of acting at all) are so accustomed to a cooperative policy style in managing conflicts that they will lean towards cooperation in foreign policy as well. The second analytical context we refer to is corporatism (Schmitter, 1979). Corporatism as a domestic policy style is characterized by the voluntary cooperation of antagonistic societal groups, such as trade unions and employers' associations, and the state. If a state's domestic policy patterns are marked by corporatist arrangements, it is to be expected that it will seek cooperative conflict management in international affairs, too. The third and last analytical approach relevant to domestic policy styles concerns the type of democracy. Democracies differ from each other in their ways of regulating social conflicts (Lijphart, 1984). Consensus democracies are characterized by proportional representation and decision-making aimed at general approval, whereas Westminster democracies are strictly majoritarian. This distinction leads us

to presume that Consensus democracies will orientate their foreign policy style toward cooperation as well.

One more institutional factor deserves closer consideration: the degree of popular participation within a state. The relevant analytical context for this factor is the discussion about the relationship between the type of rule and a state's foreign policy behaviour (Müller and Risse-Kappen, 1990), especially between democracy and peace. Ever since Kant, a prominent argument in liberal theory has been that a state's foreign policy will be less violent and more cooperative if it has to have the consent of its citizens. Therefore, one can assume that a state with a participatory foreign policy decision-making process shows a cooperative foreign policy style.

H9: The more participatory a state's foreign policy decision-making process is, the more cooperative its foreign policy style will be.

Hypotheses about dispositional factors influencing policy style can be found, first of all, in the literature on belief systems.¹² According to this approach, the foreign policy decision-making elite is led by its normative beliefs and by the image that it has of international reality. Following the research done in the USA during the last decade, we can distinguish two general beliefs of the foreign policy elite: 'accommodationism' and 'hardline' (Wittkopf, 1990). 'Accommodationism' means that the individuals strongly support cooperation with other states and with international organizations. Conversely, the preparedness to follow unilateral strategies including the use of military means to achieve national US interests can be described as 'hardline'. Therefore, we can assume that a state whose foreign policy elite has a belief system characterized by 'accommodationism' tends to adopt a cooperative foreign policy style.

H10: The stronger the fundamental beliefs of the foreign policy elite are oriented toward 'accommodationism', the more cooperative the state's foreign policy style will be.

The second dispositional factor worth considering, the problem-structural approach, has been developed in conflict theory, and has proven its explanatory power in research on international regimes (Rittberger, 1990). The problem-structural approach argues that the characteristics of issues or conflicts predetermine the way they are

dealt with. However, one has to take into consideration that these characteristics are not typical of the issues as such but generally ascribed to them by the actors. Therefore, problem structure can be regarded as a dispositional factor. Once the actors have assessed the issue, it can be concluded that they will select one mode of conflict management rather than another. Four kinds of conflict need to be distinguished with regard to their conduciveness to cooperation:

H11: The higher a state assesses a conflict on the scale (1) conflict about an absolutely assessed good, (2) conflict about means, (3) conflict about a relatively assessed good, (4) conflict about values, the more uncooperative the state's foreign policy style will be.

Our positional hypothesis about policy styles deals with the institutional enmeshment of a state in international organizations. It is based on the assumption that a state which is strongly integrated in international organizations is used to a mode of cooperation with other states (Zürn, 1993).

H12: The more a state is institutionally enmeshed in international organizations, the more cooperative the state's foreign policy style will be.

Taking a look at the values for the subsystemic policy style variables as displayed in Table 7, we see that not all of our hypotheses seem to be helpful in explaining the behavioural difference between the USA and West Germany despite their similar conflict positions. With regard to the domestic policy-style hypothesis, it is difficult to reach a clear-cut conclusion. On the one hand, West Germany is neither a weak nor a strong state, but usually characterized as stronger than the USA. We would therefore expect a less cooperative behaviour of Germany. On the other hand, corporatist practices are stronger in West Germany than in the USA. This would suggest just the opposite, i.e. a more cooperative German behaviour. Finally, according to our operational criteria, both countries range between the Consensus and the Westminster models of democracy. The slightly stronger tendency

