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TWO FACES OF POWER¹

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The concept of power remains elusive despite the recent and prolific outpourings of case studies on community power. Its elusiveness is dramatically demonstrated by the regularity of disagreement as to the locus of community power between the sociologists and the political scientists. Sociologically oriented researchers have consistently found that power is highly centralized, while scholars trained in political science have just as regularly concluded that in "their" communities power is widely diffused.² Presumably, this explains why the latter group styles itself "pluralist," its counterpart "elitist."

There seems no room for doubt that the sharply divergent findings of the two groups are the product, not of sheer coincidence, but of fundamental differences in both their underlying assumptions and research methodology. The political scientists have contended that these differences in findings can be explained by the faulty approach and presuppositions of the sociologists. We contend in this paper that the pluralists themselves have not grasped the whole truth of the matter; that while their criticisms of the elitists are sound, they, like the elitists, utilize an approach and assumptions

¹ This paper is an outgrowth of a seminar in Problems of Power in Contemporary Society, conducted jointly by the authors for graduate students and undergraduate majors in political science and economics.

² Compare, for example, the sociological studies of Floyd Hunter, *Community Power Structure* (Chapel Hill, 1953); Roland Pellegrini and Charles H. Coates, "Absentee-Owned Corporations and Community Power Structure," *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 61 (March 1956), pp. 413-19; and Robert O. Schulze, "Economic Dominants and Community Power Structure," *American Sociological Review*, Vol. 23 (February 1958), pp. 3-9; with political science studies of Wallace S. Sayre and Herbert Kaufman, *Governing New York City* (New York, 1960); Robert A. Dahl, *Who Governs?* (New Haven, 1961); and Norton E. Long and George Belknap, "A Research Program on Leadership and Decision-Making in Metropolitan Areas" (New York, Governmental Affairs Institute, 1956). See also Nelson W. Polsby, "How to Study Community Power: The Pluralist Alternative," *Journal of Politics*, Vol. 22 (August, 1960), pp. 474-84.

which predetermine their conclusions. Our argument is cast within the frame of our central thesis: that there are two faces of power, neither of which the sociologists see and only one of which the political scientists see.

I

Against the elitist approach to power several criticisms may be, and have been levelled.³ One has to do with its basic premise that in every human institution there is an ordered system of power, a "power structure" which is an integral part and the mirror image of the organization's stratification. This postulate the pluralists emphatically—and, to our mind, correctly—reject, on the ground that

nothing categorical can be assumed about power in any community. . . . If anything, there seems to be an unspoken notion among pluralist researchers that at bottom *nobody* dominates in a town, so that their first question is not likely to be, "Who runs this community?" but rather, "Does anyone at all run this community?" The first query is somewhat like, "Have you stopped beating your wife?" in that virtually any response short of total unwillingness to answer will supply the researchers with a "power elite" along the lines presupposed by the stratification theory.⁴

Equally objectionable to the pluralists—and to us—is the sociologists' hypothesis that the power structure tends to be stable over time.

Pluralists hold that power may be tied to issues, and issues can be fleeting or persistent, provoking coalitions among interested groups and citizens, ranging in their duration from momentary to semi-permanent. . . . To presume that the set of coalitions which exists in the community at any given time is a timelessly stable aspect of social structure is to introduce systematic inaccuracies into one's description of social reality.⁵

A third criticism of the elitist model is that it wrongly equates reputed with actual power:

If a man's major life work is banking, the pluralist presumes he will spend his time at the bank, and not in manipulating community decisions. This presumption holds until the banker's activities and participations indicate otherwise. . . . If we

³ See especially N. W. Polsby, *op. cit.*, p. 475f.

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 476.

⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 478-79.

presume that the banker is "really" engaged in running the community, there is practically no way of disconfirming this notion, even if it is totally erroneous. On the other hand, it is easy to spot the banker who really *does* run community affairs when we presume he does not, because his activities will make this fact apparent.⁶

This is not an exhaustive bill of particulars; there are flaws other than these in the sociological model and methodology⁷—including some which the pluralists themselves have not noticed. But to go into this would not materially serve our current purposes. Suffice it simply to observe that whatever the merits of their own approach to power, the pluralists have effectively exposed the main weaknesses of the elitist model.

