

THE ROLE OF MASS COMMUNICATION IN  
INTER-STATE CONFLICT: THE ARAB-  
ISRAELI WAR OF OCTOBER 6, 1973

BY

OLFAT HASSAN AGHA\*

Conflicts are an inevitable feature of social life and of international relations. Simmel, Coser, and others view conflict as performing various social and individual functions.<sup>1</sup> For example, conflict is seen as an integrative force, at times as preservative in certain situations, and as facilitating the formation of coalitions.<sup>2</sup>

In principle, the sociological significance of conflict has never been disputed. Conflict is admitted to modify or cause unifications, organizations, and interest groups. After all, conflict is one of the most vivid interactions.

Social conflict has been defined in various ways. Boulding defines conflict as a situation of competition in which the parties are aware of the incompatibility of potential future positions and in which each party wishes to occupy a position that is incompatible with the wishes of the other.<sup>3</sup>

For purposes of study, Coser has defined this to mean a struggle over values and claims of scarce status, power and resources in which the aims of the opponents are to neutralize, injure or eliminate their rivals.<sup>4</sup> Coser is concerned mainly with the functions, rather than the dysfunctions, of social conflict.<sup>5</sup>

For Simmel, no group can be entirely harmonious, for it would be devoid of process and structure. Both positive and negative factors build group relations.<sup>6</sup> Cooperation, as well as conflict, has social functions. Far from being dysfunctional, a certain degree of conflict is an essential element in group formation and the persistence of group life.<sup>7</sup>

At least two theoretical frameworks can be identified as alternative ap-

\* The author is a researcher at the Center for Political and Strategic Studies of *Al-Ahram*. This article was based on her M.A. thesis at the American University in Cairo. She wishes to thank Dr. Gehan Rachy, her thesis adviser, Dr. Floyd Shoemaker, and Dr. Oguz B. Nayman for their inspiring guidance and valuable supervision.

1. Georg Simmel, *Conflict* (translated by Kurt H. Wolff, New York: The Free Press, 1955); Lewis A. Coser, *The Functions of Social Conflict* (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1956), p. 8.

2. N. Bhaskara Rao, *Indo-Pak Conflict - Controlled Mass Communication in Inter-State Relations* (Ram Nagar, New Delhi: S. S. Chand and Co., (Rit), Ltd., 1971), p. 6.

3. Kenneth Boulding, *Conflict and Defense. A General Theory* (New York: Harper, 1962), p. 5.

4. Coser, *op. cit.*

5. *Ibid.*

6. Simmel, *op. cit.*, p. 13.

7. Coser, *op. cit.*, p. 31.

proaches to a wide variety of special kinds of conflict phenomena. These are Bernard's approach to the analysis of social conflict, and Rapoport's three models of conflict dynamics.<sup>8</sup>

Bernard distinguished three general frameworks and called them the social psychological, the sociological, the semanticist or 'misunderstandings' approach.<sup>9</sup> These three approaches differ in general assumptions they make about the nature, causes, and resolutions of conflict. Rapoport distinguishes three modes of conflicts according to psychological and behavioral patterns characteristic of each. These are 'fights', 'games', and 'debates'; they are three ideal types representing three different sets of general assumptions about the structure and dynamics of conflict situations.<sup>10</sup>

Wright believes that conflict is a term of broad connotation with applications in the philosophical, biological, physical, and social worlds.<sup>11</sup> Conflict between persons or social groups is the central interest in the study of 'Conflict Resolution'. Wright argues that of all such conflicts, international conflict, often resulting in war is (1) the most dangerous to mankind, (2) the most typical of social conflicts, (3) the most comprehensive of all other forms of conflict, (4) and the most thoroughly examined in the literature dealing with conflict.<sup>12</sup>

It has been predicted by cognitive consistency theories that some self-persuasion will occur under conditions in which a source while communicating with his adversary is persuaded of the soundness of the position he advocates.<sup>13</sup> Also according to cognitive dissonance theories, when a persuader consciously employs counter-attitudinal advocacy to influence the attitudes or behavior of another, the counter-attitudinal advocacy is viewed as an available means of persuasion. If certain conditions exist, there is the possibility that the persuader will persuade himself.<sup>14</sup>

This argument implies that a message from a persuader's side is more likely to be effective if it includes the opposing argument of a given conflict. The presence of such counter-attitudes in one's message is likely to persuade the opponent, and there is also the possibility of self-persuasion. These

8. Anatol Rapoport, *Fights, Games, and Debates* (Ann Arbor Mich.: University of Michigan Press, 1960). A summary of Rapoport's three models of conflict is given in Rao, *op. cit.*, pp. 10-11.