TABLE 7
Values for Variables Influencing Policy Styles

H	Variables	West Germany	United States
8	Domestic policy style Strength of the state Corporatism Type of democracy ¹	In between Medium Medium In between	In between Weak Weak In between
9	Participation	Low	Low
10	Belief system	Accommodationist	Hardline
11	Conflict assessment	Conflict about values and conflict of interest about a relatively assessed good	Conflict about values
12	Institutional enmeshment ²	89 memberships in international organizations	65 memberships
	CONFLICT BEHAVIOUR	Mainly conditional	Exit

¹ The type of democracy was determined according to the values for the factors: concentration of the executive power; legislative-executive relationship; bicameralism; federalism; minority rights.

² The figures about institutional enmeshment are based on the *Yearbook of International Organizations* (1986/87).

of Germany towards consensus is not significant enough to make a strong argument in favour of this hypothesis. Thus, except for corporatism, domestic policy styles do not seem to possess sufficient explanatory power. The same is true for the hypothesis about the degree of participation, since it was low in both states. The belief systems, on the other hand, and the conflict assessment of the foreign policy elite in West Germany and the USA differed very strongly from each other and may have led the two states to the foreign policy behaviour which we would expect with regard to the hypotheses. In addition, the hypothesis about institutional enmeshment could be confirmed: Germany's membership in international organizations was significantly higher than US membership.

Thus, the behavioural difference between West Germany and the USA may be explained as follows: In West Germany the belief system

of the foreign policy elite was basically oriented towards international cooperation. There was a common conviction among the principal actors that Germany should behave as a responsible, tolerant and useful member of the international community, a lesson learned from the experience of World War II. Because of their accentuation of concertation and dialogue, the Germans' belief system favoured 'accommodationism'. In Germany, as in most other Western states, too, the UNESCO crisis was perceived as a conflict about values, about irreconcilable ideological cleavages between East and West. At the same time, however, Germany attached comparatively more importance to the justified claims of the Third World for a better balanced dissemination of information, i.e. a conflict of interest about relatively assessed goods. Finally, German foreign policy was to a much higher degree embedded in international institutions than US foreign policy — most remarkably on the regional level within the supranational framework of the European Communities.

The belief system of the foreign policy elite in the USA must be described as 'hardline'. When the Reagan administration came to power the right-wing members of the Republican Party became highly influential in the foreign policy decision-making process. The belief system of these foreign policy actors was characterized by a more bilateral attitude. In accordance with their belief system it was not important to support international organizations like the UN. There was a strong conviction among the foreign policy elite that the influence of the Soviet Union had to be reduced and the spread of communism contained. The US administration perceived the UNESCO crisis as an ideological conflict between Western values and Eastern values. The demands of the Third World countries for a NWICO were almost exclusively regarded as an attack against Western values, not as an attempt at just distribution.

To conclude, although the institutional hypothesis about the impact of policy styles on foreign policy behaviour could not be confirmed by the empirical evidence, there is sufficient reason to believe that the behavioural differences of the USA and West Germany can be attributed to one positional and two dispositional factors. First, the belief system of the US foreign policy elite was strongly oriented towards an uncooperative foreign policy behaviour, whereas their West German counterparts believed in the adequacy of a more cooperative foreign policy behaviour. Second and third, the conflict assessment in the United States and the relatively low enmeshment of the USA in

international organizations further encouraged a more uncooperative foreign policy behaviour.

8. Conclusion

In this article we have tried to account for the divergent behaviour of four industrialized countries — the USA, the Soviet Union, France and West Germany — at the height of the UNESCO crisis by testing competing approaches to the explanation of foreign policy and different hypotheses fitting these approaches. Since we found the conflict behaviours during the UNESCO crisis to be systematically related to the different interests of the four countries, we proceeded on the basis of the causal path of 'interest-oriented behaviour'. In a first explanatory cut we were thus able to explain the variety of UNESCO policies by the different media systems, and the societal values they represent, and by different positions in the overall international power structure. Although the approach of 'interest-oriented behaviour' proved successful, it was not completely satisfactory because US and West German behaviours differed to a much greater extent than their interests. In a second cut we therefore tried to refine our basic explanation by looking at factors which might account for differences in US and West German foreign policy styles. Now, hypotheses based on dispositional factors showed the greatest explanatory power: The differences in US and West German behaviours seemed above all to reflect differences in the belief systems of the respective foreign policy elites. In sum, it has proven worthwhile to begin the analysis on the basis of an open analytical model which not only included different causal paths but also a great variety of potential independent variables: The explanation has benefited from the combination of two ways of causation as well as of domestic and international as well as institutional and dispositional factors.