As the foregoing quotations make clear, the pluralists concentrate their attention, not upon the sources of power, but its exercise. Power to them means "participation in decision-making"⁸ and can be analyzed only after "careful examination of a series of concrete decisions."⁹ As a result, the pluralist researcher is uninterested in the reputedly powerful. His concerns instead are to (a) select for study a number of "key" as opposed to "routine" political decisions, (b) identify the people who took an active part in the decision-making process, (c) obtain a full account of their actual behavior while the policy conflict was being resolved, and (d) determine and analyze the specific outcome of the conflict.

The advantages of this approach, relative to the elitist alternative, need no further exposition. The same may not be said, however, about its defects—two of which seem to us to be of fundamental importance. One is that the model takes no account of the fact that power may be, and often is, exercised by confining the scope of decision-making to relatively "safe" issues. The other is that the model provides no objective criteria for distinguishing between "important" and "unimportant" issues arising in the political arena.

⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 480–81.

⁷ See especially Robert A. Dahl, "A Critique of the Ruling-Elite Model," this REVIEW, Vol. 52 (June 1958), pp. 463–69; and Lawrence J. R. Herson, "In the Footsteps of Community Power," this REVIEW, Vol. 55 (December 1961), pp. 817–31.

⁸ This definition originated with Harold D. Lasswell and Abraham Kaplan, *Power and Society* (New Haven, 1950), p. 75.

⁹ Robert A. Dahl, "A Critique of the Ruling-Elite Model," *loc. cit.*, p. 466.

II

There is no gainsaying that an analysis grounded entirely upon what is specific and visible to the outside observer is more "scientific" than one based upon pure speculation. To put it another way,

If we can get our social life stated in terms of activity, and of nothing else, we have not indeed succeeded in measuring it, but we have at least reached a foundation upon which a coherent system of measurements can be built up. . . . We shall cease to be blocked by the intervention of unmeasurable elements, which claim to be themselves the real causes of all that is happening, and which by their spook-like arbitrariness make impossible any progress toward dependable knowledge.¹⁰

The question is, however, how can one be certain in any given situation that the "unmeasurable elements" are inconsequential, are not of decisive importance? Cast in slightly different terms, can a sound concept of power be predicated on the assumption that power is totally embodied and fully reflected in "concrete decisions" or in activity bearing directly upon their making?

We think not. Of course power is exercised when A participates in the making of decisions that affect B. But power is also exercised when A devotes his energies to creating or reinforcing social and political values and institutional practices that limit the scope of the political process to public consideration of only those issues which are comparatively innocuous to A. To the extent that A succeeds in doing this, B is prevented, for all practical purposes, from bringing to the fore any issues that might in their resolution be seriously detrimental to A's set of preferences.¹¹

¹⁰ Arthur Bentley, *The Process of Government* (Chicago, 1908), p. 202, quoted in Polsby, *op. cit.*, p. 481n.

¹¹ As is perhaps self-evident, there are similarities in both faces of power. In each, A participates in decisions and thereby adversely affects B. But there is an important difference between the two: in the one case, A openly participates; in the other, he participates only in the sense that he works to sustain those values and rules of procedure that help him keep certain issues out of the public domain. True enough, participation of the second kind may at times be overt; that is the case, for instance, in cloture fights in the Congress. But the point is that it need not be. In fact, when the maneuver is most successfully executed, it neither involves nor can be identified with decisions arrived at on specific issues.

Situations of this kind are considered, for example, the case—familiar to this audience—of the faculty member in an academy headed by a tradition-bound and aggrieved about a long-standing which a strong vested interest the professor resolves in the private to launch an attack upon the public faculty meeting. But, when the truth is at hand, he sits frozen in. Among the many possible reasons of these could have been of crucial (a) the professor was fearful that his action would be interpreted as a his disloyalty to the institution decided that, given the beliefs and colleagues on the faculty, he certainly constitute on this issue one; or (c) he concluded that, given of the law-making process in the proposed remedies would be permanent. But whatever the point to be made is the same: to a person or group—consciously or unconsciously—creates or reinforces public airing of policy conflicts. A group has power. Or, as Prschneider has so admirably put

All forms of political organization favor of the exploitation of some and the suppression of others because is the mobilization of bias. Some are organized into politics while others are

Is such bias not relevant to power? Should not the student be alert to its possible existence in the institution that he studies, and prepared to examine the forces which are into being and sustain it? Can the possibility, for instance, that a group in a community participates vigorously in supporting the decision-making process than in participating in decisions within the process? Should the researcher overlook some person or association could be making to relatively non-contentious by influencing community values, procedures and rituals, notwithstanding there are in the community and power conflicts?¹² To do so is,

¹² E. E. Schattschneider, *The Politics of Money* (New York, 1960), p. 71.