9. A summary of Bernard's characterization of these frameworks is given in Rao, *op. cit.*, p. 8.

10. *Ibid.*, pp. 8-11.

11. Quincy Wright, 'The Value for Conflict Resolution of a General Discipline of International Relations', *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 1, No. 1, p. 3 (1959).

12. *Ibid.*

13. Shel Feldman, *Cognitive Consistency* (New York, 1966), pp. 109-170; Gerald Miller, 'Communication and Persuasion Research: Current Problems and Prospects', *The Quarterly Journal of Speech*, 54 (3), pp. 268-276 (1968).

14. Gerald Miller, 'Saying is Believing: Toward a Rhetoric of Counter-Attitudinal Advocacy', unpublished paper presented at the University of Iowa, 1970, pp. 5-6.

implications seem to be relevant in the context of promoting credibility or mutual trust towards each other in an inter-state conflict situation.

Burton proposes the idea of 'controlled communication' for conflict resolution. His book is a report on the use of a technique by which political and social scientists exercised control of discussions between representatives of states and nations that were involved in conflict. 'Controlled communication' is intended to describe the technique that has some special features particularly suited to the nature of international and inter-state conflict.<sup>15</sup>

Trust and suspicion occupy an important role in various efforts to account for stability and instability of a wide variety of human relationships. In 1958, Deutsch gave one of the earliest systematic formulations of the concepts. However, little progress has been made since then toward a more satisfactory conceptualization of trust and suspicion.<sup>16</sup>

The initiation of co-operation requires 'mutual trust'. Deutsch employs the term 'trust' generally as reference to the situational as well as the personality characteristics that may be involved in the establishment of a socio-psychological relationship of mutual trust.<sup>17</sup> Definitions of trust and suspicion advanced by Deutsch are, in effect, operational definitions and do not constitute definitions of trust and suspicion as concepts. In other words, Deutsch delineates the situations in which trust and suspicion are assumed to occur, and from the behavior observed in these situations, he infers that an individual has made his choice on the basis of trust or suspicion. Unfortunately, the behavior of individuals in the situations delineated by Deutsch is subject to other interpretations.<sup>18</sup>

Loomis was concerned, first, with a description of the conditions which an individual would, on the basis of trust, establish a cooperative relationship with another person, and secondly, with the use of communication in establishing trust. Loomis's work indicates that the subjects who communicated were more likely to perceive trust than noncommunicating subjects. The probability increased as the level of communication increased.<sup>19</sup>

In Kee and Knox's conceptualizations, both trust and suspicion are postulated as having two related components: the observable choice behavior, and a subjective state which underlies the manifest choice behavior. On this basis a conceptual model has been proposed.<sup>20</sup>

Lieberman developed a particular notion of trust based on the notion of

15. John W. Burton, *International Relations: A General Theory* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1965), p. 49.

16. Herbert W. Kee, and Robert E. Knox, 'Conceptual and Methodological Consideration in the Study of Trust and Suspicion', *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 14, p. 358 (1970).

17. Morton Deutsch, 'The Effect of Motivational Orientation Upon Trust and Suspicion', *Human Relations*, 13, p. 123 (1960).

18. Kee and Knox, *op. cit.*, pp. 358-360.

19. James L. Loomis, 'Communication, the Development of Trust and Cooperative Behavior', *Human Relations*, 12, p. 305 (1959).