However, there are a number of reasons for caution. First, this explanation does not yet take into account policy changes over time. The result is a static picture that might not be adequate for the whole length of the UNESCO crisis. Second, factors other than those included in our model probably had an influence. One of them could be the special characteristics of UNESCO as an international organization: disintegrative behaviour may well have been encouraged by the absence of a veto for major contributors in UNESCO. Furthermore,

UNESCO, in contrast to the ITU, did not possess any regulatory power in international communications. Therefore, it was possible for the United States to choose the exit option without substantial costs. The special status of France as host country of an organization with a Director-General from Senegal, a former French colony, just as the special situation of Germany as a divided country, virtually excluded certain behavioural options. Third, and last, our results might be due to our limited selection of cases. More countries may have to be analysed in order to put the approaches and hypotheses to a more severe test and to substantiate or modify this account.

NOTES

1. This article originates from a research project on the 'Policies of Industrialized Countries towards UNESCO 1978-1986' currently conducted at the Center for International Relations/Peace and Conflict Research, University of Tübingen and funded by the German Research Association (DFG). We thank Hans Peter Schmitz, Marion Urban and Michael Zürn for their valuable comments.
2. For general information on the UNESCO crisis, cf. Dicke (1988) and Beigbeder (1987).
3. Cf. Carlisnaes's similar model of foreign policy explanation (1986: 114 f.).
4. For an overview see Müller/Risse-Kappen (1990).
5. Cf. e.g. Kriesberg (1982), who distinguishes between 'conflict' as a situation of goal incompatibility and 'conflict management' as the interactive behaviour dealing with this situation.
6. Other potential explanatory factors have been omitted because of obvious irrelevance or marginal theoretical importance.
7. Actor positions have to be measured independently from, and prior to, the concomitant behaviour in order to avoid giving mere rationalizations the status of motivating interests. We determine actor positions on the basis of official policy statements and interviews with decision-makers.
8. For a similar procedure see Hart (1981) on the NIEO.
9. Cf. Zürn (1987: 42 f.). The numbers in parentheses refer to the fields in Table 1, e.g. the field 'liberal/economic' represents positions taken on issue A.1 with a medium (2) and strong (3) conflict intensity.
10. Cf. the 1984 Soviet position paper 'Pozicija SSSR po nekotorym principal'no važnym voprosam dejatel'nosti JUNESKO na sovremennom etape', in Komissija (1989: 1, 312 ff.).
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Beyond Intergovernmentalism: The Quest for a Comprehensive Framework for the Study of Integration¹

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ABSTRACT

This article draws on an empirical study of EC energy policy between 1985 and 1992 in a theoretical discussion of the requirements for a comprehensive theory of integration for the post-1985 period. An analytical framework that improves on intergovernmentalist approaches is proposed. The author argues that a 'domestic politics' approach presupposes a delineation of state strategies and state actor capability in a given issue area prior to the analysis of interstate bargaining at the EC level. Further, this approach is argued to be inadequate as a basis for a theory of integration as such, where the ability on the part of the Commission for designing policy that satisfies states' interests is argued to be a necessary condition for the achievement of integrative outcomes. Integration is defined as the intended yet often informal effect of such policy designs, and informal integration is assumed to generate political pressures towards formal integration.

1. Introduction

In the post-1985 period, integration in the EC has become a major topic for analysis by political scientists, both empirically and theoretically. The events that started with the signing of the Single European Act (henceforth the SEA) and the commitment to the internal market programme marked the beginning of a period that has witnessed increased international attention to EC-level policy and outcomes of such policy. Empirically, it was clear to the layman as well as the specialist that what is often loosely referred to as integration took place. However, this phenomenon is far from self-explanatory.

This article is based on the empirical results of a detailed investi-