¹³ Dahl partially concedes this and observes ("A Critique of the Ruling-Elite Model," *loc. cit.*, pp. 468–69) that "one could argue

II

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Situations of this kind are common. Con- sider, for example, the case—surely not un- familiar to this audience—of the discontented faculty member in an academic institution headed by a tradition-bound executive. Ag- grieved about a long-standing policy around which a strong vested interest has developed, the professor resolves in the privacy of his office to launch an attack upon the policy at the next faculty meeting. But, when the moment of truth is at hand, he sits frozen in silence. Why? Among the many possible reasons, one or more of these could have been of crucial importance: (a) the professor was fearful that his intended action would be interpreted as an expression of his disloyalty to the institution; or (b) he de- cided that, given the beliefs and attitudes of his colleagues on the faculty, he would almost certainly constitute on this issue a minority of one; or (c) he concluded that, given the nature of the law-making process in the institution, his proposed remedies would be pigeonholed per- manently. But whatever the case, the central point to be made is the same: to the extent that a person or group—consciously or uncon- sciously—creates or reinforces barriers to the public airing of policy conflicts, that person or group has power. Or, as Professor Schatt- schneider has so admirably put it:

All forms of political organization have a bias in favor of the exploitation of some kinds of conflict and the suppression of others because organization is the mobilization of bias. Some issues are organized into politics while others are organized out.¹²

Is such bias not relevant to the study of power? Should not the student be continuously alert to its possible existence in the human institution that he studies, and be ever pre- pared to examine the forces which brought it into being and sustain it? Can he safely ignore the possibility, for instance, that an individual or group in a community participates more vigorously in supporting the nondecision- making process than in participating in actual decisions within the process? Stated differently, can the researcher overlook the chance that some person or association could limit decision- making to relatively non-controversial matters, by influencing community values and political procedures and rituals, notwithstanding that there are in the community serious but latent power conflicts?¹³ To do so is, in our judgment,

¹² E. E. Schattschneider, *The Semi-Sovereign People* (New York, 1960), p. 71.

¹³ Dahl partially concedes this point when he observes ("A Critique of the Ruling-Elite Model," pp. 463-69) that "one could argue that even in a

to overlook the less apparent, but nonetheless extremely important, face of power.

III

In his critique of the "ruling-elite model," Professor Dahl argues that "the hypothesis of the existence of a ruling elite can be strictly tested only if . . . [t] here is a fair sample of cases involving key political decisions in which the preferences of the hypothetical ruling elite run counter to those of any other likely group that might be suggested."¹⁴ With this assertion we have two complaints. One we have already discussed, viz., in erroneously assuming that power is solely reflected in concrete decisions, Dahl thereby excludes the possibility that in the community in question there is a group capable of preventing contests from arising on issues of importance to it. Beyond that, how- ever, by ignoring the less apparent face of power Dahl and those who accept his pluralist approach are unable adequately to differentiate between a "key" and a "routine" political decision.

Nelson Polsby, for example, proposes that "by pre-selecting as issues for study those which are generally agreed to be significant, pluralist researchers can test stratification theory."¹⁵ He is silent, however, on how the researcher is to determine what issues are "gen- erally agreed to be significant," and on how the researcher is to appraise the reliability of the agreement. In fact, Polsby is guilty here of the same fault he himself has found with elitist methodology: by presupposing that in any community there are significant issues in the political arena, he takes for granted the very question which is in doubt. He accepts as issues what are reputed to be issues. As a result, his findings are fore-ordained. For even if there is no "truly" significant issue in the community

society like ours a ruling elite might be so influ- ential over ideas, attitudes, and opinions that a kind of false consensus will exist—not the phony consensus of a terroristic totalitarian dictatorship but the manipulated and superficially self-imposed adherence to the norms and goals of the elite by broad sections of a community. . . . This objec- tion points to the need to be circumspect in inter- preting the evidence." But that he largely misses our point is clear from the succeeding sentence: "Yet here, too, it seems to me that the hypothesis cannot be satisfactorily confirmed without some- thing equivalent to the test I have proposed," and that is "by an examination of a series of con- crete cases where key decisions are made. . . ."