20. Kee and Knox, *op. cit.*

interest, which is similar to the concept of maximizing gain in game theory. Nations do trust other nations, but this trust is based on a sophisticated notion of self-interest. The concept involves the interests of the persons involved, hence the term 'i-trust'.<sup>21</sup>

Based on the notion of 'trust' as defined by Deutsch the following are essential elements in describing the behavior of a trusting country:

1. A country is relying upon something.
  2. This something relied upon may be an object, an event, or a source of information.
  3. Something is risked by the trusting country.
  4. The trusting country hopes to achieve some goal by taking this risk.
  5. The designed goal is not perceived as certain.<sup>22</sup>
- In the context of interstate relations 'trust' may be described as reliance upon the communication behavior of the people in the decision-making role of another country to achieve a desired but uncertain objective in a risky, or a very tense or crisis situation. Interstate relations imply a kind of strategic interaction which in turn implies taking into account the communication behavior of an adversary, whether such behavior is past, present, or anticipated. Such strategy is built upon the tacit intent of influencing the other party in its decision making.<sup>23</sup>

We can say in the context of the Arab-Israeli conflict that one of the basic conditions for any fruitful approach to the solution of the disagreement is that the facts about any agreement be made public in both countries. It is believed that this would allow a more objective and flexible approach to replace the self-righteous and rigid attitudes of both sides.

The above would be ideal, but the norms of negotiation between states in conflict do not always include such an open strategy. The alternative is a study of public communication.

The purpose upon which this study was based was an assumption that an examination of general principles of conflict from a communication perspective will shed light upon the dynamics of interstate conflicts and, hopefully, will lead to insights which will be useful in easing interstate, as well as international tensions. This study is the implementation of the UNESCO objectives 2.1 in which it is hypothesized that systematic analysis of the mass media of countries engaged in interstate conflict would enable the researcher to assess the degree of trust that the countries display toward each other and some of the constraints that operate under crisis situations.

21. B. Lieberman, '1-Trust: A Notion of Trust in Three Person Games and International Affairs', *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 8, p. 278 (December 1954).

22. Morton Deutsch, 'Trust and Suspicion', *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 12, p. 266 (December 1958).

23. Rao, *op. cit.*

### Method

The present study is a replication of Rao's study *Indo-Pak Conflicts* (1971), applying his hypotheses, methodology and research design but in a different setting, i.e., the Arab-Israeli conflict and the October 6, 1973 War.<sup>24</sup> Rao studied the period of rising tension preceding the India-Pakistan conflict of 1965, then the period of actual war, and finally the period of slowly declining tensions. The period analyzed in his study spanned February 1965 to April 1966.<sup>25</sup> From newspaper editorials he measured the degree that each side manifest suspicion or trust of the other side.

In the research design trust was defined as the degree to which 'opinion' messages reproduce official positions taken by an adversary nation, and the degree to which some or any of the positions taken by an adversary nation are accepted or recognized as having some measure of legitimacy.

The main hypothesis of this study is that if the mass media of the countries engaged in interstate conflicts present a two-sided view, the process might help to establish effective communication and trust between the two. Thus, the presence or absence of the acknowledged positions of the opponent and the extent to which they are granted legitimacy in public communications of a country can be regarded as an indication of trust between the parties. Two sub-hypotheses can be given:

1. The countries involved in a conflict will have more trust toward each other at times of relative normalcy in interstate relations, than in times of increasing tensions and crisis situations.

2. Trust or suspicion, viewed as a continuum, is affected by the nature of the relationship the two countries have toward each other.

This study attempted to analyze how and whether editorials published in the prestige papers of Egypt and Israel, *Al-Ahram* and *The Jerusalem Post* respectively, reflected trust toward each other. The period analyzed in this study spanned September 13, 1973 to January 31, 1974. The study was divided into three main time periods:

1. The pre-war period (tension) from September 13 to October 5, 1973.
2. The war period (crisis) from October 6 to October 29, 1973.
3. The post-war period (a step to final settlement) from October 30 to January 31, 1974.

The assumption made was that a climax period (war period) will be preceded by a period of rising tension, and followed by a period of declining tension.