¹⁴ *Op. cit.*, p. 466.

¹⁵ *Op. cit.*, p. 478.

safety standards in Transvaal a non-issue until arrival of black NUM 4 years ago. see Guardian 28/9, p. 9

also role of media here in "making" or ignoring issues

①
②

under study, there is every likelihood that Polsby (or any like-minded researcher) will find one or some and, after careful study, reach the appropriate pluralistic conclusions.¹⁶

Dahl's definition of "key political issues" in his essay on the ruling-elite model is open to the same criticism. He states that it is "a necessary, although possibly not a sufficient condition that the [key] issue should involve actual disagreement in preferences among two or more groups."¹⁷ In our view, this is an inadequate characterization of a "key political issue," simply because groups can have disagreements in preferences on unimportant as well as on important issues. Elite preferences which border on the indifferent are certainly not significant in determining whether a monolithic or polythitic distribution of power prevails in a given community. Using Dahl's definition of "key political issues," the researcher would have little difficulty in finding such in practically any community; and it would not be surprising then if he ultimately concluded that power in the community was widely diffused.

The distinction between important and unimportant issues, we believe, cannot be made intelligently in the absence of an analysis of the "mobilization of bias" in the community; of the dominant values and the political myths, rituals, and institutions which tend to favor the vested interests of one or more groups, relative to others. Armed with this knowledge, one could conclude that any challenge to the predominant values or to the established "rules of the game" would constitute an "important" issue; all else, unimportant. To be sure, judgments of this kind cannot be entirely objective. But to avoid making them in a study of power is both to neglect a highly significant aspect of power and thereby to undermine the only sound basis for discriminating between "key" and "routine" decisions. In effect, we contend, the pluralists have made each of these mistakes; that is to say, they have done just that for which Kaufman and Jones so severely taxed Floyd Hunter: they have begun "their structure at the mezzanine without showing us a lobby or foundation,"¹⁸ i.e., they have begun by studying the issues rather than the values and biases that are built into the political system and that, for the student of power, give real

meaning to those issues which do enter the political arena.

IV

There is no better fulcrum for our critique of the pluralist model than Dahl's recent study of power in New Haven.¹⁹

At the outset it may be observed that Dahl does not attempt in this work to define his concept, "key political decision." In asking whether the "Notables" of New Haven are "influential overtly or covertly in the making of government decisions," he simply states that he will examine "three different 'issue-areas' in which important public decisions are made: nominations by the two political parties, urban redevelopment, and public education." These choices are justified on the grounds that "nominations determine which persons will hold public office. The New Haven redevelopment program measured by its cost—present and potential—is the largest in the country. Public education, aside from its intrinsic importance, is the costliest item in the city's budget." Therefore, Dahl concludes, "It is reasonable to expect . . . that the relative influence over public officials wielded by the . . . Notables would be revealed by an examination of their participation in these three areas of activity."²⁰

The difficulty with this latter statement is that it is evident from Dahl's own account that the Notables are in fact uninterested in two of the three "key" decisions he has chosen. In regard to the public school issue, for example, Dahl points out that many of the Notables live in the suburbs and that those who do live in New Haven choose in the main to send their children to private schools. "As a consequence," he writes, "their interest in the public schools is ordinarily rather slight."²¹ Nominations by the two political parties as an important "issue-area," is somewhat analogous to the public schools, in that the apparent lack of interest among the Notables in this issue is partially accounted for by their suburban residence—because of which they are disqualified from holding public office in New Haven. Indeed, Dahl himself concedes that with respect to both these issues the Notables are largely indifferent: "Business leaders might ignore the public schools or the political parties without any sharp awareness that their indifference would hurt their pocketbooks . . ." He goes on, however, to say that

the prospect of profound changes [urban-redevelopment program] physical layout, and usage of downtown area and the effects of the commercial and industrial problems of New Haven were all related in an obvious way to the daily concerns of businessmen.²²

Thus, if one believes—as Prosser does—when he wrote his critique of the ruling-elite model—that an issue, to be considered important, "should involve actual disagreement in preferences among two or more groups," then clearly he has now for a long time poses written off public education, urban redevelopment, and public education as key "issue-areas." At this point aside, it appears somewhat best that "the relative influence of public officials wielded by the Social Notables is revealed by an examination of their participation in areas in which they are interested.

Furthermore, we would not expect to find a possibility that even on those issues which appear indifferent, the Notables would suggest, for example, that they send their children to private schools. Notables do recognize that public expenditures have a direct bearing on tax liabilities. This being so, their strong representation on the Board of Finance,²⁴ the expectation of their direct interest to play a role in fiscal policy-making, in the educational budget in particular, this, Dahl is silent: he inquires neither of the decisions made by the Board of Finance with respect to education nor of their impact upon the public schools.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 71.

¹⁷ *Op. cit.*, p. 467.

¹⁸ *Who Governs?*, p. 82. Dahl says that "the main policy thrust of the Board of Finance is to oppose tax increases; this leads to large expenditures for anything but traditional city services. In this respect, the most effective weapons ordinarily available to the Board of Finance. The Notables are most easily achieved by a mayor if his policies coincide with those of a weak mayor if they have the support of the Board of Finance. . . . New Haven has continued to find it expedient to appoint them to the Board."

¹⁹ Dahl does discuss in general terms the changes in the level of tax rates

¹⁶ As he points out, the expectations of the pluralist researchers "have seldom been disappointed." (*Ibid.*, p. 477).

¹⁷ *Op. cit.*, p. 467.

¹⁸ Herbert Kaufman and Victor Jones, "The Mystery of Power," *Public Administration Review*, Vol. 14 (Summer 1954), p. 207.

¹⁹ Robert A. Dahl, *Who Governs?* (New Haven, 1961).

²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 64.

²¹ *Ibid.*, p. 70.

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IV

better fulcrum for our critique of model than Dahl's recent study of Haven.¹⁹

It may be observed that Dahl is not so explicit in this work to define his "political decision." In asking "Notables" of New Haven are directly or covertly in the making of decisions," he simply states that there are "three different 'issue-areas' in which important public decisions are made: the two political parties, urban development, and public education." These are the grounds that "nominate" the persons which will hold the New Haven redevelopment program. The largest in the country. Public education is its intrinsic importance, and it is in the city's budget." Dahl concludes, "It is reasonable to estimate the relative influence over public decisions by the . . . Notables by an examination of their activity in these three areas of activity."²⁰ This statement is in fact from Dahl's own account that he is in fact uninterested in two of the "decisions" he has chosen. In the public school issue, for example, he states that many of the Notables live in the suburbs and that those who do live in the city choose in the main to send their children to private schools. "As a consequence, their interest in the public schools is primarily rather slight."²¹ Nomination of political parties as an important issue is somewhat analogous to the issue of the apparent lack of interest of the Notables in this issue is suggested for by their suburban residence of which they are disqualified from holding public office in New Haven. In itself concedes that with respect to public issues the Notables are largely ignored by business leaders might ignore the political parties without awareness that their indifference is a pocketbook . . ." He goes on, that

Dahl, *Who Governs?* (New Haven,

the prospect of profound changes [as a result of the urban-redevelopment program] in ownership, physical layout, and usage of property in the downtown area and the effects of these changes on the commercial and industrial prosperity of New Haven were all related in an obvious way to the daily concerns of businessmen.²²

Thus, if one believes—as Professor Dahl did when he wrote his critique of the ruling-elite model—that an issue, to be considered as important, "should involve actual disagreement in preferences among two or more groups,"²³ then clearly he has now for all practical purposes written off public education and party nominations as key "issue-areas." But this point aside, it appears somewhat dubious at best that "the relative influence over public officials wielded by the Social Notables" can be revealed by an examination of their nonparticipation in areas in which they were not interested.