All the editorials, signed and unsigned, that appeared daily in *Al-Ahram* and *The Jerusalem Post*, dealing with any aspect related to their mutual relations or with any aspect concerning the other country's matters, were included for analysis. An inventory of 40 categories, stating the official

24. *Ibid.*

25. *Ibid.*

position of each country on issues involved in the conflict was prepared. A running inventory of 20 categories stating the hidden interests, intentions, motives advanced by editorialists of one nation as the real reasons behind the adversary's policies on issues involved in the conflict, was kept for each country. Thus, the inventory for each country included both the official positions which reflect the governments' policies and the hidden interests, fears, motives, or intentions on issues involved. The Inventory Code Sheet containing the inventory of Israeli positions (40 official statements and 20 hidden interests categories) was checked against the editorials in *Al-Ahram*. The Inventory Code Sheet containing the inventory of Egyptian positions (40 official statements and 20 hidden interests categories) was checked against editorials in *The Jerusalem Post*.

The inventories were compiled from *Provisional Verbatim Record* of the United Nations Security Council meetings, letters from the Permanent Representatives of Egypt and Israel to the United Nations to the Secretary General, and from publications of the State Information Services of the countries. Also *Al-Ahram* and *The Jerusalem Post* were used as subsidiary sources to fill in any gaps in the inventory items during the period of study.

Examples from the Egyptian Inventory (Official Position):

1. We are not going to permit the state of 'no war no peace' to continue for much longer.
2. The targets of Egyptian official policy are: liberation of our lands, preservation of our territorial integrity, and determination that the usurped rights of the Palestinians will be preserved.

Examples from Egyptian 'Hidden Interests' (intentions, motivations, fears and doubts):

1. Israel will dishonor the cease-fire again and will attempt to occupy additional territories.
  2. If Dr. Kissinger could not force Israel back to the "lines of Oct. 22" when the first cease-fire was supposed to go into effect, than how is he later going to push them back to the lines of 1967?
- Examples from Israeli Inventory (Official Position):
1. The Israeli Security-Theory is indispensable.
  2. The Arabs cannot drink their petrol.
- Examples from Israeli 'Hidden Interests':
1. The Arabs want to throw three million Israelis into the sea.
  2. Cease-fire is dangerous to Israeli security and may lead to more war; it is a catastrophic.

By applying content analysis procedures, the present study was designed to measure quantitatively the relative attention paid by editorials of *Al-Ahram* and *The Jerusalem Post*, to Arab-Israeli relations along six dimensions, three reflecting trust, and three reflecting suspicion intentions. These six dimensions reflect both the frequency of references to an adversary's stated position which was judged to be an indication of

two-sided orientation, and the frequency of occasions when such references were accompanied by either an explicit legitimacy or by explicit rejection.<sup>26</sup>

### Results and Analysis

The results of this study support the main hypothesis that if the mass media of the countries engaged in interstate conflicts present a two-sided view, the process might help to establish effective communication and trust between the two. When the protagonists are willing to publicly acknowledge the opponent's stated positions on given issues in a conflict, this provides a basis for trust which is necessary before the parties can come to terms.

Editorials were utilized as indicators of interaction between Egypt and Israel; they were the "contexts units" from which the inventory items, 'coding units', were isolated. Table 1 shows that in *Al-Ahram*, the total number of editorials that appeared during the period of study was 716. Of these 716 editorials, 483 editorials were related to Arab-Israeli relations and to the conflict in general. In *The Jerusalem Post*, the total number of editorials that appeared was 246. Of these 246 editorials, 197 editorials were related to the conflict.

The editorials related to the conflict during the war period increased. Out of the 121 editorials published in *Al-Ahram* during the war period (Oct. 5-29), 117 editorials were related to the conflict. This represents 96.8% of the total number of editorials. Out of 60 editorials published in *The Jerusalem Post*,

Table 1. Frequencies of Total Editorials, Editorials Related to Conflict, and Percentage of Editorials Related to Conflict on a Period Basis.