Furthermore, we would not rule out the possibility that even on those issues to which they appear indifferent, the Notables may have a significant degree of indirect influence. We would suggest, for example, that although they send their children to private schools, the Notables do recognize that public school expenditures have a direct bearing upon their own tax liabilities. This being so, and given their strong representation on the New Haven Board of Finance,²⁴ the expectation must be that it is in their direct interest to play an active role in fiscal policy-making, in the establishment of the educational budget in particular. But as to this, Dahl is silent: he inquires not at all into either the decisions made by the Board of Finance with respect to education nor into their impact upon the public schools.²⁵ Let it be

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 71.

²⁰ *Op. cit.*, p. 467.

²¹ *Who Governs?*, p. 82. Dahl points out that "the main policy thrust of the Economic Notables is to oppose tax increases; this leads them to oppose expenditures for anything more than minimal traditional city services. In this effort their two most effective weapons ordinarily are the mayor and the Board of Finance. The policies of the Notables are most easily achieved under a strong mayor if his policies coincide with theirs or under a weak mayor if they have the support of the Board of Finance. . . . New Haven mayors have continued to find it expedient to create confidence in their financial policies among businessmen by appointing them to the Board." (pp. 81-2)

²² Dahl does discuss in general terms (pp. 79-84) changes in the level of tax rates and assessments

understood clearly that in making these points we are not attempting to refute Dahl's contention that the Notables lack power in New Haven. What we are saying, however, is that this conclusion is not adequately supported by his analysis of the "issue-areas" of public education and party nominations.

The same may not be said of redevelopment. This issue is by any reasonable standard important for purposes of determining whether New Haven is ruled by "the hidden hand of an economic elite."²⁶ For the Economic Notables have taken an active interest in the program and, beyond that, the socio-economic implications of it are not necessarily in harmony with the basic interests and values of businesses and businessmen.

In an effort to assure that the redevelopment program would be acceptable to what he dubbed "the biggest muscles" in New Haven, Mayor Lee created the Citizens Action Commission (CAC) and appointed to it primarily representatives of the economic elite. It was given the function of overseeing the work of the mayor and other officials involved in redevelopment, and, as well, the responsibility for organizing and encouraging citizens' participation in the program through an extensive committee system.

In order to weigh the relative influence of the mayor, other key officials, and the members of the CAC, Dahl reconstructs "all the important decisions on redevelopment and renewal between 1950-58 . . . [to] determine which individuals most often initiated the proposals that were finally adopted or most often successfully vetoed the proposals of the others."²⁷ The results of this test indicate that the mayor and his development administrator were by far the most influential, and that the "muscles" on the Commission, excepting in a few trivial instances, "never directly initiated, opposed, vetoed, or altered any proposal brought before them. . . ."²⁸

This finding is, in our view, unreliable, not so much because Dahl was compelled to make a

in past years, but not actual decisions of the Board of Finance or their effects on the public school system.

²³ *Ibid.*, p. 124.

²⁴ *Ibid.* "A rough test of a person's overt or covert influence," Dahl states in the first section of the book, "is the frequency with which he successfully initiates an important policy over the opposition of others, or vetoes policies initiated by others, or initiates a policy where no opposition appears." (*Ibid.*, p. 66)

²⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 131.

subjective selection of what constituted *important* decisions within what he felt to be an *important* "issue-area," as because the finding was based upon an excessively narrow test of influence. To measure relative influence solely in terms of the ability to initiate and veto proposals is to ignore the possible exercise of influence or power in limiting the scope of initiation. How, that is to say, can a judgment be made as to the relative influence of Mayor Lee and the CAC without knowing (through prior study of the political and social views of all concerned) the proposals that Lee did *not* make because he anticipated that they would provoke strenuous opposition and, perhaps, sanctions on the part of the CAC?⁹

In sum, since he does not recognize *both* faces of power, Dahl is in no position to evaluate the relative influence or power of the initiator and decision-maker, on the one hand, and of those persons, on the other, who may have been indirectly instrumental in preventing potentially dangerous issues from being raised.¹⁰ As a re-

⁹ Dahl is, of course, aware of the "law of anticipated reactions." In the case of the mayor's relationship with the CAC, Dahl notes that Lee was "particularly skillful in estimating what the CAC could be expected to support or reject." (p. 137). However, Dahl was not interested in analyzing or appraising to what extent the CAC limited Lee's freedom of action. Because of his restricted concept of power, Dahl did not consider that the CAC might in this respect have exercised power. That the CAC did not initiate or veto actual proposals by the mayor was to Dahl evidence enough that the CAC was virtually powerless; it might as plausibly be evidence that the CAC was (in itself or in what it represented) so powerful that Lee ventured nothing it would find worth quarreling with.

¹⁰ The fact that the initiator of decisions also refrains—because he anticipates adverse reactions—from initiating other proposals does not obviously lessen the power of the agent who limited his initiative powers. Dahl missed this point: "It is," he writes, "all the more improbable, then, that a secret cabal of Notables dominates the public life of New Haven through means so clandestine that not one of the fifty prominent citizens interviewed in the course of this study—citizens who had participated extensively in various decisions—hinted at the existence of such a cabal. . ." (p. 185).

In conceiving of elite domination exclusively in the form of a conscious cabal exercising the power of decision-making and vetoing, he overlooks a more subtle form of domination; one in which those who actually dominate are not conscious of

sult, he unduly emphasizes the importance of initiating, deciding, and vetoing, and in the process casts the pluralist conclusions of his study into serious doubt.

V

We have contended in this paper that a fresh approach to the study of power is called for, an approach based upon a recognition of the two faces of power. Under this approach the researcher would begin—not, as does the sociologist who asks, "Who rules?" nor as does the pluralist who asks, "Does anyone have power?"—but by investigating the particular "mobilization of bias" in the institution under scrutiny. Then, having analyzed the dominant values, the myths and the established political procedures and rules of the game, he would make a careful inquiry into which persons or groups, if any, gain from the existing bias and which, if any, are handicapped by it. Next, he would investigate the dynamics of nondecision-making; that is, he would examine the extent to which and the manner in which the *status quo* oriented persons and groups influence those community values and those political institutions (as, e.g., the unanimity "rule" of New York City's Board of Estimate¹¹) which tend to limit the scope of actual decision-making to "safe" issues. Finally, using his knowledge of the restrictive face of power as a foundation for analysis and as a standard for distinguishing between "key" and "routine" political decisions, the researcher would, after the manner of the pluralists, analyze participation in decision-making of concrete issues.

We reject in advance as unimpressive the possible criticism that this approach to the study of power is likely to prove fruitless because it goes beyond an investigation of what is objectively measurable. In reacting against the subjective aspects of the sociological model of power, the pluralists have, we believe, made the mistake of discarding "unmeasurable elements" as unreal. It is ironical that, by so doing, they have exposed themselves to the same fundamental criticism they have so forcefully levelled against the elitists: their approach to and assumptions about power predetermine their findings and conclusions.

it themselves, simply because their position of dominance has never seriously been challenged.

¹¹ Sayre and Kaufman, *op. cit.*, p. 640. For perceptive study of the "mobilization of bias" in a rural American community, see Arthur Vidich and Joseph Bensman, *Small Town in Mass Society* (Princeton, 1958).

INFLUENCE

The purpose of this article is to spell out the resulting hypothesis, to produce a method for estimating interaction between legislators, to state the relevance of specific institutional study of legislative behavior. The logical task falls somewhere between group laboratory situation and complex arena of community dynamics. Intense observation, control, and sacrifice in favor of a real and The analysis of a relatively self-cal entity is lost in favor of maintaining the advantages of laboratory universe selected for this study people who must directly or indirectly, rely upon each other to satisfy their official purposes.

I. DISTRIBUTION OF INFLUENCE

Data classified here under "influence" are accumulated from experiments included in a structured design. The items were administered to members of the 1961 Indiana Senate session was in progress. The response "attributed" influence; that is, treated as a reflection of the degree one senator attributes to another. *Influence Data.* The reliability of data is a function of experimental design. The writer judged that the conditions of the experiment were favorable. The subjects were members of a face-to-face knowledge about other members, relatively great, especially in view of that the continuity of membership to session has been high. The results encouraged to make only those decisions which they had information. The total universe of decisions approached the total universe of decisions are drawn. And finally

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