Interval	AL-AHRAM			THE JERUSALEM POST		
	Freq. of Total Editorials	Freq. of Eds. Rel. to Conf.	Per cent- age	Freq. of Total Editorials	Freq. of Eds. Rel. to Conf.	Per cent- age
Pre-War	121	34	28%	14	4	28.6%
War	121	117	96.8%	60	40	66.7%
Post-War	474	332	68%	172	153	88.7%
Total	716	483		246	197	

26. Due to the researcher's lack of knowledge of Hebrew, the national Israeli language, *The Jerusalem Post* was selected for analysis because it is published in English and fits the requirements of a prestige paper. This is considered one of the limitations of the present study. Another limitation is that *The Jerusalem Post's* editions of the pre-war period (except for the first four days of October) were not available in Egypt. Even during the war and post-war periods, a few of *The Jerusalem Post's* editions were missing. The missing issues are: September: 13-30, October: 5, 11, 18, 25, November: 12, 20, 22, and December: 7, 13, 14, 19.

40 editorials or 66.7% of the total were related to the conflict. This increase in the frequency of editorials during the war period indicates that the number of editorials on Arab-Israeli relations appearing in the two newspapers co-varied as the tension between the countries rose and fell. Since the tactical situation of the armed forces on both sides of the Suez Canal required intentional crossing of this water passage to encounter the enemy, secrecy concerning the Egyptian attack was indispensable. As a result, the period of rising tension was very short. Consequently, it lasted only a few days before the war when the military preparations could no longer be concealed.

The third period began to show de-escalation of tension, characterized by frequent variations due to events such as the Arab Summit (Nov. 26, 1973), the deadlocked negotiations at 'Kilo 101' (escalation), Kissinger's second mission, and the Geneva Conference (de-escalation). A considerable, and observable de-escalation of tension was evident when the disengagement agreement was ready for approval by both sides.

During the pre-war period in both newspapers, the percentage of editorials related to the conflict was about 28% and increased during the war period up to 96.8% in *Al-Ahram* and to 66.7% in *The Jerusalem Post*. In the post-war period, the percentages dropped to 68% in *Al-Ahram*, but raised to 88.7% in *The Jerusalem Post*. This abnormal increase in the percentage of the editorials related to conflict in *The Jerusalem Post* can be attributed to the Israeli interest in a political settlement especially after the failure of the Israeli Security Theory in the October War. Israelis in the post-war period were more interested in writing about the possibility of a political settlement than writing about their military achievements in the war.


Table II shows that in *Al-Ahram*, in the pre-war period, the mean daily frequency of editorials related to conflict was 1.42 editorial per day; in the war period it was 5.09 editorial per day; and in the post-war period it was 3.44 editorial per day. In *The Jerusalem Post* the mean daily frequency of

Table II. Frequencies of Editorials Related to Conflict, in *Al-Ahram* and *The Jerusalem Post*, and their Mean Daily Frequencies on a Period Basis.

Interval	AL-AHRAM		THE JERUSALEM POST	
	Editorials Related to Conflict	Mean Daily Frequency	Editorials Related to Conflict	Mean Daily Frequency
Pre-War	34	1.42	4	0.8
War	117	5.09	40	1.74
Post-War	332	3.44	153	1.63
Total	483		197	

editorials related to conflict was 0.8 in the pre-war period (from 1-5 October), 1.74 in the war period, and 1.63 in the post-war period.

A new parameter can be deduced to measure the rate of escalation and de-escalation. This parameter is the increasing numbers of editorials daily during escalation and the decreasing frequency of editorials during de-escalation. The rate of increase is higher than the rate of decrease. This is common in interstate conflicts, especially in this case where the armed conflict was a surprise. However, these rates, as shown in Graph 1, reflect the increase in the number of editorials during escalation and the decrease in the number of editorials during de-escalation.



The escalation - de-escalation Graph I is asymmetrical, while in the Indo-Pak conflict this diagram was more or less symmetrical in both newspapers analyzed since the war was decisive and a clear settlement was implemented.<sup>27</sup> The shape of Graph I is due to the fact that no final settlement has been achieved in the conflict. The three phases of the conflict are observed to be coinciding with their correspondent periods, i.e., escalation during

27. Rao, *op. cit.*, pp. 99-100.

the pre-war period, climax during the war period, and de-escalation during the post-war period.

Minor political events, in the tension (pre-war period) and the settlement (post-war period) periods, had considerable influence on editorials mentioning the adversary's position, e.g., the Shoenu Camp Affair in September during the pre-war period, or Kissinger's missions during the settlement period.<sup>28</sup> On the other hand, during the war period, only major political events had an effect on the editorials, e.g., the oil embargo.

As shown in Graph I, in both curves representing *Al-Ahram* and *The Jerusalem Post*, the rate of increase of the mean daily frequency of editorials during escalation sharply increases until it reaches a point of inflection near the date of the beginning of war, after which the rate of increase decreases gradually at the climax. This coincides with two major events of the war period: the Arab oil embargo, and the crossing of Israeli forces to the West Bank of the Canal. Following this, the mean frequency decreases at an increasing rate until it reaches a second point of inflexion near the cease-fire date after which the rate gradually decreases to the end of the post-war period. However, the curve never reaches its original value. This indicates that complete de-escalation of tension, i.e., return to normalcy was not achieved.

In both papers, the climax took place approximately at the same time. However, it is noticed that the characterizing points of *The Jerusalem Post's* curve is somewhat later than those of *Al-Ahram's* curve. The curve of *The Jerusalem Post* has much lower values than those of *Al-Ahram's* and its de-escalation is very slow.

During the war period there was an increase of events due to military actions and interference by the super powers and the Arab states. All these factors had a corresponding influence on the plotted parameters. The major events had an influence on the corresponding parameters. Nevertheless, the response had its own reaction time or 'Delay Period' which can be defined as the time elapsed before the majority of editorials dealing with a certain event were published. The prolongation of this period depended upon several factors:

1. The importance of the event and its relationship to the conflict.
  2. The degree of clarity of the consequences of the event.
  3. The possibility of prediction of further consequences.
  4. The freedom of the editors to comment upon the event.
- From the data of this study, it is evident that reactions to some events had a delayed reaction time, i.e., the 'Delay Period'. For example, in the outbreak of war on October 6, there was a one-day delay in editorial reaction.

28. The Shoenu Camp Affair concerned the announcement by the Austrian government on September 29, 1973, that it would no longer allow group transit of Soviet Jews emigrants through Austria, and would close Israeli-run facilities that housed emigrants awaiting transfer to Israel.

The majority of editorials on the war appeared on October 8. On the other hand, there was no delay for the oil embargo of October 17. On October 18, two articles appeared in *Al-Ahram* on the Petrol Conference in Kuwait. This happened because there was a high degree of predictability of the consequences of this event.

In *Al-Ahram*, the trust and suspicion frequencies were low in the pre-war period, due to the surprise of the attack. Only in the fifth week and just after the beginning of war, did the trust frequencies suddenly increase and continue to increase during the war period. This indicated the self-confidence resulting from the military achievements of Egypt, i.e., the crossing of the Suez Canal, and the dismantling of the Barlev Line, and the oil embargo.

Also suspicion increased during the war, but it was at a low level. Furthermore, the trust frequencies dropped after the cease-fire because of the indefinite military situation (the Israeli pocket in the West Bank). The trust frequencies continued to drop, in spite of Kissinger's first mission, until it reached its low level when the 'Kilo 101' talks deadlocked. During Kissinger's second mission, the trust frequencies increased but fluctuated with the mediator's negotiation with both sides.

In *The Jerusalem Post* during the pre-war period (only five daily issues were available), the trust frequencies were low because of the number of editorials on the conflict. The reason for this was the Egyptian concealment of the attack. In the war-period, the trust frequencies increased but at a lower rate than *Al-Ahram's*, due to the air lift, the Israeli crossing to the West Bank of the Canal, and the nuclear confrontation, between the U.S.A. and the USSR, which seemed to be in the Israeli favor. It is clear that after the breach to the West Bank trust reached a maximum. Also after the exchange of war prisoners, which was fundamental to Israel, the trust frequencies increased sharply. During the remainder of the post-war period, there were natural fluctuations depending upon the expectations of success or failure of Kissinger's negotiations. Table III depicts the total trust and suspicion frequencies in *Al-Ahram* and *The Jerusalem Post* on monthly and period bases.

The suspicion frequencies, in the pre-war period, were low in both newspapers because they dealt with the conflict only occasionally. During the war period, the suspicion frequencies in *Al-Ahram* fluctuated depending upon military and political events. During the post-war period, there was an increase in suspicion frequencies in December, after the deadlock of 'Kilo 101' talks. Suspicion frequencies sharply dropped in January as a result of the success of Kissinger's second mission, i.e., the disengagement between the opposing armies.

For *The Jerusalem Post*, weekly suspicion frequencies were lower during the war period than *Al-Ahram* due to the small number of editorials related to the conflict. However, it suddenly appeared at the break of war. Also, the suspicion frequencies during the post-war period fluctuated the whole per-

Table III. Total Trust and Suspicion Frequencies in *Al-Ahram* and *The Jerusalem Post* on Monthly and Period Bases.

Interval	AL-AHRAM			THE JERUSALEM POST		
	Total Trust Frequencies	Total Suspicion Frequencies	Total Trust Frequencies	Total Suspicion Frequencies	Total Trust Frequencies	Total Suspicion Frequencies
Monthly Basis	4	0	—	39	10	—
Sept.	101	34	—	65	16	—
Oct.	90	20	—	24	6	—
Nov.	59	25	—	16	0	—
Dec.	30	8	—	—	—	—
Jan.	—	—	—	—	—	—
Total	284	87	114	32	—	—
Period Basis	7	0	1	0	—	—
Pre-War	93	27	34	10	—	—
War	184	60	109	22	—	—
Post-War	—	—	—	—	—	—
Total	284	87	144	32	—	—

iod. They dropped continuously and gradually to zero value after the Geneva Conference and the disengagement of forces in January.

From the data on the frequency of trust-suspicion orientations in the editorials of Egyptian and Israeli newspapers, the pattern of differences between trust and suspicion orientations might be considered as the degree of trustfulness the countries have toward each other. These relationships can be expressed in terms of a ratio between the two orientations. Brown<sup>29</sup> proposed the following formula to obtain a ratio of trust between two countries at a given time period:

$$\text{Trust-suspicion ratio} = \frac{F_1 + F_2 + F_3}{F_3 + F_4 + F_6}$$

The F's in the formula denote frequencies; the subscripts correspond to the numbered dimensions of inventory items on the basis of which editorials of *Al-Ahram* and *The Jerusalem Post* were coded.<sup>30</sup>

<sup>29</sup> Dennis Brown, 'Trust in International Relations. A Mass Media Perspective', *Journalism Quarterly*, 46, p.777 (1969).

<sup>30</sup> These six frequencies are:

F1 : Frequency of instances in which items in the inventory of country A's official position appear in the editorial matter produced from country B.  
F2 : Frequency of instances in which any of these items are granted some explicit measure of legitimacy.  
F3 : Frequency of instances in which any of these items are explicitly rejected.

Table IV. Comparison of Trust-Suspicion Ratio in Arab-Israeli Relations on a Period Basis.

Periods	<i>Al-Ahram</i>	<i>The Jerusalem Post</i>
Pre-War	2.5	—
War	2	1.59
Post-War	2.16	2.96

Table IV shows that the ratio, during the war period was higher for *Al-Ahram* as a result of the confidence gained in Arab military achievements. In the post-war period, the trust-suspicion ratio was higher in *The Jerusalem Post* as a result of the relatively limited concessions made by Israel during the disengagement agreement (limited concessions compared to the destruction of the Israeli Security Theory just after the war). Also, the exchange of the war prisoners had its particular encouraging effect upon the Israelis.

The findings of this study support Rao's hypotheses that communications are more likely to be one-sided, rigid, and narrowly oriented toward both sides of the issues involved at times of crisis. At times of relatively less tension, when communications on subjects of mutual concern are more likely to be accompanied by both sides of the positions involved, trust levels seem to be higher than in periods of escalation and crisis, as has been in post-war periods.

#### Conclusions

The results of the content analysis of editorials in Egypt's *Al-Ahram* and Israel's *The Jerusalem Post* showed that:

As tension increased (crisis and war period), the trust-suspicion ratio decreased. In *Al-Ahram*, the trust-suspicion ratio decreased from 2.5 in the pre-war period to 2 in the war period and increased to 2.16 in the post-war period. In *The Jerusalem Post*, the ratio was 1.59 in the war period and increased in the post-war period to 2.96.

As the tensions declined, either because of a cease-fire agreement or because of any other reaction or event, countries engaged in interstate conflicts exhibited more trust for their opponent than they did at the height of conflicts or during times of increasing tensions. In October, the month of the

F4 : Frequency of instances in which 'hidden' reasons, interests, motivations are advanced by editorials of country A as the 'real' basis for the behavior and stance of country B.

F5 : Frequency of instances in which any of the above items are granted some explicit measure of legitimacy.

F6 : Frequency of instances in which any of the above items are explicitly rejected.

war, the trust frequencies in *The Jerusalem Post* were 39. In November, a month after the war and after the cease-fire agreement, the trust frequencies increased to 65.

Frequency of references to suspicion indices in both newspapers varied from one period to another. As conflict intensified, the frequency of such suspicion references increased. Suspicion frequencies, in *Al-Ahram*, were 34 in October and dropped to 20 in November. In December they were 25 and dropped to 8 in January after the agreement on the disengagement of forces.

The points mentioned above support the hypothesis that the countries involved in a conflict will have more trust toward each other at times of relative normalcy in interstate relations, than in times of increasing tensions or crisis situations. The aspect of trust-suspicion between Egypt and Israel, as indicated by the orientation of editorials in both newspapers analyzed, clearly reflected the relationships between the two countries during the period analyzed. Examples of relationships between the two countries are:

1. The exchange of war prisoners increased trust frequencies in *The Jerusalem Post* from 6 in the tenth week to 20 in the eleventh week.
2. The deadlock of "Kilo 101" talks increased suspicion in *Al-Ahram* from 12 in both the eleventh and twelfth weeks to 15 and 18 in the fourteenth and fifteenth weeks respectively.
3. The disengagement of forces increased trust from 3 in the nineteenth week up to 9 in the twentieth week in *Al-Ahram* and from zero to 7 during the same weeks in *The Jerusalem Post*.

These examples support the hypothesis that trust or suspicion, viewed as a continuum, is affected by the nature of the relationship the two countries have toward each other.

Trust-suspicion ratios supported the assumption that the editorials from the countries engaged in an interstate conflict visibly reflect the trends in their relations. From such indices it should be possible to construct an "early warning system" of an oncoming showdown between the countries involved, and that at times of crisis, communications are more likely to be one-sided, rigid, and narrowly oriented towards both sides of the issues involved.

The early warning system is proposed here to be determined as follows: when the rate of escalation begins to have its maximum value, the oncoming showdown (the outbreak of war in this study) is expected. In *Al-Ahram*, the maximum rate of escalation is seen in Graph 1, i.e., Line AA when the rate of increase of editorials during escalation is 0.14 editorial per day every day. In *The Jerusalem Post*, the maximum rate of escalation is seen in Line BB when the rate of increase of editorials during escalation is 0.06 editorial per day every day. Line BB is considerably later than Line AA of *Al-Ahram* since the Egyptians were the ones who began the attack. Line AA of *Al-Ahram* lies two or three days before the war broke. This could have been an early warning system to the Israelis.

This study supports the basic hypothesis that two-sided orientations in communication reflected trust between two adversaries compared with those communications which were not accompanied by such broad orientations.

In this study, only frequency and content of editorials are taken into account in judging the concomitants of trust. In my opinion, there is yet another important aspect which should also be taken into consideration, i.e., the opinions and reactions of people close to decision-making toward the editorials and toward the adversary on the issues areas used in the inventories. People in diplomatic courts, students, or journalists could be polled to ascertain the validity of using given items in inventories, as well as to ascertain their perceptions of those items.

When all these researches are undertaken, then valid conclusions can be drawn and guidelines for useful implementations can be developed.